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ABSTRACT 
The thesis analyses how, if at all, accession to international standards makes a 
difference to national minorities in Russia in the advancement of their cultural 
rights, focusing on the period 2000-2011. It further analyses the factors that 
influence particular forms of implementation of international standards. The study 
uses data from semi-structured interviews, as well as from legislation, legal 
judgements and Council of Europe documents. It focuses on three minorities as 
case studies: the Karelians, Mordovians and Tatars.  
The research is divided into three parts: 1) Practice and Law, investigating 
how the specific characteristics of the Russian domestic legal environment and of 
the relevant international standards generate a particular type of dynamics between 
the two; 2) Homogenisation, examining whether international standards can 
suspend or reverse Russia’s culturally homogenising tendencies since the 2000s; 3) 
Exclusion, investigating to what extent, if at all, international standards may modify 
the dynamics of majority-minority relations by facilitating the introduction of a 
form of participation that is effective, in the area of decision- and policy-making on 
minorities’ cultural rights. The thesis concludes that the role of international 
standards in the area of minorities’ cultural rights is restricted in scope in Russia. 
Two sets of reasons are identified. First, specific features of Russian politics and 
society: (i) Russia’s selective implementation of international law; (ii) the 
alternation of localism and centralism; (iii) Russia’s homogenising centralisation 
and ‘managed diversity’; (iv) the absence of guarantees for the upholding of 
minorities’ participatory rights, resulting in fictitious forms of participation. The 
second set of reasons relate to the complexities and weaknesses of international 
standards on minority rights themselves. 
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Russia cannot afford to ignore its 
nationalities
1
  
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Russia is both diverse and homogeneous. While it counts over 170 national 
minorities2 - from Koreans to Finns, from Tatars to Armenians - people who 
describe themselves as ‘Russians’3 are the clear majority of the population 
(79.8%).4 And while in 2010 there were over 16 million Muslims5 in Russia, in 
addition to people affiliated to numerous other faiths, Russians tend to identify with 
the Russian Orthodox faith. The Russian language is spoken by nearly the entire 
population (98.2%). Hence, there is a multiplicity of ethnicities sharing the country 
with ethnic Russians - with a corresponding plurality of cultures, traditions and 
languages - but combined they occupy only a relatively small space in the cultural 
life of the Russian Federation; meanwhile, the Russian language and culture are 
dominant in the media and public life.  
The ‘national question’6 is not new to Russia. In the pluri-ethnic Russian 
Empire and Soviet Union, the central authorities were acutely aware of the need to 
                                                 
1
 Interview with a high-ranking public official working on nationality issues in Saint Petersburg 
[4.18]. See list of respondents in Appendix 1. 
2
 In its First Report to the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities, Russia stated that ‘The Russian Federation is one of the largest multinational 
states in the world inhabited by more than 170 peoples’. ACFC, (First) Report submitted by Russia, 
8 March 2000, ACFC/SR(1999) 015, p. 4.  
3
 Those who declare themselves ‘Russians’ in the census. 
4
 Followed by 3.8% Tatars, 2% Ukrainians, 1.2% Bashkirs, 1.1% Chuvashes, 0.9% Chechens and 
0.8% Armenians; other, much smaller, minorities make up 10.2% of the population. The data are 
from the 2002 census. At the time of writing, the results of the 2010 census were still not available. 
5
 According to the Pew Forum, ‘Russia has the largest Muslim population in absolute numbers in all 
of Europe.’ Muslims in Russia were projected to increase from approximately 16.4 million (2010) to 
18.6 million (2030), and their share of the population from 11.7% (2010) to 14.4% (2030).  
http://pewforum.org/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-russia.aspx (accessed 2-5-2011).  
6
 By ‘national question’ is meant the complexities of the interaction of the majority with a plethora 
of minority groups. In Russian the expressions natsional’nyi vopros (national question) and 
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develop policies to accommodate national minorities as a means to secure stability. 
Although some forms of Russification have periodically been imposed in Russia’s 
history (Hosking 1998: 397), in most instances Russia has not adopted 
assimilationist policies. Nor has it failed to recognise its minorities.  
In Russia the dynamics of majority-minority relations have altered as, with 
the development of international law, they have come to be seen as part of a 
broader context. These formerly internal concerns have become internationalised, 
and international standards for minority protection, together with the inter-
governmental organisations (IGOs) behind them, have become new actors in the 
management of these relations. In particular, the Soviet Union in 1969 ratified the 
United Nations’ (UN) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination
7
 and in 1973 the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights
8
 - generating international responsibility inherited by Russia as its 
successor state. In 1996, the Russian Federation became a member of the Council 
of Europe and acceded to its treaties: the Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities
9
 and the European Convention on Human Rights,
10
 both 
ratified in 1998. Upon accession to the Council of Europe, Russia also made a 
commitment to become a state party to the European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages
11
 - although in 2011 it still had to ratify, after signing in 2001.  
This thesis analyses how international standards on the protection of 
national minorities with regard to their cultural rights are applied in Russia, 
                                                                                                                                        
natsional’naya politika (nationalities policy) are used. The term national’nost’, or ‘nationality’, has 
the same meaning as ‘ethnicity’.  
7
 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 
195, adopted 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969. 
8
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976.   
9
 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ETS No. 157, adopted 1 
February 1995, entered in force 1 February 1998. 
10
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No. 005, 4 
November 1950, entered into force 3 November 1953. 
11
 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, ETS No. 148, adopted 5 November 1992, 
entered into force 1 March 1998. 
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focusing on the period 2000-2011. The thesis examines the trajectory from the 
macro level (the Strasbourg institutions and its treaties) to the micro level (one of 
the member states) with regard to the transposition of cultural rights of national 
minorities to the domestic context. In order to capture the specificities of the 
Russian situation and highlight existing (micro)dynamics that can impact on the 
implementation of international standards, the analysis considers three case studies. 
The research question is: how, if at all, does accession to international standards 
make a difference to national minorities in Russia in the advancement of their 
cultural rights? This prompts a further question: what factors determine a particular 
role for international standards? I specifically use the expression ‘cultural rights’ to 
designate a set of rights that enables persons belonging to minorities to preserve 
their cultural distinctiveness and identity. This particular usage of the expression is 
discussed below.
12
  
The study uses data from semi-structured interviews, as well as from 
legislation, legal judgements and documents submitted to or originating from the 
Council of Europe. It focuses on three minorities as case studies: the Karelians, 
Mordovians and Tatars. In the study I do not approach Russia as an unusual, wholly 
sui generis case differing from the norm. I also refrain from making judgements as 
to whether Russia is ‘normal’ (Shleifer 2004: 76), as the significance of ‘normalcy’ 
is inevitably subjective. I acknowledge that Russia faces many of the challenges 
common to other countries that have subscribed to international minority rights 
instruments and mechanisms. At the same time one has to take into account the 
interplay of factors that influence both political processes and their outcomes: 
Russia’s unique ethnic composition, the legacy of its imperial and Soviet past, and 
the characteristics of the Putin-Medvedev leadership and associated regime. 
                                                 
12
 Section 1.2. 
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1.1 The Thesis: Structure and Purpose   
 
Structure of the Thesis 
The research question, addressing whether international standards make a 
difference to Russia’s national minorities in advancing their cultural rights, 
generates a series of sub-questions that are addressed in the thesis’ various chapters. 
In the first part of the thesis - after outlining notions and definitions (Section 1.2) - I 
introduce the methodology (1.3). Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework on 
legal transplantation, as well as Russia’s historical background in the management 
of diversity. It identifies features of Russia’s approach to diversity that are at odds 
with international standards for minority protection - without however implying 
their a priori exclusion from the Russian sphere. The remainder of the thesis is 
divided into three parts:  
 
Part 1: Practice and Law. Part 1 (Chapter 3 and 4) investigates how the 
specific characteristics of the Russian domestic legal environment and of the 
relevant international standards generate a particular type of dynamics 
between the two. Chapter 3 shows that there is a selective and flexible 
implementation of international law in Russia, rather than its being 
grounded on domestic legal guarantees. In the specific case of international 
minority rights law (as distinguished from other human rights), the elasticity 
of its application by Russia is facilitated by the international mechanisms’ 
own flexibility. Chapter 4 elaborates on the theme of the selectivity of 
international standards’ implementation, this time with a focus on the 
judiciary. As in Chapter 3, the data reveal a form of selective 
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implementation that reduces the potential role of international standards - 
due to the absence of guarantees that the said standards will be applied 
consistently and uniformly by judges. It points to a practice that can weigh 
more significantly than the law.  
 
Part 2: Homogenisation. Part 2 (Chapters 5 and 6) examines whether 
international standards can suspend or reverse what I describe as Russia’s 
culturally homogenising tendencies since the 2000s.
13
 Chapter 5 outlines: 
Russia’s promotion of a civic Russian identity (which I refer to as the ‘new 
Russian Citizen’); and the re-structuring of the Russian Federation to reduce 
the salience of ethnicity, which ultimately also acts as a homogenising 
factor. Chapter 6 analyses the standardisation of minority education through 
legal reform since 2007, coupled with the absence of coherent educational 
policies supporting minority languages and cultures. It further shows that 
the media as ‘educator’ acts to propagate a patriotic, rather than inter-
cultural, approach to Russian citizenship. The resulting scenario is one 
where cultural distinctiveness tends to be progressively diluted. This section 
concludes that even a rigorous application of international standards in 2011 
would be ill-equipped to withstand these homogenising dynamics. 
 
Part 3: Exclusion. Part 3 (Chapters 7, 8 and 9) investigates to what extent, 
if at all, international standards may modify the dynamics of majority-
minority relations by facilitating the introduction of a form of participation 
that is effective, in the area of decision- and policy-making on minorities’ 
cultural rights. Chapter 7 focuses on consultation and cooperation between 
                                                 
13
 The scope of ‘cultural rights’ analysed in this thesis is discussed below (Section 1.2). 
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the authorities and civil society (primarily minority organisations); Chapter 
8 on the consultative mechanism championed by the Russian authorities - 
National Cultural Autonomy (NCA); Chapter 9 on the remaining forms of 
participation: in elected bodies, and in other (non-NCA) mechanisms of 
consultation. Combined, the three chapters show that the concerns of 
minority groups do not tend to impact, or even inform, policy-making that 
affects minorities’ cultural rights. In turn, international mechanisms have 
not empowered minority groups to effectively engage with the Russian 
authorities. 
 
The conclusion that the role of international standards in the area of minorities’ 
cultural rights is insubstantial and restricted in scope calls for a clarification: what 
are the principal reasons behind this finding? It is argued that these are:  
 
(a) The domestic situation. Features of Russian politics and society: (i) 
Russia’s selective implementation of international law; (ii) the 
alternation of localism and centralism; (iii) Russia’s homogenising 
centralisation and ‘managed diversity’, stemming from a (largely 
Soviet) essentialist, and culture-focused, approach to nationality issues; 
(iv) the absence of guarantees for the upholding of minorities’ 
participatory rights, resulting in fictitious forms of participation.
14
 
(b) International law itself.  The complexities and weaknesses of minority 
rights law.
15
 
 
                                                 
14
 These concepts are clarified in later chapters. 
15
 One can hypothesise on a third set of reasons, linked to globalisation processes, with prevailing 
socio-economic and cultural developments inimical to the preservation of minority cultures. This 
problématique, however, is outside the scope of the thesis. 
 17 
Despite the rather pessimistic findings on the international standards’ limited role in 
Russia, I argue against the view that these standards are incompatible with the 
Russian socio-political system, or that the Russian authorities are oblivious to 
international scrutiny and unconcerned with international legal standards. A full, 
rather than selective, implementation of international human rights law is very 
much dependent on (changing) political circumstances. For minority rights 
themselves, as distinguished from other human rights, the challenges are 
considerable - due to a combination of the Russian domestic situation and 
international law itself - but may also vary as circumstances alter. 
 
Purpose of the Research and Originality 
On 31 May 2011 Valerii Tishkov, an influential actor in the area of nationalities 
policy who served as Minister of Nationalities under former President Yeltsin, 
wrote in Russkii Zhurnal: 
 
If the 20th century was the century of minorities, the 21st century will be 
the century of the majority in the sense of recognising its interests, demands 
and rights [...].  Minorities today have international protection, they know 
how to self-organise, to promote themselves and make demands before 
Strasbourg judges.
16
  
 
Effectively, Tishkov argues, minorities have been empowered: they are in a 
position akin to that of the majority, in terms of power and access to resources, 
‘either at the level of the state, or at the level of other regions within countries’. Far 
from being hapless victims, minorities can abuse their powers, and even ‘organise a 
genocide or terror against the majority’.17  
                                                 
16
 Tishkov, V. 31-5-2011. ‘XXI Vek Priznaet Prava Bol’shinstva’ (‘The 21st Century Recognises 
the Rights of the Majority’), Russkii Zhurnal (‘Russian Journal’). 
17
 Ibid. 
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Tishkov’s statements followed much publicised statements on 
multiculturalism by the leaders of three Western European countries: Germany’s 
Angela Merkel, the UK’s David Cameron and France’s Nicolas Sarkozy. These 
pronouncements fuelled debate within and beyond the three countries - each with 
substantial Muslim (and other) minorities. Merkel stated in October 2010:  
 
The approach [to build] a multicultural [society] and to live side-by-side and 
to enjoy each other [...] has failed, utterly failed.18 
 
Defeat was also said to be the end-result in in Britain: 
 
Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different 
cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the 
mainstream. We’ve failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel 
they want to belong.
19
  
 
What, then, is the solution? Integration. In Germany, Merkel argued, immigrants 
should make a much greater effort in their new society, including by learning the 
language of their host country. In the UK, British Muslims should integrate into 
British society in a way which would guard against any gravitation toward Islamic 
extremism.    
France’s President Sarkozy did not limit himself to rhetoric. During 2011, a 
new law was introduced banning the wearing of the Islamic full-face veil (niqab) in 
public places.
20
 Sarkozy said:  
 
If you come to France, you accept to melt into a single community, which is 
the national community, and if you do not want to accept that, you cannot 
be welcome.
21
  
                                                 
18
 Cited in BBC, 17-10-2010. ‘Merkel Says German Multicultural Society has Failed’. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451 (accessed 3-10-2011). 
19
 Cited in BBC, 5-2-2011. ‘State Multiculturalism Has Failed, Says David Cameron’.  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994 (accessed 3-10-2011). 
20
 The law came into force on 11 April 2011.  
21
 Cited in Agence France Press, 10-2-2001. ‘Multiculturalism has Failed, Says French President’. 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jR1m5BpdMrDES3u4Cso1v3FwQRUg?do
cId=CNG.6b096ac0cdcfce7a0f599fbbb1c85c27.911 (accessed 13-10-2011). 
 19 
 
Even the Council of Europe Secretary General Thorbjørn Jagland argued that forms 
of multiculturalism that lead to the formation of ‘parallel societies’ within states, 
and generating ‘radical ideas’, have to come to an end, in the interests of containing 
terrorism.
22
 
These statements speak of a struggle to find working solutions that would 
allow for the coexistence of different cultures and ethnicities in the same country. 
With the threat of terrorism often invoked, the notion is that a mini-clash of 
civilisations in one’s own backyard needs to be avoided. In the UK, there was 
considerable shock at the discovery that the perpetrators of the 7 July 2005 
bombings in London were British nationals who had been born and raised in Britain 
but had chosen to give their allegiance to overseas Islamic groups rather than ‘their 
own’ government. In Russia, the Chechen conflicts and Islamic fundamentalism 
have presented numerous challenges - and, as an integral part of the Russian 
Federation, the North Caucasus can easily be seen as incubating the ‘enemy 
within’. Two of the Russian public officials interviewed (in St Petersburg and 
Saransk) argued that multiculturalism might not be the best course of action to level 
internal differences; Russia, they suggested, was perhaps already displaying too 
much tolerance to difference [4.11; 4.18]. These respondents, whose interviews 
followed Merkel’s public critique of multiculturalism, referred to her statements as 
to the supposed failure of this approach. Similarly, Tishkov, in the aforementioned 
article, argues that the complexities of potential cultural and religious clashes have 
led to ‘panic’ in Russia, which results in the feeling that ‘multiculturalism is to 
blame, that it was a mistake’, echoing Merkel. 
                                                 
22
 In an interview with Financial Times. Hollinger, P. 16-2-2011. ‘Council of Europe Warns on 
Multiculturalism’, Financial Times. 
 20 
Ethnic issues have a particular salience in contemporary Russia. Whether at 
the centre of the Tsarist Empire, as a component part of the Soviet Union or as 
Russian Federation, Russia has had a long history of ethnic diversity. The 
dissolution of the Soviet Union revealed a society in which Russian national 
identity had been truncated, and where non-Russian nationalities had been affirmed 
but also controlled.
23
 The legacies of Soviet and pre-Soviet policies are still present 
in the 21
st
 century - visible in the continuation of such policies or in the 
repercussions that may ensue when breaking with them. At the same time, the 
forces of globalisation in today’s world have been, in Hammarberg’s view, 
generating a new quest for identity (2009) - a desire for self-definition resulting 
from the dislocation and homogenising tendencies created by modernity.
24
  
Global ethnic and religious tensions are likely to grow given the fast pace of 
transnational migration.
25
 The controversial speeches of Western European leaders 
do not, however, alter the fact that a considerable number of international 
instruments and documents for the protection of minorities exist - under the 
auspices of the UN, Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Through these instruments, the fate of minorities 
has become internationalised - a matter of international, rather than strictly internal, 
concern - and in some cases a matter of international jurisdiction (Pentassuglia 
2009). Considerable financial and human resources have been invested in the 
establishment of a minority rights system, which is now an integral part of the 
international human rights framework. Has participation in this system enabled 
Russia to untangle some of the complexities linked to its diversity? 
                                                 
23
 See Section 2.3. 
24
 As Hammarberg puts it: ‘More and more people appear to feel the need to define their own 
identity in a world which is changing so rapidly’ (2009). See also Hylland Eriksen (1999). 
25
 Russia has substantial numbers of guest workers from Central Asia and the South Caucasus. See, 
for example, ‘Central Asia: Russia Grapples for Labour-Migrant Dilemma’, EurasiaNet.org. 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav030510.shtml (accessed 1-3-2011). 
 21 
This thesis seeks to answer this question. Within the general area of cultural 
rights, I focus on minority education as a key factor in the preservation and 
development of minority cultures; and on national minorities’ right to participation 
in decision-making and in the formulation of policies on minority cultures. Russia 
was chosen over other multi-ethnic countries as a highly complex case study, given 
its enormous size and the multitude of ethnicities present on its territory, and as a 
significant player in the international arena, whose potential inter-ethnic conflicts 
might create instability well outside its borders.26 Russia can play a destabilising 
effect in the region; in turn, tensions in the ‘near abroad’ - former Union Republics 
of the USSR - are reflected internally in Russia. Indeed, the ethnic groups that have 
been affected by conflicts since the Soviet Union’s collapse have fellow nationals 
in Russia (i.e. Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Abkhaz, Ossetians and 
Moldovans). Internal and external tensions can be mutually reinforcing. 
The originality of this thesis lies in its multidisciplinary approach, with the 
pulling together of different threads to answer the research questions. There is a 
wealth of literature on protection of minorities, and on the promotion of their 
cultural rights from a legal standpoint, analysing the ever-evolving nature of 
international minority rights law.
27
 There is an abundance of analysis by renowned 
authors on multiculturalism, nationalism and identity.
28
 There is also copious 
                                                 
26
 Ethnically-motivated conflict has occurred in the post-Soviet period, namely the Chechen wars, 
and the spill-over of violence from Chechnya to other North Caucasus republics. The European 
Court of Human Rights has acknowledged Russia’s involvement in the preservation of the de facto 
separation of Transdniestria from the rest of Moldova (in the judgement Ilaşcu and Others v. 
Moldova and Russia, Application No. 48787/99, 8 July 2004. See also Section 3.2 below). Only in 
2009, Russia became involved in the inter-ethnic conflict in South Ossetia. In the former Soviet 
republics (the ‘near abroad’) other ethnic conflicts have unfolded (Abkhazia and Nagorno-
Karabakh), and ethnic tensions abound in the multi-ethnic Ferghana Valley, in Central Asia). The 
‘nearness’ of these territories, and Russia’s former political supremacy therein, result in an 
interconnectedness of events. 
27
 For example, Gilbert (2005a; 2005b); Pentassuglia (2003; 2009); Reidel (2010) Thornberry (2004; 
1991).  
28
 For example, Balibar (1991; 2004); Benhabib (2002); Breuilly (1994; 2005); Brubaker (2002); 
Connor (1994; 2004); Gellner (1997); Guibernau (2007); Hobsbawm (1990); Kymlicka (2003; 
2007a); Parekh  (2006); Smith (2008a; 2008b; 2010); Taylor (1992).  
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literature on Russia’s inter-ethnic and centre-periphery relations, Soviet and 
Russian ethnic federalism, and nationality issues.
29
 There is, however, little 
research linking Russian politics with international minority rights law; and 
focusing on how international law in this area is applied - together with the reasons 
for specific modalities and effects of its application. With few exceptions, authors 
that have examined nationality issues in Russia have excluded the international 
legal component from their analyses, focusing on other dimensions (politics, 
anthropology and/or sociology). International lawyers who have researched the 
implementation of international human rights law in Russia have primarily focused 
on Russia’s own jurisprudence, and the European Court of Human Rights’ case-law 
on Russia (Burkov 2007; Trochev 2009). I engage in a similar analysis but 
specifically with reference to the cultural rights of minorities. The study reduces the 
gulf between the disciplines of international human rights law and Russian politics 
by looking at minority issues and politics in light of unfolding developments in 
international law. It further integrates ethnographic elements into the legal 
discussion, with in-depth interviews carried out during the author’s fieldwork. It 
thereby brings to the fore the opinions of interlocutors, including from the less 
researched regions of Mordovia and Karelia.  
This thesis is informed by the research of the two principal authors who 
have studied minority rights in Russia with reference to international law - 
Professor Bill Bowring and Dr Alexander Osipov. This thesis adds to their analysis 
a different methodological and interpretative approach: the use of semi-structured 
interviews with a variety of respondents, particularly in the three focal regions of 
Karelia, Mordovia and Tatarstan; and the interpretation of the application of 
                                                 
29
 For example, Alexander (2004); Bowring (2002; 2003a; 2005; 2007; 2010a; 2010b); Chebankova 
(2007; 2008); Gelmal (2003); Giuliano (2011); Gorenburg (2003); Hahn (2003; 2010); Hale (2005); 
Osipov (2004; 2011); Pain (2007); Suny (2001); Tishkov (1997; 2007). 
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international standards on minority protection in line with the concepts of: 
‘selective implementation’, ‘localism’ (in the sense of ‘atomisation’), ‘managed 
diversity’, and ‘new Russian citizen’. These concepts are illustrated in the next 
chapters. 
In examining international standards on the cultural rights of minorities, I 
focus on Council of Europe standards. This is for two reasons. First, in interviews, 
when asked general questions on international standards on minority protection, 
respondents automatically focused on Council of Europe standards, rather than on 
UN instruments. Indeed, membership of the Council of Europe gives everyone in 
Russia access to the European Court of Human Rights, and the European 
Convention on Human Rights has penetrated Russia’s judicial sphere to a 
significant degree.
30
 Although the ECHR has a limited role in advancing minority 
rights, not being a minority rights instrument per se, it reconfirms the Council of 
Europe as a supranational institution with the authority to issue binding judgements 
on human rights in Russia. Second, the Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities (FCNM) is legally binding on Russia and has its own 
monitoring body, the Advisory Committee of the FCNM, whose monitoring has 
encompassed issues of relevance to the subject of the thesis: education in minority 
languages, political representation, consultative mechanisms and National Cultural 
Autonomies. Where needed, I make reference to other existing international 
standards on minority rights, developed by the UN and the OSCE. I acknowledge 
that no state entirely fulfils its responsibilities under international human rights and 
minority rights law. An international body such as the Council of Europe grants its 
member states a margin of appreciation: states are allowed relative flexibility in 
fulfilling their international human rights responsibilities, taking into account their 
                                                 
30
 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
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political, historical and social circumstances.
31
 Flexibility is even more pronounced 
in the case of minority rights law, so as to enable the devising of forms of 
implementation that match, as closely as possible, the specific needs of different 
minorities. In some cases a state’s specific history can create optimal foundations 
for the upholding of minority rights (i.e. a tradition of autonomy for minority 
groups). In other cases, the opposite may be true (i.e. a history of assimilation). In 
assessing the impact of international standards in Russia, I incorporate in the 
research an analysis of underlying characteristics that are conducive to, or 
undermine, the upholding of the cultural rights of minorities, and with them the 
implementation of the relevant international standards. The findings show that the 
specific domestic characteristics of a state - aspects of historical legacies and the 
socio-political situation - can affect the implementation of international standards.  
 
Focus of the Thesis 
There are numerous issues that, although undoubtedly worthy of analysis, were not 
included in the thesis for logistical considerations of time and space. Of these, three 
are particularly worthy of mention. First, Russian scholars and other respondents 
stressed in interviews that, in post-Soviet Russia, the most precarious conditions 
and human rights violations are experienced by immigrants rather than minorities 
with a traditional presence in Russia.32 I chose not to include the issue of 
immigrants given my focus on Council of Europe standards, which primarily apply 
to ‘old’ minorities (with a traditional presence), rather than ‘new’ minorities.33 This 
choice provoked a shift of focus from discrimination and racist societal attitudes, 
                                                 
31
 This concept was developed by the ECtHR in its case-law, and takes into account the cultural and 
historical differences between the Council of Europe member states that can lead to differing 
interpretations of the ECHR. 
32
 For example, this was the opinion of two academics and analysts in Moscow [2.16; 2.18].  
33
 This does not mean that the new minorities are excluded from the scope of the FCNM. See 
Medda-Windischer (2009). 
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which affect mostly ‘new’ minorities - immigrants from Central Asia and darker-
skinned Caucasians
34
 - to cultural rights, which primarily affect ‘old’ minorities. 
While racism and discrimination are pressing problems in Russia, I chose to focus 
on the cultural rights of national minorities as issues that are destabilising but less 
researched.  
Second, respondents noted that the challenges experienced by titular 
nationalities are greater for those persons not residing in their ‘own’ titular 
republics. A possible discrepancy in the enjoyment of cultural rights between the 
two groups (inside and outside their ‘own’ titular republics) is not a focus of the 
study. Some consideration is given to the matter in the case of the Karelians outside 
Karelia (in Tver), and Tatars outside Tatarstan (in Moscow and Saransk).35 One 
may hypothesise that the problems affecting titular nationalities outside their titular 
republics are similar to, but more pronounced than, those of minority 
representatives benefiting from territoriality. Third, I exclude the thesis the analysis 
of Russia’s ‘small-in-number’ indigenous peoples of the North, Siberia and Far 
East.
36
 Both in Russian and international law indigenous peoples are subject to a 
separate rights regime compared to national minorities.  
As the research progressed, and particularly during the fieldwork, education 
and participation became primary concerns. These are the aspects of minority rights 
that feature most prominently in the thesis (Chapters 6 to 9). Linguistic and cultural 
heritage can hardly be preserved without education through the medium of minority 
languages, or the study of minority languages as subjects in schools. They require 
                                                 
34
 When discrimination and prejudice is triggered by skin colour, it can also affect numerous 
Russian citizens from regions such as the North Caucasus, in addition to immigrants from the South 
Caucasus. 
35
 Relevant interviews were conducted where possible. The author could not meet representatives of 
Karelian organisations outside Petrozavodsk and Tver, and of Mordovian organisations outside 
Mordovia: either such organisations did not exist in the cities visited or their representatives 
declined the request for an interview.   
36
 On Russia’s indigenous people, see Section 1.2, and Xanthaki (2004). 
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expensive training of bilingual teachers and the production of appropriate 
textbooks, as well as academic research by scholars specialising in minority 
languages, history and cultures. Additionally, adequate and targeted measures for 
the preservation and development of minority cultures and languages cannot be 
effectively formulated without the involvement of the interested parties: person 
belonging to national minorities themselves.  
 
1.2 Definitions: Minorities and Cultural Rights 
 
Before moving on to the theoretical framework, I clarify the terminology used in 
the thesis - first and foremost, the definition of ‘minority’ itself, and subsequently 
‘culture’ and ‘cultural rights’. Those institutions that have pioneered the 
development and promotion of minority rights standards - the UN, the Council of 
Europe and the OSCE - have refrained from providing a definition of ‘minority’. 
Equally, there is no definition of ‘people’ despite the fact that the ‘right of peoples 
to self-determination’ has been recognised as a right erga omnes.37 As Thornberry 
puts it, in international law ‘there seems to be only general agreement that there is 
no generally agreed definition’ of ‘minority’ (1991: 164). Leading scholars of 
nationalism such as Anderson (1991) and Gellner (1997; [1983] 2006), in their 
seminal texts, have approached the issue from the point of view of ethnicity and the 
nation, focusing on the creation of nation-states - without analysing, or defining, 
minorities within such states. Yet almost every state includes minorities. Smith, for 
example, asserts that:  
 
                                                 
37
East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, International Court of Justice Reports 1995, p. 102, 
§ 29. A right erga omnes relates to a state’s obligations to prevent its breach vis-à-vis the 
community of states as a whole, as in the cases of genocide and torture.   
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[M]ost nation-states are polyethnic [and] many have been formed in the first 
place around a dominant ethnie, which annexed or attracted other ethnies or 
ethnic fragments into the state (1991: 39).  
 
Smith’s assertion reveals that ‘minorities’, as the expression itself suggests, are 
commonly understood in relation to the ‘majority’. It reinforces the view of a 
majority as a ‘monolithic cultural bloc in opposition to the minority’, which is 
seldom the case (Thornberry 1991: 7).  
There are a number of reasons for the resistance to a definition in 
international law, including: the difficulty in formulating an all-encompassing 
definition given the great diversity of minorities, their historical legacies and social 
conditions;38 and the sense of urgency in developing solutions to guarantee minority 
rights, with or without a conclusive definition.39 In practice, even without an agreed 
definition, minority rights concerns have existed for centuries, and have been the 
subject of international agreements, treaties and declarations from the 1648 Treaty 
of Westphalia, the League of Nations and contemporary international bodies such 
as the UN. These instruments have delineated a minority’s core features, although 
their exact meanings (and the responsibilities of states vis-à-vis minorities) have 
been the subject of debate and varied interpretations. Initial concepts, with the 
Treaty of Westphalia, focused on tolerance of minority faiths. Following the First 
World War, with the League of Nations, this was extended to encompass elements 
of language and ethnicity (Ramaga 1992a: 409; Hannum 1991: 1431). 
                                                 
38
 This ‘defeatist’ approach was adopted by the Council of Europe in relation to the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities:  
It was decided to adopt a pragmatic approach, based on the recognition that at this stage, it is 
impossible to arrive at a definition capable of mustering general support of all Council of Europe 
member States. 
Explanatory Report on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(hereinafter FCNM Explanatory Report), § 12. 
39
 According to Sigler, ‘[t]he real needs of minorities cannot wait’ (1983: 3). 
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The most frequently cited draft definition is the one formulated by 
Francesco Capotorti, former UN Special Rapporteur on the Subcommission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities:                                                                                                                                                   
 
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a 
non-dominant position, whose members - being nationals of the State - 
possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of 
the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, 
directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language 
(Capotorti 1979).
  
 
 
It had been further clarified that ‘minority’ cannot be interpreted in its ‘literal 
sense’40 - otherwise it would encompass ‘families, social classes, cultural groups, 
speakers of dialects, etc’.41 Rather, a ‘minority’ is to be understood as a ‘national or 
similar community, which differs from the predominant group in the State’. 42  
Capotorti’s successor, UN Special Rapporteur Jules Deschênes, slightly 
elaborated on the definition in 1985.43 However, neither definition was codified into 
a legal text. Instead, the qualifying attributes ‘ethnic’, ‘religious’ and ‘linguistic’ 
can be found in Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,44 which stipulates: 
 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own 
language. 
 
                                                 
40
 ‘Definition and Classification of Minorities’, 27 September 1949, UN Doc E/CN/Sub.2/85, § 24. 
41
 Ibid.  
42
 Ibid.  
43
 The Deschênes definition is:  
A group of citizens of a State, constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant position in 
that State, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the 
majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only 
implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim is to achieve equality with the majority in 
fact and in law. 
44
 Packer criticises the overuse of adjectives in the absence of a definition:   
[The] emphasis on the adjective becomes largely irrelevant since they too lose their meaning in the 
absence of the noun: to say that something is “green” is not very helpful if one has no idea to what it 
applies. (1993: 57)                       
See also Gilbert (1996: 169). 
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These adjectives are also included in the title of the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.45 
The first OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel 
(1993-2001) adopted a different approach: he refrained from providing even a 
working definition of ‘minority’ altogether. Rather, he argued that: ‘I know a 
minority when I see one’.46  
             The expression ‘national minority’ has also been used to designate a 
group’s national roots (Gilbert 1996: 169), effectively as a synonym of ‘ethnic’, for 
example in the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (FCNM) and the OSCE’s 1990 Document of the Copenhagen 
Meeting on the Human Dimension.47 A similar understanding of ‘national minority’ 
is also found in a definition of the term proposed by the Soviet delegation to the 
UN, as: 
 
[A]n historically formed community of people characterized by a common 
language, a common territory, a common economic life and a common 
psychological structure manifesting itself in a common culture. 48   
 
Kymlicka distinguishes between immigrants (ethnic minorities) and autochtonous 
nations (national minorities), deriving from the bifurcation of a multinational state 
(with a combination of nations or peoples) and a polyethnic state, formed by 
immigrants (ethnic minorities instead of national minorities) (1995: 11-26). Finally, 
                                                 
45
 Adopted on 18 December 1992, GA Res 47/135. 
46
 Van der Stoel, M. Keynote Address to the OSCE Human Dimension Seminar on ‘Case Studies on 
National Minority Issues: Positive Results’. He did however, in his work in Ukraine, specify that a 
national minority is to be distinguished from an indigenous people, since an indigenous people has 
no kin-state, whereas a national minority generally has. See Letter to Hennady Udovenko, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine,14 February 1997. http://www.minelres.lv/count/ukraine/970214r.htm 
(accessed 15-10-2011). 
47
 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 
1990. 
48
 UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.369, § 16. The Soviets’ addition to the other definitions was the inclusion of 
‘territory’.  
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the expression ‘national minority’ has been employed to designate a minority with a 
kin-state (Gilbert 1996: 169). 
           Reaching universal consensus on the meaning of ‘ethnicity’ has also proven 
an insurmountable obstacle. Although some characteristics overlap, there are 
distinctions between ‘nation’ and ‘ethnicity’ - although, confusingly, the etymology 
of ‘ethnic’ is the Greek ethnos, meaning ‘nation’ (Thornberry 1991: 159). An ethnie 
(ethnic community), Smith argues, serves as foundation for the development of a 
nation (Smith 1991: 39), which Anderson describes as an ‘imagined political 
community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’ (1991: 6). 
Both ethnie and nation are communities ‘of common myths and memories’ (Smith 
1991: 40).  
In the absence of a widely endorsed definition, in practice states can forge 
their own definitions, and thereby may deny the existence of specific minorities in 
their territories - or, in the case of France, of any minority.49 Thornberry stresses the 
pressing need for an agreed conclusive definition: 
 
[T]he right to identity, diversity, development […] needs acutely to be 
supplemented by some legal effort, perhaps in the form of a definition, to 
identify which groups are envisaged […] (1991: 296). 
 
Gilbert adds that the absence of a definition leads to the precariousness of the 
application of what are in fact only ephemeral concepts of ‘minority rights’ (1996: 
162).
50
  
                                                 
49
 The position of France is that it has no minorities, on the basis of Article 2 of its Constitution, 
stipulating: [France is] a [r]epublic, indivisible, secular, democratic and social. It shall ensure 
equality of its citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race and religion.  
Rodley notes that similar provisions are present in the constitutions of other countries that do not 
deny the existence of minorities within their borders (1995: 51).  
50
 He argues: 
[T]he specificity of protection for groups, particularly minorities, has remained largely uncertain. 
When there are [no definitions] in a legal instrument […] that raises the question about to whom [it] 
applies - one cannot accord rights to wholly nebulous concepts and some definition is necessary 
(Gilbert 1996: 162).  
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The search for an ideal definition is a contentious issue in the international 
minority rights system. This issue is, however, only peripheral to this thesis. The 
Russian approach is very distant from that of, say, France. In its census, and in its 
reports under the FCNM, Russia lists over 170 ethnic groups distinct from the 
majority - which include the three case studies of this thesis. More complex is the 
meaning of ‘nationality’ (natsional’nost’) in Russia - a general concept that needs 
to be unpacked. The Russian (originally Soviet) anthropological tradition divides 
‘nationalities’ - used here in the sense of ‘ethnic group’ - into three categories: 
titular, non-titular, and ‘small-in-number’ indigenous peoples of the North, Siberia 
and Far East.
51
 I first clarify the distinction between indigenous peoples and other 
nationalities. This distinction is, of course, not unique to Russia: indigenous peoples 
worldwide have insisted on their distinctiveness from ‘simple’ minorities - not least 
because international mechanisms provide greater protection to indigenous 
peoples.
52
  There is some overlapping between the two categories, although in some 
cases one group will indisputably fall into one or the other (Aukerman 2000). As 
for ‘minority’, there is no generally agreed definition of ‘indigenous people’. The 
UN International Labour Organisation, in Convention No.169,
53
 refers to 
indigenous peoples as: 
 
[P]eoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on 
account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, 
or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of 
conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries 
                                                 
51
 There is a further distinction between autochthonous people (korennye narody) and non-
autochthonous.  
52
 On indigenous people and international law also see, among others, Barsh (1996); Kingsbury 
(1993); Pentassuglia (2003; 2009); Thornberry (1991; 2002); Xanthaki (2004).  
53
 International Labour Organisation, ‘Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention’ No.169, adopted 
on 27 June 1989, entered into force 5 September 1991. The convention was adopted in the 
recognition of ‘the aspirations of [indigenous] peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, 
ways of life and economic development’, and in light of the fact that ‘in many parts of the world 
these peoples are unable to enjoy their fundamental human rights to the same degree as the rest of 
the population of the States within which they live’ (Preamble). 
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and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own 
social, economic, cultural and political institutions.
54
 
  
 
This definition exposes the vulnerability of indigenous groups, justifying the 
greater protection afforded to them. It further stresses the relationship to land: even 
through minorities can at times claim an ancestral relationship with their land, 
indigenous people have a deep cultural (also seen as spiritual) connection to land, 
as well as depending on it for their livelihood.55 Russia federal legislation provides 
for specific rights in the area of land preservation and traditional way of life.
56
 
For those groups not categorised in Russia as ‘small-in-number’ indigenous 
peoples, a supplementary distinction is made, between titular and non-titular 
nationalities. Titular nationalities are those that were provided territorial autonomy 
during the Soviet period, and ‘assigned’ a territory  named after them, usually in the 
form of ‘ethnic republics’ (as for all three case studies: the Republics of Karelia, 
Mordovia and Tatarstan). Given that these nationalities could benefit from 
territoriality, and that the Soviet nationalities policy enforced affirmative measures 
for their representation in their territory’s administration, these nationalities tend 
not to be perceived in Russia as ‘minorities’ - an expression associated with 
vulnerability and inferiority. They have been regarded as ‘titular nationalities’.57 
Russia’s approach, at least on paper, reflects the notion of the coexistence of ‘co-
nations’ rather than of a majority and minorities. The concept of ‘co-nations’ 
                                                 
54
 Article 1(1)(b).  
55
 Cobo, J.R. ’Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations’,                                     
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4 (1986),  pp. 196-7. 
56
 The main law is the Law No. 104-FZ of 20 July 2000 ‘On the Basic Principles of Community 
Organisation of Small-in-number Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the 
Russian Federation’. 
57
 The expression ‘minority’ has been linked to representatives of ethnic groups living outside ‘their’ 
territory (Malakhov & Osipov 2006: 509). In fact, the expression ‘national minority’ was mostly 
excluded from the Soviet discourse, and only seldom resurfaced. The repercussions of differing 
terminological approaches are examined in Chapter 3. 
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implies equality in status and dignity for all ethnic groups, rather than 
distinguishing between dominant and non-dominant ethnicities (Malloy 2005: 38).   
For the purpose of the thesis, I use the term ‘minority’ (or ‘national 
minority’58) according to the meaning of the expression in international law. 
Although Capotorti’s is only a working definition, it is sufficient to classify the 
nationalities considered in the thesis as ‘minorities’. The Tatars, Mordovians and 
Karelians are ‘numerically inferior to the rest of the population of the state’; they 
are ‘in a non-dominant position’; they are distinct from the rest of the population by 
the ‘ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics’ that they possess; and interview 
data indicates that they have a ‘sense of solidarity’ combined with a desire to 
preserve their cultures. Numerical factors are relative: although a minority should 
be numerically smaller than the majority, in some areas within a state its members 
might be more numerous than majority members (Thornberry 1991: 169). Of the 
three case studies, only Tatars have a population more numerous than that of the 
Russians within their republic. In these cases, international law approaches the 
condition of ‘minority’ in relation to a country in its entirety. In fact a bigger 
population does not by itself imply dominance: there are groups that, though 
numerically superior, are in a disadvantaged position, as black South Africans were 
in apartheid South Africa (a so-called ‘reversed’ minority) (Ermacora 1983: 284).59 
A ‘need for protection’, then, has to be added to the equation (Ramaga 
1992a: 119). Are the Tatars in need of such protection? I argue that they are: nearly 
two-thirds of Russia’s Tatars reside outside Tatarstan, and even within Tatarstan the 
Russian culture and language dominate in the public sphere. The same applies to 
                                                 
58
 The expression ‘national minority’, however, is not used in the sense of a minority that has a kin-
state, as this does not apply to many minorities in Russia (including Tatars, Mordovians and 
Karelians), which nevertheless fall within the scope of application of the FCNM. I use the 
expression ‘national minority’ as per Kymlicka’s classification of this type of minority as 
autochthonous (old minority) (1995), also reflected in the practice of the Council of Europe.  
59
 Cited in Thornberry (1991: 7). 
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those other ethnic republics where the titular nationality is numerically superior 
(more than half the republic’s total population): Chechnya, Chuvashia, Ingushetia, 
Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmikia, North Ossetia and Tuva.  
 
Cultural Rights of Minorities 
After discussing the meaning of ‘minority’, for the purposes of this study one also 
has to clarify the scope of a minority’s ‘cultural rights’. In the absence of a general 
agreement as to the exact scope of the expression, one first has to unpack the 
meaning of ‘culture’. Geertz takes the following position: 
 
Believing with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs. (1973: 5) 
 
Meanwhile, UNESCO provides an extremely broad definition of culture, as: 
 
[T]he totality of ways by which men create a design for living. It is the 
process of communication between men; it is the essence of being human.
60
 
 
 
Stavenhagen sees culture as a ‘coherent self-contained system of values and 
symbols’ (1995: 66). Reidel suggests the following definition:  
 
A set of shared meanings, norms, and practices that form a comprehensive 
world view that serves to unite a group and contribute to the identity of its 
members. (Reidel 2010: 66) 
 
 
Hence, culture can encompass ‘meanings’, a ‘world view’, a ‘system of values and 
symbols’, and the ‘essence of being human’. ‘Culture’ is further contained in the 
expression ‘multiculturalism’ - which has itself been seen to imply the ‘equal 
recognition of cultures’ (Kelly 2002: 5).  Young sees the ‘culture’ of 
multiculturalism as not confined to ethnic attributes, but also encompassing, for 
                                                 
60 1970 Statement on Cultural Rights as Human Rights by the United Nations Education Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization. 
 35 
example, ‘gay culture’ (1990). Yet, in its common usage, multiculturalism has 
acquired ethnic, more than strictly cultural, connotations. The statements by 
Merkel, Cameron and Sarkozy reported above, exemplify this interpretation of the 
notion of ‘culture’: their comments on ‘multiculturalism’ referred primarily to 
policies vis-à-vis Muslim minorities - communities religiously and ethnically 
distinct from the majority population in addition to possessing different cultural 
practices. It leads Hasan to denounce the term ‘culture’ when in fact what is 
intended is ‘ethnicity’ or ‘race’, which he sees as a sign of ‘pusillanimity’ (2010: 
13). 
61
 
Cultural rights are not restricted to national minorities. They are 
incorporated in general human rights international conventions and declarations, 
such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
62
 the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
63
 They are also included in 
documents specifically concerning minority rights. For example, Article 5(1) 
FCNM states:  
The Parties undertake to promote the conditions necessary for persons 
belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and 
to preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, 
language, traditions and cultural heritage. 
 
Here, both language and culture are defined as ‘essential elements of … identity’ of 
persons belonging to national minorities. Indeed, the attributes of culture are bound 
up with identity (Mannens 1999: 186).
64
 Similarly, Reidel lists as the primary 
                                                 
61
 The adjective ‘ethnic’ may, in turn, denote culture, as well as race. According to Thornberry, an 
ethnic group can refer to ‘a ‘cultural’ entity with or without distinct ‘physical’ characteristics’ (1991: 
160). ‘Ethnic’ is an all-inclusive term (Ramaga 1992b: 418-9).    
62
 GA Res. 217 (III), UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71, adopted on 10 December 1948. 
63
 993 U.N.T.S. 3, adopted on 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976. 
64
 See also Article 1(1) of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities: 
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attributes of culture: shared history, shared belief, shared identity, language, 
traditions, and practices (2010: 68). An alternative expression to ‘cultural rights’ is 
the ‘right to identity’: the right of minorities to protect their cultural destiny 
(Thornberry 1991: 141-2; Pentassuglia 2002: 133). It includes the enjoyment of 
those rights that enable a minority to express its identity, through the practice of its 
distinct cultural traditions, and the use of its language. 
Hence, I employ an understanding of ‘culture’ of national minorities that is 
inextricably linked to ‘identity’. Additionally, I treat language as a highly 
prominent group identity marker - for three reasons. First, language is at the heart 
of the expression of a group’s identity (Crystal 2000). Thus, Martin Estebanez 
argues:  
 
[L]inguistic communication [is] possibly the most intangible and at the 
same time fundamental of […] spaces [for the development of a group’s 
identity], as language permeates almost every aspect of minority identity 
(Martin Estebanez 2005: 269). 
 
Second, language encompasses all social spheres: the choice of language in the 
media, the public sector, employment, parliament and the courts has social 
repercussions, with a potential for linguistic discrimination. Third, language is a 
symbol of power. In the development of nations, the dominant group’s language 
crystallises, and consolidates as the dominant language.
65
  
The cultural rights of minorities analysed here are considered in the context 
of human rights, in a recognition that an individual’s cultural identity is bound up 
                                                                                                                                        
States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity 
of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of 
that identity [italics added]. 
65
 According to Anderson, this process occurred through the development of the printing press 
(1991).  
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with his/her dignity (Packer 1999: 247; Mannens 1992: 186).
66
 Given the very 
broad scope of minorities’ cultural I restrict my research to the following areas:  
 
(a) Linguistic rights of minorities: the right of minorities to preserve and 
develop their own language. 
(b) Cultural rights in their intersection with the right to education: the 
right of minorities to be instructed through the medium of their own 
language; or to be taught their language, history and culture as 
subjects. 
(c) Cultural rights in their intersection with the right to participation: the 
right of minorities to participate in decision-making and to be 
consulted on issues that directly affect them and their cultures. 
 
Some final notes on terminology follow.  
I use ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nationality’ interchangeably, although I use 
‘nationality’ more frequently as a direct translation of the Russian natsional’nost’. 
Also interchangeably I employ other expressions that recur in international law: 
‘minority’, ‘national minority’,67 or ‘person(s) belonging to national minorities’.   
The term ‘minority’ is always used to mean ethnic minorities rather than 
sexual or other types of minorities: the latter are outside the scope of the thesis. 
Hence, ‘minority cultures’ is used in the sense of ‘cultures of ethnic minorities’. 
I refer to ‘human rights’ as the entire international human rights system, 
including the UN as well as regional bodies (the Council of Europe and OSCE for 
Russia). ‘Minority rights’ are treated as an integral part of the international human 
rights system.  
                                                 
66
 On linguistic human rights see Skutnabb-Kangas (1994). 
67
 See note 58. 
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When talking about ‘international law’, I also use the expression 
‘international standards’. The two expressions may be used interchangeably, 
although ‘standards’ are broader: they encompass principles that are not legally 
binding (‘soft law’), such as those developed by the OSCE, as well as those arising 
from legally binding documents.
68
  
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
Before analysing my findings, I outline the methodology used for the study. The 
research is based on qualitative data gathered through 100 semi-structured 
interviews: 95 in Russia and 5 in Strasbourg (Council of Europe respondents). The 
research is time-bound, from 2000 - shortly after Russia’s ratification of the ECHR 
and the FCNM in 1998 - up to 2011 (February 2011, when I conducted the last 
interviews). The timing offers insights into Putin’s leadership, which started in 
2000, and the introduction of the ‘vertical of power’ and centralisation measures - 
continued during the joint leadership with President Dmitrii Medvedev.
69
 This 
period also saw the introduction of amendments, in 2007, to the Federal Law ‘On 
Education’,70 with potentially wide-ranging repercussions on minorities in Russia. 
The years 2010-2011, when the interviews took place, saw initial, tentative attempts 
to implement these new provisions and educational standards.  
Although it has been argued that President Dmitrii Medvedev has not 
merely been a powerless entity in the duumvirate with Putin,
71
 under Medvedev 
                                                 
68
 The UN’s ICCPR (Article 27), and the Council of Europe’s FCNM, European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages, and the European Convention on Human Rights. 
69
 Putin became acting president on 31 December 1999 upon former President Yeltsin’s resignation. 
Having won the presidential elections in 2000 and then in 2004, he was president until May 2008. 
He was succeeded by Dmitrii Medvedev, while Putin took the post of Prime Minister. In September 
2011 Medvedev announced that he would not seek a second term but that Putin would run again for 
presidency in the Russian presidential elections of March 2012. 
70
 No. 3266-1 of 10 July 1992. See Chapter 6. 
71
 Hahn argues that Medvedev has displayed some independence in both internal and foreign affairs, 
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there has been no significant departure from the direction given by Putin to 
Russia’s reforms (Hahn 2010). Among other things, Medvedev has replaced several 
regional governors, including in the ethnic republics, in line with new presidential 
powers secured under Putin’s leadership.72 Hence, in the thesis I refer primarily to 
Putin’s (or Putin-Medvedev’s) policies. 
The research makes use of case studies, with a ‘collective’ approach - from 
Stake’s categorisation of intrinsic and collective case studies (1994). Although the 
thesis has three case studies, I do not have an intrinsic interest in the case studies 
per se (intrinsic approach) (Stake 1994: 237). I apply, instead, the ‘collective’ 
approach to the case studies, aiming at identifying regularities that can apply to a 
broader context. I opt to move away from the individual idiosyncrasies of the case 
studies, with a view to developing more general conclusions where possible (Peters 
1998: 29). I then offer my interpretation of the data from interviews with my 
respondents, analysing them in light of changing political and social circumstances, 
as well as relevant Russian laws and practices.  
The thesis is multi-disciplinary. Although I decided to adopt a legal 
approach and focus on international minority rights law, the implementation of 
international law could not be fully comprehended without taking into account 
Russian history and contemporary political reality. The legislation cannot be 
divorced from political and other factors, particularly as the rule of law in Russia is 
far from guaranteed, as will be seen below.
73
  
 
Case Studies 
As noted, a collective approach was chosen to interpret data from the case studies. I 
recognise that each case study is unique, complex, and comprises numerous 
                                                                                                                                        
encouraging reform, modernisation and anti-corruption programmes (2010: 169). 
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 Vedomosti, 30-9-2010. ‘Medvedev i Voevody’ (‘Medvedev and the Governors’). See Section 5.2. 
73
 Chapters 3 and 4. 
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dimensions, but I do not engage in a ‘thick description’ or apply the verstehen 
approach (Geertz 2000). Indeed, although a ‘deep cultural immersion’ is helpful to 
formulate appropriate hypotheses and correct interpretations of the phenomena 
under study (King et al 1994: 37), it is logistically demanding in cross-unit analysis. 
This inevitably results in less depth the higher the number of cases (Gerring 2004: 
354). Thus, I opted for a ‘small-n’comparison. 
A major challenge in collective cases studies is the selection of cases. Three 
nationalities were selected because of their differences, following discussions with 
academics and activists specialising in minority issues in Russia: the Tatars, 
Mordovians and Karelians. By choosing minorities primarily in light of their 
differences, I wished to identify commonalities between them. I used the ‘most 
different system design’ (MDSD), after J.S.’s Mill’s method of difference (1843), 
comparing ethnic groups that share few common features, to shed light on the 
outcomes of the application of international standards by common explanatory 
factors (Landman 2003: 29-30). In order to identify such explanatory factors, I 
searched for discernible patters through inference - or ‘using facts we know to learn 
something we do not know’ (King et al 1994: 119). The choice of case studies was 
also partially shaped by logistic reasons: I needed to visit regions that were not 
particularly far, and therefore expensive to reach, given the restrictions of funding; 
and where my existing contacts could assist me in developing further contacts 
through a snow-balling effect.  
Of the three, the nationality that is in the strongest position politically, 
economically, demographically and culturally is the Tatar minority. Tatars speak a 
Turkic language and predominantly embrace Islam as a religion. Mordovians and 
Karelians have cultural and religious similarities (Finno-Ugric languages and 
Russian Orthodox religion), but Karelians are in a particularly weak position in 
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terms of numbers and the use of Karelian language, which is virtually disappearing 
as urbanisation advances in Karelia. The Mordovian nationality can be placed at an 
intermediate stage between the Tatars and the Karelians. According to the 2002 
census,
74
 out of 145 million Russian citizens, there were 5.5 million who identified 
themselves as Tatars, 843,350 Mordovians and 93,344 Karelians; 52.9% of the 
population of the Republic of Tatarstan were ethnic Tatars, 31.9% of the population 
of the Republic of Mordovia were Mordovians, and only 9.2% of the population of 
the Republic of Karelia were Karelians (see Tables 1 and 2). Karelia is more 
culturally and religiously homogeneous than the two other republics: in Tatarstan 
there is an almost even Christian/Muslim split,
75
 and in Mordovia the third 
nationality by size (after Russians and Mordovians) is the Tatar minority (5.2% of 
the republic’s population). Karelia’s autochthonous nationalities (Russians, 
Karelians, Finns and Veps) are traditionally Christian Orthodox, and the republic’s 
ethnic and religious composition was only very slightly altered through minor post-
Soviet migration from the North and South Caucasus. Both Finno-Ugric 
nationalities and Tatars have organised themselves in over-arching Finno-Ugric and 
Tatar institutions in Russia (Congresses of Peoples) and also international 
movements (such as the World Congress of Tatars
76
). An additional reason for 
selecting Mordovians as a case study was the inclusion of the Republic of 
Mordovia, with the republics of Dagestan and Altai, in a joint European Union and 
Council of Europe programme entitled ‘Minorities in Russia: Developing Culture, 
Language, Media and Civil Society’ (hereinafter ‘Minorities in Russia’). The 
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 In 2011 only the preliminary results of the 2010 census had been made public.  
http://www.perepis-2010.ru/perepisnye-listy/ (accessed 8-9-2011).  I rely on the 2002 census data in 
the thesis. 
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 On the basis that ethnic Russians (39.5%) and the Chuvash minority (3.3%) residing in Tatarstan 
tend to associate themselves with the Christian Orthodox faith, and Tatars (52.9%) with the Muslim 
faith. The remainder of the population of Tatarstan is religiously mixed. 
76
 It operates in Russia and is also part of an international network uniting Tatars from different 
countries. 
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programme was launched in mid-2009, to be implemented together with the 
Russian Ministry of Regional Development (the ministry responsible for minority 
issues) over the period 2009-2011. It aimed at enhancing the preparatory process 
towards the ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages.  
 
Table 1 - Case Studies: Main Characteristics77  
ETHNIC 
GROUP 
 
Type Population in 
Russia 
 
Population in 
own republic  
Percentage 
of population 
living in own 
republic 
Main 
Religion 
TATARS Turkic 5,566,215
78
 
 
2,000,116  
(Tatarstan) 
 
52.9% Muslim  
MORDOVIANS Finno-Ugric 977,381
79
 
 
 
283,861  
(Mordovia) 
31.9%  Russian 
Orthodox  
KARELIANS Finno-Ugric 93,344 
 
65,651 
(Karelia) 
9.16% Russian 
Orthodox 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
77
 Data from the 2002 census are used. 
78
 Including Astrakhan Tatars and Siberian Tatars. 
79
 Including Moskha and Erzya speakers. 
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Table 2 - Case Studies: Similarities and Differences  
FEATURE SIMILARITIES 
 
DIFFERENCES 
Territoriality 
 
Karelia-Mordovia-Tatarstan: all 
ethnic republics 
 
N/A 
State language in 
the republic 
Both Mordovian and Tatar are 
recognised as state languages in 
their republics 
 
Karelian not recognised as a state 
language in the Republic of Karelia 
Ethnicity Karelians and Mordovians: Finno-
Ugric 
 
 
Tatars: Turkic 
Language  
 
Karelian and Mordovian: Finno-
Ugric 
 
 
Tatar: Turkic 
Religion  
 
Karelians and Mordovians: 
traditionally Christian 
 
 
Tatars: traditionally Muslim 
Size of population – 
Russia 
 Karelians: small population (93,000)   
Mordovians: medium (977,000) 
Tatars: large (5,566,000) 
Percentage of the 
population - ethnic 
republic 
 Karelians; low (9%)  
Mordovians: medium (32%)  
Tatars: high (53%) 
 
 
Summary of the Case Studies’ Main Features 
Tatars 
Numerically the second biggest ethnic group after the Russians in the Russian 
Federation, approximately a third of Russia’s 5.5 millions Tatars live in the 
Republic of Tatarstan. Within the boundaries of the republic, Tatars are a numerical 
majority, surpassing ethnic Russians (52.9% Tatars and 39.5% Russians). The area 
of current Tatarstan was invaded by the Mongols in the 13
th
 century, and Islam was 
introduced in the 14
th
 century. Following the defeat of the Golden Horde at the end 
of the same century, the Tatar khanates were established - first among them, the 
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Khanate of Kazan, conquered by the Russians in 1552. Hence, Tatars and Russians 
have a long history of interaction. As Bowring puts it:  
 
If Muscovy conquered the Tatars, the Tatars thoroughly penetrated their 
conquerors. The Tatar-Turkic heritage is found throughout the Russian 
language and Russia’s cultural heritage (2007:  424). 
 
The predecessor to the Republic of Tatarstan was the Tatar Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic, established in 1920. Tatarstan is not only the epicentre of Tatar 
culture in Russia but also a rich, oil-producing and a highly industrialised republic. 
Tatarstan has ‘diaspora’ policies for Tatars residing in Russian regions outside 
Tatarstan, and centres for the promotion of Tatar culture can be found in Moscow 
and several other cities in Russia.  
 
Mordovians 
Mordovians are a numerical minority in the Republic of Mordovia (31.9% against 
60.8% Russians). Tatars are also represented in Mordovia (5.2%). The Mordovians, 
like Mari and Udmurt nationalities, were subject to acculturation through 
Christianisation in the 18
th
 century. There are two versions of the Mordovian 
language: Moksha and Erzya. Like other Finno-Ugric languages, they have 
absorbed elements of Russian syntax and grammar (Haarmann 1998: 236).  
Mordovia as a republic was established in 1934 as the Mordovian 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Mordovia is far from enjoying Tatarstan’s 
economic power: its economy is primarily based on machine building and chemical 
industries. The republic has ‘diaspora’ policies, with institutions promoting 
Mordovian culture, for Mordovians living outside the republic. In its Second 
Opinion, adopted in 2007, the ACFC noted that Mordovians, together with other 
titular Finno-Ugric nationalities, were ‘vulnerable groups’ within their republics 
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despite their titularity, given the reduction of state support for their languages and 
cultures.
80
   
 
Karelians 
The Karelians are a very small minority in the Republic of Karelia: 9.2% versus 
76.6% Russians. Karelians also live in relatively significant numbers in Tver, 
Novgorod and Leningrad oblasts. The Republic of Karelia was established in 1920 
as the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (later to be incorporated into 
the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic). The Karelian language, of which 
three versions (dialects) exist, has many borrowings from Russian, having been 
influenced by the Russian language. The economy of the Republic of Karelia is 
primarily based on wood processing and paper production. Agriculture has suffered 
after the end of the Soviet Union with the discontinuation of communal farming. 
The resulting depopulation of villages has had an impact on Karelian language use, 
through the sharp decrease of areas with a high concentration of Karelians, and the 
progressive reduction of Karelian-speaking oases.  
Separate interviews were carried out with Karelians outside the Republic of 
Karelia, in the Tver oblast, near Moscow. The version of Karelian spoken in Tver 
differs from that of Karelia, and it has been more heavily influenced by the Russian 
language (Haarmann 1998: 234). Tver Karelians consider themselves distinct from 
the Karelians in the Republic of Karelia, and have programmes to promote their 
own language and culture, including a National Cultural Autonomy of Tver 
Karelians. The Tver Karelians’ opportunities to promote their own culture are 
limited, as is commonly the case for Russia’s numerically small minorities. They 
have received some support from Finland - a country that promotes Finno-Ugric 
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 ACFC, (Second) Opinion on Russia (note 133), § 84. 
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cultures and languages - and the Tver local government has pursued a policy 
supportive of minorities, particularly Karelians.  
 
Other Respondents 
Specific areas of study call for the targeted consideration of additional cases. First, 
in examining the issue of participation, the thesis takes into account, through data 
from targeted interviews, the nationality that, above all, is precluded from accessing 
decision-making channels: the Roma. Additionally, in examining Putin’s 
centralising policies (Chapter 5) one could not exclude from consideration the issue 
of mergers of some of the Federation’s ethnicity-based territorial units with 
predominantly Slavic ones, that took place between 2005 and 2008. The mergers 
have not affected the case studies themselves, so I refer in Chapter 5 to one of the 
nationalities that have been affected: the Buryats.81 I gathered data from secondary 
sources, private communication with Buryat representatives, and conducted an 
interview with the representative of a Buryat organisation in St Petersburg. 
Second, in cities not located in Karelia, Mordovia or Tatarstan, I 
interviewed not only representatives of the focus ethnic groups, but more broadly 
minorities active in promoting their languages and cultures. This was for two 
reasons. First, there were logistical considerations, such as the absence of 
representatives of one or more of the three focus ethnic groups and their institutions 
in some such cities, or the fact that those approached for interviews declined to take 
part in the study. Second, I wished to develop a broader view of the processes and 
institutions studied, and how a region may accommodate its minority groups as a 
collectivity. Indeed, mechanisms such as National Chambers or Assemblies of 
                                                 
81
 The former Urd-Osta Buryat Autonomous Okrug was merged with Irkutsk oblast in January 2008; 
and those of the Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug were merged with Chita oblast in March 2008. 
See Section 5.2. 
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Peoples were established to address minority issues jointly by the various minority 
communities residing in a particular region. The members of these institutions did 
not always include representatives of the three case studies. The supplementary 
interviews resulted in triangulation with additional interviews with representatives 
of other groups, including non-titular ones, which revealed commonalities in the 
concerns of different minority groups.  
 
Fieldwork 
The fieldwork was divided into three parts. After conducting preliminary research, I 
compiled a list of questions for different categories of respondents, for the first part 
of the fieldwork (May and June 2010). The questions are reproduced in Appendix 
2. As the interviews progressed, recurring themes started to emerge. These led to 
more questions and cross-checking during the fieldwork, and to supplementary 
research immediately following it. These data informed the second part of the 
fieldwork, in October 2010. Notes from the interviews were then coded and 
analysed. One last research trip to Moscow in February 2011 provided the 
opportunity to clarify some pending issues, including by discussing the interview 
data with Russian academics and analysts. Some issues were followed up through 
private communications (primarily email communication) during the writing-up 
phase. The fieldwork was made possible by funds granted by the Economic and 
Social Research Council. 
The regions visited were: 
 
Ethnic republics: Petrozavodsk (Republic of Karelia), Kazan (Republic of 
Tatarstan), Saransk (Republic of Mordovia). 
 
Cities outside ethnic republics: Moscow, St Petersburg, Voronezh, Tver. 
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Table 3 - Case Studies and Fieldwork 
 
ETHNIC GROUP FIELDWORK LOCATION 
Tatars Kazan, Moscow, Saransk 
Mordovians Mordovia 
Karelians Petrozavodsk, Tver  
 
Of the cities outside the ethnic republics, Moscow and St Petersburg were visited 
primarily to ensure access to scholars at relevant academic institutions and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), which provided valuable insights into the 
dynamics of majority-minority relations. Voronezh was chosen as an (overall) 
ethnically homogeneous city, although not devoid of ethnic tensions.
82
 Public 
officials, or former officials, were interviewed where possible. The data from 
interviews in Russia were complemented by interviews with five Council of Europe 
representatives. They had been involved in activities on the implementation of the 
FCNM and ECHR in Russia, or activities towards Russia’s ratification of the 
ECRML. 
 
Interviews 
The thesis includes data from interviews carried out in Russia in May, June and 
October 2010, and February 2011. Different questions were asked of different 
groups of respondents, depending on their specialisation. The respondents were 
divided into the following categories. The codes correspond to the coding system 
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 A Peruvian student was murdered by skinheads in Voronezh in 2005. See also, on Voronezh, 
SOVA, 2-10-2007. ‘A High Profile Neo-Nazi Leader Currently under Investigation’ 
http://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/news-releases/2007/10/d11682/  (accessed 1-10-2011). 
The OSCE had a mission to Voronezh in March 2009. See ‘OSCE Minorities Commissioner to 
Investigate Education Situation of Ukrainian Minority in Russia’. http://www.osce.org/hcnm/62767 
(accessed 15-10-2011). 
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used to identify respondents in the thesis. A full list of respondents and basic data 
on them is provided in Appendix 1. 
 
 1.1  civil society - (National Cultural Autonomy) (6 respondents) 
 1.2  civil society - minority NGO (11) 
 1.3  civil society - cultural association (7) 
 1.4  civil society - congress of peoples (3) 
 1.5  civil society - human rights NGO (11) 
 2  academia (23)  
 3  media (11) 
 4  public official (18)  
 5  school employee (2)  
 6  judiciary (3) 
 7  Council of Europe (5) 
 
Civil society was divided into five different groups. Besides National Cultural 
Autonomies, analysed in Chapter 8, I distinguish between minority NGOs and 
human rights NGOs: although partially overlapping, minority NGOs focus on 
minority concerns and the preservation of minority cultures, while human rights 
NGOs have a wider spectrum of activity which encompasses minority rights.  I 
refer to ‘cultural associations’ to indicate those semi-official organisations, 
sponsored by the state, that promote minority cultures, such as Houses of 
Nationalities, and can act as a focal point for minority groups in their regions. 
Finally, Congresses of Peoples are structures established by minorities themselves 
for internal decision-making (for example, the Congress of Karelians). 
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In total 95 people were interviewed in Russia - 47 women and 48 men. For 
the Council of Europe, I interviewed three employees and two expert consultants, in 
March and September 2010 respectively. Some respondents in Russia belonged to 
more than one of category (e.g. academics who were also activists working with 
minority associations). I classified the respondents according to their main 
profession at the time of the interview, but also indicated a possible overlap in 
categories in the list of respondents.  In just one case a former public official who 
worked for an academic institution at the time of the interview was classified as a 
‘public official’ rather than an ‘academic’, given that for most of his professional 
life he had been a public official [4.13]. The majority of the information the 
respondents shared with me was not of a particularly confidential or sensitive 
nature, but I preferred to keep all respondents anonymous, so as to guarantee their 
protection. Given my focus on political processes and institutions, I chose not to 
interview ‘ordinary’ persons belonging to national minorities - meaning persons not 
active in promoting their cultures and languages. I focused instead on ‘active’ 
respondents who fit one or more of the above categories. Among the respondents 
were also several ethnic Russians whose professional activities related to minority 
issues.   
I tried to meet respondents from the main institutions working on minority 
issues in all the regions visited, to maximise the representativesness of respondents. 
I started approaching potential respondents through my main contacts, who then 
recommended other contacts through a snowballing effect. I interviewed public 
officials working on nationalities policy at federal level as well as public officials at 
the regional level. There is no complete symmetry between the three case studies, 
as some of the institutions working on nationality issues differed slightly between 
regions (for example, there was no specific Ministry of Nationality Policy in Kazan, 
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while there was one in Petrozavodsk). In addition, logistic concerns prevented me 
from having access to a group of respondents that was fully representative. Some 
public officials or representatives of minority groups declined to take part of the 
study, in light of other commitments, lack of interest or, at times, what appeared to 
be suspicious attitudes towards a foreign researcher. Requests for interviews, 
particularly formal ones with public officials, sometimes required a go-between 
who could introduce me to the potential respondent, which could not always be 
arranged.  
Public officials interviewed were not representative of Russian public 
officials generally but of those working on minority issues. The same is true for the 
other categories of respondents. The same groups of respondents working in other 
spheres might have had differing views on international standards. The academics 
were primarily working for state institutions (the Institute of Ethnography of the 
Russian Academy of Science; the Russian Academy of Science of Tatarstan; and 
state universities in the cities visited). Civil society respondents were fairly 
representative inasmuch as I approached both persons affiliated to more 
‘traditional’ organisations and others working for more outward-looking 
institutions, seeking novel ways of pursuing their goals, including through the use 
of international standards. 
Data from interviews, like the information on respondents, was coded, using 
the following categories:  
1         Participation and civil society 
2         Education 
3         Nationalities Policy (minority language programmes etc) 
4         International standards 
5         Legislation, courts and the judiciary 
 52 
6         Media 
7         Federalism 
Within these core areas, I identified the respondents’ main messages and classified 
them. I based my analysis on the ‘framework analysis’ developed by Ritchie and 
Spencer (1994). It involves the identification of the thematic framework, indexing, 
charting, and mapping and interpretation. The list of codes was developed in 
tandem with the analysis of the data;
83
 the data were then compartamentalised 
though a theme-based approach. I did not use a software for qualitative data but 
simply cut and pasted the data from my interview transcripts and notes into word 
documents. As an example of coding, I list the themes for the category of data 
‘participation and civil society’. 
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 Some statements by respondents were simply excluded from the analysis, when respondents 
raised issues that were unrelated to the focus of the thesis. 
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Participation and Civil society – Main Themes: 
 
Spurious consultation 
Consultation (neutral) 
Cooperation with the authorities (neutral) 
Good cooperation with the authorities 
Lobbying (general) 
Lobbying not working 
Lobbying successful 
Partial success/compromise 
Funding matters 
Informal participation 
Activities of civil society (general) 
Participation and international standards 
Informal practices 
Importance of access of information for participation 
Strength of civil society 
Importance of civil society 
Weaknesses/problems of civil society 
Minority issues outside politics (culture but no politics) 
Authorities attending civil society meetings 
Registration issues 
Folklore and civil society  
The ‘vertical’ affecting civil society 
Bureaucracy affecting civil society 
Leaders of minority organisations (different aspects)  
Minorities exploiting their ethnicity (for personal interests) 
Civil society and extremism 
Election of minority representatives (congresses of people) 
 
The commonalities that were distilled from the data analysis related to overarching 
themes on: informal practices; varied attitudes to the application of international 
standards on Russia; the alternation of centralism and localism; issues of education 
and cultural homogenisation; and issues of (fictitious) participation. These are the 
main themes that are explored in the thesis and in the conclusions. 
After cross-checking information from interviews it became clear that some 
respondents tended to exaggerate their statements. For this reasons, I used data 
from the interviews with caution. I cross-referenced information from interviews 
with data from publications, including by Russian analytical institutions. I 
compared the answers from different categories of respondents, and remained 
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aware of possible over-statements that might be linked to a respondent’s profession 
or political orientation. In many cases the interviews pointed me to court cases or 
particular facts, which were added to my primary sources. Not all information from 
the interviews was used as data for the research: some of the issues brought up by 
respondents did not fit the framework of the thesis. Nevertheless, all general 
discussions with respondents contributed tremendously to my general 
understanding of the issues studied and the context in which they unfolded. 
Some of the areas analysed, such as the workings of Russian bureaucracy 
and informal networks, are very difficult to penetrate as an outsider. Additionally, 
when different insiders relate their individual experiences, it becomes fragmented 
and does not amount to the full picture. This is before one takes into account that 
insiders might themselves have a skewed perception of events. The complexity and 
the size of the subject studied was simply too great to allow sweeping deduction 
based on individual accounts. As a result, I have followed the documentary flow 
and have traced the information that was publicly available, whilst acknowledging 
the difficulties in gaining a full understanding of the forces behind events. For 
example, a delay in the implementation of a law could be interpreted as resistance 
to it, or be linked to bureaucratic hurdles. I therefore combined factual data and 
information from interviews, which was disaggregated by categories of 
respondents, and offered qualified interpretations of events. I was careful not to 
present interview data on their own as facts, to avoid instances of ‘data mining’ or 
anecdotalism - a frequent problem with the use of qualitative data (Silverman 2000, 
2005). 
When respondents classified particular data as ‘facts’ but these could not be 
corroborated, it was clarified in the thesis that their categorisation as ‘facts’ was 
made by the respondents, rather than constituting empirical evidence. When 
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multiple interpretations of the data were possible, this was also indicated. If 
different sources presented different interpretations, this was explained in the text. I 
used the interviews to gain insight into the facts and to gather information on the 
perceptions of the respondents. When reliable information on particular facts was 
unavailable, I have refrained from making conclusions, or have indicated that what 
I have offered was my own interpretation. 
Semi-structured, in-depth interviews were the most suitable method for this 
type of study. Although in some cases I participated in events as an observer (in 
seminars and minority festivals), I wished to gather direct testimonies from 
stakeholders. The interviews needed to be in-depth as frequently the underlying 
reasons for particular statements were not immediately apparent, and required a 
deeper investigation for such reasons to emerge. The interviews were semi-
structured as I often needed to ask several follow-up questions to unearth the 
meanings of particular statements; this would have been impossible with a fixed set 
of questions. Hence, although quantitative data obtained through surveys would 
have ensured a broader range of respondents, qualitative methods allowed me to 
uncover the reasons why respondents provided particular answers. I also wished to 
give representatives of minorities and civil society in Russia a voice, acting as a 
conduit for their interpretation and perception of events, which are seldom given 
attention.  
The thesis took into consideration the Joint EU/Council of Europe 
Programme ‘Minorities in Russia’ referred to above. This programme was 
examined: though a five-week study visit at the Council of Europe, in March and 
April 2010;84 through discussions with, or by interviewing, some of the experts 
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 In the Secretariat of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Directorate of 
Education and Languages. 
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involved in the programme; and through my participation in some of the 
programme’s research and activities from July 2010 to April 2011 as a Council of 
Europe expert consultant. The views expressed in this thesis in no way represent the 
views of the Council of Europe, but are wholly based on personal observations and 
analysis.  
In addition to data on interviews and academic literature, I used the 
following materials: Opinions of the Advisory Committee on the FNCM, 
particularly on Russia; other Council of Europe documents (such as 
recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and 
Committee of Ministers); shadow reports from Russian civil society to the 
Advisory Committee FCNM and other international bodies; jurisprudence (Russian 
and international jurisprudence on cultural rights of minorities, and cases on Russia 
in the European Court of Human Rights); articles from the Russian print media on 
relevant political developments, and selected outputs from the international media; 
Russian legislation relating to minorities and their cultural rights (including 
previous versions of current legislation and relevant amendments), and on the 
application of international law in Russia; proceedings from selected conferences in 
Russia relating to cultural rights of minorities. 
The working languages of the fieldwork were English and Russian. The 
majority of the interviews were conducted in Russian, unless the Russian 
respondents were fluent in English and indicated that they were fully comfortable in 
speaking English. The excerpts reported in the thesis were translated from Russian 
by the author. Interviews with Council of Europe experts were conducted in 
English. The persons belonging to minorities were, in nearly all cases, more fluent 
in Russian than in their minority languages, while few were bilingual. Media 
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outputs were accessed in English and Russian. Laws, including the republics’ 
regional legislation, were accessed in Russian. The logistical difficulties of learning 
additional languages prevented me from accessing the regional or local media 
outputs in minority languages.  
Finally, ethical issues could have emerged from interviews with 
representatives of civil society involved in activities considered controversial by the 
Russian authorities. The possible risks to interviewees were taken into account, and 
the research plan was reviewed by the UCL Research Ethics Committee. Those 
who took part in the interviews were informed of the research project’s aims, 
methods and use. Anonymity was guaranteed. 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
 
The thesis aims at analysing the application in post-Soviet Russia of international 
standards on the protection of national minorities with regard to their cultural 
rights. An additional research question is what factors determine a particular role 
for international standards. The thesis wishes to contribute to the discussion on 
multiculturalism and international standards on minority protection: on one side, 
since the 1990s in particular, issues surrounding minority rights have become 
internationalised; on the other, the ‘excessive’ attention to cultural diversity has 
come under criticism. Russia is not only a powerful actor in the international arena, 
but also a country of remarkable ethnic and cultural diversity, where the application 
of international standards presents specific challenges.  
 The research questions are addressed in the thesis using a methodology 
based on a broad range of semi-structured interviews, conducted mostly in Russia 
but also in Strasbourg. The research is based on the analysis of themes from 
interviews with seven categories of respondents (civil society, academia, media, 
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public official, school employee, judiciary and Council of Europe). The research 
uses inference and the comparison of three ethnic groups as case studies, discerning 
commonalities between them despite their differences. The main messages raised 
by the respondents crystallised around general trends, identified as: informal 
practices; varied attitudes to the application of international standards in Russia; the 
alternation of centralism and localism; issues of education and cultural 
homogenisation; and issues of (fictitious) participation. These factors are found to 
provide explanations for the challenges in the application in Russia of international 
standards on cultural rights of national minorities. 
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2. ‘TRANSPLANTING’ INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS ON CULTURAL RIGHTS TO 
RUSSIA   
 
Chapter 1 has outlined the structure of the thesis, definitions and the methodology 
used for the analysis. This chapter is divided into three main sections. First, it 
illustrates the notion and significance of legal transplantation, and theories on the 
role of cultural and socio-political factors in these processes. Second, it provides an 
overview of international minority rights law, which is linked to multiculturalist 
theories and then placed in the context of the broader international human rights 
system. The dynamic interaction of Russian and Western European legal traditions 
is further described. Third, it outlines aspects of Russia’s history that are relevant to 
the understanding of its present minority policies, and their interplay with 
international standards on minority rights. 
 
2.1 The Phenomenon of ‘Legal Transplantation’ 
 
The expression ‘legal transplant’ designates the transfer of a legal rule, or entire 
legal system of law, from one entity to another.
85
 Other expressions are used 
interchangeably, including ‘borrowing’ or ‘transposition’. Watson says: 
 
[R]eceptions and transplants come in all shapes and sizes. One might think 
also of an imposed reception, solicited imposition, penetration, infiltration, 
crypto-reception, inoculation and so on […] (1974: 30). 
 
                                                 
85
 The expression ‘legal transplant’, or ‘legal transplantation’, is used in this thesis. 
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Transfers are normally understood as taking place between the legal system of a 
state to another - although it has also be used to designate the incorporation of the 
ECHR by the Council of Europe member states (Bowring 2003b; 2008). Legal 
transplantation is common: Watson stresses the influence of foreign legal norms on 
most legislative systems; thus, for example, Roman law has influenced the legal 
system in Scotland, Greek law in Germany, Swiss law in Turkey, and French law in 
Ethiopia (1974: 102).  
A particular form of transfer of norms that has been the subject of a rich 
scholarly literature is ‘Europeanisation’.86 The term refers primarily to the 
integration of EU law and practices by EU member states.
87
 Since the start of EU 
enlargement, the scholarship on Europeanisation has shifted its focus from member 
states to candidate states, several of which are post-Communist, and required to 
harmonise domestic law, practices and institutions with the EU (Bauer et al 2007).
88
 
Europeanisation, although geographically specific, is wider in scope than legal 
transplantation, as practices and institutions, in addition to legal norms, have to be 
internalised by the member states.  
The conditions for EU accession are established in the Copenhagen criteria, 
and involve the development by the candidates of the capacity to apply EU law and 
practice, by undergoing an institutional reconfiguration in line with the regulations 
contained in the acquis communautaire. The candidate countries’ accession is 
regulated by EU conditionality, which acts as a ‘gatekeeper’, only allowing states 
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 Among others see: Bache (2012); Bauer et al (2007); Börzel (2003; 2012); Delanty (2005); ; 
Exadactylos & Radaelli (2012); Featherstone (2003); Goetz (2000); Goetz (2011); Grabbe (2001); 
Green Cowles & Risse (2001); Héritier (2001); Hughes et al (2004); Knill (1998); Knill & 
Lehmkuhl (2002); Ladi (2012); Ladrech (2012); Lynnggard (2012); Martinsen (2012); O’Dwyer 
(2006); Olsen (1996); Olsen (2002); Radaelli (2000); Risse et al (2001); Saurugger (2012). 
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 Risse et al define Europeanisation as: 
[T]he emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of 
governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political 
problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks 
specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules. (2001: 3) 
88
 In the wider sense, Europeanisation also involves states with limited prospects of accession (Ladi 
2012). The ‘neighbourhood’ countries also stand to benefit from grants and some trade relations. 
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complying with the acquis communautaire to advance along the path towards 
accession. Part of the influence exercised onto the EU member and candidate states 
as part of Europeanisation processes is what Olsen calls the ‘central penetration of 
national systems of governance’; this entails ‘adapting national and sub-national 
systems of governance to a European political centre and European-wide norms’ 
(2002: 924).  
 The literature on Europeanisation analyses the level of effectiveness of the 
juxtaposition of one system over another, with the interplay of international and 
domestic models, exogenous and endogenous elements. Similarly, the literature on 
legal transplantation has generated theories on the transplantability of legal norms: 
they aim at identifying what particular conditions are necessary to bring about a 
successful transplant - one that is effectively integrated into an existing system. 
When integration takes place, the transplant becomes a functioning addition to the 
receiving system, rather than being subsequently ‘rejected’ or remaining a mere 
appendage.  
One should note at the outset that the evaluation of the impact of transfers is 
fraught with difficulty. In the case of Europeanisation, authors have noticed that its 
processes are not amenable to measurement through dependent and independent 
variables, as transformation takes place amidst mixed, coevolving processes 
(Featherstone 2003: 4; Olsen 1996: 271). These processes, which can be more 
‘evolutionary than revolutionary’ (Green Cowles & Risse 2001: 236), follow 
tortuous trajectories in shifting circumstances. Meanwhile, the EU has no clear 
benchmarks at its disposal to measure the changes taking place within a state during 
EU-isation processes (Grabbe 2001: 1018). Thus, the patterns of convergence and 
divergence of member and candidate states around the EU core can be difficult to 
explain (Green Cowles & Risse 2001:  231). 
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Further complexities are linked to the issue of causality, or the identification 
of possible causal links between domestic change and specific mechanisms and 
institutions such as the EU or the Council of Europe (Exadaktylos & Radaelli 
2012). In relation to Europeanisation, scholars have argued that there exist multiple 
understandings of causality, meaning that the emphasis should be on understanding 
rather than measuring (Bache et al 2012; Lynnggard 2012). Causality in the context 
of Europeanisation is particularly complex as it comes as a package of varied 
(domestic and international) processes occurring simultaneously (Ladrech 2012), as 
well as in a non-linear fashion (Ladi 2012). Goetz points to a ‘missing link’ 
between pressure for change and adaptation, which, in his opinion, few analyses 
aim at identifying (2000: 222). One of the methods that may be employed for this 
purpose is the ‘tracing’ of causality through the examination of categories such as 
actors and policy instruments. One needs to isolate the ‘EU effect’, and examine the 
direction of causation with regard to selected policy episodes in the causal chain 
from EU to member states (Exadactylos & Radaelli 2012). The difficulty lies in the 
need to disassociate the change induced by the EU from endogenous elements 
(Exadaktylos & Radaelli 2012), or general globalising movements (Moravcik 1998: 
4). A complicating factor is the question of how to establish causality, if any, in the 
case of absence of change (Saurugger 2012). In some cases Europeanisation can be 
delayed or occur in stages that are not immediately detectable (Martinsen 2012). 
The transposition onto states of other international models, such as those of the 
Council of Europe, will be affected by the same dynamics.  
 
Cultural and Socio-Political Factors in Legal Transplantation 
Scholars have attributed varied degrees of importance to domestic legal and 
institutional cultures and practices in processes of transfer. Powell and DiMaggio 
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argue that the continuous interaction of institutions leads to convergence, even 
when structures have developed differently throughout their histories (1991). 
Others believe that the law develops in particular socio-political, as well as cultural, 
contexts (Pulchalska-Tych’ & Salter 1996). According to Orücü, cultural 
differences lead to a mismatch when legal systems have different traditions, such as 
socialist and religious ones versus legal systems that are not grounded on 
ideological or religious beliefs (2002: 219). In the context of Europeanisation, Knill 
sees the ‘degree of embeddedness’ of national institutional arrangements as a factor 
influencing domestic adaptation (1998: 24).
89
 Yet Green Cowles & Risse provide 
data claiming to disprove this position, which they refer to as the ‘isomorphism 
hypothesis’ (or the inability of Europeanisation mechanisms to take root given the 
deep historical and cultural entrenchment of domestic institutions) (2001). They see 
(EU) integration as a pragmatic choice: ‘actors evaluate existing models and 
determine which one is successful. They then adopt the model irrespective of its 
national origin.’ (Green Cowles & Risse 2001: 233) These two positions reflect 
those of Watson and of Kahn-Freund on legal transplants, who had already 
developed diametrically opposed views by 1974.
90
 Watson stressed the facility with 
which norms may be transferred, travelling across borders, downplaying a possible 
resistance to ‘foreign’ legal norms, or the importance of local legal culture: his view 
was that there is not necessarily a link between the law and the socio-political and 
economic situation of a country (1974: 2). Conversely, Kahn-Freund’s point of 
departure was the position that a law is shaped around the people for whom it is 
made (1974). The same concept is behind Ewald’s ‘mirror theory of law’, by which 
‘[L]aw is a mirror of society, and every aspect of the law is moulded by economy 
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 Other scholarship has argued on the importance of several other factors, such as the domestic 
capacity for reform (Knill 1998; Goetz 2000) . 
90
 For a comparison of the two theories, see Heim (1996). 
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and society’ (1995: 492). According to this model, the prerequisite for the 
transferability of legal principles is a close resemblance in the socio-political 
environment of the donor and recipient states (Kahn-Freund 1974; Heim 1996: 
196). Orücü sees as key to overcoming differences in what she calls the process of 
‘tuning’ – a form of adaptation of norms by adjusting them to local conditions 
(2002: 219).  
 In relation to Europeanisation, an additional factor in domestic 
transformation is the EU conditionality, and the pressure that can be applied by the 
EU. Divergence between the EU and the candidate state results in a ‘misfit’; in turn, 
a misfit leads to adaptational pressure (Green Cowles & Risse 2001: 222).  Héritier 
argues: 
 
Where the established policy of a member state diverges from a clearly 
specified European policy mandate, there will be an expectation to adjust, 
which in turn constitutes a precondition for change (2001: 1). 
 
At the same time, the detection of specific patterns of fits or misfits is problematic 
(Green Cowles & Risse 2001: 223). Even favourable conditions may not lead to 
convergence (Olsen 2002: 261-2). Factors determining the ‘goodness of fit’ are not 
fixed, as both the EU and member or candidate states continue to evolve (Börzel & 
Risse 2003). Additionally, a misfit might produce pressure, yet pressure might not 
necessarily induce change.  
Then, one needs to analyse the specific context of the transfer, as ‘goodness 
of fit’ approaches provide limited understanding of the presence or lack of change. 
In the case of Europeanisation, studies have shown that local factors tend to be 
more important than external factors (Hughes et al 2004), adaptation pressures 
interacting in different ways with local circumstances (Green Cowles & Risse 
2001). O’Dwyer sees a ‘combination of political opportunism and policy 
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unpredictability’ (2006: 153). If this is the case with the adaptation pressure of EU 
conditionality, it is likely to be even more so in the case of the Council of Europe, 
where there is no similar ‘gatekeeping’ mechanism to regulate compliance with 
international obligations.  
Thus, transformation is unpredictable. At the same time, what seems like a 
‘transfer’ from a ‘foreign’ system might in fact be rather less than this. The 
donating and the receiving systems do not tend to be completely separate entities, 
and there might be a blurring of the distinction of what is exogenous and 
endogenous. Where does one system start and another end? Different systems are 
not sealed off and isolated until the transplant takes place. Even when a new treaty 
is ratified, the provisions it contains can often be already present in some shape and 
form in the ratifying state’s legal system.91 Then, comparative law does not amount 
to the ‘comparison of two separate and unconnected entities, frozen in the present’ 
(Bowring 2003b: 180). Most systems are mixed, often the originating from multiple 
legal sources. It means that the analysis of a transplant necessitates the careful study 
of the relations between one polity and another, as well as the history and political 
situation of the receiving state.  
 
2.2 International Minority Rights Law in the Context of 
International Human Rights Law 
 
Before moving on to sketching the historical perspective of Russia’s nationality 
policies,
92
 in this section I outline some of the attributes of international minority 
rights law, placing it within the broader context of international human rights law. I 
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 For example, Watson argues: ‘Often the host system had a similar rule and little of importance 
was received apart from the terminology.’ (1974: 97) 
92
 See Section 2.3. 
 66 
then add considerations on international human rights law, in light of realist, 
ideational
93
 and republican liberal theories.  
Xanthaki argues that, although international human rights law does not refer 
directly to multiculturalism, its basic notions are reflected through it (2010). 
Although multiculturalism is not a monolithic body of thought, multiculturalists 
argue for the ‘equal recognition of cultures’ (Kelly 2002: 5) as a vital underpinning 
of ethnic groups’ coexistence. Multiculturalism is defined by Parekh as:  
 
[A] body of beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of people 
understand themselves and the world and organise their individual and 
collective lives. (Parekh 2006: 2-3) 
 
Multiculturalists have argued that multiculturalism can further stability in societies 
that are ethnically diverse, displaying forms of identification and, therefore, 
different and possibly conflicting loyalties. Multicultural policies, in their view, can 
further safeguard the cultural wealth of multicultural societies (Kymlicka 1995; 
Kymlicka 2007b; Parekh 2006; Phillips 2007; Taylor 1992; Young 1990). This 
position is based on the belief that diversity cannot simply be eliminated: it is a fact 
that the majority of states are and have been multi-ethnic. The attempt to transcend 
difference, with the (unrealistic) objective of creating a colour- and difference-blind 
society is not a viable option (Phillips 2002). The denial of difference does not 
solve its complexities, but merely removes them from public discourse. Instead, 
Smith values a policy that ‘engages rather than suppresses difference’ (1998: 204). 
Similarly, Phillips talks of ‘democracy through difference’ (2002: 5) [italics in 
original]. 
As noted, France is one of the countries that do not recognise the existence 
of minorities on its territory.94 It is an exception in Europe:95 although Merkel, 
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 Embracing human rights law for altruistic reasons. This and other theories are discussed below. 
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Cameron and Sarkozy’s pronouncements might suggest the opposite, overall there 
has been a departure from traditional Western theories of nationalism, which had 
been developed around ‘an idealized model of the polis in which fellow citizens 
share a common descent, language, and culture’ (Kymlicka 1995: 2). To attain this 
ideal, minorities have been eliminated, assimilated, expelled or segregated. Ideals 
of ‘cultural purity’ are unnatural, Kymlicka argues, since they keep ethnicities and 
nations frozen in their (supposedly) traditional forms. Instead, identities are in a 
state of flux, and the rule is ‘cultural hybridity’ (2007a: 100). The notion of cultural 
hybridity is a rejection of the ‘homogenous nation-state’, and of assimilationist or 
exclusionist policies (Kymlicka 1995; 2007b).  Packer places this in the context of 
human rights and freedoms: 
 
In contradistinction from the exclusivist, coercive and assimilating nature of 
the putative ‘nation-State’ which values ‘purity’, we must think in terms of 
securing and expanding opportunities for multiple, open and evolving 
cultures and identities: we must value freedom [italics in original]. (Packer 
1999: 270)96] 
 
On the other hand, there has been much criticism of multiculturalism. For example, 
Anderson sees multiculturalism in a negative light, noting that ‘many ‘old nations’ 
[…] find themselves challenged by ‘sub’-nationalisms within their borders - 
nationalisms which, naturally, dream of shredding this subness one happy day’ 
(1991: 3). Žižek argues that multiculturalism as an ideology is in fact ‘hegemonic’, 
and conjures up an ‘illusion of anti-racist multiculturalism’ (2011: 44). He believes 
that there is a form of racism masked as liberalism:  
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 A number of Latin American countries also reject the notion of ‘minorities’, considering it 
irrelevant to their populations (Thornberry 1991: 3). 
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 Of the Council of Europe member states, in May 2011 only four countries had not ratified nor 
signed the FCNM (France, Turkey, Monaco and Andorra); 39 had ratified and 4 signed it.  
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 See also Article 1 FCNM, stating that minority rights are ‘an integral part of the international 
protection of human rights.’  
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[T]his kind of “respect” for the Other is the very form of the appearance of 
its opposite, of patronizing disrespect. The very term “tolerance” is here 
indicative: one “tolerates” something one does not approve of, but cannot 
abolish, either because one is not strong enough to do so or because one is 
benevolent enough to allow the Other to retain its illusions - in this way, a 
secular liberal “tolerates” religion, a permissive parent “tolerates” his 
children’s excesses, and so on. (2011: 46)  
 
Barry sees as the pernicious consequence of an excessive attention to cultures. He 
believes that multiculturalism’s differentiated treatment is a menace to equality, as 
well as detracting attention from ‘universal human values’ and disadvantages 
shared by different ethnic groups, such as poverty (2001). Hasan likens 
multiculturalism to segregation and ghettoisation. Others have noted a potential for 
illiberal practices harming vulnerable persons within a minority (Okin 1999; Okin 
2002). It is linked to a fear that excessive tolerance might lead to illiberal practices 
in illiberal backwaters located within liberal democracies. 
 Inversely, both multiculturalist theories and international human rights law 
converge in the the belief of a strong correlation between the acceptance of 
diversity, with the recognition of its intrinsic value, and stability. The link between 
the acceptance of diversity and stability is also behind the international minority 
rights system, which originated from a desire to prevent gross human rights abuses 
against vulnerable minorities. The impetus for the promulgation of the FCNM came 
from the 1990s armed conflict in the Balkans (Martin Estebanez 2005: 271).
97
 The 
post of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities was established in 
1992 specifically to seek an early resolution of ethnic tensions. These tensions can 
emerge with the dominance of a culture over another, and the non-recognition of 
the value and dignity of minorities. It can be expressed by imposing a particular 
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qualifies minority rights as ‘an essential factor for peace, justice, stability and democracy’. PACE 
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language on minority groups: in these cases, language becomes the ‘emblem of that 
dominance’ (Crystal 2000: 77). The loss of control over one’s cultural expression 
(for example when witnessing the impending death of one’s language) can lead to a 
sense of alienation (Crystal 2000: 78). 
International human rights law has not developed its own definition of 
multiculturalism. However, the importance of culture, for all individuals, is 
recognised by international bodies such as the UN (particularly UNESCO) and the 
Council of Europe.
98
 States have endorsed (through signatures and ratifications) 
declarations and conventions that encompass multicultural approaches. For 
example, the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions
99
 had 116 states as parties in May 2011. There is 
an emerging consensus that a plurality of minority cultures and identities 
‘enrich[es] the fabric of society as a whole’.100  
One tenet of multiculturalism that is effectively at the foundation of 
international human rights law is the need for social integration. Multiculturalism 
does not necessarily imply fragmentation. Ideals of ‘unity’ and the accommodation 
of minorities are not mutually exclusive. Rather, it is the societal marginalisation of 
particular groups that can lead to radicalisation. Different ethnicities may feel a 
common loyalty towards their state, as in the commonly-cited example of 
Switzerland, with its multi-layered identity: the canton, the cultural/linguistic 
group, and the overarching Swiss identity (Spillman 1997: 203; 211). Indeed, 
Guibernau argues that the adoption of a ‘cosmopolitan attitude’, as an overarching 
identity, does not necessitate renouncing one’s national identity. It simply requires 
                                                 
98
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 20 October 2005, entered into force in 18 March 2007. 
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 General Comment No. 23: The Rights of Minorities (Art. 27). 08/04/1994. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, § 9.    
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adding another layer - a ‘cosmopolitan layer’ - to it (2007: 195). Multiple loyalties 
lead to ‘a balance between cohesion, equality, and difference’ (Xanthaki 2010: 24). 
In international minority rights law there is a strong emphasis on integration 
and social cohesion. For example, the FCNM’s Explanatory Report clarifies: 
 
[Article 5 FCNM] acknowledges the importance of social cohesion and 
reflects the desire expressed in the preamble that cultural diversity be a source 
and a factor, not of division, but of enrichment to each society.101 
 
This approach also addresses the issues of inequality and marginalisation. What 
may be perceived as inequality (the differentiated treatment of particular minorities) 
can in fact amount to a programme of  ‘special measures’, to build concrete 
opportunities for real, rather than apparent, equality. Affirmative action in support 
of minorities is widely recognised as non-discriminatory, and acting to elevate a 
minority to genuine equality with the majority.102  
 
International Standards or Double Standards? 
While the international minority rights system aims at simultaneously promoting 
cultural distinctiveness and integration, one should also note certain features and 
perceptions of it that impact upon its applicability in Russia.  
The international human rights system holds member states to account for 
what happens within their borders - unlike the regulation of interstate exchanges 
such as trade (Moravcsik 2000: 217-8). In the case of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), the rights of ‘everyone’ in a state’s jurisdiction are 
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 FCNM Explanatory Report (note 38), § 46. 
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 Article 1(4) of the UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD) (note 7), ratified by Russia in 1969, states that:  
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the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.  
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protected,
103
 and everyone is empowered to submit cases to the European Court of 
Human Rights. As a challenge to state sovereignty and self-determination, the 
international human rights system is an exceptionally radical development 
(Humphrey 1974). Why would governments be willing to renounce their full 
sovereignty for an internationally-managed system, on which they have no direct 
control? Moravacsik refers to two reasons: the coercion by great powers (realist 
approach) and altruistic reasons (ideational approach). Among the supporters of the 
realist theory there is a cynical strand that sees liberal values and human rights as a 
tool in the hands of powerful governments to add a veneer of legitimacy to 
essentially selfish geopolitical pursuits. In line with this interpretation, Donnelly 
talks about the United States’ ‘hegemonic power’ in relation to the Inter-American 
human rights regime
104
 (1986). Similarly, Waltz denounces the imposition of great 
powers’ ideas over other countries (reminiscent of the old adage cuius regio, eius 
religio): 
 
Like some earlier great powers, we [the United States] can identify the 
presumed duty of the rich and powerful to help others with our own beliefs 
[...]. England claimed to bear the white man’s burden; France had its 
mission civilisatrice (1979: 200). 
 
Additional pressure to embrace human rights norms has been seen to originate from 
international institutions that are not human rights-based but carry substantial 
weight, including in the area of human rights, such as the World Bank (Brysk: 
1994) and the European Union (Moravacsik 2000).105 These bodies have significant 
influence and may use their political and economic weight to force governments to 
join the human rights system. The ideational approach, instead, sees the human 
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 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights of the Organization of American States. 
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 Texts on minority rights include the European Parliament’s ‘Resolution on Linguistic and 
Cultural Minorities in the European Community’, A3-0042/94, 29 February 1994, Official Journal 
of the European Communities, No. C 61, pp. 110-113. 
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rights system as based on ideals which not all governments necessarily share, but 
which are promoted by civil society organisations through campaigning and 
lobbying. According to this theory, civil society and those governments that 
embrace the human rights system are driven by altruistic sentiments.  
 Moravacsik proposes a third approach: the ‘republican liberal’ theory, 
through which new democracies use international human rights mechanisms to 
‘lock in’, and thereby solidify, democratic institutions - protecting themselves 
(through outside support and ready-made institutions) against internal non-
democratic threats (2000: 219-20). In the realist and republican liberal approach, 
human rights are a pragmatic choice - to affect foreign and internal policies 
respectively.  
An in-depth analysis of the three theories in the Russian case is outside the 
scope of this thesis. Suffice to say that, whichever the motivation, Russia has 
formally acceded to the international human rights regime (first the UN, 
subsequently the Council of Europe and the OSCE). However, Russia has accused 
these international bodies of an anti-Russia political agenda, and of pursuing 
particularlistic interests rather than human rights - somewhat in line with the 
‘cynical strand’ of the realistic theory. For example, with regard to the OSCE, 
former President Vladimir Putin stated:  
 
They are trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument designed to 
promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries. And this 
task is also being accomplished by the OSCE’s bureaucratic apparatus.106 
 
What prompts such vehement criticism? Chandler points to a presence of double 
standards in the internationalisation of minority rights through the OSCE. He 
argues that this process has consisted in the development of standards for the ‘new 
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 Cited in Kolesnikov, A. 12-2-2007. ‘The Munich Speech. Vladimir Putin Tells Off the United 
States’, Kommersant. For more on Putin’s attitudes to international law see Chapter 3.  
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[Eastern European] democracies’ to guarantee peace in the new Europe - a need 
acutely felt following conflict in the Former Yugoslavia (1999: 67). To avoid the 
post-World War I scenario, when treaties on minorities were forced solely upon 
Eastern Europe, generating hostility, the OSCE standards were to be applied 
universally. At the same time, Western countries acted to reduce the scope of the 
OSCE’s impact on their internal affairs. Western countries insisted on strategic 
exclusions from the scope of international monitoring: Germany for ‘new’ 
minorities (to exclude its substantial immigrant population); the US for ‘indigenous 
peoples’ (to exclude American Indians); the UK and Turkey, with Spain’s support, 
for groups said to be involved in terrorism (to exclude matters involving Northern 
Ireland and the Kurds); and France for any ‘national minorities’ on its territory, by 
claiming that none existed (to exclude its population of Arab origins). Through 
these exclusions, particularly those negotiated by the UK and Turkey, possible 
conflicts in the West were left outside the scope of the OSCE monitoring. In this 
way, ‘universal’ standards can rather be likened to ‘double’ standards. This led to 
what Chandler defined as ‘the selective interpretation of what constituted a national 
minority question by Western states and the pragmatic acceptance of this 
framework by Eastern states.’ (1999: 66-7; 71) 
A very different scenario can be observed in the case of the UN. Here 
Russia (the Soviet Union) participated in defining the scope of the human rights 
system, including in early discussions in the 1940s on the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR).
107
 Russia remains an influential player in the UN by 
remaining a permanent member, with the veto, of the 15-strong UN Security 
Council.
108
 Instead, the Council of Europe is an institution in whose development 
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 The realist theory can of course be applied here - Russia may use its influence in the UN Security 
Council to pursue its political interests. 
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Russia has, for the most part, not been involved, including in the formulation of its 
fundamental treaty: the ECHR.109 The ECHR dates from 1950, while Russia joined 
the Council of Europe in 1996. Neither was Russia involved in the adoption of the 
two main Council of Europe instruments on national minorities and minority 
languages: the FCNM and the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages (ECRML).  For the late joiners, the Council of Europe required an 
accelerated route to the Council of Europe human rights system: in the case of 
Russia, it included a commitment that the ECRML would be ratified.
110
 Russia 
signed the ECRML but had still not ratified it in 2011 - resulting in non-compliance 
with this international obligation. Yet, France, which has also refrained from 
acceding to the ECRML is under no obligation to do so, being one of the ten 
countries that ratified the Statute of the Council of Europe in 1949, thereby 
establishing the institution.
111 Neither is France required to accede to the FCNM. As 
for some aspects of the OSCE minority rights regime, this can well create 
perceptions of double standards.  
In light of these considerations, I do not approach this study with an 
unshakeable belief that the international human rights system is necessarily and 
always an undiluted force for good, behind which lie purely altruistic motives. 
Pragmatic (realist) considerations might well lie behind many member states’ 
(including Russia’s) decision to develop and/or join these instruments. The 
republican liberal theory can also apply to Russia inasmuch as some aspects of 
human rights - such as the rule of law as opposed to ‘legal nihilism’112 - provide 
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 On the other conditions for accession, see Section 3.2. 
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 Medvedev’s expression. Cited in Vedomosti, 22-1-2008. ‘D. Medvedev: Rossiya - Strana 
Pravovogo Nigilizma’ (‘D. Medvedev: Russia - A Country of Legal Nihilism’). See also Section 4.1. 
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favourable foundations for the development of the existing political, legal and 
economic regimes.  
 
Russia, the West and ‘Legal Transplantation’ 
The comments voiced by Putin concerning the OSCE, reported above, speak of a 
suspicious attitude to international (‘Western’) institutions such as the OSCE, 
which become locked in an ‘us-and-them’ discourse. Yet, throughout its history, 
Russia has borrowed from Western models.
113
 Russian law had a pre-Soviet 
grounding on the Roman-Germanic legal family (Ajari 1995). Ajari writes: 
 
Political factors, rather than cultural difficulties, have prevented the draft of 
a Civil Code for the Russian Empire, heavily based on a pandectist [Roman-
Germanic] framework, from becoming positive law right before the First 
World War. The Draft […] imposed to reluctant revolutionary judges a 
difficult coordination between “socialist” and “bourgeois” rules. (1995: 94, 
note 3) 
 
Although Soviet legislation was based on uniformity and laicisation (after 
eliminating religious legacies such as Orthodox canon law or Islamic law), there 
were also other forces influencing it, some of which legacies of pre-Soviet times 
(Ajari 1995: 99; 101).  Russia continued to borrow from the West even during the 
Soviet Union with regard to its civil law (Ajari 1995: 94; Rudden 1994: 61). With 
the decline of the Soviet models, the Soviet Union explored alternative socialist 
models from Central and Eastern Europe, including Hungary and Poland, 
particularly during the perestroika. It paved the way for reaching out further West 
for additional alternative models. No longer required to be grounded on ideology, 
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 In the same fashion, there is also a long history of opposition to the West (Heim 1996: 210). 
While it reached its climax during the Cold War era, already under the reign of Peter the Great 
(1682-1725) several groups opposed reforms based on Western European models (Riasanovsky 
1995). 
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Russian legal scholarship could examine normative solutions, including those from 
foreign sources (Ajari 1995: 101; 109-10).  
Despite this, differences between Western Europe and Russia have been 
seized upon to justify claims that a treaty such as the ECHR, as a ‘Western’ 
instrument, cannot be applied in Russia. For example, Kharlamova (2009) cites 
historical and psychological reasons supposedly separating Russians from Western 
Europeans, such as Russian ‘spirituality’ and ‘irrationality’, as well as a presumed 
aversion to democratic reforms such as those initiated by USSR President Mikhail 
Gorbachev in the late Soviet period. Evidence that Gorbachev acted against the 
inclinations of his people, Kharlamova believes, is shown by his popularity in the 
West and concomitant unpopularity in Russia.  Western authors similarly refer to 
differences that may not be reconciled. Some describe Russia’s judicial system as 
mirroring a ‘hybrid’ political system - a ‘pluralistic form of authoritarianism’ 
(Solomon 2005). Others suggest that specific features of the Russian judicial 
system, such as nadzor - the re-opening of legal proceedings that should be final - 
are opposed to the ‘Western principles of […] the right to a fair trial.’ (Pomeranz 
2009: 35)  
It can of course be disputed that the right to a fair trial is a uniquely 
‘Western’ concept - for example, jury trials presided over by independent judges 
operated in Russia from 1864 to 1917 (Bowring 2009b: 259). Human rights 
principles have not been transplanted from the ‘West’ onto a Russian tabula rasa. 
Concepts associated with human rights law were already present in pre-Soviet 
Russia (Bowring 2008).
114
 Bowring argues that with the ratification of the ECHR, 
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 While some authors argue that Marxism and human rights are incompatible (e.g. Kolakowski 
1983), others believe that human rights are a component of socialism, and that Maxism not only has 
an authoritarian tradition but also a human rights one (Lane 1984: 350). Thus, in the Soviet Union, 
while political rights were often repressed, there was an emphasis on social (and collective) rights 
(Lane 1984: 352). Social, economic and cultural rights are now part of the international human 
rights system.  
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its principles are not transferred into a completely different ‘body’ of law, or legal 
system and tradition, but are in fact a rediscovery of principles that had been part of 
the Russian legal tradition. Contacts with, and travel to, the West has resulted in 
what Bowring calls ‘dynamic interplay of Russian and Western European […] 
history and traditions.’ (Bowring 2003b: 176). The importing of Marx’s theories 
also effectively consists in the transfer of a (Western) theory and its application in 
Russia. Another import has been the idea of National Cultural Autonomy, which 
first appeared in 19th century Vienna, and was applied, following a process of 
adaptation, in post-Soviet Russia. Equally, principles underlying Soviet and post-
Soviet programmes for the promotion of minority languages and cultures, such as 
education in minority languages, closely resemble those contained in the Council of 
Europe’s FCNM and the ECRML. International human rights law has been 
increasingly employed by Russian human rights lawyers and judges in post-Soviet 
Russia. Then, it becomes difficult to draw a dividing line between Russia and the 
rest of Europe. It means that the ECHR present not only exogenous, but also 
endogenous elements, or at least principles that have, in previous historical phases, 
been internalised by Russia, and harmonised with its legal culture. Legal 
‘transplantation’ is not as clear-cut as the transplantation of a foreign organ into a 
body - despite the frequently used analogy. It can occur imperceptibly, over time, 
through the interaction of different actors and legal cross-fertilisation (Bowring 
2003b: 2008). Moreover, transplantation is not forcefully only one way - from West 
to East. Despite this, international law in Russia has not fully shaken off the label of 
chuzhoy, or alien, as will be shown below.
115
 To better analyse Russia’s current 
interaction with international minority rights law, we now need to turn our attention 
to the specificities, and historical foundations, of Russia’s nationalities policy. 
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2.3 Historical Perspectives: Russia and the National 
Question and Minority Rights 
 
In Sergei Eisenstein’s 1944 film Ivan the Terrible, the 1552 defeat of the Kazan 
Khanate at the hands of the Russians is portrayed as a glorification of Russian 
power and a humiliation for the Tatars. After victoriously chanting ‘to Kazan!’, the 
city is swiftly and effortlessly taken by the Russians (in reality, the Russo-Kazan 
wars had unfolded since 1438). The military venture is presented as a reaction to 
the boldness of the envoy from the Kazan Khanate, who had presented Ivan with a 
knife with the suggestion he uses it to commit suicide - adding that ‘Kazan is big’ 
and ‘Moscow is small’. 
This is an example of a culturally insensitive approach to Russia’s 
multinational character. Gibatdinov argues that, throughout the history of Russia, 
Islam was portrayed in publications as a ‘fake’ religion (2010); and Shnirelman 
presents evidence of textbooks being employed to support particular versions of 
history (1999; 2006; 2009).116 At the same time, the Soviet Union has been 
famously described as an ‘affirmative action empire’, with ‘the most ambitious 
affirmative action programme in history’ (Martin 2001: 2).117 Hence, nationality 
issues, although devoted considerable attention, have rested on contradictory 
foundations, shifting between the two poles of promotion of cultural 
distinctiveness, and its hindrance. Soviet nationalities policy provides a key 
example of this oscillation. 
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 This was not only the case of ethnic Russians. Shnirelman equally shows that, in the ethnic 
republics, there have been similar cases of ethnocentric representations of history by other 
nationalities.  
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 Prior to this, in Imperial Russia, Catherine the Great’s policy was to  refrain from commanding 
religious uniformity while instead introducing a ‘policy of toleration’ for its many faiths (Crews 
2006: 2). 
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The Soviet approach to the ‘national question’ sought to forge a strong link 
between ethnicity and territory, encapsulated in Stalin’s definition of a nation as a: 
 
[H]istorically evolved, stable community based on a common language, 
territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a 
community of culture [italics added].  (Stalin 1950: 239) 
 
On the basis of this principle, Soviet ethnic federalism was established. The Soviet 
Union (and Russia’s precursor, the RSFSR118) was divided into territories, several 
of which were ‘assigned’ to particular ethnicities.119 This created a form of 
asymmetric federalism: a hierarchy of independence ranging from the union 
republics, to autonomous republics down to smaller units.120 With some 
adjustments,121 the structure of Russia’s federalism was preserved in post-Soviet 
Russia. In 2011 Russia had 83 subiekti (subjects, or territorial units), comprising: 
21 ethnic republics (formerly autonomous republics), 46 oblasts, nine krai, four 
autonomous okrugs, two federal cities (Moscow and St Petersburg) and one 
autonomous oblast (Jewish).
122
 The concept of ‘nationalities’ was based on 
essentialist notions, nationalities being seen as entities with intrinsic characteristics. 
The view propagated by Soviet ethnologist Lev Gumilev, in particular, saw these 
ethnic groups as regulated by natural rather than social processes - as self-contained 
entities with a permanent, immutable identity, transferred from generation to 
generation (Bassin 2007). 
Soviet nationalities policy supported ethnic and cultural diversity. Since 
language  was considered the predominant ethnic marker in the Soviet Union, the 
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state established schools in minority languages (Slezkine 1994).123 The local 
administration was transferred to local leaders through the process of korenizatsiya 
(indigenisation). Local leaders filled positions in the local administration, the local 
Communist party, the judiciary and industry, through complex quota systems. 
Admission to the best universities was also dependent on membership of the titular 
group. Overall, in local government titular groups were overrepresented, and 
affirmative action policies continued up to perestroika (Gorenburg 2003; Slezkine 
1994).  
Indeed, the advent of Communism was portrayed by its leaders as the end of 
the oppression of the Russian Empire’s peoples. Lenin’s 1917 ‘Declaration of the 
Rights of the Peoples of Russia’ contained guarantees of self-determination and 
equality. Lenin further argued that Marxism required centralism in order ‘to sweep 
away the old, medieval, caste, parochial, petty-national, religious and other 
barriers’, but this had to be a form of ‘democratic centralism’ (1913). This type of 
centralism would not preclude local self-government or autonomy:  
Obviously, one cannot conceive of a modern, truly democratic state that did 
not grant such autonomy to every region having any appreciably distinct 
economic and social features, populations of a specific national composition 
(Lenin 1913). 
 
The Soviet Union was, then, based on anti-imperialist values and self-determination 
of its peoples, at least in principle.124 Although what ensued deviated significantly 
from the originally-conceived ‘democratic centralism’, the Soviet Union had some 
degree of localism: local self-government constituted a mechanism for control but 
also provided some level of representation, involving people in the life of the 
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 Local languages were considered necessary to reach workers. As Stalin wrote, only the mother 
tongue enables ‘a full development of the intellectual faculties of the Tatar or of the Jewish worker.’ 
(Stalin 1050: 21) 
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 Ideologically the Communists were opposed to colonisation, although Hirsch points out that the 
Soviet Union could not have survived without the material resources of its constituent parts (2005: 
78).  
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community (Bowring 2010b: 665-6; Tiskhov & Filippova 2002). Bowring traces 
the legacy of regional autonomy back to the imperial past, for example in the case 
of Finland (Bowring - forthcoming). While imperial and Soviet Russia tend to be 
known for their absolutist, centralised policies, both also saw instances of local 
autonomy: the zemstva (local government) and the mir (peasants’ communities) in 
Imperial Russia; and later the ‘soviets’ (workers’ councils). Hosking argues that the 
success of the ‘soviets’ in 1905 and 1917 was primarily due to ‘the long experience 
of both peasants and workers in creating and running their own grass roots 
institutions’ (1990: 26).125  
Local and regional autonomy has benefited nationalities. From the 16
th
 
century, according to a mutual agreement between Moscow and the Kazan and 
Astrakhan Khanates, Tatars were able to retain their language and religion, as well 
as their lands, in exchange for loyalty to the tsar (Kutafin 2006). There were also 
opportunities to self-manage in the area of education: for example, Kokko and 
Kon’kova relate how the 19th-century reforms of Alexander II, with the 
establishment of zemstva, enabled the Ingrian Finns to organise their education in 
the Finnish language, including (as of 1863) a three-year course for Finnish 
teachers, taught in both Finnish and Russian. In 1888 there were already 38 Finnish 
schools in Ingria (a part of the present Leningrad oblast), and, in 1913, 229 schools 
(Kokko and Kon’kova 2009: 18).  
At the same time, the Soviet nationalities policy lacked coherence, with an 
alternation of liberal and illiberal practices. Although titular nationalities were 
usually able to preserve their ethnic diversity, certain minorities were subjected to 
repressive and deeply traumatic measures such as mass deportation during the 
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Stalin period - notably the Chechens, Crimean Tatars and Germans.126 The 
Karelians and Mordovians interviewed who had lived in the Soviet period, 
described social attitudes that eroded their dignity as representatives of their ethnic 
groups, leading to widespread feelings of shame in their origins. Another aspect of 
identity - religious expression - was repressed, in the case of minorities and ethnic 
Russians alike, with the killing of priests and the closure of churches and mosques, 
in the belief that religious institutions might hamper the process of collectivisation 
(Duncan 1999).127 At a minimum there was a lack of real autonomy from Moscow 
(Melvin: 207; Sakwa, 2008: 228) - as regional leaders recruited by the Bolsheviks 
had to be unremittingly loyal (Duncan 1999; Roeder 1991). Unwavering ‘loyalty’ 
meant that in practice these leaders were not in a position to fully represent the 
interests of their ethnic group.128 Ultimately, whether the regions and localities 
could exercise some autonomy in decision-making depended on the centre. And, 
during the Soviet Union, following an auspicious start, Stalin criticised the ‘local 
nationalism, including the exaggerated respect for national languages’129 that had 
characterised the Union’s initial phases. Thus, the numbers of schools in minority 
languages decreased from the end of the 1930s onwards (Gorenburg 2003). To 
return to the example of Finnish-language schools, in the late 1930s teaching 
exclusively in the Russian language was imposed, together with the closure of 
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Finnish newspapers and Lutheran churches (Kokko and Kon’kova 2009: 18). The 
Soviet Union moved from Lenin’s original notion of ‘democratic centralism’ to 
top-down, exclusivist decision-making. 
Overall, the regulation of ethnicity fundamentally occurred in a top-down 
fashion. The wishes of minorities were rarely taken into account in formulating 
nationalities policy. Language policies required minorities to learn a mother tongue 
determined by their ethnicity, itself biologically inherited from their parents,130 
regardless of personal linguistic preferences and habits (Slezkine 1994: 416; 432). 
Due to the fact that Soviet leaders considered several non-Russian nationalities as 
‘backwards’, the state adopted a deeply paternalistic and patronising attitude 
towards them. The Soviet leaders effectively repressed the cultural traditions of 
certain ethnic groups by forcing them to work in collectives (Hirsch 2005: 251). 
This approach points to a legacy of management of diversity rather than its respect, 
or engagement with it - a form of ‘managed diversity’. It further indicates a policy 
based on assumptions as to the meanings of diversity - based on essentialist notions 
of minority groups, seen as internally homogeneous collectives.  
The Soviet legacy can be seen in the context of an alternation of localism 
and centralism. A clarification of the meaning of these two concepts - localism and 
centralism - may be helpful here. There are two sides of ‘localism’: as a form of 
local autonomy that can accommodate the specific needs of minority communities; 
and as fragmentation of federal policies into uncoordinated activities at the local 
level.  In the first case, local autonomy serves to promote minority rights, as 
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cultural diversity can be better enabled through decentralisation and flexibility. 
Grin suggests that decentralisation is conducive to enhanced participation: 
 
[I]t appears likely […] to be easier to implement [participatory democracy] 
in institutionally decentralised settings [...]. This multiplies the levels at 
which practical arrangements can be designed for individuals citizens and 
grassroots movements to make their concerns heard [italics added]. (2003: 
152-3).
131
 
 
In the second case, localism can lead to a laissez-faire approach that atomises 
efforts at the local level without their integration into coherent federal policy on 
national minorities, and with insufficient financial and technical support from the 
centre. Centralism can provide an antidote to fragmentation, through a coherent 
framework for local efforts - but it can also lead to the imposition of centrally-
conceived policies, without the participation of civil society, including 
representatives of national minorities. Centralism is linked to the concentration of 
power by the central authorities: as Wolman puts it, ‘to centralise is to concentrate 
by placing power and authority in a center, while to decentralize is to disperse or 
distribute power from the center’ (1990). Elander argues that ‘neither centralism not 
localism are inherently good or bad’, as their functions and approaches to them 
vary, nor are local autonomy and democracy always inextricably linked (1997). An 
alternation of localism and centralism is also a feature of post-Soviet Russia, and a 
recurring theme in this thesis.  
In post-Soviet Russia attention is paid to ethnic diversity and there has been 
a proliferation of government programmes on nationalities. As part of its 
implementation of the FCNM, the Russian government has submitted to the 
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Council of Europe three substantial reports,132 outlining its programmes for the 
preservation and development of minority cultures and languages. In its 2006 
Second Opinion on the implementation of the FCNM by Russia, the Advisory 
Committee of the FCNM (ACFC) acknowledged that ‘the Russian Federation has 
adopted a positive approach to the Framework Convention’s monitoring process’.133 
This statement was echoed by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe, which, in 2007, stated that the Russian authorities had ‘continued to pay 
attention to the protection of national minorities’.134 The tradition of teaching 
minority languages and cultures, as well as teaching through the medium of 
minority languages, has continued in post-Soviet Russia. In 2007 the Council of 
Europe’s ACFC noted that in all of Russia’s territorial units there were at least 
some schools providing teaching of minority languages and cultures, while also 
acknowledging attempts between the first and second reporting cycles (2000 to 
2005) to increase the teaching in large cities and for dispersed minorities.135 Yet 
there continue to be impediments to minorities’ participation in decision-making 
regarding matters that affect them, leading to the formulation of policies that, as in 
the Soviet period, tend to be centrally-defined and essentially top-down. This 
situation due to an absence of guarantees that bottom-up initiatives will be 
effectively forwarded up to decision-making levels.  
What is the reason for such a lack of guarantees? We come to another 
Soviet legacy and feature of post-Soviet Russia: around the core, centrally-
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developed policies radiate a myriad of ad hoc, ‘informal’ practices. The 
predominance of such practices in lieu of universal rules has been documented by 
Ledeneva: these are (often illegal) means based on ‘opportunistic logic’, that 
involve, among other things, the use of unofficial channels, including the 
alternative enforcement of the legislation, to achieve particular ends (2006). These 
circumstances do not signify an utter absence of formal practices and of the rule of 
law in Russia. However, a web of informal, opaque practices can be traced, existing 
alongside formal structures. As Ledeneva puts it: 
 
[I]nformal practices were an integral part of the postsocialist transformation 
[…] they were beneficial for certain individuals but also made them hostage 
to the system. These practices were not simply illegal but integrated the law 
into political, media, and business technologies, often manipulatively. 
Similarly, they did not simply follow or contradict informal norms but relied 
on some of them and played one set of norms against the other (2006a: 
190).  
 
Although persons belonging to minorities might themselves benefit from personal 
networks, their arbitrariness denies the guarantees of a fully functioning legal 
system. 
 This outline has identified three features of Russia’s approach to 
nationalities: a tendency to formulate top-down policies; the coexistence of 
devolution (localism) and centralising tendencies; and the ubiquity of informal 
practices. These characteristics, as will be seen later, have a profound impact upon 
the application of international standards on minority protection in Russia. At the 
same time, attempts have been made to incorporate these standards into Russian 
law and practice in post-Soviet Russia - a period characterised by internal 
uncertainty, including as to what it means to be ‘Russian’. 
Two roots for this uncertainty are to be found in Russian history. Hosking 
points to a choice not to build a Russian nation-state during the Soviet Union 
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(2005), which meant that the Union’s collapse left not only an ideological, but also 
an identity, vacuum. The concept of russkii (belonging to the Russian nation) had 
by then become ephemeral, supplanted by vague notions of a ‘Soviet people’. 
Meanwhile, Russians have historically perceived themselves at the core of a 
multinational empire, or the ‘Staatsvolk - the dominating people of a multinational 
state’ (Opalski 2002: 299). This has implied a need to re-position themselves, and 
re-shape their identity, following the loss of much of this ‘empire’ as the Union 
fragmented (Hosking 1998). It generated the russkii vopros, the ‘Russian question’ 
- or doubts as to Russians’ self-definition vis-à-vis other nationalities sharing the 
same territory (Simonsen 1996: 91). By the same token, post-Soviet Russia has 
seen a renewed effort - from critics, politicians and others - to ‘forge the nation’ 
(Tolz 1998; Tolz 2001). One of the approaches to self-definition is neo-imperial 
and grounded on Eurasianism, with the aim of creating an ‘Eurasian home’ for the 
Russians and non-Russian nationalities residing in Russia (Opalski 2002: 301). It is 
while ‘forging a nation’ that Russia has taken upon itself the international 
obligations resulting from ratification of international treaties on human rights and 
minority protection.   
 
 
2.4 Conclusion: Russia Between East and West? 
 
Two main considerations emerge from this chapter. First, in each case study on 
legal transplantation, the legal tradition and culture of the receiving state, and its 
theoretical or ideological foundations, are complex, and derived from ever-
changing political circumstances. In the case of Russia, one has to take into account 
the nuanced nature of its history, its complex relationship with the West - at times 
rejected as the ‘other’, at times used as a model - and its dual identification with a 
 88 
Western and Eurasianist tradition. One ought to avoid forcing the Russian system 
into the reductionist model that sees it as a quintessentially centralised and 
autocratic state. 
Second, ‘fits’ and ‘misfits’ between the international and domestic systems 
are also complex, and cannot be easily placed into two fully distinct categories. The 
richness and complexity of Russia’s history means that the same tradition can have 
both fits and some misfits. For example, although the Russian judiciary has seen a 
tradition of servility, there have also been instances of judicial independence. 
Related to this concept is the fact that the drawing of a dividing line between Russia 
and the ‘West’ would be an artificial exercise, as the two systems have not 
developed by following two separately and mutually exclusive trajectories. 
The question arising from this chapter, and addressed in the thesis, is 
whether the multiculturalist views that are at the core of minority rights law - 
particularly the marriage of integration and cultural distinctiveness - are 
transferrable to Russia. These views have also emerged in Russia. They may be 
conceived as a way of preserving Russia’s linguistic and cultural wealth without 
jeopardising social cohesion through an overarching, all-inclusive identity for its 
groups alongside the preservation of cultural pluralism. Tishkov has acknowledged 
the impossibility of a ‘monoculture’ in Russia:  
 
[A] democracy should be built on the recognition of diversity, rights, 
demands and interests that are linked to people’s culture, their ethnic and 
religious origins; at the same time a civic solidarity [for all citizens] should 
be affirmed. In Russia there is talk of Russian [rossiiskii] identity, of all-
Russian [obshcherossiiskii] patriotism. The formula here should not be 
‘either-or’ (either an ethnic Russian or a Russian citizen; either a Chechen 
or a Russian citizen) but ‘both’. Democracy should be built in a way to 
reflect this complexity [italics added]. (2011)
136
 
 
                                                 
136
 See Section 1.1 (note 16). 
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This implies the need for Russia’s engagement with difference, rather than an 
attempt ultimately to eliminate it - an approach is analogous to that of the 
international minority rights system. Opalski examines the question from the point 
of view of Kymlicka’s theory of liberal pluralism (1995), and argues that the 
essentialism and collectivism of the nationality discourse in Russia are not 
conducive to the application of Kymlicka’s theories: Russia has a culture that 
‘continues to rely heavily on the language of institutionalized ethnicity, ethnic 
federalism, and ethnic group rights.’ (Opalski 2002: 316) This raises the question of 
whether the natural process of building a new, post-Soviet identity is creating 
multi-layered identities of equal dignity, or a ‘core’ Russian, effectively 
supremacist, culture. International standards could play a role in furthering the 
former approach - that of a multiculturalist society - or remain a mere appendage at 
the periphery of a more or less covert Russian nationalist discourse that 
marginalises, or assimilates, other cultures. 
In the assessment of transferability of international (Council of Europe) 
standards on minorities’ cultural rights to Russia, one has to acknowledge the 
complexity in establishing causal links between such standards and developments 
in Russia. As noted in the previous chapter, the qualitative data contained in the 
thesis is based on the interpretations of domestic change by the respondents. It does 
not aim at identifying all processes of causality, but at highlighting gaps in 
implementation between international obligations and corresponding actions by the 
Russian government. They will be analysed in light of some of Russia’s main 
characteristics in relation to its nationalities policy identified in this chapter: a 
tendency to formulate top-down policies; the coexistence of devolution (localism) 
and centralising tendencies; and the ubiquity of informal practices. 
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     PART 1: PRACTICE AND LAW 
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3. SELECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN RUSSIA  
 
Chapter 2 has elucidated the notion of legal transplantation and stressed the 
dynamic interaction of Russia’s and European legal traditions. It has further 
described the historical approach to nationality issues in Russia, and the features 
that can constitute obstacles to multiculturalism and the implementation of 
international standards on minority protection: the tendency to formulate top-down 
policies, the coexistence of localism and centralism, and the prevalence of informal 
practices.  
This chapter assesses the ambivalent reception of international law in 
Russia. It investigates how the specific characteristics of the Russian legal 
environment and of the relevant international standards generate a particular type of 
dynamics between the two. It is argued that, despite legally endorsing the 
supremacy of international law over domestic law, Russia reserves the right, in 
practice and in selected cases, not to honour its commitments. It has developed 
what I call a ‘selective implementation’ - a form of application of international law 
that is short of ‘implementation’ per se, as discussed below. Despite these 
reservations, the application of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), has, overall, progressively increased in Russia since ratification; yet, in 
the specific case of international minority rights and the Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), the impact of international standards 
is reduced by the flexible nature of their application in Russia, itself facilitated by 
the standards’ own fluidity. It creates a legal environment for minority rights in 
which the practice can weigh more significantly than the law.   
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It has already been noted that, in examining the application of international 
law in Russia, I focus on Council of Europe mechanisms.
137
 This and the next 
chapter incorporate the analysis of the application not only of its minority-specific 
convention, the FCNM, but also the ECHR. Although the ECHR has limited impact 
on the promotion of minority rights, not being designed specifically to protect 
minority rights, its implementation is a barometer for the implementation of 
international human rights standards in the wider sense. To date the ECHR has no 
provisions, nor is there yet a protocol, specifically relating to minority rights. Cases 
concerning minority rights must be based on provisions such as Article 3 (inhuman 
and degrading treatment), Article 8 (respect for family and private life) and Article 
14 (discrimination in the enjoyment of other specific rights). In this way it provides 
basic guarantees for vulnerable groups including minorities, which grows with its 
ever-expanding case-law.
138
 Unlike the ACFC’s Opinions,139 ECtHR’s judgements 
against Russia in most cases require the payment of sums of money as ‘just 
satisfaction’, and are subject to enforcement through the Council of Europe’s 
Committee of Ministers. 
 In the first part of the chapter,  I introduce the notion of Russia’s ‘selective 
implementation’ of international law in Russia. In the second and third sections, I 
present the results of interviews with public officials and with civil society, 
outlining their perceptions on the role and impact of international law. I supplement 
these data with those from interviews with Council of Europe experts: three 
Council of Europe employees and two external experts who have sat on Council of 
Europe monitoring bodies – for the FCNM and the European Charter for Regional 
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 Section 1.1. 
138
 On the ECHR and minority rights see also Section 4.2. 
139
 The monitoring process is based on country reports submitted, at intervals of five years, by the 
state party to the FCNM, data from civil society (shadow reports), and ACFC’s visits to the States. 
On the basis of this data, the ACFC compiles Opinions, which are followed by Resolutions of the 
Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers. 
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or Minority Languages (ECRLM).
140
 I conclude by offering my interpretation as to 
the selectivity of implementation of international standards in Russia.  
 
3.1 ‘Applying’ without ‘Implementing’: Russia’s Selective 
Implementation 
 
As noted, the incorporation of the ECHR into Russian law and practice amounts to 
a form of ‘legal transplantation’ (Bowring 2003: 164). However, the adoption of 
legislation and its implementation are two distinct processes. For example, Hughes 
et al argue that states might incorporate the acquis communautaire into domestic 
law but not be equipped with the capacity to implement the new provisions. They 
conclude that the process of ‘formal legislative engineering […] has to 
accompanied by a more informal process of normative adaptation and policy 
learning if the former is to be effective.’ (Hughes et al 2004: 165) The specific form 
of implementation largely depends on the type of ‘reception’ of international law in 
each state. 
Russia has engaged in substantial legal reform since its accession to the 
Council of Europe. It needed to remedy the fact that, following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, it was ill-fitted to join the Council of Europe. This was highlighted in 
1996 by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE):141 
 
[T]he legal order of the Russian Federation does not, at the present moment, 
meet the Council of Europe standards as enshrined in the statute of the 
Council and developed by the organs of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.
142
  
 
                                                 
140
 In interviews the respondents affiliated to the Council of Europe were asked to express their 
personal opinions and observations, and as such are not to be taken as reflecting the official position 
of the Council of Europe. 
141
 PACE, ‘Russia’s Application for Membership of the Council of Europe’, 18 January 1996, Doc. 
7463. 
142
 PACE, ‘Report on the Conformity of the Legal Order of the Russian Federation with Council of 
Europe Standards’, 28 September 1994, Doc. AS/Bur/Russia (1994)7. 
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There were even fears that Russia, by acceding to the Council of Europe, would 
lower the institution’s human rights standards, with a consequent loss of status of 
the Strasbourg law (Janis 1997: 94). Russia’s admittance to the Council of Europe 
was conditional upon its institutional and legal reform, to harmonise its laws and 
practices to Council of Europe principles.143 Russia, then, embarked on a legal 
reform programme which was as rapid as it was deemed promising (Nussberger 
2008: 667) - leading to the adoption of new criminal and civil provisions. The 
foundations of Russia’s legal reform programmes were laid on the 1993 
Constitution’s Article 15(4), which declares the supremacy of international law 
over Russian law: 
 
The universally-recognized norms of international law and international 
treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation shall be a component part 
of its legal system. If an international treaty or agreement of the Russian 
Federation fixes other rules than those envisaged by law, the rules of the 
international agreement shall be applied [italics added]. 
 
 
However, there is a tension between this and paragraph 1 of the same article, 
which, instead, proclaims the Constitution, rather than international law, supreme: 
The Constitution of the Russian Federation shall have the supreme juridical 
force, direct action and shall be used on the whole territory of the Russian 
Federation [italics added].   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Article 17(1) of the Constitution seems to place the two at the same level: 
In the Russian Federation recognition and guarantees shall be provided for 
the rights and freedoms of man and citizen according to the universally 
recognized principles and norms of international law and according to the 
present Constitution [italics added]. 
 
                                                 
143
 In the Final Declaration of  the Council of Europe’s Vienna Summit of 9 October 1993, member 
states of the Council of Europe stated that they would ‘welcome the democracies of Europe freed 
from the Communist oppression’. However:  
Such accession presupposes that the applicant country has brought its institutions and legal system 
into line with the basic principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. 
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This tension is symptomatic of the complex relationship between Russian law and 
international law. Russia is simultaneously proclaiming international law to be 
above Russian law and the opposite, in the same constitutional provision. In 
Russian judicial practice international law has prevailed over domestic law in the 
event of conflict between the two,
144
 but not specifically in cases of conflict with 
the Constitution. The assumption that international law is superior even to Russia’s 
highest legal norms, the Constitution, has been called ‘a very bold proposition’ 
(Danilenko 1999: 64). Burkov solves this conundrum by pointing to the fact that in 
cases of conflict the Constitution would need to be amended, allowing international 
de facto supremacy but not its direct invalidation of Russian constitutional norms 
(2007).145 The amendment would be introduced voluntarily by Russian institutions 
rather than being imposed from international bodies. Hence, if this were to happen, 
the requirement of supremacy of international law could be met in a way that still 
leaves the Russian government a measure of control - and a possible buffer between 
law and practice.
146
  
A gap between international legal responsibility and practice can be 
observed in other areas of the Russian legal system. The 1996 Constitutional Law 
‘On the Judicial System of the Russian Federation’147 makes it compulsory for 
Russian courts to apply ‘generally recognised principles and norms of international 
law and international treaties of the Russian Federation’. Similarly, the 1998 Law 
‘On the Ratification of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and 
                                                 
144
 However, the interviews for this study indicate that this does not happen consistently, and there is 
no full consensus on the issue even among high-ranking judges. See statement by the Chairman of 
the Russian Constitutional Court, Section 3.2 (notes 196 and 198). 
145
 Burkov points to Article 22 of Law No. 101-FZ of July 1995 ‘On International Treaties of the 
Russian Federation’.  It envisages amendments of the Constitution if ‘an international treaty contains 
rules requiring the change of individual provisions of the Constitution’. 
146
 See also Bowring (1997; 2000). 
147
 No. 1-FKZ of 31 December 1996. 
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Fundamental Freedoms’148 compels courts to apply the ECHR. Russia has a monist 
approach to international law - meaning that the treaties it enters into are 
immediately and directly applicable in the country, without the need of 
supplementary Russian legislation to be adopted.149 A 2003 Supreme Court 
Resolution150 states at Point 1 that: 
 
[T]he rights and liberties of man in conformity with commonly recognised 
principles and the norms of the international law, as well as the international 
treaties of the Russian Federation shall have direct effect within the 
jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. 
 
The legal bases for the direct application of international law create wide-ranging 
new opportunities for Russian lawyers and judges, and as such have been perceived 
as a highly positive development by commentators such as Danilenko (1999: 53). It 
marks a significant departure from previous constitutions: the Soviet Union had a 
dualist, rather than monist, approach, envisaging the implementation of 
international law but not its direct application in Russian courts.151 Despite this, the 
application of international law in Russian courts presents logistical difficulties, as 
will be seen in the next chapter - as well as requiring a political will for 
implementation. There are two main reasons. First, the ECHR is an extremely 
complex instrument, due to the volume of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, which 
transforms the ECHR through its interpretation. Second, monism does not have an 
undisputed advantage over dualism. It could mask the attempt to find a ‘shortcut’, 
by absolving a member state from the responsibility to compile, adopt and 
implement tailored legislation - the equivalent, for example, of the UK’s 1998 
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 No. 54-FZ of 30 March 1998. 
149
 With the technicality that they must be published in the official gazette (Rossiiskaya Gazeta). 
150
 Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 5 of 10 October 
2003 ‘On the Application by Courts of General Jurisdiction of the Commonly Recognized Principles 
and Norms of International Law and International Treaties of the Russian Federation’, adopted by 
the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.  
151
 Both in the 1978 RSFSR Constitution and the 1977 USSR Constitution. 
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Human Rights Act. The monist approach, with its apparent openness to 
international law can be a double-edged sword: Russia commits all - but may 
deliver little. 
What is the situation in practice? Burkov and Trochev have shown that the 
modes of interpretation of ECHR case-law in Russia’s courts (including Russia’s 
three highest courts - the Russian Constitutional Court, the Russian Supreme Court, 
and the  Supreme Commercial Court) - are often superficial, lacking detailed 
references to, and analysis of, the ECHR jurisprudence (Burkov 2007; Trochev 
2008a: 176).152 Although on one side the level of incorporation of the ECHR into 
Russian legal practice has increased since 2005,153 on the other citations routinely 
relate to principles of law that complement or confirm the Russian Constitution, 
rather than their being used more creatively (perhaps controversially) to overcome 
contradictions or fill gaps in the Russian legal system (Burkov 2007: 40; Danilenko 
1999: 62). Such gaps are numerous, as the Russian Constitution provides only 
vague provisions on human rights, meaning that the ECHR could serve the vitally 
important function of defining and crystallising Russian human rights law 
(Danilenko 1999: 62). The fact that the ECHR serves primarily a complementary 
function to domestic legislation raises doubts as to the real ‘supremacy’ of 
international law. Meanwhile, the vague references to the ECHR perpetuate the 
opacity as to the exact meaning of ‘generally recognised principles and norms of 
international law’. Danilenko argued in 1999 that the RCC had ‘invented its own 
version of sources of international law for domestic consumption’ (1999: 62). 
                                                 
152
 Burkov engaged in an analysis of 3,911 cases from courts of first and second instance in 
Sverdlovsk oblast. Of these, only 12 cited the ECHR since between 1998 and 2004. The proportion 
of citations is much higher for the Russian Constitutional Court (RCC); by 2004, there were 54 RCC 
judgements with ECHR citations, of 116 judgements pronounced since the ECHR came into force in 
May 1998 - yet Burkov contends that application would have been feasible in nearly every case 
(Burkov 2007: 36; 47). For a critique of Burkov’s analysis, see Golubok (2010).  
153
 For example, Nussberger shows an increase in the citations by the Russian Constitutional Court 
from 2005 to 2006 (2008: 619).  
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Hence, although the ECHR is certainly used by Russian lawyers and judges, and 
concrete efforts have been made for its application, one may say, as Burkov does, 
that the ECHR is ‘applied’ but is not ‘implemented’ (2007). Following this 
approach, I interpret ‘implementation’ as a coherent and comprehensive set of 
measures to progressively incorporate international obligations into a country’s 
domestic law and practice; and ‘application’ as a set of individual instances of 
judges or officials employing principles of international law. ‘Selective 
implementation’ reflects a form of ‘application’ that falls short of full-fledged 
‘implementation’. In the next two sections (3.2 and 3.3) the forms of 
implementation are analysed in light of perceptions of international law among 
public officials and civil society representatives respectively. These data are then 
supplemented by those from interviews with Council of Europe experts. 
 
3.2 The Views of Public Officials: ‘International Law as 
Foreign’ 
 
The official media in Russia has tended to portray the ECtHR as biased against 
Russia, and chipping away at its sovereignty (Nussberger 2008: 664).154 In all 
likelihood this activates feelings of self-preservation, coupled with a common 
distrust of the ‘other’, seen as Western Europe155 - sentiments that are powerfully 
present in Kharlamova’s arguments reported above.156 Nussberger reflects on 
Russia’s ambivalent reception as to what is considered ‘external’ (chuzhoy):  
 
As Russian […] history shows: What has come from outside, has either been 
welcomed enthusiastically or deeply condemned (2008: 667).  
 
                                                 
154
 Some of these views reported in the media were articulated by Putin himself and RCC Chairman 
Velerii Zorkin (see statements reported below in this same section). 
155
 On the perception of Western Europe as the ‘other’ see Tolz (2001). 
156
 See Section 3.1. 
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This polarisation is reflected in the interview data from two categories of 
respondents (public officials and civil society), on the issue of the applicability of 
international law in Russia. Public officials’ responses substantially differed from 
those of civil society, in that the former centred around the theme of Russia as 
‘different’ from the rest of Europe - and, thus, from other Council of Europe 
member states. This difference was linked by public officials to distinct historical 
and political traditions, and Russia’s unique pluri-ethnic makeup, which made 
Council of Europe mechanisms ill-suited to accommodate Russia’s needs. 
Inversely, civil society tended to see international standards as an opportunity to 
advance their objectives - a perception often accompanied by regret that the impact 
of international mechanisms did not have more far-reaching repercussions. Both 
civil society and public officials referred to the ECRML as well as the FCNM in the 
interviews, given the resonance of the Council of Europe programme ‘Minorities in 
Russia’,157 and the resulting debate on the ECRML’s possible ratification. In the 
interviews, the respondents used the expression ‘the Charter’ (Khartiya) as 
abbreviation for the ECRML. ‘The Charter’ is used in their statements reproduced 
in this chapter. 
I first describe public officials’ responses. A former high-ranking public 
official saw the FCNM and ECRML as ‘supplementary instruments’ to the 
mechanisms already employed in Russia to cater for minority interests - an 
essentially superfluous additional layer [4.13]. He believed that ‘the objectives of 
international standards are already realised [in Russia]’, using as an example the 
fourteen officially recognised languages of Dagestan. The analogous view is 
expressed in Russia’s Second Report to the ACFC, stating that ‘basically all 
                                                 
157
 See Section 1.3. 
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provisions of the Framework Convention have been respected’.158 The same 
respondent thought that Russia should still ratify the ECRML; as to the reason for 
ratification he argued:  
 
The position of Russia is useful for Europe. In Europe Islam is a new 
phenomenon and Russia instead has 1,000 years of coexistence with 
Islam… [4.13]  
 
One public official from Tatarstan, and three more persons in quasi-official 
institutions - one from Tatarstan and two in Mordovia - saw international standards 
as fundamentally irrelevant to their ethnic republics. The perception stemmed from 
the view that minority rights are for disadvantaged minorities only. Those 
nationalities that enjoy titular status were, in their opinion, not disadvantaged: 
 
There is no problem in Tatarstan. [In Russia] there are issues of small-in-
number peoples of the North and their way of life, but there are no small-in-
number indigenous peoples in Tatarstan. [4.8] 
 
A public official in Mordovia also doubted the usefulness of international standards 
but added that ‘perhaps there are some prospects’ [4.11]. 
The ECRML was also not considered a panacea. A public official from 
Tatarstan said: 
 
I am in favour of the ratification of the Charter and its application in 
Tatarstan […]. [But] the focus of the Charter is the protection of the 
languages of the small-in-number indigenous peoples, and languages that 
are disappearing. In Tatarstan there isn’t a problem with this, although it 
could happen [in the future]. [4.10]  
 
And in Mordovia: 
 
Mordovia is not very interested in the Charter because it doesn’t protect 
Mordovians in Mordovia, only the diaspora [Mordovians outside 
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 ACFC, (Second) Report submitted by Russia, 26 April 2005, ACFC/SR/II(2005)003, p. 70. 
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Mordovia]. The Mordovian languages are already the state [official] 
language in Mordovia. [4.12]
159
 
 
These statements reveal a misunderstanding of international standards and 
particularly the ECRML. Both FCNM and ECRML may be applied in the titular 
republics. The public officials’ view is primarily due to a discrepancy between the 
understanding of a ‘minority’ in Russia and in international law: as noted, 
international law considers a ‘minority’ to be a group in a disadvantaged position in 
a country as a whole,160 while titular nationalities in Russia are commonly not 
perceived as ‘minorities’ in Russia.161  Traditional expressions to designate non-
Russians employed during the Soviet period did not include ‘minority’162 but rather 
‘nation’ and ‘nationality’ (natsiya, natsional’nost’) and ‘ethnos’ (etnos, etnonarod) 
(Sokolovskii 2004).  
The statements of a former public official interviewed [4.13], and of public 
officials at Council of Europe events attended by the author, reveal an underlying 
belief that Russia’s titular nationalities would be ‘offended’ if they were referred to 
as ‘minorities’. This can solidify perceptions that international human rights 
mechanisms are based on Western countries’ conceptualisation of nationality 
issues, and therefore unsuitable for Russia. Only two of the cited respondents saw a 
potential benefit in the application of the ECRML in Mordovia or Tatarstan, but 
only in a possible future, should the use of titular languages be eroded. Despite 
these views, the cultures and languages of titular nationalities in Russia are 
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 Russian is the only state language in the whole territory of the Russian Federation, as per Article 
68(1) of the Russian Constitution, and Law No. 53-FZ of 1 June 2005 ‘On the State Language of the 
Russian Federation’. The 21 ethnic republics, with the exception of Karelia, have also officially 
recognised ‘state languages of the republics’ - for example, the Tatar language in Tatarstan. 
160
 Regardless of whether a national minority is a numerical majority within a particular region (see 
Section 1.2). An alternative interpretation of the public officials’ responses in the ethnic republics is 
that they were aware of the meaning of ‘minority’ under international law, but they did not wish to 
be regarded as such - due to  a perceived link between minority status and inferior status - and 
preferred the expression ‘titular nationality’. The rejection of the self-identification as a ‘minority’ 
was, however, not conveyed by the civil society respondents belonging to national minorities.   
161
 See Section 1.2 and note 57. 
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 With few exceptions (Malakhov & Osipov 2006: 509).  
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generally not in a strong position. In the case of the Republic of Mordovia, on the 
one hand the two Mordovian languages, Moksha and Erzya, are recognised as state 
(official) languages alongside Russian;
163
 on the other, equality in legal status is not 
translated into equality in practice, with Russian enjoying a much more dominant 
position than Moksha or Erzya in the public sphere.  
The framing of Russia as ‘different’ from Western Europe was further 
elaborated by public officials. The following extracts are from the interviews with a 
public official in Tatarstan, three in Moscow and one in Mordovia:  
 
In Western Europe there is a very different situation from Russia. The 
people from Catalonia, America, Western Europe are different. Russia 
needs a strong hand (sil’naya ruka). Somebody like Putin was needed. 
When there is no sil’naya ruka a Russian doesn’t know what to do. It 
doesn’t mean that the system in Russia is bad, just that it’s different. But 
you can never tell, every generation changes. [4.10] 
 
The situation in Russia is very different from that of the other member 
states; it’s much bigger. Even the biggest member state [of the Council of 
Europe, after Russia] will have much fewer minorities and languages than 
Russia. [4.13]  
 
There is a very different juridical understanding [in Russia], and 
harmonisation [with international law] is not easy. [4.15] 
 
There are many nationalities in Russia. Ratifying the Charter in the UK, for 
example, is not the same as Russia ratifying it. [4.16] 
 
For Part III [of the ECRML]
164
 a lot of funds are needed, and it’s difficult in 
Russia. It’s not a country like Germany. There are much more languages. 
[4.12] 
 
The respondents presented several layers of ‘difference’, ranging from an 
idiosyncratic Russian ‘psyche’ (close to Karlamova’s view),165 to differing juridical 
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 Article 3 of Law No. 4-Z of 24 April 1998 ‘On the State Languages of the Republic of Mordovia’ 
stipulates that ‘the state languages of the Republic of Mordovia are Russian and Mordovian 
(Moksha and Erzya)’.  
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 Part III of the ECRML includes specific undertakings for the promotion of minority or regional 
languages. Upon ratification, the member states are required, pursuant to Article 2(2) ECRML, to 
select and commit to a minimum of 35 undertakings from 68 options, in the spheres of: education 
and culture, judicial authorities, administrative authorities, media, and economic and social life. 
165
 See Section 3.1. 
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interpretations, to more objective criteria such as the country’s geographical size, 
number of ethnic groups and languages spoken in its territory.  
Civil society representatives commented on what they considered public 
officials’ dismissal of international standards. The director of a minority NGO in 
Moscow described a ‘state policy’ based on the authorities’ belief that ‘Europe is 
not needed to fix problems in Russia’ [1.2.3]. The director of a human rights 
organisation in St Petersburg said he had observed a strong resistance to the 
perceived need to shed Russia’s distinctiveness from Europe in order to embrace 
international standards: 
 
We had a project on juvenile justice [which involved using Council of 
Europe standards] and there was a big resistance among some people. There 
is a big resistance from nationalists - they think that [using international 
standards] means assisting the West in influencing Russia, in making Russia 
a part of Europe. [1.5.11] 
 
No views on the superfluous nature of international standards were expressed in 
Karelia by either public officials or civil society. This might derive from the weak 
position occupied by the Karelian language and culture in the republic, despite its 
titularity.166 Finally, the view of two public officials - one in Kazan and one in 
Moscow [4.7; 4.14] - differed from those of the other public officials, in that they 
were supportive of international standards. These respondents were themselves 
representatives of minorities, and were committed to advancing minority interests. 
Their attitudes were therefore more aligned to those of civil society respondents, 
rather than those of other public officials interviewed. 
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 It might also be explained by the fact that two of the four public officials interviewed in Karelia 
were themselves ethnic Karelians (one respondent displaying a particularly strong commitment to 
preserve Karelian identity); and by the limited knowledge of international standards of the other two 
public officials interviewed. 
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Russia: Just Another Member State or Superpower? 
Before examining the views of civil society, I wish to further elaborate on the 
reception of international standards by the Russian authorities. Here I include data 
from interviews with a former member of the ACFC (ACFC respondent) [7.5], and 
a member of the Committee of Experts of the ECRML (CEEC respondent) - the 
body that monitors state parties’ compliance with the ECRLM [7.4]. The first 
respondent had been involved in the FCNM monitoring on Russia, and the second 
in the Council of Europe programme ‘Minorities in Russia’, aimed at aiding the 
preparatory process towards ECRML ratification.
167
  
In 2010, Russia submitted its Third Report to the ACFC. It was also in the 
second year of its implementation of the programme ‘Minorities in Russia’. The 
two experts shared the opinion that Russia was not openly violating its obligations 
under international minority rights law, and that attempts were being made at its 
implementation. In the case of ECHR implementation, the CEEC respondent 
believed that Russia’s ‘problems are comparable to other countries’. Asked to point 
to any possible forms of implementation specific to Russia, comparing it to other 
Council of Europe member states, the ACFC respondent noted that Russia very 
rarely, in its reports, directly responded to shortcomings identified by the ACFC in 
an Opinion on Russia, or outlined specific measures to rectify them.168 The 
respondent further described what he called a predominantly ‘defensive approach’ 
on the part of Russia. 
 
The willingness and ability to listen to each other and get into a really 
constructive dialogue would be lower than in other countries. [The FCNM] 
is more seen [by the Russian authorities] as an unnecessary burden, like 
they really don’t need it, while in other countries there is more of an open 
mind to listen to critique. [7.5] 
                                                 
167
 See Section 1.3 on the programme. 
168
 In some cases, a country will go as far as enacting legislation to directly address concerns raised 
in an ACFC Opinion, although this occurs rarely [7.5]. 
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The second (CEEC) respondent noted that ‘Russia perceives itself as a powerful 
country, which doesn’t want to be subdued’ [7.4].  
Russia’s ‘defensive approach’ might be linked to its self-perception, as the 
second expert suggests, as a great power that commands respect in the international 
arena. The idea of Russia as a ‘great power’ (derzhavost’) forms part of Putin’s 
view of Russia (Duncan 2007).169 This status can be achieved by following an 
intrinsically Russian path. Already in 1999, Putin had argued for the ‘Russian idea’ 
to be shaped by the ‘organic merger of universal, human values with primordial 
Russian values’.170 He added:  
 
Russia will not soon become, if it at all becomes, a second edition of, say, 
the USA or England, where liberal values have deep historical traditions 
[…]. A strong state for a Russian is not an anomaly, not something to fight 
against, but, instead, a source and guarantor of order.
171
    
 
Russia under Putin’s leadership has been described as a ‘managed democracy’, or 
‘a combination of democratic institutions and authoritarian institutions’.172 It 
constitutes an amalgam of strong statehood and Eurasianism.
173
 Through the media, 
and the manipulation of Soviet myths, Russians are encouraged to forge a ‘Russian 
way’ to modernisation that does not reject, but integrates elements of the Soviet 
past (Novikova 2010). 
                                                 
169
 Together with patriotism, the need for a strong state (gosudarstvennichestvo) and social solidarity 
(Duncan 2007). 
170
 In this statement Putin used the adjective rossiiskii (civic Russian) rather than russkii (ethnic 
Russian), so as not to exclude non-Russian nationalities. 
171
 Putin, V. 31-12-1999. ‘Vladimir Putin: Rossiya na Rubezhe Tysyacheletiya’ (‘Russia on the Eve 
of the Millenium’), Rossiiskaya Gazeta. 
172
 As defined by Putin’s advisor Sergei Markov. Markov, S. 5-12-2003. ‘Managing Democracy’, 
News Hour with Jim Lehrer. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/july-dec03/russia_12-05.html 
(accessed 1-7-2011). 
173
 Duncan describes ‘Eurasianism’ as a body of ‘policies which give priority towards promoting the 
cooperation and unity of the post-Soviet states’ (2002).  Eurasianism has pan-Slavic roots inasmuch 
as it defines itself in its opposition to Westernisation (Bonnett 2002: 444). See also Bowring 
(2003a). 
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Russia’s commitment to following its ‘own’ path might explain why similar 
concerns are expressed by the ACFC in both the First and Second Opinions, with 
no substantive changes between the two. In the case of the ECRML, the CEEC 
respondent noted that the substantive delay in ratification might be explained by 
Russia’s laborious preparation for its implementation [7.4]. It might, however, also 
signify an ultimate disregard for the commitment to ratification which the country 
entered into in 1996. The perception of Russia as a ‘different’ (non-Western) type 
of democracy is in line with the interviewed public officials’ framing of Russia as 
‘different’ - a country where mechanisms such as the FCNM and the ECRML are 
effectively superfluous. Meanwhile, the Russian government’s position, as stated in 
its Second Report to the ACFC, that it fully meets all FCNM requirements174 is 
facilitated by the fact that the FCNM is a flexible instrument. This flexibility allows 
the development of tailored policies that truly accommodate the specific needs of 
different groups - yet it is also a double-edged sword, as vague provisions may well 
generate vague policies. 
While the exact scope of a FCNM ‘violation’ might be subject to differing 
interpretations - and it is hardly possible to determine whether the Russian 
government is in good faith or disingenuous in its self-praise - there have also been 
instances of clear avoidance of international responsibilities. Already in the early 
days of Russia’s membership of the Council of Europe, the government refrained 
from fulfilling the commitments made at the time of ratification. These included, in 
addition to the prompt ratification of the ECRML, the ratification of the ECHR’s 
Protocol 6,
175
 on the abolition of the death penalty.
176
 Despite early differences 
                                                 
174
 ACFC, (Second) Report submitted by Russia (note 158), p. 70. 
175
 Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, ETS No. 114, adopted 28 April 1983, entered into 
force 1 March 1985. 
176
 Russia executed 53 people in 1996. Since then, there has been a moratorium on the death penalty 
- although by 2011 it had not been formally abolished. See Pinchuk, D. 19-11-2009. ‘Russian Court 
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between Russia and the Council of Europe, Ovcharenko writes that ‘it was clear for 
both sides that the marriage, even if unhappy, should continue’.177 By continuing, it 
generated further tensions. First, perhaps the source of the most acute tensions was 
Russia’s blocking of the adoption of the ECHR’s Protocol 14178 for four years, 
thereby delaying a reform of the ECtHR aimed at accelerating its adjudication of 
cases and reducing its caseload. All Council of Europe member states ratified 
Protocol 14 between 2004 and 2006, with the exception of Russia, which ratified it 
only in February 2010. Second, Russia has created obstacles to the investigation of 
cases against it, by refusing to cooperate with the ECtHR in some instances, and by 
preventing fact-finding missions. It has refused to provide documents to the 
ECtHR, particularly on Chechen cases (Koroteev 2008). There was no cooperation 
in the preparation of the cases Klyakhin v Russia179 and Poleshchuk v Russia.180 
Requested documents were not supplied as ‘not relevant to the case’ or for being a 
‘state secret’181 (Koroteev 2008; Solvang 2008; Trochev 2009). A fact-finding 
mission was refused in the cases of Shameyev and 12 others v Georgia and 
Russia,182 Trubnikov v Russia,183 and Mikheyev v Russia.184 This refusal came 
despite provisions in the ECHR requiring cooperation from member states in the 
conduct of the ECtHR’s investigations, including the provision of documents,185 
                                                                                                                                        
Extends Moratorium on Death Penalty’, Reuters. 
177
 Ovcharenko, E. 16-2-2006. ‘Razvod s Sovetom Evropy - i Devichya Familiya’ (‘The Divorce 
with the Council of Europe - and the Maiden’s Name), Izvestiya. 
178
 Protocol 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
amending the control system of the Convention, ETS No. 194, adopted 13 May 2004, entered into 
force 1 June 2010. 
179
 Application No. 46082/99, 30 November 2004.  
180
 Application No. 60776/00, 7 October 2004.  
181 
The Russian authorities referred to Article 161 of the Criminal Procedural Code, protecting the 
interests of the parties to the proceedings, the state and military secrets. 
182 
Application No. 36378/02, 12 April 2005. 
183 
Application No. 49790/99, 5 July 2005. 
184
 Application No. 77617/01, 26 January 2006. 
185
Article 38 ECHR states: 
[The ECtHR will] pursue the examination of the case, together with the representatives of the parties, 
and if need be, undertake an investigation, for the effective conduct of which the State concerned 
shall furnish all necessary facilities. 
 108 
and despite the confidentiality that the ECtHR can guarantee if so requested.186  
Against this background, doubts have been raised about Russia’s genuine 
commitment to the ECHR’s founding principles. As PACE noted:   
 
[T]he lack of cooperation of the Russian authorities […] will inevitably cast 
serious doubts as to Russia’s will to abide in good faith with the 
commitments entered into upon ratification of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.187  
 
Third, there have been instances of harassment of persons who had submitted cases 
to the ECtHR. In the case Fedotova v Russia,188 a tax inspection against the 
applicant’s representative was used as a means of harassment, and was considered 
by the ECtHR as interference with the right to individual petition.
189
 A fourth, 
highly complex point of contention has been the retention of nadzor, a supervisory 
review of judgements that are (and should be treated as) final - a legacy of the 
Tsarist and Soviet periods (Pomeranz 2009: 16). This aspect of the Russian legal 
system defies the principle of legal finality and res judicata190 (Koroteev & 
Golubok 2007; Pomeranz 2009). The ECtHR has criticised Russia on this point: in 
Ryabykh v Russia191 the Court found nadzor in violation of the ECHR’s Article 6192 
and clearly spelled out that ‘where the courts have finally determined an issue, their 
ruling should not be called into question’.193 Rather than simply abolishing nadzor, 
                                                 
186
 Under its Rule 33, ‘Public Character of Documents’, Rules of Court, 1999. 
187
 PACE, ‘Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by the Russian Federation’, 3 June 2005, 
Doc. 10568, § 258.  
188
 Application No. 73225/01, 13 April 2006. 
189
 The right of any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals to submit an 
application to the ECtHR, when claiming to have been a victim of an ECHR violation by one of the 
states party to it. The ratifying states are prohibited from hindering the exercise of this right (Article 
34 ECHR). The ECtHR judged the tax inspection in the Fedotova case to have been linked to the 
applicant’s legal claim. Fedotova v Russia, ibid, § 49-50. 
190
 A case that has been settled in court.  
191
 Application No. 52854/99, 24 July 2003.  
192
 On the right to a fair trial.  
193
 § 51. However, it should be noted that, in line with the ECtHR’s respect for the member states’ 
legal and cultural traditions (the ‘margin of appreciation’), the ECtHR accepted the application of 
nazdor in some instances: ‘only when made necessary by circumstances of a substantial and 
compelling character’. Ryabykh v Russia (note 191) § 51. 
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Russia has sought to harmonise it with international standards. Although its impact 
has been reduced through legal reform, it remains a problem (Pomeranz 2009: 16; 
35).   
Political hostilities complete the picture. Putin said about the judgement in 
Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia194 - in which the ECtHR ruled that both 
Russia and Moldova were responsible for human rights violations in Moldova’s 
breakaway region of Transdniestria:  
 
This is a purely political judgement, that undermines our trust in the 
international judicial system.
195
 
 
The Chairman of the Russian Constitutional Court, Valerii Zorkin, similarly 
rejected some aspects of the ECtHR’s jurisdiction. In November 2010 he stated that 
‘Russia, if it wishes, may withdraw from the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Human Rights’.196 The ECtHR, he argued, ‘encourag[ed] those in Russia who want 
any excuse’ not to use their domestic courts. It followed a case in which the ECtHR 
had found Russia guilty of discrimination for denying a divorced male soldier a 
three-year parental leave to care for his children, which was routinely granted to 
women.
197
  Zorkin added: 
Russia has the right to develop a defence mechanism against such decisions 
[by the ECtHR]. [The ECtHR] ignored [Russia’s] historical, cultural and 
social situation.
198
 
 
                                                 
194
 See note 26. The Russian government refrained from cooperating with the Council of Europe in 
the execution of the judgement. 
195
 Putin, V. 2007 ‘Stenographic Report on the Meeting of Members of the Council for Enhancing 
Institutions of Civil Society and Human Rights and President Putin’. 
196
 Cited in Pushkarskaya, A. 22-11-2010. ‘Valerii Zor’kin Gotov k Oborone Natsional’nogo 
Pravovogo Suverniteta’ (‘Valerii Zorkin is Ready to Defend National Legal Supremacy’), 
Kommersant. 
197
 In the case Konstantin Markin v Russia, Application No. 30078/06, 7 October 2010 (referral to 
the Grand Chamber 21 February 2011). 
198
 Cited in Reuters, 22-11-2010. ‘Russia could Shun European Rights Court - Top Judge’.  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/22/us-russia-court-rights-idUSTRE6AL5IW20101122 
(accessed 20-5-2011). 
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Finally, the Russian authorities have displayed forms of the ‘defensive approach’ 
referred to by the ACFC respondent [7.5], as a reaction to criticism from 
international bodies. In the case of the ACFC, the Russian authorities have argued 
that the ACFC’s ‘views […] quite often are unreasonably negative’, referring to a 
‘somewhat biased interpretation of the Russian legislation and law-enforcement 
practice’.199 In another case, it strongly rejected the findings of a 2007 report on 
Russia by the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance.200 Referring to the report, the 
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation at the UN, Valerii Loshchinin, 
complained that: 
 
[A] range of problems […] was extrapolated which for our country either 
don’t exist or aren’t really that serious or systematic […] the report is 
inappropriate […] unfortunately, there have been incidents of racist and 
ethnic intolerance. However, to make far-reaching conclusions […] based 
on unproven data and falsifications […] is absurd.201  
 
 
The refusal to abandon nadzor proceedings and to cooperate with the Council of 
Europe in some instances, together with public displays of defiance vis-à-vis the 
Council of Europe and the UN, reconfirm Russia’s resistance to some aspects of 
international standards - and its selective approach to them. One should note at this 
point that some degree of protectionism of a country’s sovereignty is not a purely 
Russian phenomenon. To use an example from the UK, an ECtHR judgement in 
favour of prisoners’ right to vote sparked a debate in the country as to whether the 
                                                 
199
 ‘Comments of the Government of the Russian Federation on the Second Opinion of the Advisory 
Committee on the Implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities by the Russian Federation’, 11 October 2006. 
200
 Report by the Special Repporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Doudou Diène, on his Mission to the Russian Federation, 20 
May 2007, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/19/Add.3.   
201
 Statement by Ambassador Valerii Loshchinin, reported in: ‘Open Letter to the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour’, 10 September 2007, http://www.sova-
center.ru/en/xenophobia/news-releases/2007/09/d11531/  (accessed 5-10-2011). The letter was 
signed by several Russian NGOs.  
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ECtHR was going too far, imposing principles - electoral rights of persons found 
guilty of crimes - not shared by the British populace.
202
 Similarly, in Italy, the 
ECtHR was seen as trampling over Italian cultural traditions by ruling against the 
display of Catholic crucifixes in non-religious schools.
203
 There is a delicate 
balance between the retention of sovereignty and international cooperation. 
The approach chosen by Russia in maintaining this balance, and the reasons 
behind them, are complex. Trochev argues that one should not assume, as is often 
done, that Russia’s reception of international law is ‘somewhere between defiance 
and quiet ignorance’ (2009: 146). Russia is responding to the new challenges 
created by accession to international human rights mechanisms - whether through 
cooperation or resistance, or a mixture of both. Specific motivating factors lie 
behind Russia’s accession to the Council of Europe. These factors may or may not 
include a genuine desire to incorporate its principles. There are likely to be a 
combination of reasons, which may include trade, the development of ties with 
Western Europe, and the maintenance of a connection with the Soviet bloc - whose 
newly-independent states located in Europe have also joined the Council of Europe 
(Jordan 2003). According to Sakwa, Putin considers Russia ‘part of the West’, 
rather than distinct from it, and encompassing elements of both East and West, in 
the Eurasianist tradition (2004: 168-9). This approach was reflected by a statement 
of a former public official interviewed, who said that Russia ‘is part of Europe’, and 
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 Greens and M.T. v The United Kingdom, Application No. 60041/08 and 60054/08, 23 November 
2010 (final 11 April 2011). See Council of Europe Press Release, 12-4-2011, ‘L’arrêt de la Cour 
concernant le Retrait Systématique du Droit de Vote aux Détenus au Royaume-Uni Devient 
Définitif’. On the reaction in the UK see for example BBC, 10-2-2011, ‘MPs Reject Prisoner Votes 
Plan’. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12409426 (accessed 2-9-2011). A similar judgement 
had already been issued in Hirst v The United Kingdom (No. 2), Application No. 74025/01, 5 
October 2005. 
203
 On the grounds that crucifixes in classrooms violated the secular principles of the state education 
system. See for example Hooper, J. 3-12-2009, ‘Human Rights Ruling against Classroom Crucifixes 
Angers Italy’, The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/03/italy-classroom-
crucifixes-human-rights?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487 (accessed 12-10-2011). The judgement was 
later reversed by the Grand Chamber, in Lautsi and Others v. Italy, Application No. 30814/06, 18 
March 2011.   
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thus cannot ignore its standards [4.13]. As noted in Chapter 1, the Russian 
leadership might also believe that ‘locking in’ selected aspects of the international 
human rights system could be to its advantage.
204
 This was also the opinion of a 
Council of Europe representative: 
 
They [the Russian authorities] realise that it is to their advantage to have a 
more independent judiciary, [so as] to have better economic development. 
[7.3]  
 
A Russian lawyer working for the Council of Europe also linked the application of 
international law to state interests: 
 
Whether or not implementation takes place […] depends on whether the 
state sees a state interest in it. Transparency of the judiciary is in 
everybody’s interest, and it is important for Russia’s international image. 
There is a Russian saying that ‘you cannot say for sure that you will not find 
yourself in prison’. So it’s in people’s interest to have a fair judiciary. 
 
Russia was active in bodies of the Council of Europe fighting against 
corruption and terrorism, because these issues have been very important to 
Russia. There is a state interest.  
 
The Council of Europe hasn’t provided a clear explanation as to why 
international standards on minorities and languages are useful to the state. 
Russia probably thinks that it’s already complying with international 
standards on minorities and languages. There are policies for languages [in 
Russia]. Russia might say that other countries, like Turkey, are the real 
problem. The Council of Europe needs to explain it […] [and] it’s up to the 
Council of Europe to convince Russia to ratify the Charter. [7.1] 
 
According to this respondent, Russia has a utilitarian approach to international law, 
where a state interest in the promotion of minority rights has to be identified prior 
to implementation. The respondent placed the burden to prove this state interest on 
the Council of Europe. Similarly, a respondent in Moscow, the representative of a 
human rights NGO and academic, believed that Russia linked engagement with 
international standards to specific advantages, for example in the form of trade 
                                                 
204
 See Section2.2, on realist theory and international human rights law. 
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benefits. International cooperation was seen as promoting state interests and 
potentially the personal interests of individuals involved in international exchanges. 
These individuals wish to have: 
 
[…] opportunities to travel to get in touch with international experts, to 
bring these people to [Russia], to be included in official delegations. They 
are interested in projects. Because international contacts and opportunities 
to travel can be helpful for trade, for funds …and also for the international 
image of the country. [1.5.1]  
 
More prosaically, this respondent added that ‘also travel is for pleasure’.  Whatever 
their underlying motivation, these exchanges expose Russian public officials to 
international standards, and involve them in mechanisms for human rights and 
international cooperation. The ECHR, albeit slowly and somewhat inconsistently, is 
increasingly penetrating Russian legal practice. But is it enough? Presenting Russia 
as ‘different’ can justify a selective implementation that oversteps the commonly-
accepted boundaries of the margin of appreciation envisaged by the ECtHR. 
Representatives of civil society pointed to the limited impact of international 
standards caused by this selectivity, particularly in relation to nebulous 
international obligations on minority rights.  
 
3.3 The Views of Civil Society: ‘International Law as Weak’  
 
The respondents from the ‘civil society’ category tended to focus on what they 
perceived as flaws of the international minority rights system, seen as ineffective 
given its substantial flexibility. These respondents made no reference to 
international standards being ‘alien’ or ‘foreign’ - or irrelevant to Russia. Rather, 
with few exceptions, discussed below, they shared the perception that international 
mechanisms were insufficiently far-reaching to directly influence Russia’s law and 
practice. I refer here to the representatives of organisations that were aware of 
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international standards - many organisations with limited resources and 
international exposure were not aware of them.  
 The statements of two representatives of civil society, one in Moscow and 
one in St Petersburg, illustrate the attitudes of the civil society representatives 
interviewed. The respondent in Moscow, director of an NGO working on inter-
ethnic relations, saw the flexibility of the FCNM as a reason for its lack of real 
impact: ‘the FCNM does not state clearly that governments have to do specific 
things’ [1.2.3], referring to the fact that ACFC Opinions only contain 
recommendations. Similarly, the representative of a human rights NGO in St 
Petersburg, working on the protection of minorities, said: 
 
I would really like to see the FCNM implemented. It’s a very good 
convention […]. But the FCNM is only about principles. And if the 
Language Charter was ratified it would not really change things much. 
There is no mechanism for implementation, the [Council of Europe] 
monitoring is not very good. The Charter and FCNM only help at the moral 
level: they provide moral standards on which to orient oneself. Like the 
Russian Constitution, they are declarative, the do not provide details. But 
ideally what is in the FCNM should be realised, and all my work is towards 
this. [1.5.7] 
 
In fact, this interpretation is legally incorrect. The FCNM, like the ECRLM,
205
 does 
create legal obligations, but they have to be translated into practice by the states 
party to the instrument - including through dialogue and negotiations between the 
government and minorities. ACFC Opinions, whose very name suggests the 
absence of specific legal obligations, are often simply approached as loose 
recommendations which do not command remedial action. The Opinions are the 
basis of Committee of Ministers Resolutions, which generate international 
obligations - yet inasmuch as there are no binding judgements, they can be regarded 
as a case of ‘soft jurisprudence based upon hard law’, as Hofmann puts it (2008: 
                                                 
205
 The ECRLM requires its states party to select, and commit to, a set of undertakings (see note 
164). 
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173).
206
 The lack of direct and specific obligations in the text of the FCNM 
minimises the impact of the ‘hard law’ part of the equation, with a resulting 
emphasis on ‘soft law’.  
Some respondents judged not only the FCNM, but international law 
generally, as inadequately equipped to withstand obstacles to its implementation in 
Russia. Among the reasons cited were: a possible conflict between domestic and 
international law; the fact that ‘the interests of the authorities come before people’s 
rights’ [1.5.3]; and the lack of a real commitment by the authorities to 
comprehensively implement international law. The last point was illustrated by the 
director of an NGO in Moscow: 
 
There were some important seminars of the Council of Europe [on the 
FCNM] in different towns of Russia […]. There was some interest by public 
officials but then the years went by and there was no follow-up. [1.2.3] 
 
Respondents from the ‘civil society’ category, as well as analysts (‘academia’), 
referred to forms of opportunism by the state: the appropriation of international 
standards to add a democratic veneer to what, in reality, had scarce democratic 
substance, with a view to promoting internationally a positive image of Russia. The 
exceptions were Mordovia and Karelia, where the respondents did not voice 
opinions relating to perceived flaws of the international minority rights system. In 
most cases, neither did these respondents list perceived benefits offered by the 
system. The absence of references to perceived flaws compared to their 
counterparts in other regions might be due to these respondents’ lower awareness of 
the minority rights system’s potential impact in Russia, rather than to the belief of 
its flawlessness.  
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 Hofmann differentiates this system from that of the ECtHR, which instead amounts to ‘hard 
jurisprudence based upon hard law’ (2008: 173). 
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 Despite the said flaws, civil society respondents that commented on 
international standards did not consider them insignificant in Russia. The 
exponential increase in applications to the ECtHR reflects the appeal of Strasbourg 
in defending human rights (and the concurrent distrust of Russian courts) (Trochev 
2009). Civil society and minority representatives interviewed approached 
international standards in a pragmatic manner, as a tool that often accorded well 
with their own objectives. They seized upon the opportunity to appeal to the 
Council of Europe as a supranational body that might rectify some shortcomings at 
home. Far from fearing Western interference and the resulting loss of Russian 
sovereignty, they would have welcomed stronger international mechanisms to 
support their activities in Russia.  
How can one explain the differences of views between the majority of 
public officials and civil society respondents? Keck and Sikkink show trajectories 
of cooperation not within a state, but through ‘transnational advocacy networks’ 
(1998a; 1998b; 1999). Such networks are referred to as ‘forms of organization 
characterized by voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal patters of communication’; 
the actors in these networks are bound by common objectives and various forms of 
cooperation, but also by shared values (Keck & Sikkink 1999: 89). These networks 
can act to promote the acceptance of international norms into the domestic sphere, 
including by shifting perceptions of domestic actors vis-à-vis such norms as well as 
behaviours (Keck & Sikkink 1999: 90). Similarly, Mertus argues that with 
globalisation and transnational civil society, non-state actors, particularly NGOs, 
have contributed to building a (global) human rights culture (1999: 1387). In Russia 
there have been instances of shifting perceptions of international law, from alien 
(chuzhoy) to integral to Russian law - simultaneously an identity that does not see 
Russia as in opposition to the Council of Europe (perceived as Western Europe), 
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but as part of it. While the East-West dichotomy is still present in some of the 
rhetoric referred to in this thesis,
207
 networks reach out to external, powerful actors 
to gain leverage on their own state (the ‘boomerang’ effect - Keck & Sikkink 1999: 
93). Keck & Sikkink’s position is based on the complexity of interaction among 
various domestic and international actors, and the ever-changing nature of identity 
(1999: 90). Similarly, Lipschutz and Peterson argue that states no longer can be 
considered as unitary in the context of international civil society. There are various 
forms of interaction between different individuals and groups that transcend state 
borders, and are dictated by personal and group interests rather than state interest 
(Lipschutz 1992; Peterson 1992).  
 
3.4 Mixed Outcomes  
 
Given the differing views on international standards, what is, in practice, the level 
of compliance with them? I look at this issue from two points of view: the 
specificities of FCNM implementation; and civil society’s use of international 
standards. As noted, many of the respondents in all categories had little or no 
awareness of international standards for minority protection. The director of a 
minority organisation in Moscow summarised the situation thus: 
 
Since 2000 I’ve been working in this area [of minority rights] and I don’t 
think that there are more than 100 professionals [in Russia] who know about 
or understand [international standards on minority rights]. [1.2.5]  
 
The representatives of an organisation in Moscow [1.2.3] and one in St Petersburg 
[1.5.7] similarly held the view that minority organisations themselves had little or 
no knowledge of these standards. This was confirmed by the interviews: it was the 
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 See, for example, Putin’s statement on the OSCE in Section 2.2. See also instances on the 
discrediting of NGOs for receiving funding from Western institutions, described in Section 7.3. 
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larger organisations, primarily in Moscow and St Petersburg, with international 
contacts, which had the specialised knowledge of Council of Europe mechanisms. 
They reported having used the standards in one or more of the following three 
ways: by referring to international standards in their exchanges with the authorities, 
using them to support their claims; by participating in the compilation of shadow 
reports on the FCNM for the ACFC; or by attending meetings and events of the 
programme ‘Minorities in Russia’.208 
In the interviews the authorities in the three republics had very little to say 
on the subject of their encounters with international standards. A representative of 
the Tatar Cabinet of Ministers said that they had not used the FCNM, as ‘we did not 
get to this’ [4.10]. He added, with regard to Tatarstan, ‘Russia does not use 
confrontation’ - perhaps linked to the perception that international standards and 
international mediation are used only in case of severe ethnic tensions, which the 
republic had been fortunately spared. A high-ranking public official working on 
nationality issues in Moscow only noted that international standards are applicable 
mostly in the case of indigenous people [4.15]. Respondents from quasi-official 
institutions or well-connected minority associations displayed similar attitudes. A 
representative of the House of Nationalities in Moscow
209
 said that: ‘we don’t deal 
with international standards, we work on cultural issues’ [1.3.4]. In this case, 
international standards on minority rights were divorced from the preservation and 
promotion of cultural pluralism, despite the latter coinciding with the aims of these 
standards. One of the leaders of the Inter-regional Social Movement of Mordovian 
(Moksha and Erzya) Peoples Movement in Saransk rapidly dismissed the question 
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 See 0 on the programme. At the time of the interviews, in the summer of 2010, events had 
recently taken place in the programme’s focus region of Mordovia, and in Moscow. The interviews 
revealed an awareness of the ECRML that, presumably as a result of the programme, was much 
more pronounced than that of the FCNM.  
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 On Houses of Nationality, see Chapter 7. 
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of a possible FCNM application in Russia by saying that it is ‘not really used’ by 
the authorities - hinting at the complexities of its application [1.4.3].  
  In this environment, then, a compelling question becomes how, if at all, the 
federal authorities guarantee that the international obligations arising from Russia’s 
accession to the FCNM cascade down to, and are shared with, the regional and 
local authorities. The regional authorities were asked about possible mechanisms to 
coordinate FCNM implementation, through a three-level (local, regional and 
federal) framework. Public officials in the regions said they did not operate within 
the scope of such a framework: they had received no specific guidelines besides the 
general principles of the Concept of State Nationalities Policy of the Russian 
Federation.
210
 A public official from Karelia stated:  
 
We didn’t receive any instructions about how to implement international 
standards. We don’t really have much information on the standards - 
although we do try to get and provide as much information as possible [4.2]. 
 
A former Minister of Education of an ethnic republic - an academic at the time of 
the interview - stated that he had never been required to incorporate any aspect of 
international standards, including the FCNM provisions on education, in his work 
as a minister [2.12]. His personal opinion was that international obligations were 
not taken into account in shaping Russian domestic policies. He added that ‘Russia 
is very good at writing reports [to the Council of Europe]’ - pointing to a greater 
attention to form than to practice.  
The question on the modality of implementation was then put to a 
representative of the Ministry of Regional Development. He confirmed the absence 
of guidelines:  
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 Presidential Decree No. 909 of 15 June 1996.  The Concept lists general principles, such as the 
right to equality for all citizens regardless of ethnic origin, the right to ethnic self-identification, the 
rights of indigenous peoples and the prohibition of ethnic hatred. It places National Cultural 
Autonomies and ‘dialogue’ between the Russian authorities and minorities at the heart of Russia’s 
nationalities policy. 
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We don’t give any instructions. There is already the federal legislation that 
is in compliance with international standards. [4.16] 
 
The data strongly indicate that there is no implementation plan for the FCNM. 
Russian legislation provides a general framework for human and minority rights, 
but there are other complexities: the vagueness of the legislation; the de jure-de 
facto dichotomy;
211
 and the overlooking of a positive responsibility of the state to 
engage in affirmative action to support minority cultures. The issue of vague 
legislation is captured in a statement by the director of a minority NGO in Karelia:  
 
International standards [on minority rights] should become the concrete 
basis of Russian law. If international law says that there should be minority 
education, it should actually happen. Now people see this just as a principle, 
as an ideal. We need to write everything in the laws very clearly, that 
classes [for the study of minority languages] should be formed etc. We need 
to have mechanisms for the realisation [of international standards]. [1.2.1] 
 
This statement reflects a perceived need for the crystallisation of norms that can be 
easily pinned down rather than remaining vague notions only vaguely met. It 
echoes the view, reported above, that the FCNM only amounts to a set of principles 
[1.5.7]. Another respondent had similarly emphasised the absence of mechanisms to 
realise the rights formally enshrined in Russian legislation, in the context of 
minority education [4.14]. The Ministry of Regional Development’s reliance on 
vague domestic legal norms denotes the absence of coordination between 
institutions at different levels and a generally passive approach in the 
implementation of international standards on minority protection. A public official 
complained of what he saw as Russia’s disregard of its positive responsibilities, 
with reference to the ECRML: 
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 Itself resulting from the vagueness of the legislation. See also Chapter 4 on the interference in 
activities of the judiciary. 
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The Charter has provisions on education in minority languages, for which 
the state has to create the conditions. Instead Russia’s approach is that it 
should not go against the right to study [a minority language], instead of 
creating favourable conditions for it. [4.7]
 212
  
 
It reflects the attitude displayed by public officials interviewed. They tended to hold 
the view that nationalities policy primarily centre on benign neglect: the negative 
obligation of the state not to interfere with the freedom of minorities to preserve 
their cultures and languages, without the concurrent positive obligation to create the 
conditions for their preservation. Without the obligation to adopt special, concrete 
measures, the same Tatar respondent argued, the authorities simply prolong their 
ongoing policies and activities, without actively guaranteeing protection for 
minority cultures and languages [4.7]. 
The absence of a coordinated country-wide effort to enhance 
implementation, complete with targets that are periodically and centrally evaluated, 
point to an application of international standards characterised by a predominance 
of localism in the sense of atomisation.
213
 While developing a comprehensive 
implementation strategy is certainly no simple task in Russia, given its territorial 
vastness and ethnic pluralism, the reliance on traditional (Soviet-style) models of 
state programmes for minority cultures results in a form of implementation that is 
haphazard.  
An external perspective on the application of international law in Russia 
was provided by Council of Europe representatives interviewed: three Council of 
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 Chapter 8 ECRML include provisions ‘to make available’ different types of education. Article 
7(1) states that: 
[T]he Parties shall base their policies, legislation and practice on the following objectives and 
principles: [...] 
(c) the need for resolute action to promote regional or minority languages in order to 
safeguard them; [...] 
(f)  the provision of appropriate forms and means for the teaching and study of regional or 
minority languages at all appropriate stages [...]. 
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 ‘Localism’ can be linked to both fragmentation and uncoordinated action, or to local autonomy. 
This is discussed below (Section 5.2).  
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Europe employees and two external experts.
214
 These respondents saw any attempt 
to quantify Russia’s level of compliance with international standards as a real 
challenge. With reference to the ECHR, a respondent, a Russian lawyer working for 
the Council of Europe, noted that assessing the impact of the ECHR presents 
complexities as the ECtHR considers individual cases rather than systems of 
legislation and practice. He referred to a Russian saying that ‘it is impossible to 
measure the average temperature in a hospital’ [7.1]. All people have different 
temperatures; similarly, the ECtHR operates at the level of individual rulings, and 
there are no clear indicators to pin down their cumulative impact. 
With reference to the FCNM one of the Council of Europe experts identified 
a different set of problems:  
 
The problem is that, unlike the Language Charter, the Framework 
Convention is not clear-cut. [For example] it doesn’t say how many hours 
governments have to teach [minority languages]; it’s much more general. 
[7.5]  
 
On the other hand, the Council of Europe representatives shared the opinion that 
there had been attempts at implementation of international standards in Russia, and 
cooperation with the Council of Europe. For example, the Russian lawyer said: 
 
There are areas where you can see that the attitude with regard to 
international standards is changing. It’s a mixture of people starting to 
understand European practice, and also attitudes shifting. One area in which 
things have changed is detention. Before the conditions of prisons were very 
bad, with cases of torture. Now this is changing, and it has been accepted 
that prisoners who have had to endure these conditions have a right to 
compensation. There are domestic decisions in favour of compensation. 
[7.1] 
 
The shift in judicial attitudes with regard to prison conditions had been induced, the 
respondent believed, by ECtHR judgements. A form of incorporation of 
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international law into the Russian judicial sphere takes place when Russian courts 
reproduce domestically legal principles upheld in Strasbourg judgements. The same 
respondent disagreed with the view that Russia’s ‘defensive approach’, noted 
above, might signify a prevailing rejection of international standards. For example, 
although Russia had attacked the report by the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Contemporary Forms of Racism,
215
 the report had not been without impact:  
 
The number of convictions for racial attacks has increased since the [UN] 
report, and this might be as a result of it. If the person you speak to doesn’t 
agree with you, it doesn’t mean that he has not taken what you say into 
account. Sometimes it’s simply a ritual - that when you are criticised, you 
have to reply and defend yourself. Overall the visit of the Rapporteur was 
beneficial. Russia also used the UN report in the case Georgia v Russia. It 
referred to what was written in the report to show that there is no policy of 
discrimination [in Russia], and that Georgians who were expelled from the 
country were expelled for administrative reasons. [7.1] 
 
The Russian analytical centre SOVA corroborates one of the points made by the 
respondent: between 2008 and 2009 Russian law-enforcement agencies managed to 
restrain the activities of the main ultra-right groups in Moscow, resulting in a 
reduction of instances of racially-motivated violence in 2009, for the first time in 
six years.
216
 With regard to Georgia v Russia, the respondent referred to an 
interstate application filed by Georgia against Russia, for its large-scale 
deportations of Georgians.
217
 The Georgian authorities argued that the Russian 
government had won public support for the anti-Georgian policies through the 
media, with reference to data in the UN Special Rapporteur’s report on the 
frequency of xenophobic messages in the Russian media.
218
 Russia justified the 
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 Report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism […] (note 200).  
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 SOVA Report: Kozhevnikova, G. 2009. ‘Under the Sign of Political Terror. Radical Nationalism 
and Efforts to Counteract it in 2009’. http://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-
analyses/2010/03/d18151/ (accessed 3-10-2011). 
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 Georgia v Russia, Decision on Admissibility, Application No. 13255/07, 30 June 2001, § 22. 
Hundreds of Georgian citizens were deported from Russia in 2006 as relations between the two 
countries deteriorated. 
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 Report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism […] (note 200). 
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deportations on the grounds of illegal immigration from Georgia, and noted that the 
Special Rapporteur had stated in his report that there was ‘no State policy of racism 
or xenophobia in the Russian Federation’.219 In fact, the Special Rapporteur had 
also concluded that: 
 
[W]hile there is no State policy of racism in the Russian Federation, the 
Russian society is facing a profound trend of racism and xenophobia’.220  
 
This trend included:  
 
[A] climate of relative impunity that the perpetrators of such acts [of 
violence against minorities] enjoy from law enforcement […].221  
 
One could interpret Russia’s use of the UN report as a cynical one, serving the 
country’s particularistic needs - alternatively dismissing222 and using a report 
depending on the government’s needs. According to this interpretation, Russia 
appropriated the report for its own purposes, isolating one finding from the overall 
context of the report, and not responding to the specific reference by Georgia to the 
section on the portrayal of minorities in the Russian media.  
 The Council of Europe respondents noted other aspects of Russia’s 
approach to international law they considered problematic. The issues cited were: 
egregious human rights violations in the North Caucasus, where there has been ‘not 
much progress, only promises’ [7.3];223 the propiska system, which ‘nobody [in 
Russia] realises […] is a human rights issue’ [7.1];224 and the rights of homosexuals 
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 The report’s findings were, overall, contested by the Russian authorities. See Section 3.2. 
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 See for example PACE, ‘Legal Remedies for Human Rights Violations in the North Caucasus’, 4 
June 2010, Doc. 12276. 
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 The propiska is a residence permit. Its absence, which is not infrequent in the case of migrant 
workers, can lead to their being deprived of political, social and economic rights. See PACE, ‘The 
Propiska System Applied to Migrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Council of Europe Member 
States: Effects and Remedies’, 12 October 2001, Doc. 9262. 
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- citing the refusal of the (then) mayor of Moscow Yurii Luzhkov to allow gay 
pride demonstrations in the city
225
 [7.1]. 
The circumstances surrounding ECRML ratification are a further example 
of Russia’s selective approach to international commitments. Russia has a clear 
obligation to ratify the treaty, given the commitment made at its accession to the 
Council of Europe.
226
 The interviews evidenced the perception among public 
officials and civil society alike that Russia still has a choice to opt out and refrain 
from ratification - although this might admittedly originate from a lack of in-depth 
knowledge of Russia’s international obligations. As a respondent from a human 
rights NGO noted, the Russian government has an interest in international projects, 
and willingly cooperated on the programme ‘Minorities in Russia’ [1.5.1];227 yet, 
by 2011, the programme had not led to concrete steps towards ratification. This 
might not only be due to a reluctance to take up new obligations, but also to the 
perceived instability that would result from shifts in the status quo in majority-
minority relations - a fear of ‘strengthening minorities too much’, as a Council of 
Europe expert put it [7.4]. The same respondent noted: 
 
There is the issue of ethnic conflict, the feeling that there is a danger 
attached to ratifying [the ECRML] […]. The public officials also are afraid 
that the minorities will be strengthened and might then want more rights 
[...]. [7.4] 
 
The federal authorities in Moscow, she felt, were perhaps fearful that ratification 
could unleash a torrent of demands. In this case, Russia might be indefinitely 
postponing ratification as it sees a stronger state interest in not ratifying than in 
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ratifying. This might also explain the high level of control that Russia exerted over 
the ‘Minorities in Russia’ programme, noted by the same respondent:  
The Russian government made it clear that it wanted to participate in 
meetings [between Council of Europe experts and minorities], so its active 
participation was a compromise […]. The participation of public officials in 
meetings is contrary to the normal procedures of the Committee of Experts: 
usually the Council of Europe experts [during missions] at first meet 
minorities only [without representatives of the authorities], to make sure 
that they are not influenced by public officials. [7.4]  
 
Hence, interviews with Council of Europe experts suggest, on the one hand, that 
among Russian officials the reception of the ECHR is progressively enabling its 
direct application; on the other, they indicate a residual degree of control by the 
Russian authorities over some aspects of compliance with the ECHR and, in 
particular, with international minority rights standards. These attitudes consolidate 
a selective form of implementation. 
 
Every Little Helps: International Standards as a Tool for Activists 
Selective implementation implies some implementation nonetheless. The general 
conclusion of civil society representatives was not that international standards 
should be disregarded as irrelevant, but that what opportunities exist ought to be 
exploited. Civil society respondents were able to identify some benefits in the mass 
of flaws that they had enumerated. The main benefits of international standards 
cited by the respondents were: the support from an international body (of a moral if 
not always practical kind); and the legal articulation of their convictions, framed as 
human rights and enshrined in legally-binding international documents. A 
respondent, an academic and Mordovian activist in Saransk, saw a symbolic 
significance that could ultimately have a practical impact on policy. Speaking about 
the ECRML, he said:  
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Any international document impacts on Russia’s internal policy. [By 
acceding to international instruments] Russia enters a system of civilised 
nations. [2.14] 
 
A public official from Karelia believed that the FCNM ‘force[d] the [federal] 
authorities to think about [minority] issues and to think of solutions’ [4.2]. Other 
respondents from both civil society and academia believed in a positive role for 
international standards in Russia, although they did not provide specific examples 
of what this role may be. 
The data indicate that some practical use is made of international standards. 
The foundations of international human rights law are already incorporated into 
domestic law via the ECHR, and increasingly used in Russian courts. Regional 
public officials reported invoking international standards on minority protection in 
campaigning and lobbying, and employing them in centre-periphery exchanges. For 
example, a civil servant in Karelia reported citing Russia’s international minority 
rights obligations to solicit the allocation of adequate (federal) funding to the 
republic for programmes on minority cultures, such as media outlets operating in 
Karelian language. The Tatarstani Parliament in May 2009 called on the Russian 
authorities to ratify the ECRML, in order to uphold the right to access education in 
one’s minority language - a right the regions saw menaced by the 2007 Law 309 
amending the Law ‘On Education’.228 Minorities in Russia have started framing 
their claims by relating them to linguistic rights, rather than, more generally, to 
cultural programmes (Suleymanova 2010). The Council of Europe has acted as 
mediator, by facilitating exchanges between the Russian authorities and civil 
society at Council of Europe-sponsored events;
229
 and by considering the claims 
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and observations included by civil society in ACFC shadow reports, which have 
contributed to the formulation of the ACFC’s recommendations. An academic and 
activist from Tatarstan believed that the support of the Council of Europe or the 
OSCE might increase the chances of success when civil society lobbied the Russian 
state in the area of minority rights. When, in 2009, a decree removed the option to 
take the final secondary school exam in the Tatar language,
230
 in addition to 
addressing protest letters to the Russian authorities, his pressure group had written 
to the Council of Europe and the OSCE [2.6].
231
  
The director of a minority NGO from Karelia had clearly identified 
international standards as an opportunity - something that could add substance to 
her claims as a minority representative, and as such had ‘always used them’ [1.2.1]. 
She had noted an interest in international standards among local government and 
courts in Karelia, although the actual ‘application’ of the standards was ‘a different 
matter’. Her NGO’s use of the new opportunities afforded by international law can 
be contrasted with the position of the head of an NCA in Moscow [1.1.5]: in 
common with other NCA representatives, he had very little (if any) knowledge of 
the FCNM. Although based on a small sample, my interpretation of the data is that 
NCAs or minority associations with close links to the authorities do not look for 
supplementary lobbying opportunities other than those already offered by their own 
networks. The aforementioned NGO from Karelia had opted not to become a NCA. 
It was by no means openly critical of the establishment and sought to cooperate 
with the Karelian authorities wherever possible, yet it also pursued its independent 
objectives. The Moscow NCA, instead, operated very closely with the authorities 
and MPs. Other respondents, leaders of NCAs or other minority organisations, had 
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close contacts with the local authorities or the Duma,
232
 or had themselves acceded 
to these institutions. The data suggest that the use of international standards is 
inversely proportional to the overlapping of networks and interests between 
minority organisations and institutions such as the Duma. 
There are instances in which international organisations have directly 
intervened to facilitate the defusing of tensions in instances of problematic 
majority-minority relations. A civil society representative from Karelia referred to 
the case of a Mari representative in the republic of Mari El, Vladimir Kuzlov, who, 
in 2005, had been the victim of an attack by unidentified individuals and suffered 
life-threatening injuries.
233
 In the preceding years the relations between Mari 
organisations and the Mari El’s authorities had deteriorated, as 2000 saw the 
election as the republic’s president of Moscow-born Leonid Markelov of the 
extreme right-wing Liberal Democratic Party. Markelov refused to collaborate with 
the existing Congress of Mari People and instead formed another organisation, the 
Mari Council, with handpicked loyalists as its members.
234
 The Mari groups had 
subsequently positioned themselves politically in opposition to Markelov. 
Following the deterioration of relations between the Mari ethnic group and Mari 
El’s authorities, and the incident involving Kuzlov, the Council of Europe issued 
recommendations condemning the conditions of Russia’s Finno-Ugric people, to 
which Mari belong.
235
 The respondent believed that: 
 
The authorities [of Mari El] tried to change afterwards [...]. It’s not true that 
Russia doesn’t care about international standards. They [the authorities] 
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don’t want a big scandal. [After the Council of Europe recommendations] 
they tried very hard to show that the situation is now fine. This was also 
reflected in Mordovia, [where] there have been a lot of events for Finno-
Ugric people [1.2.1].  
 
A civil society representative and academic believed that the increased attention to 
the needs of Finno-Ugric people was motivated by trading incentives with Finno-
Ugric countries outside Russia, such as Finland - after the Council of Europe 
brought the issue to international attention [1.5.1]. He further noted that 
international monitoring had contributed to improving the conditions of Russia’s 
indigenous peoples. Another ethnic group to which the Council of Europe has 
devoted attention is the Meskhetian Turks. Deported from Georgia to Central Asia 
in the Soviet period, and having resettled in Russia’s Krasnodar krai in 1989, 
Meskhetian Turks were mostly not granted Russian citizenship in the post-Soviet 
period.
236
 The situation was resolved primarily through a resettlement to the United 
States.
237
  
 
3.5 Conclusion: Selective but Valuable 
 
This chapter has shown that the approach to international law in Russia is 
characterised by its selective implementation. The perception prevails among public 
officials that international law is ‘Western’ and that Russia is ‘different’: in addition 
to objective criteria of ‘difference’ such as size and number of minorities, there is  a 
self-perception that Russia is a ‘managed’ democracy and a ‘great power’ 
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(derzhavost’). Instead, civil society institutions, including minority organisations, 
appear to have embraced the opportunities that exist to further their objectives with 
the assistance of international law. The prevailing view among the civil society 
respondents was far removed from the Russian government’s own, which favours a 
measure of control over international standards’ application.   
While there have been centralised, federal-level decisions - which, depending 
on the circumstances, have  promoted or thwarted the application of international 
standards -, these have often alternated with a default localised approach where 
localities and regions are omitted from central plans to implement the relevant 
standards. It suggests a selectivity of implementation by which the Russian 
authorities seemingly seek to reap the benefits from adherence to an international 
system, for example through trade and international cooperation, while filtering 
what may otherwise result in a perceived ‘excessive’ penetration of international 
principles into the Russian sphere. Hence, there are no guarantees that international 
standards will be applied comprehensively in Russia - thereby lessening the overall 
impact they may exert on domestic law and practice. Among the international 
standards, the flexible, open-ended provisions of the FCNM are certainly more 
volatile than the ECHR. The cases of Mari and Meskhetian Turks seem to indicate 
that the more concrete the recommendations by the Council of Europe, the greater 
the chances that they will be solidified into concrete action. The ECHR, meanwhile, 
regularly imparts detailed sets of legal obligations, and boasts a rich and constantly 
growing jurisprudence. Is it to Russian jurisprudence in practice that I now turn, 
with the analysis of the views of those who directly apply international law in their 
work: the judges. 
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4. THE JUDICIARY AND INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS: FROM APPLICATION TO 
IMPLEMENTATION?   
 
Judges have a crucial role in the implementation of international standards. They 
are the ones who translate abstract international conventions into domestic judicial 
practice. The performance of judges, their receptiveness to or rejection of 
international law is a factor determining its impact, or lack thereof. This chapter 
examines the Russian judiciary’s approach to international law and minority rights.  
It is shown that the judiciary is a multi-faceted, non-monolithic body: the selectivity 
in the Russian authorities’ reception of international law is mirrored by the varied 
attitudes of judges. Judicial practice varies across the country and courts at different 
levels. Although both the data from this study’s interviews and from legal studies 
point to an overall increasing application of the ECHR in Russian courts,
238
 
application is contingent upon a combination of external circumstances, including 
instances of political pressure, and upon judges’ own attitudes and commitment. 
There is an additional complicating factor in the safeguard of minority rights 
through courts: the difficulty in legally formulating minority claims, due to the 
vagueness and flexibility of both domestic and international legislation. It 
reconfirms prevailing tendencies of selective implementation of international law.  
In this chapter, I analyse data from in-depth interviews with judges and 
persons who have worked closely with judges. First, I consider the complexities in 
the application of international law, with a focus on the ECHR, and I discuss the 
possible repercussions of informal practices upon the rule of law in Russia. Second, 
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I examine legal cases relating to minority issues and the Russian courts’ 
performance. Third, I outline options for the possible enhancement of the role of 
Russian courts in protecting minority rights. I conclude by noting difficulties in the 
crystallisation of minority rights through Russia’s courts, both with regard to 
domestic and international law. 
 
4.1 The Russian Judiciary and the ECHR’s Application  
 
The direct application of international standards by Russian courts relates primarily 
to the ECHR. The open-ended provisions of the FCNM, which have to be translated 
into concrete measures by the member states, are not conducive to their direct 
application by domestic courts. Such measures can involve legal reform, but also 
programmes and (non-legally binding) regulations for the promotion of minority 
cultures. Thus, the ECHR features prominently in this chapter. 
The application of the ECHR is no simple task. It is not only the ECHR 
itself but also its body of jurisprudence that requires incorporation into the Russian 
legal system. This is in line with the ‘expansive meaning’ of the Russian 
Constitution’s Article 15(4),239 which encompasses not only treaties themselves, 
but also their interpretation by international bodies (Danilenko 1999: 68). Article 
15(4) also applies to the ‘evolutionary aspect’ of international law: the ECHR is not 
static, but a living instrument with an evolving interpretation by the ECtHR. The 
member states’ reception to it needs to be adjusted accordingly (Danilenko 1999: 
465; Nussberger 2008: 617). As Keller & Stone put it: 
 
[A] state in compliance at one moment in time will be put out of compliance 
at a later point, every time the court decides to raise the level of protection 
(2008: 703).  
                                                 
239
 Stipulating that international law takes precedence over Russian law. See Section 3.1. 
 134 
 
It is no surprise that the application of the ECHR generates complexities. To 
unpack these difficulties I interviewed a judge from Voronezh (in service for 17 
years at the time of the interview - ‘Judge A’ [6.1]), one from St Petersburg (13 
years - ‘Judge B’ [6.3]), a procurator from St Petersburg (‘Procurator’ [6.2]), a 
lawyer and director of an NGO working on human rights cases in Voronezh 
(‘Lawyer’ [1.5.5]) and another director of an NGO in St Petersburg (‘NGO 
Director’ [1.5.11]). The last two respondents had been involved in projects 
providing ECHR training to Russian judges.  
All five respondents agreed that the harmonisation of Russian legal practice 
with the ECHR had been progressing since ratification, echoing the opinions of the 
authors cited in Chapter 3. ‘Judge A’ affirmed that, in 2010, when the interviews 
took place, judges were required, not only expected, to apply international law. 
Both ‘Judge A’ and Judge B’ had discerned a clear shift towards a more frequent 
application of the ECHR in the second half of the 2000s. A closer look at the 
conditions of application reveals, however, a more complex picture. Judges can find 
themselves pulled in two separate directions, with an obligation to apply 
international standards, and (direct or indirect) disincentives to do so. 
The respondents  spoke of the following measures that tended to intensify 
application: binding resolutions and ‘letters’ by Russia’s three highest courts,240 
serving as instructions to judges, and requiring ECHR application
241
 (all 
respondents); disciplinary measures that may be instigated by the Qualification 
Collegium of Judges (Kvalifikatsionnaya Kollegiya Sudei) in case of failure to 
apply the ECHR (‘Judge A’); the possible overruling of a judgement by a higher 
                                                 
240
 The Russian Constitutional Court, the Russian Supreme Court and the Supreme Commercial 
Court. 
241
 See below on resolutions and ‘letters’ (Section 4.2). 
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court for failure to apply, or to apply correctly, the ECHR (Procurator); and 
possible repercussions for  a judge’s career if a case on which s/he ruled is taken to 
Strasbourg and results in Russia’s defeat (‘Judge B’). The ‘Procurator’ argued that 
there were ‘no real problems in implementing international standards’. She added 
that upon ratification of a treaty Russia takes upon itself the responsibility to 
implement it: ‘It takes time, but it is done’. The ‘Lawyer’ noted that judges have 
started to approach training in international law as a means of furthering their legal 
qualifications: ‘Now the judges want to apply [international law]. If they apply it 
they look very progressive.’  
 The disincentives consist in judges at times experiencing a gravitational pull 
towards non-application. ‘Judge B’ said that she had witnessed judges carefully 
circumventing the ECHR. The ‘Lawyer’ had primarily interpreted this avoidance, 
which she had also periodically noticed, as insufficient training, generating a fear of 
‘mistakes’: 
 
They don’t know how to do it. They try to read the ECHR like they would 
read [Russia’s] criminal code. For example, they try to understand it without 
looking at the case-law. They don’t apply [the ECHR] because they don’t 
want to feel stupid. They are afraid of making mistakes.  
 
‘Judge B’ was asked whether she had observed a similar insecurity among her 
colleagues about their performance in court. She went much further than the 
‘Lawyer’:   
 
They are afraid of making mistakes but also they are afraid of looking too 
progressive. Nobody will punish them if they do apply the ECHR, but they 
can be considered too liberal for a judge […]. I had a case [in which] there 
was a conflict between domestic and international law. I applied 
international law and the other judges found it difficult to accept it. I had to 
convince them [that it was the right thing to do]. I looked like a 
revolutionary, although I wasn’t doing anything revolutionary. 
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She believed this attitude to be due to the fact that some judges are ‘conservative, 
especially the judges trained during the Soviet Union’, which affects judicial 
practice. The ‘Lawyer’ also pointed to a ‘mentality’ disfavouring application: 
 
It is an issue of mentality. The Russian judges still have to go through the 
transition [to the application of international law], and get accustomed to 
applying it.  
 
Similarly, the ‘NGO Director’ saw a complex transition for some judges: 
 
The old school of judges are still far away from the international standards 
[...]. The new [young] judges are career-oriented and are different. The 
young judges dream of occupying places in international courts, and they 
are unhappy under an omnipotent government. The situation […] depends 
on the psychology of judges.  
 
The respondent believed, then, that younger judges tend to be more progressive and 
wish to embrace a new (post-Soviet) judicial era. The ‘Procurator’ identified a 
similar pattern, although she believed that resistance to change by the more 
conservative judges had characterised only the initial phases of the transition, and 
that most difficulties had been ironed out by 2010: 
 
At the beginning there were difficulties, including psychological, with the 
older generation; they were used to looking at the old law, the national law, 
and thought of international law as an interference with domestic law. 
 
Variance in judicial performance (Burkov 2007; Trochev 2009) reveals that these 
complexities have still not been fully resolved. An illustration of the tension 
between Russian and international law is provided by judges’ attitudes to cases of 
collision between the two. In these cases, pursuant to Article 15(4) of the Russian 
Constitution, international law takes precedence over domestic law. When asked 
whether judges indeed treat international law as superior to Russian law, ‘Judge A’ 
simply cited the legislation in this area, stipulating that international law must 
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prevail. ‘Judge B’, when asked the same question, focused on what she saw as the 
situation de facto, rather than de jure: 
 
Judges will do what is easier for them [...]. Normally they are obliged to 
apply international law; but if they don’t they will not make it evident, they 
might keep quiet, and make it look like they forgot in that particular case.  
 
The ‘NGO Director’, similarly, believed that some judges ‘don’t act as if 
international law has priority over Russian law’. He identified, again, a generational 
gap, by which the most conservative judges tended to be those trained during the 
Soviet Union.  
Do judges, then, have a margin of discretion in deciding over application or 
non-application? The ‘Procurator’ denied this: judges are ‘obliged’ to apply 
international law. She noted: ‘Why take a risk with your job? It is a utilitarian 
position: if you know that your decision will be overturned, why do it?’ The 
‘Lawyer’, however, echoing ‘Judge B’, argued that remedial action, including the 
overturning of a ruling, does not necessarily follow a failure to apply, or to apply 
correctly, the ECHR. Indeed, Burkov and Trochev show that mistakes in ECHR 
application, including in higher courts, do take place (Burkov 2007; Trochev 2009). 
‘Judge A’ had similarly noted that, despite her superiors having become ‘very 
strict’ about applying international standards, she had observed cases in which 
judges refrained from applying the ECHR, with no direct consequences. Again, this 
is corroborated by legal studies, showing that judgements are not consistently 
quashed as a result of failure to apply the ECHR (Burkov 2007: 76). It follows that 
the requirement to apply international standards is not widely enforced.
242
  
 
 
                                                 
242
 The statements by the ‘Procurator’, reported above, may originate from a concern with presenting 
the Russian judiciary in a positive light to a foreign researcher. 
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Judges, Informal Practices and the Rule of Law 
The independence and professionalism of the judiciary are essential to make the 
application of international law a reality. Progressive constitutional provisions, in 
line with international standards, are ineffective unless there is a corresponding 
inclination by judges to apply them (Danilenko 1999: 53). The interviewees shared 
the opinion that knowledge, through training and materials, can progressively 
reshape the attitudes of the judiciary: what seems ‘revolutionary’ may thus become 
‘the new normal’. Yet, other factors besides knowledge and legal practice affect 
application. ‘Judge B’ referred to ‘political’ decisions:  
 
The first [ECtHR] case on Russia, Kalashnikov v Russia,
243
 was distributed 
very widely; it was everywhere. Others less so. The Chechen case on 
discrimination, Timishev, was not published widely.
244
 I think that it was a 
political decision.
245
 
 
This takes us to the infiltration of the judiciary by political interests. It involves the 
use of informal practices, including in the form of pressure on judges, to influence 
the rule of law. ‘Judge B’ elaborated on her views:  
 
Q: Is there pressure on judges? 
A: There are different types of pressure. In Russia nobody is protected. 
There are strong political and business interests and to go against them you 
need a lot of courage. Nobody is protected; you will have to make a choice. 
If I had had to work on a case like Khodorkovskii’s I would have left the 
court.
246
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 Application No. 47095/99, 15 July 2002. 
244
 Application Nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00, 13 December 2005.  
245
 The Kalashnikov case related to prison conditions and length of detention. The respondent 
believed the Timishev case, in which Russia was judged to have discriminated against an ethnic 
Chechen, to be more politically sensitive.   
246
 The respondent referred to the very prominent case of former Russian oligarch Mikhail 
Khodorkovskii, arrested for fraud in 2003 and subsequently found guilty. He was still in detention in 
2011. It has been widely considered to be a political case characterised by a series of unfair trials. 
See, for example, Amnesty International Press release, 24-5-2001. ‘Russian Businessmen Declared 
Prisoners of Conscience after Convictions are Upheld’. http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-
releases/russian-businessmen-declared-prisoners-conscience-after-convictions-are-uph  (accessed 
15-10-2011). 
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Studies have shown that the Russian judiciary is not fully independent (Hendley 
2007; Ledeneva 2006a, 2006b, 2008; Shevtsova 2003: 149; Trochev 2008a).
247
 
Popova presents the theory of ‘strategic pressure’ in analysing levels of judicial 
independence in Russia and Ukraine. In countries that are not consolidated 
democracies nor consolidated autocracies, political competition hinders 
independent courts, as dependent courts are ‘more useful and more attractive to 
vulnerable incumbents’, particularly weak incumbents.  It results in the 
‘politicization of justice’. (Popova, 2012) In the Russian legal environment there is 
no full separation between the executive and judiciary, as the interests of the 
executive can trickle down to the courts. Even President Medvedev has admitted to 
the absence of an independent judiciary in Russia. Shortly after his appointment, 
Medvedev called Russia a country of ‘legal nihilism’, adding that ‘[n]o European 
country can boast of such disregard of the law’.248 
Post-Soviet ‘legal nihilism’ finds its roots in Russian history (Pomeranz 2009: 
15): in particular, in Soviet Russia, courts operated according to unwritten, pliant 
rules and superiors’ orders. The RSFSR and USSR Constitutions were rarely 
applied directly, due to the vagueness of their wording. Instead, judges prioritised 
secondary law, statutes as well as ‘instructions’ from above; these included 
‘resolutions’ and ‘letters’ from higher courts, but also from non-judicial influential 
bodies such as ministries. It created a Soviet ‘culture of dependency’ of the 
judiciary on the executive (Hendley 2007). Such instructions tended to be ‘for 
internal use only’: regulations were thus listed in unpublished documents, in the 
absence of judicial transparency (Nussberger 2008: 635; Burkov 2007: 26). Thus, 
the impact of international law in the USSR remained insignificant, despite the 
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 See also PACE, ‘Allegations of Politically Motivated Abuses of the Criminal Justice System in 
Council of Europe Member States’, 23 June 2009, Doc. 11993. 
248
 Cited in Vedomosti, 22-1-2008. ‘D. Medvedev: Rossiya - Strana Pravovogo Nigilizma’ (‘D. 
Medvedev: Russia - A Country of Legal Nihilism’). 
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country being ‘perhaps the most assiduous ratifier of UN instruments’ (Bowring 
2009a: 285). 
As for other sectors, informal practices have infiltrated the judiciary 
(Ledeneva 2006a; Solomon 2005). Informal practices can take the form of 
personalised responses to a judge’s performance. ‘Judge B’ observed that issuing a 
judgement on a case later taken to Strasbourg, and resulting in Russia’s defeat, ‘can 
be an obstacle to [a judge’s] career’. But it depends: ‘they [the authorities] could 
close their eyes on it, or they could use it against you’ - depending on the 
circumstances, and relations between a particular judge and the authorities or 
his/her superiors. The ‘NGO Director’ had further identified diverging judicial 
practices in different courts:  
 
In [Town A] judges are more independent than in [Town B]. The [Rayon C] 
court has a reputation for rubber stamping.
249
 
 
The ‘Lawyer’ confirmed:   
 
There are cases in which the decision has already been made before the trial 
takes place. They are politicised cases.  
 
Soviet and post-Soviet judicial culture favours opaque means and informal 
practices to literal application and the principle of equality before the law. In 
politically controversial cases, the notorious phenomenon of ‘telephone justice’ 
may compel judges to issue rulings in line with the political imperatives of 
powerful individuals - following ‘instructions’ received over the telephone (Gelman 
2004; Krasnov 2004; Ledeneva 2006b; Ledeneva 2008).250 Russian judges 
experience pressures from a multitude of actors: numerous organs can, or have tried 
to, exert their influence upon the judiciary. Solomon cites, among these, the 
                                                 
249
 The names of towns were removed in the interests of confidentiality. 
250
 See also PACE, Doc. 11993 (note 247). 
 141 
Ministry of Economic Development, the State Duma, the Federal Council, the 
siloviki (former military and security officials), and the government itself (2005: 
340). 
Judges’ financial circumstances are not favourable to independence. 
Payments to judges’ salaries and housing originate from regional budgets rather 
than directly from the federal budget, causing judges to be financially dependent on 
the local authorities.251 The rules for the appointment of judges create the conditions 
for possible control by the leadership, as federal judges are appointed by the 
president,252 upon recommendations by a Qualification Collegium of Judges.253 In 
some cases, judges who strive to maintain their full independence when pressure is 
placed upon them may be discredited, isolated, and, ultimately, pushed out of the 
system. For example, in October 2010 former Moscow city court judge Sergey 
Pashin was dismissed after he criticised the conviction of a pacifist, and his ill-
treatment in prison, for refusing to serve in the army during the Chechen conflict.
254
   
In line with this, the ‘NGO Director’ argued:  
 
The practice of the courts, including the Supreme Court, is sometimes 
contradictory. The Supreme Court is not independent and also the 
Constitutional Court is losing some independence under Putin. This year 
judge Yaroslavtsev was squeezed out [of the Constitutional Court] and he 
was one of the last two independent judges.  
 
The respondent referred to the case of a former judge of the Russian Constitutional 
Court, Vladimir Yaroslavtsev, who resigned from his position four months after 
complaining of intense political pressure on the Russian judiciary, in an 2008 
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 On dependency on housing, also see Hendley (2007: 267). 
252
 Article 128(2) of the Russian Constitution. There is a different appointment procedure for the 
judges of the three higher courts, who are appointed by the Federation Council (the Russian 
Parliament’s upper chamber) upon proposals by the president (Article 128(1)). This does not 
guarantee independence given the vertical structure of power. See Section 5.2. 
253
 Article 19(2) of Law No. 30-FZ of 14 March 2002 ‘On the Organs of the Judicial Community in 
the Russian Federation’. 
254
 Amnesty International, ‘Annual Report 2001’. 
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interview to the Spanish newspaper el País.
 255
 According to the respondent, the 
Constitutional Court’s Chairman Valerii Zorkin had sought to discredit 
Yaroslavnev by turning other judges against him, as a form of retaliation for his 
criticism of Zorkin himself for being ‘too eager to listen to command’, as the 
respondent put it. It led to the judge’s resignation.  
This is not to say that there are no or extremely few fair verdicts. Short of 
politicised cases, the interviews point to judges’ freedom of action. Fair trials result 
from a combination of freedom from pressure and individual judges’ own 
commitment to independence and fairness of proceedings. The ‘NGO Director’ 
summarised it as: ‘The way a judge behaves depends both on his/her personality 
and pressure from above.’ These results are in line with Hendley’s argument that 
opportunities for judges to operate independently emerge primarily in cases that do 
not touch upon the key interests of Russia’s most powerful individuals - whether at 
the federal or regional level (2007: 267). The interpretation of a Council of Europe 
expert was that ‘Russia is still reserving the right to intervene’: it keeps open the 
option to influence judges’ performances. For as long as this option exists, he 
believed, there cannot be an independent judiciary. As he put it: ‘there can’t be a 
partially independent judiciary, like there can’t be a partially pregnant woman’ 
[7.3]. Hence, although there exist opportunities for the application of international 
law, in practice it occurs selectively. 
 
4.2 Use of Courts to Defend Human and Minority Rights 
 
When judges are not subjected to, or resist, pressure, the courts can become 
locomotives for change - tools to advance human and minority rights. Judicial 
                                                 
255
 The interview was used for the article: Bonet P. 31-8-2008. ‘En Rusia Mandan los Órganos de 
Seguridad, Como en la Época Soviética’ (‘In Russia Security Forces are Used as in Soviet Times’), 
El País.  
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patterns are not fully predictable: for example, one should not assume the 
politicisation of judicial decisions in all cases involving human rights organisations. 
In a case from 2008, the human rights NGO Citizens’ Watch in St Petersburg 
successfully sued the local administration for requiring it to provide copies of all its 
outgoing correspondence for the period July 2004-July 2007, without the court 
order foreseen by law in such cases. The St Petersburg City Court declared that the 
local authorities were in violation of the law.
256
 
The ‘NGO Director’, likewise, argued:  
 
Courts can give protection to NGOs if the defence lawyers know what they 
are doing, but it depends on the judges.  
 
Consequently, there is scope for the judiciary to play a role in defending human 
rights - including minority rights. Yet the jurisprudence on the cultural rights of 
national minorities in Russia is miniscule. During her 17 years of service, ‘Judge A’ 
was aware of only two cases in her Voronezh court relating to minority interests - 
on migration and citizenship.
257
 Two main reasons are identified for the paucity of 
legal cases involving minority rights. First, there is a weak - albeit growing 
(Trochev 2005; 2008a) - tradition of litigation in Russia. In addition to practical 
considerations such as the need for resources for litigation, lawsuits antagonise 
public officials when these become defendants in a case. As will be seen in Chapter 
7, good relations with the authorities are considered to be of paramount importance 
by many minority representatives in their efforts to promote programmes for the 
preservation of their cultures and languages. It is when dialogue with the authorities 
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 St Petersburg City Court, Judgement of 29 October 2008, No. 33/12016/2008. 
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 Other judgements on minority issues - the ones that tend to receive media coverage - involve 
instances of racially-motivated violence. See, for example, SOVA, 2011. ‘Winter 2010-2011. 
December and its Consequences’. http://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-
analyses/2011/05/d21571/ (accessed 30-10-2011).  
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proves fruitless, the director of a minority NGO in Petrozavodsk suggested, that one 
should resort to the courts:   
 
At the moment things happen only if the authorities think that something is 
advantageous for them; if they don’t think so nothing will happen. In these 
cases it’s necessary and important to sue […]. If the situation between the 
authorities and civil society doesn’t change, it will be the only way. [1.2.1] 
 
There is a second issue: the scarcity of instances that can be categorised as clear-cut 
minority rights violations. The same respondent cited, as possible opportunities for 
minorities’ judicial redress, instances of clear and tangible violations, such as the 
failure to pay social benefits to which indigenous peoples are entitled (i.e. Veps in 
Karelia); or the failure to pay a bonus of 25% on the salary of civil servants who 
can work in minority languages in addition to Russian - a provision in Karelian 
(regional) legislation that is rarely complied with. In many instances, legislation on 
minority and linguistic rights tends to be declarative and overly general, referring to 
the ‘development’ of minority languages and cultures. Thus, for example, Article 
2(2) of the Law ‘On the Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation’ states: 
 
The Russian Federation guarantees all its peoples regardless of their 
numbers equal rights on the conservation and development of the native 
language, freedom of choice and of use of the language for 
communication.
258
 
 
This type of provision does not generate specific responsibilities for state 
institutions. The respondent also identified general shortcomings running through 
the Russian legislature and judiciary, concluding:  
 
There is no structure to control the implementation of the legislation [...]. 
Since perestroika they [the authorities] have tried to build a new [legal] 
system; a lot of laws were adopted. But as they build this system they also 
undermine it, because when a law is adopted there can already be another 
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 Law No. 1807-I of 25 October 1991. On general provisions that do not lead to specific 
responsibilities, see also those on the financing of National Cultural Autonomies (Section 7.3). 
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law that [the law-makers] don’t know about, and one law contradicts 
another. Instead, during the Soviet Union, when laws were passed 
everybody applied them. There was a strong mechanism of control. [1.2.1] 
 
The respondent suggested that the post-Soviet judicial environment is still in a 
transitional phase, with a judicial vacuum left by the Soviet system that is still 
partly unfilled. In the post-Soviet legal climate some elements of the ‘old’ system 
linger on, exerting residual control over the judiciary, without however 
guaranteeing the coherence that can stem from a heavily centralised system. 
Despite these complexities, Russia’s higher courts have started to rule on 
issues relating to minority rights. Eight years before France banned the full-face 
veil, Russian courts ruled in favour of women being allowed to wear headscarves in 
the photographs for their (Russian internal) passports. A group of Muslim women 
had argued against a requirement to remove their headscarves while these 
photographs were taken, given the Islamic prescription that they should not appear 
bareheaded in front of strangers.
259
 The case had been turned down by the Russian 
Supreme Court (RSC) but upheld by the RSC’s Cassation Collegium. As a 
consequence, a regulation of a Ministry of Internal Affairs directive, requiring that 
a person be photographed bareheaded for passport images,
260
 was declared invalid 
on the grounds that it restricted the right to freedom of religion.  
Meanwhile, the Russian Constitutional Court (RCC) has ruled on matters 
relating to minority languages in the republics. In one case from 1998 the RCC 
ruled on the legal requirement that the president of the Republic of Bashkortostan 
speak both Russian and Bashkir. Analogous provisions on titular languages are 
found in the constitutions of the republics of Buryatia, Ingushetia, Yakutia, North 
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 Russian Supreme Court (RSC), Cassatium Collegium, Judgement of 15 May 2003, No. KAS03-
166, ‘Concerning the Case of F. K. Gabinullina [and Others] [...]’. 
260
 Point 14(3) of Internal Directive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 15 September 1997 No. 
605 ‘On the Procedures for Issuing, Replacing and Registering Passports of the Citizens of the 
Russian Federation’. 
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Ossetia, Tatarstan, Tuva and Adygeya. The court dismissed the case by referring to 
the absence of ‘objective criteria’ on which to base the court decision: 
 
Until the question of the legal status of the state language of the Republic of 
Bashkortostan is resolved, legal agencies are to ensure that citizens may 
exercise their rights during the electoral process regardless of language 
requirements. [italics added]
261
 
 
This ambiguous judgement has been explained as an attempt by the RCC to avoid a 
clear ruling on a very sensitive issue. As Zhukov puts it, ‘the court has told the 
regions to solve the problem themselves’.262 At the same time, the RCC left open 
the possibility of a non-Bashkir speaker to become president of the republic, 
thereby lessening the status of the titular languages in Russia as a whole - as the 
ruling is applicable not only in Bashkortostan but in all republics.  
  In another case from 2004, the RCC ruled on Article 10(2) of the Law of the 
Republic of Tatarstan ‘On the Languages of the Peoples of the Republic of 
Tatarstan’,263 stipulating that the Tatar and Russian languages are to be studied in 
equal measure in the republic’s nurseries and schools.264 The plaintiff had 
complained that Tatarstan’s language legislation forced the republic’s students to 
study Tatar intensively, detracting from their ability to master other subjects:  
 
[The intensive study of Tatar] reduces the opportunity to deepen the study 
of other subjects of the curriculum, and also of optional disciplines […]. 
Those who reside in the Republic of Tatarstan therefore are in an unequal 
position in the realisation of the right to education compared to those living 
in other subjects of the Russian Federation, which violates the guarantees of 
this right [of equality] under the Constitution [...].  
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 RCC, Judgement of 27 April 1998, No.12-P ‘On the Assessment of the Constitutionality of the 
Provision of Article 92(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Bashkortostan […]’.  
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 Zhukov, M. & Poryvayeva, A. 28-4-1998. ‘Constitutional Court says Presidents don't have to 
Learn Languages’, Kommersant. 
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 Law No. 1560-XII of 8 July 1992 (with amendments of 28 March 1996). 
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 RCC, Judgement of 16 November 2004, No. 16-P ‘On the Constitutionality of Article 10(2) of 
the Law of the Republic of Tatarstan ‘On the Languages of the Peoples of the Republic of Tatarstan 
[…] in  relation to the Complaint by  S.I. Khapugin […]’’.  
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The issue of the Tatar alphabet was also raised in the same case. The plaintiff 
argued that the choice of alphabet flows from the constitutional right of Russia’s 
republics to establish their own state languages.
265
 The RCC ruled that Tatarstan’s 
legislation, stipulating that Tatar and Russian must be studied ‘in equal measure’, 
did not represent a violation of the Russian Constitution; rather, it served to enable 
the use of Tatar in all spheres in public life. The intensive study of Tatar was, then, 
per se not interpreted as an obstacle to equality. The RCC, however, stressed the 
authority of the federal centre in formulating language policies, including those 
affecting the republics’ state languages. Additionally, the study of Tatar must not 
undermine Russian as a state language of the Russian Federation:  
 
The teaching of Tatar as a state language of the Russian Federation cannot 
occur to the detriment of the federal component of the basic federal 
curriculum
266
[…] or be an obstacle to the realisation of the right of students 
to deepen their learning of other subjects of the curriculum, including 
Russian […]. [F]ederal law regulates the principal issues on the status of the 
republics’ state languages affecting the interests of the Russian Federation 
[…] and also establishes general principles of the legal regulation of these 
languages […].267 
 
The federal centre, it was ruled, further decides on the alphabet of languages in 
Russia - in line with another judgement that confirmed the constitutionality of legal 
provisions requiring that the federal authorities make decisions on language 
scripts.268     
In another case, the parent of a school pupil in Tatarstan submitted a claim 
to the RSC challenging the introduction of Russian-only exams in Tatar schools in 
2009.
269
 The parent argued that the abolition of the option to take the exam in Tatar 
violated her daughter’s right to an education in her mother tongue. The RSC turned 
                                                 
265
 Article 68(2), Russian Constitution. 
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 The federal part of the curriculum, common to all regions of Russia. See Chapter 6. 
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 Point 4. 
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 The judgement prevented the Republic of Tatarstan from officially switching from the Cyrillic to 
Latin alphabet for the Tatar language. See also Section 5.2.  
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 See Section 6.2. 
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down the claim, pointing to the distinction between the right to receive an 
education in a particular language and the language of the subsequent exam; and 
noting that instruction in Tatar should take place with no detriment to the Russian 
language as a state language.
270
 Other judgements have confirmed the 
constitutionality of the banning of political parties on the grounds of ethnic or 
religious identity; and ruled that no more than one local or regional National 
Cultural Autonomy per minority could be established in a municipality or a region. 
There cases are discussed in Part 3 of the thesis.
271
 
To conclude, the higher courts have crystallised some of the rights of 
minorities, protecting minority languages - by upholding the right to study Tatar 
and Russian in equal measure - and religious minorities - by making special 
allowances for Muslim practices. At the same time, the RCC has reasserted the 
authority of the federal state, with regard to centralised decision-making on school 
curricula, script, the language of exams, platforms for political parties, and the 
registration of National Cultural Autonomies. The cases examined in this section 
were filed by private citizens and, in the case concerning the Latin script for Tatar, 
by the Republic of Tatarstan. This last case serves as an illustration of the regions’ 
use of the RCC in their battles against the federal centre (Trochev & Solomon 
2005). The incremental use of courts to defend the rights of people and regions 
may, in turn, lead to a greater ‘demand for law’ (Hahn 2003: 133). This can expand 
the domestic jurisprudence on minority issues, and concomitantly the role of 
Russian courts in adjudicating on these cases. 
 
 
                                                 
270
 RSC, Cassation Collegium, Judgement of 2 July 2009 No. KAS09-295 ‘On the Claim by A.A, 
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A Burgeoning Role for the Courts? 
The enhancement of the role for Russian courts in defending minority rights can be 
facilitated by two simultaneous processes: the ECHR’s ‘expansion’ (in Strasbourg), 
and the guidance from Russian higher courts to lower courts in the form of 
resolutions (in Russia). The ECHR’s expansion reduces the impact of one of its 
features that acts to restrict its effect in Russia: the fact that it is built around rulings 
on individual cases. As Keller and Stone Sweet put it:  
 
[There is a] tension […] between two functions of the Court. The Court 
constructs Convention rights as general norms, which it treats as having 
prospective legal consequences for States. At the same time, its powers are 
largely limited to the rendering of individual (retrospective and particular) 
justice to victims of specific abuse [italics added]. (2008: 691-2)  
  
With a focus on individual justice, the ECtHR can do little to solve patterns of gross 
and systematic violations (Kamminga 1994), systemic violations - leading to the 
submission of ‘clone’ cases (Leach 2005) - or administrative malpractice. The 
ECtHR cannot initiate cases proprio motu but is activated only by individual 
complaints (Reidy et al. 1997). It has refrained from recognising ‘administrative 
practice’ in human rights violations in both Chechnya and Turkey (Bowring 2008: 
95).272 The focus on individual applicants is also one of the reasons why the ECHR 
is ill-equipped to protect minorities as groups. 
The ECtHR is compelled to modernise to meet new and evolving challenges 
(Keller & Stone Sweet 2008). I argue, then, that there is an expansion of the 
ECHR’s scope that runs both vertically and horizontally. Vertically, the ECtHR has 
added new layers of meaning to individual rights. It is becoming more ‘innovative’ 
and ‘creative’ when confronted by new challenges (Bowring 2008; Keller & Stone 
                                                 
272
 The expression ‘administrative practice’ indicates violations that take place routinely, for which 
effective remedies are not guaranteed and that are frequently followed by the perpetrators’ impunity 
(Bowring 2008). 
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Sweet 2008: 691). Horizontally, the ECtHR has increasingly demanded the 
adoption of ‘general measures’ across member states - rather than discrete, case-
specific responses to individual violations (Keller & Stone Sweet 2008). This 
development has been accompanied by the member states’ relaxation of their 
sovereignty with the transfer of some judicial control over to the ECtHR since 
1950. The ECtHR is indeed slowly, but resolutely, moving towards a greater role as 
law-maker - as a ‘Constitution of Europe’:273 
 
[The] Court behaves more as a general and prospective lawmaker than a 
judge […] it seeks general solutions to general problems (Keller & Stone 
Sweet 2008: 703). 
 
The ECtHR’s expanded role would assist national governments in improving their 
human rights records by providing redress domestically274 - a priority of the ECtHR 
in light of its enormous caseload. In this context, the Council of Europe’s 
Committee of Ministers has asked the ECtHR to find the origins of systemic 
problems and delineate solutions, in the form of recommendations.275 The ECtHR 
has itself become vocal in emphasising the importance of effective remedies at the 
domestic level.276  
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 Greer argues that: 
[The Court] is already ‘the Constitutional Court for Europe’, in the sense that it is the final 
authoritative judicial tribunal in the only pan-European constitutional system there is. (2006: 173) 
The Court itself has called the ECHR ‘a constitutional document’, in Loizidou v Turkey. Application 
15318/89, 23 March 1995, § 71. In 2000 the court’s president, Luzius Wildhaber, contended that the 
constitutional role of the court should be increased (2007). 
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 This has presented challenges in Russia. In 2011 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, with regard to a number of member states including Russia, noted ‘with grave concern’: 
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concerned. 
PACE Resolution 1787 (2011), ‘Implementation of Judgements of the European Court of Human 
Rights’, 26 January 2011. 
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 Committee of Ministers Resolution Res(2004)3 ‘On Judgements Revealing an Underlying 
Systemic Problem’, 12 May 2004 and Committee of Ministers Resolution Res(2004)6 ‘On the 
Improvement of Domestic Remedies’, 12 May 2004. 
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 In Kudla v Poland, Application No. 30210/96, 26 October 2000, § 146-60 and Surmeli v 
Germany, Application No. 75529/01, 8 June 2006. The exhaustion of domestic remedies is a 
requirement for the submission of an application to the ECtHR. The high number of cases found 
admissible in Strasbourg reveals that domestic remedies in the member states are often inadequate.  
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Indeed, guaranteeing the ECHR’s rights does not only amount to providing 
the right to submit individual petitions in Strasbourg, but the effective realisation of 
such rights within a state’s boundaries.277 New opportunities to enhance general 
measures include the development of ‘pilot judgements’,278 by which the ECtHR’s 
judgements come complete with guidelines for domestic courts, with a view to 
increasing domestic adjudications modelled upon pilot judgements. Identifying 
‘general solutions to general problems’ stimulates a growing emphasis on the 
general over the individual. It is beneficial to minorities, who stand to gain from a 
general recognition of ‘group rights’ over individualism (Bowring 2008). The 
outstanding hindrance to a more substantial use of the ECHR in minority cases is its 
scarce application (Gilbert 2002) - given that it is not specifically an instrument for 
minority protection. Yet the jurisprudence continues to grow, and, as an evolving 
instrument, the ECHR is slowly widening its scope to embrace some minority 
issues.
279
 In the case Timishev v Russia,
280
 the ECtHR found that Russia had 
discriminated against the victim on ethnic grounds. In some instances, the ECHR 
and FCNM overlap and are mutually reinforcing. Thus, the right of association, 
protected at Article 11 ECHR, bestows rights upon all organisations, including 
those promoting minority rights. Equally, restrictions on the right to association in 
Article 7 FCNM cannot go beyond those permitted under Article 11 ECHR.
281
  
 
Guidance from the Higher Courts 
The second phenomenon serving to enhance the role of Russian courts in the 
application of international law is the guidance provided by the higher Russian 
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 In the meaning of Article 1 ECHR: ‘to secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in … [the] Convention’ . 
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 See, for example, Broniowski v. Poland, Application No. 31443/96, 22 June 2004. 
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courts to lower courts. Guidance comes in the form of ‘resolutions’ 
(rukovodiashchie raziasneniya) and ‘letters’ (metodicheskie pis’ma) on the 
application of international law and particularly the ECHR.
282
 Resolutions are 
explanatory notes on court proceedings issued by the RSC and the Supreme 
Commercial Court, creating legally binding obligations on all courts. The first such 
resolutions dates from 1995:283 it signalled the formal acknowledgement of the role 
of international law in Russian jurisprudence, although in practice it did not add to 
the Constitution’s existing Article 15(4)284 (Burkov 2007: 28). RSC Resolution No. 
5 (2003) goes into more detail.285 It establishes: an obligation on Russia to 
recognise and guarantee human rights and freedoms, in line with the commonly 
recognised principles of international law (Point 1); and an obligation on courts to 
apply directly international treaties to which Russia is a party (Points 3 and 4). Such 
treaties have ‘direct and immediate effect’ (Point 5) and should be applied ‘in 
particular […] [when the treaty has] set out other rules than the legislation of the 
Russian Federation’ (Point 5). It is stressed that international law has ‘priority’ over 
Russian law (Point 8). Failure by judges to comply with the above points, or 
incorrect application of international law, ought to be followed by remedial action - 
by overturning a judgement (Point 9).
286
 The Supreme Commercial Court opted for 
a ‘letter’,287 a non-binding document containing instructions to the lower courts. A 
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 By 2011 there had been no resolutions on minority-related issues. 
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 Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 8 of 31 October 
1995 ‘On Some Questions Concerning the Application of the Constitution of the Russian Federation 
by Courts’.  
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 See Section 3.1. 
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 Resolution No. 5 of 10 October 2003  (note 150). 
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 See also Chapter 3. 
287
  Informational Letter by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Commercial Court of the Russian 
Federation,  No. C1-7/CMP-1341 of 20 December 1999 ‘On the Main Provisions Applied by the 
European Court of Human Rights for the Protection of Property Rights and Right to Justice’. 
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‘letter’ carries such symbolic weight that its instructions are normally followed by 
courts, despite the absence of a legal obligation to do so.288  
Resolutions and ‘letters’ fit with the Soviet tradition of applying instructions 
and secondary law rather than the Constitution itself or international law. The 
importance of resolutions was confirmed by one of the respondents, the ‘Lawyer’, 
who said: 
 
When there is a resolution on a particular issue the judges can no longer 
ignore it. [Through the resolutions] there has been a change of attitude. Now 
they understand that they have to apply international law. 
 
In addition to resolutions, the performance of the higher courts itself acts as 
guidance to lower courts. The RCC, Burkov argues, is the most responsive to 
international law. The judgements of this court carry most weight in the Russian 
judicial system, as adjudications have a normative character (Burkov 2007: 28; 33). 
In practice, the RCC’s case-law also provides ‘instructions’ to lower courts, by 
serving as a template for the application of international legal principles. In this 
way, the higher courts’ judicial practice cascades down to lower courts. A 
complicating factor is that the higher courts do not always serve as good models as 
their performance has been far from flawless. Although the number of citations has 
increased in the 2000s,
289
 starting with the breakthrough Maslov case,290 Burkov’s 
data show that many opportunities for ECHR application are overlooked.
291
  
Additionally, the modes of citations tend to be superficial, lacking analysis of the 
ECHR jurisprudence, or even mistaken (Burkov 2007; Trochev 2008a: 176). 
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 However, the ‘letter’ is brief and devoid of practical information on the technicalities of 
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(Danilenko 1999: 57). 
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 In 2005 and 2006 the RCC cited the ECHR in 16 out of 22 judgements. In 12 of them the 
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 RCC, Judgement of 27 June 2000, No. 11-P, ‘On the constitutionality of Articles 47 and 51 of the 
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‘Superficial’ citations mean a general references to the ECHR, without 
supplementing them with its case-law - despite the fact that the exact scope of the 
ECHR’s rights only emerge through the accumulation of judgements. Applying the 
ECHR superficially or mistakenly may be harmful: in extreme cases, the Russian 
judiciary has misused the ECtHR’s jurisprudence to justify what in reality were 
ECHR violations (Nussberger 2008: 667).   
The dubious performance of higher courts has important consequences as 
ordinary courts rely heavily on them for guidance. ‘Judge B’ said: 
 
The Supreme Court is conservative, or rather not sufficiently active. For 
certain issues it remains silent. And if the Supreme Court does not speak out 
on certain issues [provide guidelines], in the lower courts judges are afraid 
[to apply the ECHR in these cases].
292
  
 
The RSC has sometimes failed to follow its own recommendations from the above-
mentioned 2003 Resolution in its judgements (Burkov 2007: 83). The defiance of 
the RCC’s chairman vis-à-vis the ECtHR293 can further influence the lower courts’ 
outlook on international law.  
Burkov has suggested that the route to enhanced ECHR application is 
conditional upon profound changes in the performance of higher courts. Higher 
courts should: issue detailed instructions to lower court on ECtHR case-law on 
Russia, including analyses of cases - rather than vague references; and dare to use 
international law to supersede Russian law where applicable. In this manner, the 
higher courts would motivate and enable other courts to apply the ECHR 
consistently and correctly. As Burkov puts it:  
 
If a law professor does not ask students to read a particular text-book or a 
case, the professor is thereby implying that he will not address the principles 
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 She added that training had slowly but progressively provided judges with new skills, resulting in 
greater confidence to directly apply the ECHR.   
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contained in this book at the examination, and, as a result, only a few 
individuals will refer to the book. Why would one do so if one could 
manage to graduate without addressing this particular book? Will one know 
about the existence of the book in the library? The Supreme Court of Russia 
should become this “professor” […] (2007: 76).  
     
This is closely reflected by the observation of a Russian lawyer working at the 
Council of Europe: 
 
In some cases it’s hard for judges to know what the international standards 
are… You need to make the standards easy, understandable, and as 
substantial as possible. [Russian] district judges will not do research on 
what it means to apply international standards on, for example, fair trials. 
[7.1]  
 
Thus, a greater role for the Russian courts in defending human rights might result 
from the ECHR’s expansion, as discussed above, and from the Russian higher 
courts’ taking the lead in moving towards an enhanced application of international 
law by providing guidelines for lower courts - in short, progressing from 
application to implementation.  
 
4.3 Conclusion: Opportunities without Guarantees  
 
This chapter has argued that the selective implementation of international law stems 
from: the judges’ varied approaches to international law; the fact that its application 
is not consistently enforced; and potential pressure on judges. Some judges do not 
make the leap from domestic to international law and remain safely within the 
realms of Russian law. If unchallenged by the authorities, judges are allowed to 
remain in their comfort zone. Consequently, application is not uniform across the 
country, across courts and even at the level of individual judges. At the same time, 
judges in Russia may be constrained in some of their actions: the fate of progressive 
judgements tend to depend more on political considerations than the rule of law. 
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Indeed, the Russian judiciary cannot insulate itself from politicised institutions 
themselves somewhat at the mercy of informal practices. Then, in some cases 
judges may be pressurised, following centralised (political) decisions; yet in others 
the judges’ independence is not impinged upon, and they are left a margin of 
discretion in applying (or not) international law. These dynamics reflect an 
alternation of centralised control and laissez-faire in Russian political-juridical life. 
The implementation of international law has not been fully integrated into 
the Russian judicial system, reducing guarantees concerning the upholding of rights 
contained in international documents and mechanisms, including minority rights.  
The Russian judiciary has still not reached a level in which the distinction beween 
domestic law and international law blur, when the latter is incorporated into the 
former (Green Cowles & Risse 2001: 235). Despite this, there are indications that 
the ECHR’s application in Russia is incremental: unlike the FCNM, it has 
generated a set of precise legal principles through the ECtHR, in some cases 
reproduced in resolutions and guidelines from Russian higher courts.  
In the case of minority rights, there are complicating factors. First, the 
ECtHR still devotes little attention to minority rights: its jurisprudence does not 
encompass several issues of concern to minorities, such as minority education.  It 
was observed in this chapter that this might alter through the widening of the 
ECHR’s scope, although in 2011 the legal principles on minority rights arising 
from its jurisprudence were still scarce. In Russia, ECHR application mostly 
contributes to an advancement of the rule of law generally, which can benefit 
minorities as well as other groups. However, Burkov’s observation that enhanced 
ECHR implementation is likely to arise through detailed, concrete instructions 
cascading down from higher to lower courts can hardly be expected in the area of 
minority rights. Indeed, the meagre jurisprudence on minority issues the Strasbourg 
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court means that there are no resolutions on minority rights cases, and that lower 
courts have no guidance on the adjudication of these cases.  
Second, the legal articulation of minority claims is complex. The scarcity of 
legal guarantees for minorities in Russian law stems from the absence of explicit 
‘rules’ for the protection of the cultural rights of minorities - itself coupled with a 
weak (albeit growing) tradition of using litigation to solve disputes. Although the 
regions have used the courts to claim their rights vis-à-vis the centre - indicating a 
growing thirst for justice through litigation - these efforts are still relatively modest 
ones. Meanwhile, with regard to the FCNM, the interviews indicate a widespread 
view among public officials and civil society alike that it comprises merely a set of 
ephemeral notions, with weak supranational monitoring, as shown in Chapter 3. 
With the application of international standards resting on shaky foundations, and 
given the selectivity of implementation, the question arises: can these standards 
assist the Russian Federation (and its minorities) in resolving the challenges of 
post-Soviet Russia, and can they reverse an existing trend toward the 
homogenisation and exclusion of minorities? These issues are analysed in Parts 2 
and 3 of the thesis. 
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         PART 2: HOMOGENISATION 
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5. STRENGTHENING THE STATE THROUGH 
HOMOGENISING CENTRALISM  
The previous two chapters have assessed the reception of international law in 
Russia: the complex relationship between the Council of Europe and Russia, and 
the inconsistent manner in which international law is brought into the Russian 
context. They have focused on the selective implementation of international law, 
and limited guarantees that the rights enshrined therein will be upheld in Russia. At 
the same time, selective implementation implies that at least some implementation 
takes place, and that international instruments can in principle enhance the 
promotion of human rights, including minority rights. I now move on to 
international standards in light of unfolding socio-political circumstances in Russia. 
This chapter argues that centralisation and (ethnically) homogenising processes in 
Russia have reduced the potential for the application of the international standards 
on minority rights; and, in turn, that international standards have been unable to 
prevent such homogenising processes. The homogenising policies of post-Yeltsin 
Russia are a series of measures that have effectively downgraded ethnicity and 
increased uniformity. The chapter delineates two forms of de-ethnification: the 
promotion of a civic Russian identity - which I call the ‘new Russian citizen’ - to 
the detriment of minority identities; and the re-structuring of the Federation to 
reduce the salience of ethnicity. 
I first outline the reasons for the de-ethnification strategy included in Putin’s 
reforms.
294
 Then I examine Russia’s homogenising efforts in the cultural arena and 
the creation of an overarching civic Russianness. Last, I outline a number of 
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administrative reforms that contribute to a de-ethnification of the Russian 
Federation through centralising, de-federalising measures.  
 
The Complexities of Diversity   
The drive for de-ethnification originates from the complexities posited by diversity. 
As noted, nationality policies in the Soviet Union hinged on the forging of a link 
between ethnicity and territory.
295
 This approach did not help a large section of 
minorities: smaller nationalities were not classified as ‘titular’, and clearly not all 
persons belonging to a titular nationality resided in ‘their own’ ethnic republics. 
During the Soviet Union, according to 1989 census data, approximately three-
quarters of Tatars lived outside the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 
and only 49% of its population were Tatars. In Khakassia, only 11% of the 
population was Khakass in 1989. Indeed, as Brubaker noted, ‘[n]ations are 
fundamentally groups of persons, not stretches of territory’ (1996: 40). At the same 
time, ethnicity-based federalism led to a heightened consciousness of diversity and 
ethnic mobilisation in the perestroika period (Gorenburg 2003). 
Yeltsin inherited these unresolved difficulties and, without the Soviet ‘glue’ 
that had held the Union together, these problems could only increase in complexity. 
Following the Soviet Union’s collapse, the regions started to gravitate away from 
the centre as they increasingly acquired autonomy through devolution (Stoner-
Weiss 1999). In 1990, Yeltsin famously invited the regions to ‘take as much 
sovereignty as [they] can swallow’. This derived less from Yeltsin’s liberal 
attitudes than from an inability of the federal authorities to fill the power vacuum 
left by the Communist party’s dethronement (Reddaway and Orttung 2004: 6). The 
Yeltsin years led to statutory and political fragmentation, as evidenced in a plethora 
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of ad hoc bilateral treaties with the subjects not regulated through a coherent 
federal legislative and administrative framework. Asymmetry became the norm: 
from the ‘unofficial asymmetry’ of ad hoc measures and selective legal 
implementation (Hahn 2003: 115), to ‘socioeconomic asymmetry’ (Stepan 2000).296 
Special arrangements to satisfy the particularistic needs of regions (and their 
leaders) enabled the formation of virtual fiefdoms, ruled by assertive leaders 
engaging in ‘regional warlordism’ (Kirkow 1995; 1998: 139).297 Substantial powers 
were enjoyed by prominent regional (ethnic) leaders in post-Soviet Russia, such as 
former (ethnic Tatar) President of Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaimiev (1991-2010), and 
former (ethnic Bashkir) President of Bashkortostan, Murtaza Rakhimov (1993-
2010). A republic like rich, oil-producing Tatarstan, with a high concentration of 
Tatars living on its territory, could defy the Russian authorities and refuse to sign 
Yeltsin’s Union Treaty in 1990, insisting instead on a power-sharing treaty.298  
At the end of Yeltsin’s rule ethnic pluralism had become synonymous with 
instability ‘from below’ and ineffective management ‘from above’. Yeltsin’s rule 
was also associated with the social ills generated by the difficult transition to a 
market economy, such as large scale privatisation and the rise of the oligarchs, 
increased poverty, lawlessness and crime. In turn, newly-found freedoms of the 
post-Communist period allowed forms of ethnic nationalisms to emerge, with calls 
for autonomy which threatened further instability. It is these complexities that 
former President Putin attempted to resolve through the strengthening of the state, 
which involved, inter alia, processes of ‘homogenisation’, with new forms of 
uniformity and centralism.  
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5.1 Russia’s Homogenising Efforts 
 
The post-Yeltsin Russian leadership has sought to promote basic, non-ethnic values 
which supposedly unify nationalities residing in Russia, to replace potentially 
destabilising multiple forms of nationalism at the regional level. In its 2006 
Comments to the ACFC’s Second Opinion, the Russian government stated that it 
was pursuing a ‘policy of de-ethnization of [the] domestic political scene’, and that 
the choice of policy derived from the fact that ‘national and ethno-cultural issues 
blend perfectly in the concept of basic civil rights’.299 The essence of this new 
approach is captured in Russia’s Third Report to the ACFC, in the expression ‘unity 
in variety’.300 This is a civic unity combined with ethnic diversity, in the 
recognition that the two are intertwined. It is supposedly an attempt to create what 
has been defined as ‘multicultural constitutional patriotism’ (Codagnone and 
Filippov 2000). Russian citizenship should replace forms of ‘quasi citizenship’ in 
regions with strong national identities such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan - ending 
their ability to forge an ‘inner abroad’ within Russia (Sakwa 2008: 234).  
The civic identity that should replace ethnic consciousness is an identity 
coloured by elements of Russian patriotism, yet only after it has been carefully 
disassociated from nationalism. Putin has espoused the view that nationalism is a 
destructive force, generating conflict and secessionist tendencies. Patriotism, 
instead, represents the overarching values through which any Russian citizen might 
find pride in his/her country and its achievements (Daucé et al. 2010). It brings 
together elements of imperial, Soviet and Russian history, whose threads have been 
laboriously pulled together: the former president has been at pains to trace a 
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continuum throughout Russian history, and to find positive outcomes in all eras 
(Sakwa 2004: 241). For example, while Putin denounced the excessively 
‘bureaucratised’ style of the old Communist Youth League (Komsomol), he upheld 
some of the principles behind it, such as ‘the spirit of love of the homeland, of the 
fatherland.’301 Soviet myths are further incorporated into what are essentially 
nation-building efforts on federal television (Novikova 2010). 
Russia has certainly seen instances of rampant Russian nationalism 
(Kozhenikova et al. 2005).302 Some neo-fascist views have reached the mainstream 
media, government institutions and academia through ideologues such as Aleksandr 
Dugin, founder, in 2002, of the Eurasia Party - a party of patriots of Russia 
(Umland 2009).
303
 Daucé et al. argue that, despite this, the general, Putin-supported 
patriotic discourse is non-militant and non-nationalistic (2010). Putin maintained 
that the national idea should be based on ‘patriotism in the most positive sense of 
the word’.304 Can this amount to accommodation of minorities - through the 
creation of an overarching identity that also respects diversity, in line with 
multiculturalist theories?  
 
Overarching Civic Identity or Pervasive Russianness? 
Establishing an overarching civic Russian identity, rather than an ethnic Russian 
one, would seem to fit Smith’s model of coexistence of diversity and integration.  
 
                                                 
301
 Putin, V. 2002. ‘Razgovor s Rossiei: Stenogramma ‘Priamoi Linii s Prezidentom Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii V.V.Putinym’’ (‘A Conversation with Russia: Stenographic Report of ‘Direct Line with 
the President of the Russia Federation V.V. Putin’’), First Channel (19 December 2002). 
302
 See also the numerous reports of the SOVA Centre, on racism and xenophobia in Russia. 
http://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/ (accessed 15-12-2010). 
303
 Among the stated aims of the Eurasia party are ‘reinforcing the strategic unity of Russia, her 
geopolitical homogeneity, the vertical line of authority [...] fighting separatism, extremism, 
localism’. See ‘Theses of Dugin’s Address to the Political Conference of the Pan-Russian Social-
Political Movement Eurasia’, 1 March 2002. http://eurasia.com.ru/dugin0103_eng.html (accessed 3-
11-2011). 
304
 While campaigning for his presidency in November 1999. Reported in Interfax, 3-11-1999, cited 
in Sakwa (2004: 163). 
 164 
This process creates: 
 
[A]n overarching community housing, but also binding together, through a 
common symbolism and institutional network, different cultures and ethnic 
communities (2008: 106).  
 
The traditional distinction between civic (liberal and inclusive) and ethnic (illiberal 
and exclusive) forms of nationalism is drawn from Kohn’s seminal work (1944). It 
has been argued that a form of inclusive civic nationalism (based on ius soli), rather 
than exclusive ethnic nationalism (based on ius sanguinis), is conducive to a 
common loyalty: thus, ‘ius sanguinis leads logically to ethnic cleansing, ius soli to 
ethnic integration.’ (Hastings 1997: 34) Brubaker, however, argues that the 
distinction between the two forms of nationalism is overstated (1999). Smith adds 
that ‘even the most ‘civic’ and ‘political’ nationalisms often turn out on closer 
inspection to be also ‘ethnic’ and ‘linguistic’’ (2010: 212-3). Indeed, Russia’s ‘civic 
identity’ has acquired an ethnic dimension by borrowing elements from Russia’s 
national iconography. A new overarching identity is supposedly being shaped 
around a concept that I call the ‘new Russian citizen’, which reasserts Russianness 
but also downgrades non-Russian ethnicities. Already in 1996 the Concept of State 
Nationality Policy of the Russian Federation, while upholding the right of ethnic 
minorities to their national and cultural identities, also stressed the ‘unifying role of 
the Russian (russkii) people on the territory of Russia’.305 Meanwhile, under Putin 
there has been a rediscovery of Russian symbolism. In 2000 he declared that the old 
Soviet anthem was to become the state anthem, the two-headed Tsarist eagle the 
state emblem, and the Tsarist tricolour (white, blue and red) the Russian flag 
(Sakwa 2004: 164-5). The ambiguity of the patriotic discourse of a strong Russia 
also lies in the nexus between Russian identity and the Russian Orthodox Church. 
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Although Putin has repeatedly emphasised Russia’s religious pluralism, the former 
president is also ostentatiously practising member of the Russian Orthodox Church 
with a close relationship with the Orthodox Patriarch. Modern Russian life, then, is 
characterised by contradictory messages: on the one hand the current leadership 
insists that patriotism and diversity can, and should, coexist - and, on the other, 
television programmes have featured Dugin himself on Russia’s First Channel 
(Umland 2009). What is being presented is a model of rossiiskii (the concept of 
Russian citizen) that is being closely identified with russkii (ethnic Russian), in a 
move towards a homogenised vision of Russia that is at odds with official 
pronouncements concerning Russia’s multi-ethnic multiculturalism.  
What is the impact of such conflicting messages? The Russian leadership 
can be perceived as representing the interests of the ‘main group’ - the Russians 
(Pain 2005a). A Muslim Tatar interviewed, an academic in Kazan, noted that the 
special relationship between Putin and the Orthodox Patriarch implicitly 
marginalised other religions in Russia. He further referred to a generalised (and, in 
his view, institutionalised) ‘Islamophobia’. He complained of non-Muslims’ failure 
to differentiate between the general Muslim population and the very few Islamic 
fundamentalists responsible for terrorist attacks from the Chechen wars onwards 
[2.10]. 
Of symbolic and practical significance is the primacy of the Russian 
language itself. There have been three developments since 2000. First, there have 
been calls to drop the requirement in the republics’ constitutions for presidents to 
speak the titular language (Hahn 2003: 130),306 and subsequently a RCC decision 
                                                 
306
 For example, in 2000, by the Head of the Central Election Commission Aleksandr Veshnyakov. 
It is also indicative that in 2000 the prosecutor of Khakassia argued that the Khakas Constitution 
should refer to ‘Russian and Khakass languages’ as the republic’s official languages, rather than 
‘Khakas and Russian’(Hahn 2001a: 513). 
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relaxing language requirements in the republics’ presidential elections.307 Second, 
as will be seen in Chapter 6, in the three focus republics of Karelia, Mordovia and 
Tatarstan, the study of and through the medium of minority languages has tended to 
decrease. Meanwhile, in 2007 the Russian government promoted the programme 
‘2007 Year of Russian Language in the Russian Federation’. Third, there has been a 
prohibition against any introduction of the Latin script in Russia. The Republic of 
Tatarstan has been particularly affected: while Tatar organisations were calling for 
the Latinisation of their alphabet, in 2002 the Duma adopted an amendment to the 
1991 Law ‘On the Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation (2002 
amendments).308 Article 3(6) of the amended law states that the alphabets of the 
Russian language, and those of the republics’ state languages, ‘shall be based on the 
Cyrillic graphic symbol’. Following the 2002 amendments, the use of (non-Cyrillic) 
alphabets for the state languages of republics have to be established exclusively by 
federal law: as Russia’s Third Report to the ACFC puts it, it ‘requires a justified 
managerial decision’.309 In line with this, in November 2004 the RCC turned down 
a claim submitted by Tatarstan’s Parliament, denouncing the 2002 amendments as 
unconstitutional, inasmuch as they prevent the republics’ choice of their own 
scripts.310 This had followed a decision of the Tatar Constitutional Court from the 
previous year, upholding Tatarstan’s right to choose the script for the republic’s 
state language, Tatar.  The 2002 amendments also mean that Karelian cannot be 
declared a state language within the Republic of Karelia as long as the traditional 
Latin script is used. Consequently, Karelian is the only language of a titular 
nationality within Russia not to be recognised as a state language within its ethnic 
republic. As a Karelian language expert noted during an interview, Karelian ‘needs 
                                                 
307
 See Section 4.2, note 261. 
308
 Law No. 1807-I, dated 25 October 1991, with the amendments introduced by Laws No.126-FZ of 
24 July 1998 and No. 165-FZ of 11 December 2002. 
309
 ACFC, (Third) Report submitted by Russia (note 132), p. 55. 
310
 See Section 4.2 (note 264).  
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to be a state language [within Karelia] but also it needs to keep the Latin alphabet’ 
[2.2]. The respondent could not see the language being divorced from its traditional 
script. In 2011 Karelian continued to have a lower legal status than other languages 
of titular nationalities in Russia.311  
Respondents belonging to national minorities, from both civil society and 
academia, voiced grievances vis-à-vis state policies on nationalities for the 
preservation of minority cultures and languages.312 A second group of civil society 
respondents believed that, given the finite resources, the present efforts in the area 
of minority cultures were still laudable. The analysis of the data shows that the 
second group of respondents judged local public officials and their efforts 
positively, having established a working relationship with them, but had limited 
awareness of the measures adopted at the federal level to promote minority 
cultures. Additionally, the second group of respondents predominantly resided in 
Mordovia and Karelia, where ethnic issues feature less in the public discourse than 
in Tatarstan. It is noteworthy that, even when not nurturing grievances towards the 
authorities, several respondents expressed sadness that their languages were 
progressively losing prominence, and felt powerless to stop advancing 
Russification. These attitudes were particularly evident in the case of Karelian 
respondents in Petrozavodsk and Tver.  
Three conclusions can be drawn from the data. First, homogenising policies 
can lead to resentment and dissatisfaction in those persons belonging to minorities 
who have an interest in the preservation of their cultures and languages. This 
suggests that homogenisation is not a precursor of stability, as the anti-
multiculturalists argue, but rather its negation. Second, the homogenising processes, 
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 Issues relating to script have not been raised in Mordovia. 
312
 Many of the grievances were linked to new policies on minority education, examined in the next 
chapter.  
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based on quintessentially Russian symbols and values (and even religion) generate 
not an interplay of different cultures, but rather a dominant Russian culture around 
which other minority cultures are ‘tolerated’. This ‘tolerance’ is close to the 
meaning that Žižek gives to the term, as a form of condescension (2011: 46).313 
Third, homogenising processes, inasmuch as they are antithetical to genuine 
multiculturalist policies, bring into question Russia’s compliance with international 
standards such as Article 5 FCNM. In addition to prohibiting assimilatory 
measures, Article 5(1) establishes a positive obligation on the member states to:  
 
[P]romote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national 
minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the 
essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, 
traditions and cultural heritage.  
 
In its Third Report to the ACFC, the Russian government provided a long list of 
programmes under Article 5, centring around festivals and cultural institutions.
314
 
Some respondents from the category ‘civil society - minority NGO’ argued that, 
although welcoming these programmes, they did not believe them to be 
contributing in practice to preserving elements of their identity [1.2.1; 1.2.2; 1.2.5; 
1.2.8; 1.2.9].
315
 The ACFC did not comment specifically on these programmes in 
its Second Opinion.
316
 However, it noted the criticism by representatives of 
minorities and some of Russia’s regions, including Tatarstan, on ‘the heightened 
role […] given to the Russian language and culture as the instrument for 
“consolidating” society’.317 The ACFC stated on this point:   
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 See Section 2.2. 
314
 ACFC, (Third) Report submitted by Russia (note 132), pp. 30-43.  
315
 Additionally, some academics and representatives of human rights NGOs referred to the 
superficiality of these programmes [1.5.1; 1.5.7; 1.5.9; 2.14; 2.16; 2.19]. See also the issue of 
‘folklorisation’ of minorities (Section 7.1). 
316
 The ACFC comments on Article 5 FCNM focused on, among other things, funding and National 
Cultural Autonomies. 
317
 ACFC, (Second) Opinion on Russia (note 133), § 108. 
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While recognising the legitimacy of the aim to protect the state language, 
the Advisory Committee considers that this aim should not be given undue 
importance in this context and should be coupled with guarantees regarding 
the values of diversity and respect for the rights of persons belonging to 
national minorities.
318
 
 
In its Third Report to the ACFC, the Russian government acknowledged a previous 
ACFC recommendation that the initiatives to promote the Russian language should 
not create obstacles to the use of minority languages. It limited its response, 
however, to pointing to the existence of provisions in Russian law on the ‘equality 
of languages’. It further noted that the programme ‘2007 Year of Russian Language 
in the Russian Federation’ promoted not only Russian but also bilingualism as ‘both 
Russians and representatives of other peoples of the Russian Federation’ 
participated in the initiative.
319
 The ACFC’s monitoring and assessment, due to its 
finite resources and time constraints, is based primarily on short state visits, state 
reports and shadow reports.
320
 It is therefore unable to pin down, analyse in detail, 
and provide recommendations on the specificities of socio-political processes that 
may lead to homogenisation and the dilution of diversity. Shifts towards 
homogenisation are subtle, and can easily slip though the net of Council of Europe 
monitoring. The use of state symbols for example, has been defined by Billig as a 
form of ‘banal nationalism’, that is as real as it is imperceptible ([1995] 2004).  
Some authors have also described insidious, covert means that might be 
used by the Russian authorities to reduce diversity - means that are even more 
impenetrable by Council of Europe monitoring. Abramov describes what in 
Mordovia are, in his opinion, attempts to divide the Mordovian population into 
Moskha and Erzya peoples, through ‘propaganda’ that started in the early 1990s, to 
                                                 
318
 Ibid, § 108-10. 
319
 ACFC, (Third) Report submitted by Russia (note 132), p. 100. There was a further reference to 
education in minority languages, analysed in the next chapter. 
320
 The time constraints were also noted by a Council of Europe expert during an interview [7.5]. 
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facilitate an ultimate shift toward a ‘united and indivisible’ Russia. Moskha and 
Erzya speakers are two subgroups whose languages differ, but both tend to self-
identify as ‘Mordovian’.321 Abramov sees a vested interest for the Russian 
authorities’ in forging a schism, as part of a general attempt to weaken the 
overarching Mordovian nationality (2010: 149-156).    
   
5.2 De-Federalisation as De-Ethnification  
 
Having described homogenising tendencies around a civic patriotic discourse, I 
move on to aspects of de-ethnification linked to centralising measures affecting 
Russia as a federation. As noted, since the end of the Soviet Union there has been 
first a progressive relaxation of the central powers (under Yeltsin), and a 
subsequent reverse movement strengthening the centre (under Putin and 
Medvedev). Similarly, for much of its history, Russia has oscillated between the 
two diametrically opposed positions of federalism (with localism through 
devolution) and centralism. It has already been mentioned that, during the Soviet 
Union, powers were delegated to titular nationalities in their ‘own’ ethnic republics 
through the policy of korenizatsiya, yet regional developments were micro-
managed by Communist Party institutions. In post-Soviet Russia, the 1993 
Constitution simultaneously enshrines guarantees for the Russian Federation’s 
sovereignty in all its territories (Article 4), and for the self-determination of 
Russia’s peoples (preamble and Article 5(3)). The latter recognises the ethnic 
republics and their rights to their constitutions and state languages (Article 5(2) and 
                                                 
321
 According to the 2002 census, of the 884,000 Mordovians recorded, only 80,000 identified 
themselves specifically as ‘Mordovian-Erzya’ and 50,000 as ‘Mordovian-Moksha’. At the forefront 
of the campaign for Erzyan nationalism, separate from Moksha, is the newspaper Erzyan’ Mastor. A 
possible split in the Mordovian nationality threatens the Republic of Mordovia as an entity:  the 
charter of Erzyan’ Mastor indicates as its main objective the creation of a Erzya national okrug on 
the territory of Mordovia.  
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68(2)).
322
 The same ambiguous approach is found in the constitutions of the 
republics themselves, simultaneously recognising the rights of titular nations (e.g. 
Tatars) and all the republics’ nationalities (e.g. Tatarstan’s ‘multi-national people’) 
(Ossipov 2008).  
In 1993, Rafael Khakimov, one of the chief advisers to Tatarstan’s President 
Mintimer Shaimiev, predicted that federalisation would prevail over centralism, 
ultimately leading to the disintegration of Russia as a country, as the regions 
became increasingly culturally assertive and financially autonomous (1993: 16). 
Sakwa considered this unlikely, noting Russia’s ‘great power mentality’, and the 
fact that its pluriculturalism had become one of Russia’s intrinsic characteristics 
(2008: 244). Sakwa was correct in his prediction inasmuch as ethnic federalism has 
been preserved to this day. It has, however, been weakened and, with it, de-
ethnified. .  
 
From Ethnic Federalism to Civic Centralism  
Putinite homogenising policies have involved a progressive de-ethnification of the 
Russian federal structure. Centralisation measures have reined in powerful regional 
leaders, reducing their autonomy from Moscow. The much-mentioned ‘vertical of 
power’ (vertikal’ vlasti) has seen the development of a steep hierarchy with the 
Russian president and his administration at its apex. Indeed, federal reforms were 
elaborated by the Presidential Commission for the Demarcation of Powers between 
the Federal, Regional and Municipal Levels of Government, formed by Putin in 
2001, under the management of (then) deputy head of the Presidential 
Administration, Dmitrii Kozak. Some of the reforms were discussed with regional 
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 On this issue, see Varlamova (2001: 13). 
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leaders, who secured a partial review of them;
323
 still, the ultimate responsibility for 
the reforms rested on the highest echelons of the executive. I focus here on the 
ethnic (de-ethnifying) aspects of the reforms in relation to: a movement from 
election to appointment of officials, the creation of a dependency of the regions on 
the central authorities, and the merging of ethnic regions with Slavic ones.  
Before Putin’s rise to power, Yeltsin’s ad hoc bilateral treaties had created a 
complex web of agreements, together with contradictory pieces of legislation and 
overlapping jurisdictions - for example in the form of regional laws that diverged 
from the federal constitution. The elimination of these contradictions was needed 
for the viability of the legal and federal systems. Putin referred to it as part of the 
process towards a ‘dictatorship of the law’.324 The centralisation measures aimed at 
the creation of uniform rules, transcending bilateral political negotiations and 
reconnecting to the centre the regional ‘islets of power’.325 Yet the package of 
measures also had a profound effect on ethnicity. Putin moved towards a general 
ethnicity-neutral bureaucratisation of the country, using opportunities offered by the 
1993 Constitution, which created a super-presidential system. It made the president 
the ‘guarantor of the Constitution’ (Article 80(2)), with the authority to suspend 
regional laws contradicting federal legislation (Article 85(2)), and heading a unified 
executive that encompassed centre and regions (Article 77(2)).   
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 Tsvetkova, M. & Shishkunova, E. 21-11-2002. ‘Gubernatorov Budut Snimat’ Izyashchno’ 
(‘Governors Will Be Overthrown Delicately’), Gazeta.ru. 
324
 The expression ‘dictatorship of the law’ was first used in Putin’s first (2000) State of the Nation 
Address to the Federal Assembly. The process of harmonisation of the legislation aimed at 
addressing the fragmentation of the Russian legal space (Hyde 2001). By 2002 efforts towards legal 
harmonisation had brought nearly all the 6,000 laws identified as contradicting federal legislation 
into line with it. By April 2002, 22 of the 42 bilateral agreements between the centre and the 
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null by 2005 (Mitin 2008: 58). 
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 This expression was used in the 2000 State of the Nation Address. In the 2002 State of the Nation 
Address Putin added that separate agreements with individual subjects had created ‘effective 
inequality in relations between [the] Federation components and, ultimately, between citizens living 
in various parts of Russia.’  
 173 
A first de-ethnifying factor has been the shift from elections to appointment, 
with a view to creating a country primarily administered by appointed managers, 
rather than elected representatives. This has been described by Filippov as:  
 
[R]emov[ing] excessive politicisation elements from the Russian state 
system, to replace politicians, which hinder its effective operation, with 
managers and bureaucrats.
326
  
 
As of 2005 the Russian president controls gubernatorial appointments. These new 
presidential powers follow an (unconstitutional) measure of September 2004, when 
Putin announced that the heads of the subjects (territorial units) of the Federation 
would be nominated by the president and confirmed in their position (nominally) by 
the legislature. The move was justified in light of the 2004 Beslan school siege 
(Lemaître 2006).327 Following the event Putin asserted that only the unity of the 
country could combat terrorism.
328
  
Although powerful leaders of ethnic regions, such as Tatarstan’s Mintimer 
Shaimiev and Bashkortostan’s Murtaza Rakhimov, were initially confirmed in their 
third term as presidents of their republics, in the absence of direct voting their 
powers became contingent upon the will and imperatives of the federal authorities. 
Between May 2008 and October 2010, Medvedev replaced 34 regional leaders.
329
 
Shaimiev and Rakhimov eventually left their positions, in January and July 2010 
respectively. One of the respondents, a scholar specialising in Tatar history, said in 
an interview:  
 
Shaimiev had political weight. He was independent, even with Putin. He 
had authority at the federal level, not only in Tatarstan. The current 
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 On 1 September 2004 Islamic militants took hostage over 1,100 people in a school in Beslan, 
North Ossetia. They demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, and led to the 
intervention of Russian security forces. The fighting that ensued resulted in the death of 334 people. 
328
 Putin, V. 13-9-2004. Speech at an enlarged cabinet meeting attended by regional leaders. 
329
 Vedomosti, 30-9-2010. ‘Medvedev i Voevody’ (‘Medvedev and the Governors’). 
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president is in a very different position. They can remove him very easily. 
He always has this Damocles sword hanging over him. [2.7] 
 
A much more pallid figure than Shaimiev, his successor Rustam Minnikhanov has 
much-reduced freedom in representing Tatarstan’s (and Tatar) interests.  
The most visible manifestation of the regional leaders’ lower status has been 
their exclusion from the Federation Council (the Russian Parliament’s upper 
chamber). This follows a law of July 2000, replacing the governors and the 
republics’ presidents with their representatives (‘senators’) in the Federation 
Council.330 Half the senators are appointed by the regional leaders - who are, as 
noted, in turn appointed by the president. The other half, appointed by the regional 
assemblies, tend to be ‘recommended’ by the Presidential Administration 
(Remington 2003: 674). This creates a ‘circular flow of power’, continuously 
reinforcing presidential power, in the Federation Council - a body that should act as 
check on, and balance out, the power of the executive (Sakwa 2008: 283). 
 The new Federation Council has been effectively de-ethnified as senators, 
in many cases, have no direct connection with the regions they represent, and tend 
indeed to come from Moscow or St Petersburg (Alexander 2004). Their 
background, connections and geographical location mean that they are, in principle, 
well-placed to lobby central structures in favour of the regions they represent. 
However, Alexander argues that appointing non-titular representatives undermines 
the republics’ distinct ethnic bases:   
 
Not only will these representatives be personally removed from the issues of 
concerns to titular nationalities and thus less likely to fight for these issues, 
but their choice further indicates to the center that ethnic issues have 
become less potent in Russian politics. [This] threaten[s] to weaken the 
long-term viability of the ethnic republics as separate entities (2004: 255-6).  
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 Law No. 113-FZ of 5 August 2000  ‘On the Order of the Formation of the Federal Federation 
Council’. 
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Following their exclusion from the Federation Council, in 2000 a new body was 
created for governors: the State Council.331 This is essentially a consultative body, 
stripped of the veto power formerly enjoyed by the governors on the Federation 
Council. It thus reduces governors’ impact on decision-making, including on 
national issues and cultural choices.   
 The vertical reaches down to regions and localities. Regional leaders have 
continued to insist on the direct appointment of mayors so as to select politically-
neutral ‘professionals’, effectively (pliant) managers, rather than politicians 
(Lankina 2005: 167).332 The Kozak Commission, established in 2001 to formulate 
amendments to the Law ‘On Local Self-Government’,333 similarly stressed the need 
to eliminate the governor-mayor cleavage, effectively by appointing bureaucrats. 
Their activities were expected to be in line with those of the republic’s governor or 
president, the presidential envoy and, ultimately, the president of Russia. Along 
with political battles, this process has excluded systems of checks and balances, as 
well as minority representation (Lankina 2005: 169-70). Those likely to be 
particularly affected are the small minorities, such as non-titular minorities within 
ethnic republics (double minorities). Meanwhile, regional leaders have themselves 
tended to contribute to political homogenisation by joining the ranks of United 
Russia, the ‘party of power’.334  
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 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1602 of 1 September 2000 ‘On the State 
Council of the Russian Federation’.  
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 For example, former governor of Sverdlovsk oblast (1995-2009) Eduard Rossel stated that 
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Lankina (2005: 162). 
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 See Section 9.2. 
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Dependency on the Centre and Regional Mergers 
A second factor of de-ethnification has been the creation of a dependency of the 
regions on the centre. In May 2000 the many subjects of the Russian Federation 
were grouped into seven presidential okrugs,335 and placed under the supervision of 
presidential envoys. The branches of the main federal agencies (the Prosecutors’ 
Office, the Federal Security Service, the Ministry of Interior and the Tax 
Inspectorate) were affiliated to the okrugs themselves rather than regional leaders, 
thereby redirecting their loyalty to the centre (Melvin 2007: 209). Cashaback argues 
that the envoys create a new intermediary layer in the communication flow between 
regions and the centre; and, despite the claims of greater accountability, the new 
structure is excluded from public scrutiny, with the concentration of powers on 
regional matters within the Presidential Administration via the envoys (2003: 8;19).  
New legislation has further standardised taxation systems across the 
Federation. A new form of ‘fiscal federalism’ was introduced during Putin’s 
presidency under which the vast majority of the regions’ revenues have been 
claimed by the centre, to be later redistributed (Sakwa 2008: 274). Moscow is the 
final decision-maker in the redistribution of funds (Melvin 2007: 210). Not only are 
the poorer, heavily subsidised regions relying on the centre for wealth, but so do the 
wealth-producing regions, as they await the re-allocation of some of the same 
wealth they have generated. Respondents in Tatarstan argued that the taxation 
system had reduced autonomy in respect of available choices to preserve their 
cultures [2.7; 4.7]. One respondent, a political analyst in Moscow, argued that, 
instead, poorer regions perceive the federal centre as a ‘kind uncle’ that assists 
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 Seven districts were established by Presidential Decree No. 849 of 13 May 2000 ‘On the 
Presidential Envoy of the President of the Russian Federation in a Federal Okrug’. The number of 
districts was increased to eight in January 2010, when the North Caucasus Federal Okrug was 
separated from the Southern Federal Okrug. 
 177 
them, but are also left in a state of dependency and lack control.336 The absence of 
economic self-sufficiency can adversely affect their assertiveness and autonomy 
[2.17].  
Meanwhile, the Law ‘On Local Self-Government’,337 rather than 
empowering and enhancing the autonomy of the localities, has primarily 
transferred their dependence from regional authorities to federal centre. Lankina 
described it as ‘facilitating the extension of Putin’s centralizing “power vertical” 
further down into grass roots.’ (2005: 16) Local government can be penalised by 
the federal centre for a multitude of reasons, including the accumulation of debts, 
and where it is a ‘threat to Russia’s territorial integrity, national security, [or] 
defence potential.’338 Lankina adds: 
 
Ideas normally associated with decentralization, such as developing civil 
society, respecting the diversity of local contexts, and increasing popular 
participation and initiative in local decision making, receive little attention 
in the law (2005: 165). 
 
Bowring agrees that the law neglects the issue of representation of national 
minorities (2010b). Hahn believes that the non-inclusive process of adoption of the 
law means it could be appropriated by those networks with an interest in 
strengthening the power vertical (2008). These measures are antithetical to the 
establishment of the decentralised settings, able to further national minorities’ 
participation in decision-making on cultural matters. The ‘vertical’, then, has led to 
a widening gulf between the Lund Recommendations in the area of territorial 
devolution and autonomy, and Russian reality.
339
 Self-government can also provide 
                                                 
336
 He added that this is ‘very bad for democracy’ [2.17]. 
337
 See note 333. 
338
 Articles 75(3) and 74(2) of the Law ‘On Local Self-Government’. Provisions on local self-
government are also found in Articles 12 and 130 of the Russian Constitution. Furthermore, in 1998 
Russia ratified the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Local Self-Government, ETS No. 122, 
adopted 15 October 1995, entered into force on 1 September 1998. 
339
 Lund Recommendations (note 131), Points 19 and 20. 
 178 
unique opportunities for minority mobilisation, which legislative reform has acted 
to truncate (Lankina 2002). 
Mergers of predominantly Russian regions with ethnicity-based autonomous 
okrugs are another example of regional homogenisation processes that involve the 
reduction of regional autonomy through top-down, non-consultative measures. 
Between 2005 and 2008 there were five mergers (see Table 4). The mergers, 
enabled by Law No.6-FKZ,340 aimed at ‘equalizing the levels of socio-economic 
development’ and at the ‘optimization of regional management, infrastructure and 
resources’.341 The authorities argued that the mergers ‘did not affect the position of 
national minorities in the new administrative and territorial entities’, as guarantees 
as to the rights of minorities, including on the preservation of their cultural and 
linguistic distinctiveness, were clearly stated in regional laws on the mergers.342 The 
former ‘autonomous okrugs’, now just called ‘okrugs’, in principle maintain a 
‘special status’; yet the status is devoid of legal meaning in Russian law (Oracheva 
& Osipov 2010).  
Some analysts have welcomed mergers. For example, Taimyr and Evenkia 
have very small populations (respectively, 30,000 and 18,000 people), and separate 
administrations imply a proliferation of bureaucratic structures (Bransten 2005). 
Financial imperatives have also been strong: the creation of a common Russian 
market, breaking through the barriers of local economies across Russia, may indeed 
facilitate economic development.343 Others have feared that the real motivation for 
the mergers might be the elimination of the ethnic republics altogether.
344
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Table 4 – Mergers 
Name of new 
subject 
Merged subjects Date of 
referendum 
Federal 
constitutional 
law on the new 
subject 
Date of the 
establishment 
of the new 
subject 
Perm krai Perm oblast & Komi-
Permyak Autonomous 
Okrug (AO) 
7/12/2003 
 
 
Law No. 1-FKZ  
25/3/2004 
 
1/12/2005 
 
Krasnoyarsk 
krai 
 
Krasnoyarsk Krai & 
Evenk AO 
and Taimyr AO 
17/4/2005 
  
 
Law No. 6-FKZ  
14/10/2005  
1/1/2007 
 
Kamchatka 
krai 
 
Kamchatka oblast & the 
Koryak AO 
23/10/2005 
 
Law No. 2-FKZ  
12/7/2006 
 
1/7/2007 
 
Irkutsk 
oblast 
 
Irkutsk oblast & Ust-
Orda Buryat AO 
 
16/4/2006 
  
Law No. 6-FKZ 
30/12/2006  
1/1/2008 
 
Zabaikalskii 
krai 
 
Chita oblast & Agin-
Buryat AO 
11/3/2007 
  
Law No. 5-FKZ 
21/7/2007 
  
1/3/2008 
 
Table based on Artobolevskii et al. (2010 : 7) 
 
The idea of resuscitating the (non-ethnic) administrative units of pre-revolutionary 
Russia345 is not new. Often dismissed as unrealistic, these ideas have intermittently 
resurfaced. Preoccupied with the power of the governors elected in 1996-1997, 
many of whom were in opposition, Yeltsin also entertained the idea of reducing the 
number of subjects from a total of 89 (in 1996) to 24 (Reddaway and Orttung 2004: 
10). Similarly, a number of governors, presidential envoys and Duma members 
have publicly stated that they were in favour of the reduction of administrative 
units.
346
 The Russian Academy of Sciences compiled a plan to reduce the number 
of regions to 28.
347
 Even more radical proposals advocated the slashing of regions 
down to between eight and ten territories (Mitin 2008: 52). After the process stalled 
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between 2008 and 2010, in late 2010 Vedomosti reported on a possible plan to 
replace Russia’s 83 regions with 20 large ‘agglomerations’ around Russia’s main 
cities.
348
  
Giving their continuing strength, the full abolition of ethnic republics is still 
a remote possibility. In 1992-1993 the (then) Minister of Nationalities Valerii 
Tishkov warned of the likelihood of violence if ethnic territorial units were 
eliminated (1993: 18). The regions’ claims for autonomy are unlikely to be 
abandoned as they are not only in the interest of the titular nationalities, but also of 
ethnic Russians residing in the ethnic republics, who wish to retain some control 
over local natural resources (Hagendoom et al. 2008). Yet the mergers are 
uncomfortable precedents for many nationalities. Although referenda appear to 
have provided the democratic and legal bases for the mergers,349 opposition to 
amalgamation has surfaced (Artobolevskii et al. 2010; Bowring 2010a; Dmitriyev 
2007). 
Take, for example, the merger of Irkutsk oblast’ with (former) Ust-Orda 
Buryat Autonomous Okrug. The central government strove to convince the 
residents of the okrug of the financial gains to be reaped from the merger, while 
strongly hinting that the region could not survive without federal support. The 
Irkutsk administration committed to maintaining a special status for the okrug post-
merger, along with special cultural and social programmes for Buryats. The 
analysis of the impact of the mergers by the Institute of Contemporary 
Development revealed that these promises have, overall, not been kept 
(Artobolevskii et al. 2010).350 Meanwhile, the Moscow Helsinki Group reported 
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voting irregularities during the referendum on the merger of 16 April 2006, 
including strong incentives, and even threats, to induce voting among the local 
population.
351
 The effect of the ‘vertical’ is evident in the process towards the re-
structuring of the Federation. The governor of Irkutst oblast, Boris Govorin, who 
had promoted the merger, was himself a product of vertical policies: he had not 
been elected but appointed by the president, and ‘as a state public official he could 
not place himself in opposition to the federal authorities and advance any claims 
[...]’ (Artobolevskii et al. 2010). This appointment finally enabled the merger 
following a deadlock of three years.
352
 An ethnic Buryat defined the merger of the 
two regions ‘an unnecessary step towards Russian integration’.353  
The mergers have not involved an ‘inclusive, transparent, and accountable 
process of consultation’, which is essential ‘to maintain a climate of confidence’.354 
Additionally, they are contrary to Article 16 FCNM, stipulating that the parties 
‘shall refrain from measures which alter the proportions of the population in areas 
inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities’. This includes ‘redrawing 
administrative borders’. Both the FCNM and its Explanatory Report stress that, for 
it to constitute a violation of the FCNM, the changes have to aim at restricting the 
rights and freedoms enshrined in the FCNM.
355
 If the mergers’ primary objective 
was indeed to reduce ethnicity-based administrative units, thereby enhancing 
homogenisation, it can be interpreted as a move deviating from the principles of the 
FCNM. The ACFC had recommended that territorial changes be accompanied by 
the right to effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities;
356
 to 
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this the Russian authorities’ ‘response’ consisted to two references: one to the fact 
that referenda and ‘open discussions’ had been held; and the other to the existence 
of legal provisions in the new administrative regions on the ‘freedoms’ of national 
minorities.
357
  
 
5.3 Conclusion: Reducing Diversity - Russia for the 
Russians? 
 
The application of international standards in Russia has been unable to withstand 
the effect of homogenising and de-federalising policies initiated by Putin. A 
patriotic discourse has reasserted Russianness, while the reformed federal structure 
has reduced opportunities for participation in decision-making at the regional and 
local level, marginalising local concerns, including those of minorities and ethnic 
republics. Similarly, the increase of the central regulation of funds has lessened 
local autonomy.   
 One could argue that aspects of the federal reforms have become a force for 
good in Russia. The rule of law is hardly possible in a country with a mass of 
contradictory laws, and where regional leaders may abuse their powers for personal 
gain. Reforms might have: advanced democracy in Russia (Hahn 2003), placed the 
Russian Constitution at the core of centre-periphery relations (in lieu of arbitrarily-
applied legal norms) (Sakwa 2004: 240), enhanced the equality of citizens 
(Cashaback 2003: 2), and possibly even have strengthened federalism (Smirnyagin 
2001). Yet reforms processes have also created ‘collateral damage’: the dilution of 
ethnic pluralism, and the reduction of the democratic content of the Federation. In 
the first case, Russia’s pursuit of a civic (Russian) identity - the ‘new Russian 
Citizen’ - can lead to its replacing, rather than adding to, minority identities. It 
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results in a general devaluation of ethnic identities, with the exception of Russian 
culture. The distinction between rossiisskii and russkii hence becomes blurred, as 
the federal authorities have sought to impose elements of russkii upon the entire 
population. The motivating factor is not necessarily a suppression of diversity with 
Russian neo-imperialist undertones, but rather the strengthening of the state.
358
 
Still, this project brings a real risk that it might be interpreted ‘a disguised and 
embellished version of the old Soviet rhetoric of the fusion of all nations into a non-
national Soviet nation’ (Codagnone & Filippov 2000: 283).  
Second, the effect of the ‘vertical of power’ has been a reduction of checks 
and balances: the regions have become part of a more rigid, technocratic state. 
Putin’s vertikal’ has eroded regional autonomy through the convergence of powers 
at the centre and a weakening of democratic processes and regional autonomy.
359
 
Undemocratic elements of the measures are particularly evident in the abolition of 
elections and voting irregularities in referenda. The reforms have excluded key 
actors from decision-making, such as civil society (Hahn 2001b; Taylor 2005); they 
have further excluded systems for ‘horizontal accountability’ (Hashim 2005).   
Although the Russian government has justified the restructuring of the 
federation in terms of promoting  greater equality in socio-economic 
development,
360
 standardisation through de-federalisation has not necessarily 
resolved the country’s fragmentation and the utilitarian approach to its management 
(Sakwa, 2004: 239). ‘Selected co-operation’ with regions of ‘strategic importance’ 
continue (Chebankova 2007: 289). Meanwhile, the ‘dictatorship of the law’ did not 
prevent Putin from unconstitutionally imposing a new form of presidential 
appointment of governors, disregarding principles of federalism and separation of 
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powers enshrined in the Russian Constitution (Lemaître 2006). The predominance 
of the federal centre in many spheres of public life in the regions, regulated by non-
transparent processes, signifies, Chebankova argues, an absence of ‘federal values’ 
(2007: 295-299). Russia does not have the flexibility of the type of federalism 
described by Friedrich - one that does not amount to a ‘fixed division of power’, but 
in the coordination of different political communities that develop ‘arrangements 
for working out solutions’ (1968: 176). The ‘spirit of federalism’ is still missing, so 
that Russia resembles more a centralised state rather than a federation: ‘de jure a 
federation (with independent local self-government), de facto a centralised state 
(with a vertical of power)’ (Artobolevskii et al. 2010: 174).  
Russia has, then, distanced itself from the conditions necessary for the 
upholding of international standards of minority protection: democratic 
processes,361 local autonomy, and opportunities for participation and public 
consultations - including in cultural matters. Democracy, rule of law and civil 
society are preconditions for successful autonomy arrangements within federations 
(Ghai 2000: Pain 2005a). To this, the Russian leadership contrasts the need for 
‘unity’ as a prerequisite to strengthen the state - for example, as a measure to 
combat terrorism following the Beslan incident. Hence, international standards on 
minority rights have been unable to prevent the homogenising and centralising 
processes in Russia; in turn, with these processes Russia has distanced itself from 
international standards. Homogenisation can reduce the appreciation and respect of 
pluralism. The next chapter focuses on education, whose functions, in a 
multicultural society, includes that of instilling respect for diversity.   
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6. INTERCULTURALISM OR ACCULTURATION? 
EDUCATION AND THE MEDIA 
Education has a pivotal role in safeguarding Russia’s cultural diversity. This 
chapter analyses Russian educational policies for the teaching of minority 
languages and cultures, as well as intercultural education. The chapter has a focus 
on the 2007 amendments of the Russian Law ‘On Education’.362 I argue that while 
the new provisions might signal a greater attention to the local needs of minorities 
within the federal educational framework, they may also have other consequences, 
namely lead to enhanced localising and/or centralising tendencies. On one side, the 
amendments can lead to a fractionalisation of the Russian educational space in the 
absence of a coherent, nation-wide educational policy. On the other, they enable an 
increased control of the federal centre over the regions in the area of education.
363
 
These two shifts are seemingly moving in opposite directions (localism and 
centralism) but may in fact simultaneously impact on minority education. From the 
special reference to these amendments I widen the discussion to incorporate other 
reforms that affect minorities, particularly with regard to the language of exams; 
and to scrutinise the role of the media as educator.  
The limited involvement of minorities and regions in decision-making with 
regard to the new regulations in the education sphere caused considerable alarm 
among some minority representatives, as described below. In addition to the 
potential destabilisation of inter-ethnic relations in the country, these reforms have 
hindered Russia’s fulfilment of its responsibilities under international minority 
rights law. The contours of these responsibilities, in the area of education, are 
charted through the FCNM and the ECRML: Article 12 FCNM (state parties’ 
responsibility to foster the knowledge of cultures and languages of minorities and 
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the majority); Article 14 FCNM (right to learn one’s minority language); and 
Article 8 ECRML (education in regional or minority languages).364  
 In this chapter I outline the shifts in the region-centre balance introduced by 
the new education policies with regard to minority education. I then analyse the 
impact of the new education policies at three levels: the regional, the local and the 
federal. At all levels I note issues that may affect minorities’ linguistic and cultural 
rights, with reference to compliance with the FCNM. I then move on to inter-
cultural education.
365
 I show that, where minority rights intersect with education 
rights, there are two concomitant functions for the education system: providing 
minorities with the opportunity to receive a particular type of education (i.e. in a 
minority language) but also ensuring that the majority receive an education 
reflecting society’s pluralism. This form of inter-cultural education is provided not 
only by the education system itself, but also by the media. I conclude by stating that 
international standards in 2011 were unequipped to withstand existing 
homogenising dynamics in Russia. For international standards to make a difference 
in the area of inter-cultural education, states have to embrace their positive 
responsibilities, rather than remaining within the confines of their negative 
responsibilities - through the simple non-interference in the ability of minorities to, 
for example, speak their languages. The active promotion of diversity, through both 
education and the media, is paramount for the preservation and development of 
minority languages and cultures, and for a functioning multicultural society. Paying 
insufficient attention to the relevant legislation and policy frameworks leads to 
homogenising tendencies. In the case of Russia, it can contribute to the progressive 
loss of a wealth of languages and cultures that form an integral part of the Russian 
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Federation’s historical and cultural heritage. The active promotion of pluralism can 
only occur through shifts from Russia’s existing approaches to localism and 
centralism.  
 
School Data and Interviews 
The last data provided by the Russian government to the ACFC indicates that for 
the period 2001-2004 in Russia there were 2,166 schools in which Tatar was used 
as a language of instructions, and 1,466 in which Tatar was studied as a subject. 
There were 200 schools where either of the two Mordovian languages (Moksha and 
Erzya) were used as a language of instruction366 and 275 where either was studied 
as a subject. There were no Karelian schools where Karelian was used as a 
language of instruction, and 40 where the language could be studied as a subject. 
Of the 100 interviews conducted, 22 were particularly relevant to this 
chapter because of the respondents’ direct involvement in minority and/or inter-
cultural education. The respondents belonged to the following categories: minority 
NGO (4 respondents), human rights NGO (3), academia (10), public official (3) and 
school employee (2). The interviews included a relatively large number of 
academics as the new educational policies are still only partially implemented and 
have generated few analysable data; academics and analysts offered insight into the 
reasons for the tension between law and practice, and potential repercussions on 
national minorities. The category ‘academia’ includes analysts from research 
institutions and academics directly involved in programmes for the preservation of 
minority languages and cultures. 
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6.1 Changing the Rules of the Game: The Three Players in 
the Education System  
 
In December 2007 Law No. 309367 (Law 309) amended the Federal Law ‘On 
Education’. The main thrust of the new provisions was the creation of a common 
federal educational space, but it also dispensed a plethora of new rights and 
responsibilities to local institutions, particularly individual schools. The 
amendments have placed a stronger emphasis on Federal State Educational 
Standards - with a myriad of small modifications interspersed throughout the law 
placing the adjective ‘federal’ before ‘state educational standards’. The 
amendments aim at creating a ‘unified educational space’ (Law 309, Article 
7(3)(1)). They have been justified in light of the need to raise educational standards, 
by setting minimum standards which all of Russia’s schools must attain. It was 
further argued that the amendments bring the Law ‘On Education’ into line with the 
Russian Constitution (Kuz’min et al. 2010),368 which indeed stipulates that 
educational standards are to be established by the Russian federal government.369 
The Russian authorities argued that the amendments were not meant to impose a 
new educational or cultural straitjacket upon the regions, but to create an 
overarching general framework that could be flexibly applied by individual schools, 
following consideration of the needs of students and their parents. 370 
 The most contentious section of Law 309 has been the effective elimination 
of the ‘national component’ - a particular model for the teaching of language, 
history and culture of non-Russian nationalities. The pre-309 Law ‘On Education’ 
included three ‘components’: the federal level, the regional level and the individual 
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school - each contributing to the curriculum. At the regional level, regions devised 
the ‘national-regional component’, approximately 15% of teaching time of the 
standard school curricula for all pupils, devoted to the study of minority languages 
and cultures. The school component (an additional 10%) could be used at the 
school’s discretion to further develop the teaching of minority languages and 
cultures, thereby creating a school ‘with an ethno-cultural component’.371 As a 
mechanism for the teaching of minority languages and cultures, the ACFC saw the 
‘national-regional component’ in a positive light.372 Post-309, the Law ‘On 
Education’ makes no reference to such components. Yet the education programme 
is still divided into parts: the ‘obligatory’ and ‘variable’ parts.373 The former (70% 
of total teaching time) is devised at the federal level, while the latter part (30%) is 
established by the ‘participants in the educational process’, or, as summarised by 
the Russian government in the Third Report to the ACFC, ‘primarily by educational 
institutions with consideration of the needs of students and their parents, as well as 
by education regulatory bodies.’374 The two main actors in the Russian education 
system are now the federal centre and local institutions; the individual schools, with 
input from local civil society (students and parents), devise the ‘variable’ part - up 
to 30% of the curriculum.375 The ‘middle level’ - i.e. the republics and other 
subjects of the Russian Federation - is seemingly excluded. This section explores 
the three levels of education policy management: the regional, the local, and the 
federal centre.  
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The Regions: Decreased Legal Guarantees 
The Russian authorities have provided assurances that the regions will not be 
marginalised in the formulation of educational policies. They will continue to adopt 
normative acts, as well as developing educational programmes on the bases of 
regional and local needs.376 The Russian authorities have stated that:  
 
[The] subjects of the Russian Federation are actively involved in the process 
of elaboration of the obligatory part of the main educational program, also 
for the purposes of ensuring that due consideration is given to regional, 
national and ethno-cultural components.377  
 
What has been effectively removed is the legal and formal control by the regions. 
The downgrading of their legal status was articulated by a Russian education 
expert:  
 
Regions […] no longer have permission to maintain fully independent 
regional legislation in education. No longer can any regional system of 
education with self-sufficient legislation exist. Prior to 2007 there was some 
kind of balance between regional and federal legal systems on particular 
topics. The new situation is directed at the prohibition of this ‘balance’.378  
 
Unsurprisingly, the adoption of Law 309 has sparked centre-periphery tensions 
(Stepanov 2010a: 5). The amendments were met with resistance and 
demonstrations (Gordeev 2009a); demonstrators denounced centralised decision-
making on minority education as a violation of their constitutional right to freely 
choose their language of education.379 Some regions reliant on Moscow for 
subsidies, normally timid in their claims to the centre, on this occasion acted in 
unison with Tatarstan, joining the republic in its protests, which were articulated 
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with ‘one voice’.380 The reactions to the amendments were recorded through 
interviews for the thesis in the focus republics, as well as in Moscow and St 
Petersburg, where several schools ‘with an ethno-cultural component’ exist. In the 
republics of Mordovia and Karelia, respondents from civil society as well as school 
employees displayed little or no alarm at the amendments, and in most cases had 
little awareness or knowledge of them. The situation was dramatically different in 
Tatarstan. Here, the respondents tended to be aware of the amendments, whose 
swift adoption had generated feelings of uncertainty and powerlessness. An 
education specialist at Kazan’s Institute of History381 - who had previously been 
consulted in the formulation of federal education standards, and in the preparation 
of federal textbooks depicting Tatar history - perceived the new regulations as an 
imposition, adopted ‘quickly and without discussion’ [2.7]. His position was that 
the policies of the federal centre prevented Tatarstan from preserving its 
diversity.
382
 Another Tatar respondent echoed the opinion that Moscow’s actions 
were ‘destructive’ [4.7]. There was further uncertainty due to hearsay over potential 
further centralisation: possible supplementary amendments to the Law ‘On 
Education’ (which between 1996 and 2009 was amended over 60 times); and 
possible modification in the procedures for the federal endorsement of new 
textbooks, until then produced autonomously in the republics for use at the regional 
level. The same respondent from the Institute of History described the feared 
removal of this autonomy as a ‘threat’ to minority cultures [2.7]. This view was 
shared by another education specialist in Moscow, who spoke about an ‘education 
vertical’ [4.14].  
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 The discrepancy between the three republics in their perceptions can be 
explained by a number of factors: the much greater size of the Tatar nationality 
compared to the other two383 (leading to a more pronounced ethnic consciousness); 
the public discourse around the amendments, taken up, in particular, by former 
Tatar President Mintimer Shaimiev, who vigorously opposed them; the higher 
stakes - given the much higher number of schools operating in Tatar language than 
in Mosha, Erzya or Karelian. Tatarstan was also particularly affected by two other 
centralising measures: the federal rejection of Tatarstan’s claim to use the Latin 
alphabet for the Tatar language;
384
 and the introduction of the Russian-only 
‘uniform state exam’ (Edinyi Gosudarstvennyi Ekzamen - EGE). The Russian-only 
exam was introduced through a 2009 decree removing the option for students to 
take the EGE, the final secondary school exam, in a minority language rather than 
Russian.385 The highly-controversial decree affected Tatarstan, which had until then 
enabled students to access universities within the republic through a state exam that 
could be taken in either Tatar or Russian.386 The requirement to take the state exam 
in Russian has had a profound effect on the status of minority languages in Russia. 
Tatar respondents (civil society and academia) argued that the obligation to take the 
exam in Russian would inevitably lead to an increasing number of parents sending 
their children to Russian schools, hoping for better academic achievements in 
(Russian-language) exams, and, with them, enhanced job prospects. According to the 
same Tatar respondents, sitting the state exam in Tatar does lead to a lack of fluency 
in Russian, or to Tatar enclaves isolated from the rest of Russia. Part of the education 
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in Tatar national schools is in Russian - and most of the media and forms of public 
communication in Tatarstan are also conducted in Russian. This issue was raised in 
the Russian courts: the parents of a student in Kazan’s Gymnasium No. 2, a Tatar 
school where teaching takes place in Tatar, Russian and English, submitted a case to 
the Russian Supreme Court following the decree’s adoption. The parents saw the right 
of taking the exam in one’s language as an extension of the right to receive an 
education in it - which, in their opinion, the presidential decree had violated. As the 
claim was turned down,387 the complaint was submitted to the ECtHR.
388
 
Loss of fluency in Russian is a particularly remote possibility in the Republic 
of Karelia, where Karelians amount to less than 10% of the republic’s population, and 
where the language has virtually disappeared from public places with the exception of 
small demographic pockets with relatively high concentrations of Karelians. These are 
primarily villages that are gradually becoming uninhabited as most young people 
leave them in search of employment. Despite this, a Karelian activist complained in an 
interview that two nurseries that operated exclusively in Karelian - with 
methodological support from Finland - had been closed by the Russian authorities 
[1.2.2]. The measure was justified by the authorities in this way: 
 
The refusal of federal executive bodies to use in Russia [the] so called 
“language nest” technique applied in Finland can […] serve[s] as an example 
of efforts taken to ensure equal access to education for persons belonging to 
national minorities. The above technique is aimed at learning by the Finno-
Ugric minorities of their native languages. However, its mechanism creates [a] 
closed language environment within the frames of pre-school institutions 
where children plunge into native language from the early childhood. In [the] 
multinational environment of Russia this would significantly reduce their 
socialization opportunities and, accordingly, would entail [a] violation of the 
principle of equal opportunities of education, further employment etc. and is 
considered as segregation of children on ethnic grounds.389 
 
                                                 
387
 SRC, Cassation Collegium, Kamalova case (note 270). 
388
 In 2011 there had still been no admissibility decision by the ECtHR. 
389
 ACFC, (Third) Report submitted by Russia (note 132), pp. 103-4. 
 194 
Hence, the Russian authorities saw these nurseries as a form of segregation and a 
threat to equality, much like the position of the critics of multiculturalism described in 
Chapter 1.  Yet international standards for minority protection are very clear that 
equality does not mean enforcing uniformity to pre-empt potential instances of 
discrimination, but creating the conditions for the preservation of diversity, while also 
adopting ‘special measures’ to ensure that minorities enjoy equal opportunities despite 
their difference.   
The decrease, through Law 309, of the regions’ options for independent 
law-making in the area of education could in theory be rebalanced by the direct 
participation of the regions in federal decision-making. However, the precedents of 
the adoption of Law 309 and the introduction of exclusively Russian-language 
exams indicate the absence of guarantees of effective participation in decision-
making. In the case of Law 309, respondents agreed that discussions took place ex 
post facto, on modalities of implementation rather than on its adoption and 
content.390 The role of the regions in shaping educational policies has consequently 
decreased. They are afforded fewer legal guarantees, which has caused alarm in 
some regions,391 as they are faced with a sense of unpredictability given the lack of 
clarity on the practical consequences of the reforms. With the regions’ role 
diminished, the local and federal levels have acquired greater prominence, with 
increased ‘localism’ and ‘centralism’.  
 
Schools and Localities: Localism or Atomisation? 
The regional layer of decision-making having been removed through Law 309, the 
schools have the autonomy to self-organise with regard to the ‘variable’ part of 
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education, according to the new model outlined above. In light of this, a respondent 
called Law 309 a ‘great achievement’, inasmuch as it gave increased autonomy to 
individual schools [2.23]. Another nationality expert saw it as a step towards the 
implementation of the 1985 European Charter for Local Self-Government, ratified 
by Russia in 1998
392
 [2.15]. Indeed, cultural diversity tends to be better catered for 
through decentralisation, which enhances participation at the local level and a 
greater attention to local needs (Grin 2003: 152-3). At the same time, Law 309 
creates both new responsibilities and new opportunities for schools. Present 
conditions, both internal and external to schools, might impair the fulfilment of 
responsibilities and the enjoyment of opportunities available to schools.  
 First, schools require a new set of skills as well as information concerning 
their new responsibilities. Following the adoption of Law 309 schools had only 
minimal knowledge of the law and what it entailed (Stepanov 2010b). The 
interviews for this thesis exposed much confusion and, in several cases, a lack of 
information. Although specialists on education and nationality issues in Tatarstan 
were generally aware of the amendments, the majority of respondents in Karelia 
and Mordovia, and non-specialists in Tatarstan, tended to believed that Law 309 
would not substantively affect teaching in the republics. This perception tended to 
coincide with vague notions of the amendments. Some had the erroneous belief that 
the amendments had been repealed. Even specialists in Kazan and Moscow had 
limited information, and were cautious in their predictions as to how the 
amendments would affect the teaching of minority languages and cultures. A 
respondent, an academic working on inter-cultural education in Moscow, said: 
 
Moscow has given more power to individual schools, so they should decide 
[what to teach] on the basis of [the preferences of] the local population, but 
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it’s not clear how. How it will be done is still not known. So the regions are 
suspicious, and they have full right to be suspicious [2.22]. 
 
One specialist explained that the confusion as to how to comply with the federal 
standards had led to schools simply prolong previous practices, and to continue to 
seek guidance from regional regulatory bodies [2.23]. In fact, no substantive 
changes had been made in minority education in the three republics by 2011.  
Law 309, then, has placed schools in Russia in a procedural and legal limbo 
while practical guidelines are developed. Yet the resulting precariousness around 
minority education is not necessarily only a transitory, time-bound phase. While 
schools might ultimately be equipped with information, training and materials, 
other factors in the schools’ external environment might intervene to restrict their 
scope of action to the detriment of minority education. Such factors relate to federal 
funding and Russia’s socio-economic environment. 
In the case of federal funds, schools in Russia have an interest in 
accommodating the needs of students and their parents as schools receive financing 
in a measure that is proportional to the number of students (Stepanov 2010a: 6). 
Denial of the opportunity to learn a minority language by a school might lead a 
pupil belonging to a minority to leave for another educational institution, thereby 
decreasing the first school’s funds. Similarly, students who are uninterested in 
minority languages, even if themselves members of a minority, will prompt schools 
to reduce minority language teaching [2.15; 2.22]. This system can induce the 
monetisation of culture, with schools being driven by financial concerns rather than 
the accommodation of local preferences. Respondents working in education 
invariably referred to tight budgets, although schools are supplied with materials - 
such as textbooks on minority languages and cultures - free-of-charge. 
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Closely related to the issue of school budgets is the socio-economic 
environment that minorities inhabit together with the majority. Socio-economic 
conditions can, in practice, restrict the options available to minorities. The 
introduction of the requirement to hold the EGE in Russian language illustrates this: 
parents and students might decide, as a consequence, not to avail themselves of 
their legal right to education in a native language provided by Russian law.393 
Respondents from a variety of backgrounds made frequent references to an 
increasing number of parents opting for Russian-language education for their 
children, particularly following the requirement to hold the EGE in Russian.394 
Meanwhile, demographic shifts due to low birth rates,395 financial constraints and 
migration from rural to urban areas in search of employment, have led to the 
closure of minority schools. This has particularly affected small village schools, 
where minorities are concentrated and where the language of instruction is more 
likely to be the language of the minority.396 In 2011 it was reported that 700 village 
schools are closed a year.397 These schools are no longer considered financially 
viable and tend to be closed as part of plans of modernisation of the education 
system. When there is no other minority-language school in the vicinity, pupils are 
left with no alternatives but joining Russian-language schools. Despite this, in its 
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Third Report to the ACFC (2010) the Russian government stated that 33 languages 
were used as languages of tuition and 47 additional languages were studied as 
subjects. The figures had increased from, respectively, 30 and 45 languages 
reported in the Second Report submitted in 2005. The Third Report added that:  
 
In recent years, a number of the subjects of the Russian Federation have 
significantly increased their networks of general education institutions that 
hold tuition in native languages.398  
 
Hence, the Russian authorities describe a scenario where minority language 
education has increased where other sources indicate it has decreased. 
Suleymanova explains this discrepancy, with relation to Tatarstan, by noting that 
some schools that are recorded as schools ‘with an ethno-national component’ have 
in have reality switched to Russian language for the teaching of several courses, 
confining the Tatar language to the teaching of Tatar literature and history (2011). 
This is due not only to a new concern for complete fluency in Russian (since the 
introduction of the Russian-language EGE) but also to a general devaluation of the 
status of the Tatar language following a brief Tatar renaissance in the aftermath of 
the Soviet Union’s collapse. The number of languages taught might not have 
decreased but the actual teaching might have been reduced or be generally scarce. 
In Karelia the teaching of the Karelian language was considered by the respondents 
from minority organisations and a school teacher as insufficient to provide fluency, 
with only two hours of teaching a week [1.2.1; 1.2.2; 5.1]. Thus, even if schools 
weigh the needs of parents and students, the teaching of minority languages and 
cultures might ultimately decrease as a mirror of ongoing socio-economic patterns 
which see the Russian language and culture as the pathway to financial viability. In 
this case, Russia’s centralising move (the Russian-language EGE) can directly 
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shape decision-making at the local level, as schools and the local population adjust 
to the new provisions.  
Finally, the new educational policies do not deal with further complexities. 
In the Kamalova case cited above, challenging the 2009 obligation to take the state 
exam in the Russian language,
399
 the school shared the opinion of the parent who 
initiated the case, and wished to continue to hold exams in Tatar. Despite this 
agreement, the Supreme Court’s ruling prevented the accommodation of the 
parents’ wishes by the school. Another example was provided by a representative 
of a minority (Jewish) organisation in Moscow, whose son attended one of the 
city’s schools. He said:     
 
In schools there are textbooks on the bases of Orthodox culture… The 
music lessons have traditional Russian songs - Russian Orthodox songs. It is 
not for any particular policy [of Russian nationalism] but it’s because that’s 
what they [the teachers] know. There are no professionals in schools who 
have received training to deal with inter-religious issues […]. I don’t like a 
member of the clergy to go to my son’s school, and my son to tell me that a 
priest has been there [to talk to the students about Russian Orthodoxy] 
[1.2.5].   
 
The respondent was referring to religious classes that started in 2010.400 The 
schools decided, together with the pupils’ parents, on the type of religious 
education to be provided - including Russian Orthodox or Islamic variants, or a 
history of religions approached from a secular perspective. This example illustrates 
that, even in consultation with parents, some parental concerns can slip through the 
net of such discussions. In this case, the wishes of parents were considered 
collectively, and the school opted for classes on Orthodox religion as the majority 
of children in the school were Russian Orthodox. It is certainly difficult to involve 
wide sections of the local groups in permanent dialogue; at the same time, the 
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Russian Orthodox Church to introduce the teaching of  Russian Orthodoxy in Russian schools.  
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excessive flexibility of arrangements might lower the level of representativeness, as 
there is no obligation to ensure an inclusive process. Meanwhile, the rights of 
parents, and responsibilities of schools, remain undefined - for example it remains 
unclear when additional courses ought to be set up in a school to accommodate the 
linguistic or cultural needs of specific minorities. The lack of clarity on the exact 
scope of the schools’ responsibilities, and of parents and students’ rights, causes a 
lack of formal redress in cases of dissatisfaction.  
To conclude, schools operate in an environment fraught with adverse socio-
economic conditions vis-à-vis minority languages and cultures. Moreover, areas of 
legal uncertainty remain, as well as cases in which parental concerns remain 
unaccounted for. This is when the federal centre ought to step in, providing legal 
and procedural clarity for the actors involved in education processes, as well as 
coherent and sustainable policies that assist pupils, parents and schools withstand 
socio-economic pressures threatening the preservation of minorities’ cultural 
heritage.  
 
The Federal Centre: Laissez-faire 
As shown in Chapter 5, Putin’s centralising, de-federalising policies have been a 
fundamental aspect of Russian politics since the early 2000s. At the same time, 
certain areas, such as education in minority languages and cultures, face a lack of a 
central coherent planning, supervision and support. 
Legal clarity is one of the primary requirements for compliance with state 
obligations in the area of minority education, referred to in numerous ACFC 
Opinions.401 The 2006 ACFC Commentary on Education states that:402   
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 See, for example, ACFC, (First) Opinion on Estonia, 14 September 2001, 
ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)005, § 51-2.  
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Legal certainty and clarity are preconditions for coherent implementation of 
the provisions of the Framework Convention, especially since the 
Framework Convention requires the concretization and contextualization at 
national, regional and local levels.403 
 
Legal clarity is of particular relevance during decentralisation processes - when, as 
in the Russian case, local authorities and individual schools are delegated new 
responsibilities. Teachers, parents and pupils need to be aware of what decisions are 
taken and on what legal basis, if they are to participate in decision-making on 
educational matters, including minority education.404  
  The state parties to the FCNM are afforded a wide margin of discretion in 
establishing the rules for its implementation. The FCNM provisions themselves, 
such as Article 14(2) (education in a minority’s language), are worded very 
flexibly, in light of the ‘financial, administrative and technical difficulties’ that may 
arise in the teaching of, or through the medium of, minority languages.405 
Depending on the resources available, the member states have to act ‘as far as 
possible’ and when there is ‘sufficient demand’.406 In its Second Opinion on Russia, 
the ACFC commented favourably on aspects of the flexibility of Russia’s education 
system. It noted that the ‘national-regional component’, in conjunction with the 
schools’ and federal components, provided a variety of options to pupils and 
students. According to this model, different educational institutions placed a greater 
or lesser emphasis on the learning of minority languages and cultures, yet they all 
operated within the same broad educational framework.407 Clearly some flexibility 
allows for the accommodation of local needs. Cultural rights of minorities cannot 
                                                                                                                                        
402
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be approached in a uniform, mechanical manner, but have to take into account the 
nuances of each group’s special characteristics and needs in different territories - 
for example, whether or not a group is concentrated in a particular area or 
geographically dispersed.408 
 This flexibility, however, has to exist within a framework that offers 
sufficient guarantees to minority groups - particularly of a legal and financial 
nature.409 Minimum standards have to be developed at the domestic level, following 
the analysis of the local conditions, resources and needs through a process that 
defines and then crystallises the rights of minorities. As noted, the right to receive 
an education in one’s language is enshrined in the Constitution and other laws, but, 
despite this general framework, the contours of Russian legislation in minority 
education remain dim. Among the regulations that legislation should provide are 
clear thresholds on the number of pupils belonging to minorities that will activate 
the provision of new minority language classes. In Russia these decisions are left to 
individual schools, in the absence of specific thresholds and, according to the 
ACFC, a ‘poorly defined’ division of responsibilities between the local, regional 
and federal bodies.410 The consequence is wide discretionary powers being vested in 
individual schools. This laissez-faire approach, the ACFC noted, does not provide 
sufficient guarantees for minorities to enjoy the right to education in their mother 
tongue, particularly in the case of small and dispersed national minorities.411 
Without specific guidelines, the Law ‘On Education’ (both pre- and post-309) is 
interpreted and applied differently in various regions and in different schools 
(Stepanov 2010b) - not only to tailor solutions to local needs, but as the standards 
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of application are left undetermined and do not form part of a coherent whole. In 
practice schools have provided minority language education even without specific 
federal regulations. This signals a local commitment and attention to minority 
needs, but these efforts are not buttressed by clear rights that parents can invoke.  
Hence, the transfer of legal responsibilities from the regions to the centre 
and localities has inevitably caused an interlude of legal uncertainly. The situation 
has progressed only minimally between 2007 and 2011: for the most part, in 2011 
Law 309 had still not been translated into practice. The ACFC recognised this type 
of impasse as problematic when it called not only for legal guarantees but also for 
them to be supplemented by implementing regulations and teaching practice.412 For 
laws to be effective, the supervision of their enforcement also has to be effective. 
The ACFC has argued that reports by the state parties to the FCNM tend to skirt the 
issue of judicial enforcement, failing to provide details on the relevant 
jurisprudence.413 Although these are generalised problems, Russia’s specific 
characteristics - the large number of its minorities, ethnic federalism, and the 
existence of numerous ‘minorities within minorities’ - converge to create a 
particularly complex scenario, with different layers of demands. A lack of specific 
guarantees and thresholds means that there is only a minuscule body of 
jurisprudence in minority-related cases - the Kamalova case being one of the rare 
exceptions.414 
Legal guarantees should fit within an ‘active and coherent educational 
policy’.415 This is an integral part of a government’s responsibility in FCNM 
implementation: the state has to formulate and apply mechanisms ensuring that 
relevant measures cascade down to the different institutions that play a role, 
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whether directly or indirectly, in its implementation, including schools. A coherent 
educational strategy should ideally be coordinated with a wider language policy 
(Council of Europe 2007). In the absence of such a strategy the efforts for the 
promotion of minority languages and cultures typically become fragmented, 
remaining a succession of isolated initiatives.416 The ECRML includes provisions 
for the safeguard of minority languages encompassing several areas of language 
usage - education, judiciary, administrative authorities, media, cultural activities, 
economic and social life - reflecting a need to approach language preservation 
holistically for language policies to succeed. A coherent long-term strategy in 
education may involve bilingual education and also the provision of secondary and 
tertiary education - to enable students to consolidate and further develop their 
language skills.417 Indeed, a frequent ACFC recommendation is the provision of 
education in minority languages in universities.418 In this sense, the focus on 
individual schools (the small, rather than the big, picture) is myopic. While there 
are material impediments in guaranteeing substantial attention to all minority 
languages, particularly when they are as numerous as in Russia, there is a need for 
strategic choices. A Karelian activist in Petrozavodsk noted its absence in the 
following way:  
 
Some work is done for languages - a bit here, a bit there - but there is no 
comprehensive policy. [1.2.2]   
 
The federal state educational standards, adopted to serve as a guiding framework 
for individual schools, are themselves worded in vague terms. In relation to 
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languages, they state goals rather than procedures and guidelines. The goals are 
described as, among others:  
 
[I]mprovement of language knowledge (listening, reading speaking and 
writing) [...] [of the] understanding of the role of language in intellectual 
development [...].
 419
 
 
Finally, a state’s positive responsibilities in the area of minority education include 
awareness-raising over the options for instruction in minority languages and 
cultures. The ACFC has noted that, although in some cases demand for education in 
minority languages is low in Russia, the fact that the right to minority language 
instruction is enshrined in federal legislation requires that the government makes 
students and parents aware of existing opportunities.420 Awareness-raising is linked 
to creating an expectation that such rights will be realised if claimed (De Varennes 
& Thornberry 2005: 419). Low demand has already been discussed above and was 
raised repeatedly during interviews, with references to parents’ preference for full 
fluency in Russian rather than in a minority language. Other respondents (of the 
categories ‘civil society’, ‘academia’ and ‘school employee’) referred to: poor 
facilities for the teaching of minority languages [1.2.1; 1.2.2; 1.2.8; 2.5; 2.13; 5.1]; 
a lack of professional prospects for bilingual teachers and scholars [1.2.9; 1.2.2; 
2.2; 2.3; 2.5], or those who are fluent in minority languages [1.1.3 1.2.1; 2.2; 2.7]; 
and the barriers to taking the state exam in minority languages [2.6; 2.7; 5.2].
421
 A 
Tatar respondent noted that these conditions mean that minorities have no real 
choice as to whether to preserve their cultural differences [2.7]. At the same time, 
fluency in a minority language should not jeopardise fluency in the state’s official 
                                                 
419
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language. The ACFC has clarified that even in minority-language schools the 
majority language should be an integral part of the curriculum.422 This approach 
was followed during the travaux préparatoires of Article 14 FCNM: the parties 
insisted on a compatibility of the protection of the minority languages through 
education while also, as De Varennes and Thornberry put it, ‘equipping the 
members of minorities with sufficient language skills to succeed in the broader 
society […]’ (2005: 419). A proactive and positive approach to language pluralism 
convey the view that bilingual education can expand, rather than limit, one’s 
horizons in a plurilingual society. 
 
6.2 Inter-culturalism  
 
Special educational arrangements for minority groups can potentially lead to 
ghettoisation. This risk can be offset by efforts towards social cohesion through 
inter-cultural education and the media. These can serve as instruments to promote a 
sense of a plurilingual, multicultural society through the promotion of inter-
culturalism in the public discourse. The idea of interaction between different 
cultures and groups, and their cross-fertilisation, is stressed by the suffix ‘inter’ of 
‘inter-culturalism’.423 This interplay is in the interest of both states and minorities: 
as noted in the ACFC’s Commentary on Education, governments have an interest in 
social cohesion (as a path to stability),424 while minorities tend to desire social and 
economic integration.
425
 Both elements are present in Article 29(1) of the UN 
                                                 
422
 ACFC, (First) Opinion on Serbia and Montenegro, 27 November 2003, 
ACFC/INF/OP/I(2004)002, § 98. 
423
 This leads to a supplementary distinction between multilingualism (the simple presence of 
different languages in a particular space) and plurilingualism (a coexistence of languages grounded 
on the appreciation of linguistic diversity - and a fundamental aspect of intercultural education) 
(Council of Europe 2007).  
424
 ACFC, Commentary on Education (note 402), p. 9. 
425
 Parents wish for good standards of living for their children. Ibid. 
 207 
Convention on the Rights of the Child,
426
 stating that education should be directed 
at promoting the respect for both the child’s ‘own cultural identity, language and 
values’ and that of the country in which the child lives (paragraph 1(c)). Education 
should further nurture respect for ‘tolerance […] friendship among all peoples, 
ethnic national and religious groups […]’ (paragraph 1(d)).  The FCNM refers to 
the inter-cultural perspective of minority rights, with relevance to ‘intercultural 
dialogue […] particularly in the field of education, culture and the media’ (Article 
6(1)) and to ‘foster[ing] knowledge of the culture, history, language and religion of 
[…] national minorities and of the majority’ (Article 12(1)). Plurilingualism does 
not only imply the majority learning the rudiments of minority languages, but also 
their appreciation and respect (Council of Europe 2007). In Article 14 FCNM, an 
emphasis is placed on the interaction and mutual understanding in the education 
system. Then, adaptability and efforts for interaction and integration have to come 
not only from minorities, but also from the majority. At the same time, there should 
be no prejudice as to the learning of the official language of the state
427
 - again, to 
stimulate social cohesion and to keep the threat of ghettoisation at bay. Key to these 
processes is ‘integration in diversity’.428 
One of the respondents, the representative of a minority NGO in St 
Petersburg, had noticed initial steps in this direction, which she judged positively. 
She believed that activities to promote minority cultures in her city had become 
more outward-looking by involving inter-group dynamics. Earlier, she said, 
activities had been ‘internal’: 
 
Now it is two directions: it’s for the nationality [itself], but there is also the 
dissemination of information [outside the group]. [Activities] are not done 
                                                 
426
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with the balalaika but with education, with seminars. Before there was a 
certain closure, the [ethnic] groups were separated from the rest of society. 
Now there are people who come to our [Finno-Ugric] organisation who are 
Tatars or from other groups, but they are interested in other nationalities 
[…]. Some of the activities are shown on television. We want to stop 
national separatism, because nobody is 100% of a particular nationality, we 
are all mixed. [1.2.9] 
 
The respondent implicitly criticised the folkloristic slant of some cultural 
programmes, welcoming a new effort towards education, while also stressing the 
importance of inter-group exchange. She referred to the media as contributing to 
the coming together of different societal groups, by educating the population on 
diversity. Other respondents were more critical of the media - which serves the 
crucial function of helping to shape societal self-perceptions. 
  
The Media: The New Teacher 
As minority cultures and languages, and inter-cultural approaches, are sidelined in 
schools, the role of the media is correspondently enhanced. It serves the role of 
educator, including by shaping social attitudes towards minorities. This is 
particularly the case with the broadcast media: television is the main source of 
information in Russia, available in virtually every household (Ognianova 2009). 
The Russian media operates on two levels: it promulgates patriotism and it builds 
societal attitudes towards particular groups. In the first case, the media serves the 
function of nation-building, as described by Anderson (1991). In Russia, the media 
has contributed to creating a new identity for the country in its post-Soviet 
incarnation (Hutchings et al. 2010: 177). Hutchings writes: 
 
Since 2000, Channel 1 has, without reverting entirely to totalitarian type, 
been enlisted in a nation-building campaign launched by Putin to restore 
Russian pride from the humiliations it had endured under Yeltsin. It is 
accompanied in this mission by the Rossiia channel, owned entirely by the 
government […]. Channel 1 deploys “everyday patriotism” which, rather 
than grounding itself in the “ordinary,” aims instead to use the recurring 
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cycles of the daily news bulletin to promote heroically positive images of 
both Putin and Medvedev (2010: 178-9). 
 
 
Two respondents, both journalists and representatives of media freedom 
organisations in Moscow, were asked to elaborate on the role of the Russian media 
in the minority discourse [3.9 and 3.10]. The first respondent said that Russian 
patriotic themes are evident on television and state-funded cinematography.
429
 The 
multiplication of patriotic messages in the state media has coincided with the 
increasingly frequent coverage of the Russian Orthodox Church on television [3.9]. 
The broadcast media can easily be employed to accommodate the interests of the 
leadership, as the main television channels are controlled by or closely associated to 
the state. The second respondent similarly said: 
 
The state media promotes a patriotic agenda, traditional values. The 
Orthodox Church has a big role. The media contains themes of the Russian 
and Soviet empires […]. The Prime Minister [Putin] in particular reminds us 
of our ‘glorious past’, which is useful during electoral campaigns. [3.10]  
 
 
In line with this, Hutchings writes that Putin’s leadership has intensified nation-
building in the broadcast media through ‘patriotic’ programmes. These included:  
 
[A] series of made-for-television dramas celebrating the Great Patriotic War 
and depicting triumphs from pre-revolutionary Russia’s history, and a 
number of programmes idealising the daily work of Russia’s security forces 
and Secret Service [...]. [O]nly months after the end of the South Ossetian 
conflict in late summer 2008 […] a glossy television film portraying the 
“truth” about Georgian atrocities (Olympius Inferno, Igor Voloshin, 2009) 
[was broadcast] [...] (2010: 179).
430
  
 
 
Patriotic programming can be construed as a form of Billig’s ‘banal nationalism’: 
the presence of nationalistic themes of which the members of society might not be 
aware, but that affect them through their pervasiveness in daily life (2004). While 
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the broadcast media is imbued with patriotic themes of Russia’s greatness, 
Hutchings argues that there has been ‘little evidence’ of an inversed ‘banal 
nationalism’ in the form of a positive portrayal of minority cultures that could 
advance their respect and appreciation (2010: 179). 
The Russian media’s second form of potential impact on society is the 
sparking of tensions between ethnic groups. The UN Special Rapporteur on 
Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance has written about the ‘dissemination of racist and xenophobic ideas and 
stereotypes by an increasing sector of the media, which has contributed to ‘a 
negative image of certain communities and [to] fostering feelings of intolerance and 
xenophobia’. This has been the case, in particular, with Roma and Tajiks - 
associated with drug trafficking and crime in the media - and Caucasians, 
particularly Chechens - associated with terrorism.
431
 
International standards envisage the opposite role for the media - that of 
fostering tolerance and pluralism. The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers 
describes the role of the public service broadcaster as ‘as an essential factor of 
pluralistic communication’.432 It adds that public service broadcasters have a 
responsibility to promote a culture of tolerance and understanding, and that the 
broadcast media generally is ‘a potent force for creating an atmosphere in which 
intolerance can be challenged’.433 The use of minority languages is also foreseen in 
public broadcasters.
434
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The media is a double-edged sword: it can further both tolerance and 
intolerance. Russia has no public service broadcasting whose stated role is that of 
serving the needs of the public - encompassing its numerous social strata and 
groups, including by devoting special attention to national minorities.
435
 There is no 
provision for minorities to feed into decision-making on programming. The first 
journalist interviewed argued that in Russia decisions on broadcasting were taken 
on the basis of two factors: politics and ratings [3.9]. The portrayal of politics does 
not tend to embrace minority concerns, while ratings privilege entertainment 
programmes. Coverage of themes related to minorities only occurs in the case of 
major incidents, as in the ultra-right, racist rallies that resulted in riots in Moscow 
on 11 December 2011, to subsequently spill over to other Russian cities.
436
 Even in 
this case, he believed that the coverage was ‘wide-spread but not in-depth’ [3.9]. 
The second journalist similarly stated: 
 
In general each channel deals with the promotion of mainstream politicians 
and entertainment […]. Officially there is no censorship but channels try not 
to upset people in power and get as much money as possible from the 
channels. [3.10] 
 
As little information on minority issues reaches the mainstream media, with the 
exception of serious incidents involving minorities or festivals with a folkloristic 
flavour, the activities of organisations devoted to minority cultures remain largely 
confined to a narrow circle of supporters. Similarly, media in minority languages, 
although highly valued by representatives of minorities, has limited reach. It leads 
to the localisation of minority media; this should be counterbalanced by the federal 
                                                 
Additionally, Article 11(1) ECRML stipulates that the public broadcasters must address the needs of 
the users of minority languages. The ACFC has further noted that minority concerns should be 
regularly mainstreamed in the in the media. ACFC, (Third) Opinion on Croatia, 6 December 2010. 
ACFC/OP/III(2010)005, § 125; 131. 
435
 PACE, ‘Public Service Broadcasting’, 21 January 2004, Doc. 10029 Addendum. 
436
 See SOVA, ‘Winter 2010-2011’ (note 257). 
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state broadcaster, with programming that reflect the country’s ethnic pluralism, in a 
genuine inter-culturalist effort.  
 
6.3 Conclusion: Tensions between Centralism and 
Localism 
 
This and the previous chapter, on ‘Homogenisation’, revealed egregious 
complexities in the preservation of Russia’s cultural wealth that international law is 
not equipped to withstand. Processes for the promotion of minority languages and 
cultures in Russia’s educational space are caught between localising and 
centralising tendencies. Centralising tendencies are those that raise the status and 
financial viability of the Russian language and culture, such as the requirement to 
take the state examination in Russian, as well as legal reform ‘from above’, short of 
consultation with minority groups. Localising moves place new rights and 
responsibilities on individual schools through Law 309 by expanding the segment 
of the curriculum which they can, at least nominally, independently devise. Federal 
involvement seems to fluctuate between the two coexisting poles of macro- and 
micro-management - with the imposition of regulations without consultation in 
some areas and laissez-faire attitudes in others. Meanwhile, the role of the ‘middle 
level’ - that of the subjects of the Federation - has been downgraded.  
If we accept Grin’s contention that participation is facilitated through 
decentralised arrangements,437 localism at the sub-regional level may represent a 
progression towards the satisfaction of the needs and wishes of minorities, and with 
greater compliance with international standards. Russia’s history includes a legacy 
of local self-organisation to cater for the needs of the local populace.
438
 In post-
                                                 
437
 See Section 2.3. 
438
 See Section 2.3. 
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Soviet Russia, data from the interviews
439
 indicate that schools interact with parents 
and students and, in a number of cases, accommodate them. However, this chapter 
has shown that devolution is not enough. Specific efforts need to be made by the 
federal state for the preservation of minority languages and cultures through the 
education system. Such efforts entail legal clarity, and, even more crucially, a 
coherent educational policy. Minorities and individual schools are not part of a 
Federation-led coordinated framework that can revitalise minority language use, 
and reverse processes of linguistic assimilation. Rather, the Russian-language EGE 
encourages assimilation as an instrument for full integration in society; these 
processes appear to be linked to current moves towards the promulgation of a 
Russian patriotic discourse, built around a Russian civic identity (Daucé et al. 
2010). The aim is not necessarily that of ‘Russianising’ nationalities, but rather to 
simplify and strengthen Russia’s governance. Still, such discourses - reflected in 
the media - together with prevalent socio-economic conditions inimical to minority 
language use, make the preservation of minority cultural heritage a remote 
possibility without a more proactive stance by the state. Indeed, in a republic like 
Karelia, where Karelian speakers are a small minority, the use of the language 
continues to decline.  
Having reduced the republics’ legal powers, there is an increased 
atomisation of the Russian educational space, broken down to individual schools 
operating along loose federal standards. The rights of minorities remain opaque and 
difficult to pin down, exacerbating the difficulties of solidifying guarantees around 
them. New forms of centralism and localism are therefore needed, namely: efforts 
from the centre in delineating and implementing a coherent strategy for minority 
education and inter-culturalism - in cooperatoin with the regions and minorities; 
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 Particularly with school employees in Petrozavodsk and Kazan [5.1; 5.2]. 
 214 
and localities and schools that are equipped to implement this strategy. Rather than 
a dichotomous system, the two sides need to be part of incessant, sustained efforts 
to preserve culturally-distinctive identities, and prevent the progressive 
impoverishment of Russia’s linguistic and cultural pluralism. The media as 
educator has a crucial role to play in these processes. 
 The Russian authorities’ approach suggests a dilution of ethnicity as a route 
to levelling difference, perceived as a shortcut to a social equality based on 
standardised values. The reassertion of Russianness appears to be fed by a 
perceived ‘threat’ of multi-ethnicity well captured by a statement by M.N. 
Kuz’min. A former Director of the Institute of National Issues in Education of the 
Ministry of Education and Science, in 2004 Kuz’min argued:  
 
Compared to mono-ethnic countries, multi-ethnicity predestines a country to 
less stability, to the presence of additional areas of inner contradictions 
(2005: 16).  
 
This was echoed by the observation of one of the respondents from Tatarstan: 
 
In Moscow there is a prejudice, a fear that if Russia has too many strong 
ethnicities and languages there will be problems. [4.7] 
 
Similarly, a high-ranking public official working on nationality issues argued in an 
interview that state policies for the preservation of ethnic diversity are ‘both good 
and bad’ [4.18]. Although ‘positive’ in allowing the preservation of minority 
cultures, they are ‘negative’ inasmuch as they create fragmentation. There is an 
echo of anti-multiculturalist arguments, and of Anderson’s preoccupation with 
forms of sub-nationalisms surfacing with force to de-stabilise the country.
440
 
Indeed, the Tatars who called for the use of the Latin, rather than Cyrillic, alphabet 
                                                 
440
 See Section 2.2. 
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in Tatar-language texts have been linked to separatism and described as a ‘threat to 
national security’.441   
The interviews revealed negative perceptions of contemporary nationality 
policies by persons belonging to minorities. A recurring perception is that the 
authorities, while to some extent accommodating minorities, prevent alternative 
ethnic identities from flourishing into something more than marginal - for example, 
preventing children from becoming more fluent in Karelian than in Russian, as in 
the above example of ‘language nest’ nurseries. It reinforces the feeling of ethnic 
minorities not having a ‘real choice’ over the preservation of their distinctiveness, 
and of being forced into a cultural straitjacket. In this context, then, the key 
international standards concerning minority rights were largely unable to withstand 
Russia’s homogenising dynamics. In turn, for international standards to make a 
difference, Russia has to embrace its positive responsibilities in the areas of 
education and the media, transcending forms of laissez-faire and benign neglect, 
and encouraging minority participation in decision-making in both spheres. In light 
of this, it is on minority participation that the final part of the thesis focuses. 
 
 
  
                                                 
441
 In a report presented before the Russian parliament, cited in Saiganova, S. 8-2-2001. ‘Turki 
Royut pod Russiyu cherez Tatarstan’ (‘Turks Get into Russia through Tatarstan’), Vremya i Den’gi,  
p. 24. On the issue of the Latin script, see Sections 4.2 and 5.1. 
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7. PARTICIPATION THROUGH COOPERATION? 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND MINORITIES’ CULTURAL 
RIGHTS  
'Я имею право...' 
'Да, Вы имеете право.' 
'Не закончил, имею   право...' 
'Да, конечно.' 
'…Тогда я могу...' 
'Нет, не можете!' 
  
 
‘I have the right…’ 
Yes, you have the right.’ 
‘I didn’t finish, I have the      
right…’ 
‘Yes, you have the right.’ 
‘… Then I can…’ 
          ‘No, you can’t!’ 
[Russian joke] 
 
Part II has shown that international standards on minority protection have been 
unable to withstand the homogenising tendencies under Putin and Medvedev. In 
Part III of the thesis, ‘Exclusion’ (Chapters 7, 8 and 9), I focus on whether 
international standards have a role in promoting the participatory rights of national 
minorities. I analyse opportunities for minorities in Russia to participate in 
decision-making and programme implementation on cultural matters; and I ask 
how, if at all, international mechanisms play a role in these dynamics.   
In the three chapters of Part III, I differentiate between general cooperation 
between the state organs and civil society (analysed in Chapter 7) and official 
mechanisms of participation, such as advisory councils and elected bodies 
(Chapters 8 and 9). Chapter 7 further incorporates considerations on the right of 
association (Article 7 FCNM442 and Article 11 ECHR443), while Chapters 8 and 9 
                                                 
442
 Article 7 FCNM: 
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focus on the right to participation as provided by Article 15 FCNM.444 The right to 
association and participation overlap and form a continuum: in line with the 
FCNM, minority groups have the right to self-organise without interference from 
the government; and, in turn, the government must involve these self-established 
groups in decision-making processes.  
In the context of cultural identity, participatory rights are essential in the 
formulation of effective minority policies, reflecting minorities’ claims, but they are 
probably the most complex rights to delineate and regulate. Difficulties in 
implementing participatory rights exist in all countries: international standards are 
so flexible as to sometimes seem ephemeral, and there are logistical difficulties in 
the establishment of effective mechanisms to channel stakeholders’ needs to higher, 
decision-making levels. These are due to an interplay of factors, including possible 
majority-minority tensions, in-group differences, and the issue of accountability of 
representation. At the same time, the benefits of participation are manifold. The 
inclusion of the various societal groups in the political and cultural life of a country 
facilitates a sense of ‘joint ownership’ of the state and its policies. It lessens 
possible feelings by minority groups of being subdued by a dominant group, and 
helps maintain peace and stability, through harmonious minority-majority relations. 
Ultimately, it assists the social integration of all groups, facilitating their genuine 
equality (Hofmann 2006: 6; 17).  
                                                                                                                                        
The Parties shall ensure respect for the right of every person belonging to a national minority to 
freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of expression, and freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion.  
443
 Article 11(1) ECHR: 
 Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others… 
Paragraph 2 contains some narrowly-defined restrictions to this general right. The right to 
association is discussed particularly in Section 7.3. 
444
 Article 15 FCNM: 
The Parties shall create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons belonging 
to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, in particular those 
affecting them.  
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The right to association, analysed in this chapter, refers to an organisation’s 
right to ‘exist’, through its recognition as a legal person, and to freely operate.445 
The importance of this right is stressed by Machnyikova, and linked to minorities’ 
ability to promote their rights as a group: 
 
The right to freedom of assembly and association is one of the central rights, 
whose free enjoyment is essential for the preservation of the identity of 
persons belonging to national minorities, since it is geared towards persons 
uniting and associating to express and protect their common characteristics 
and interests. In fact, the right to associate is a precondition for the existence 
of a group (2005: 204). 
 
By uniting, minorities accumulate force to more strongly call for their rights.  
In addition to the FCNM provisions already cited, of relevance to 
participation is Article 8 FCNM (right to manifest one’s religion or belief, 
including by establishing religious associations), and Article 7(4) ECRML, which 
states: 
In determining their policy with regard to regional or minority languages, 
the Parties shall take into consideration the needs and wishes expressed by 
the groups which use such languages.  
 
Similarly, one of the subparagraphs of Article 12 ECRML, on ‘cultural activities 
and facilities’ is:  
 
[T]o encourage direct participation by representatives of the users of a given 
regional or minority language in providing facilities and planning cultural 
activities.
446
  
 
The implementation of these provisions requires special mechanisms such as 
advisory councils: institutionalised points of contact between the authorities and 
                                                 
445
 Article 7 FCNM and the Aritle 11 ECHR also provide for the right to freedom of assembly: the 
right to engage in peaceful demonstrations. 
446
 Article 12(1)(f) .‘Soft law’ standards are also found in the Lund Recommendations (note 131). 
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stakeholders.
447
 In addition to these mechanisms, an essential ingredient in effective 
participation is an environment that is favourable to pluralism and receptive to input 
from society’s different groups. Optimal conditions are created by a common ‘Civil 
Society’ composed of different ethnic communities (Klinke & Renn 1997: 257). 
This guarantees a ‘civic culture’ for democratic stability (Almond & Verba 1989), 
with mutual respect and recognition (Shils 1991), and the appreciation of pluralism 
(Ghai 2000: 16). 
In Chapters 7 to 9 I argue that in Russia there are hindrances to the 
application of both international obligations on freedom of association (Article 7 
FCNM and 11 ECHR) and to the right to participation (Article 15 FCNM). In 
particular, Chapter 7 shows that international standards have a limited role in 
advancing the rights of Russian civil society associations - a role that is largely 
confined to mediation in internationally-sponsored events, and to the protection of 
the (negative) rights of associations, through non-interference in their operations.
448
 
The limitations of the role of international standards stem from the fact that Russian 
civil society operates in an environment that is, overall, unfavourable to its input in 
decision-making and in the implementation of programmes on minorities. Three 
main reasons are identified and addressed below. First, public discourse on 
minority issues - and, thus, dialogue between the state and civil society - is confined 
to themes that do not overstep pre-established boundaries, remaining in the realm of 
‘culture’ per se, rather than ‘cultural rights’ or ‘minority rights’. Second, the state’s 
approach to civil society rests on a limited receptiveness of civil society initiatives, 
and on essentially ad hoc, and therefore precarious, modalities of cooperation. 
Informal practices and political considerations are variable factors affecting the 
fortunes of civil society, in an environment where windows of opportunity appear 
                                                 
447
 These are analysed in chapters 8 and 9. 
448
 The latter stems from the jurisprudence under Article 11 ECHR. 
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and vanish ad hoc. Third, civil society is in a position of vulnerability, due to legal 
restrictions to its activities - with occasional direct infringements of the right to 
association - and a paucity of funds available to it. Hence, depending on the 
circumstances, the Russian authorities may respond to civil society’s activities on 
minority cultures in any of the following ways: though cooperation and support; 
with indifference and disinterest; or with the creation of obstacles by erecting walls 
around civil society activity.  
By the expression ‘civil society’ I mean Russia-based non-profit 
organisations, many of which are run by minorities themselves, that promote 
minority rights in Russia. In this chapter I also consider research institutes working 
on minority issues, both at the federal and regional levels. I exclude National 
Cultural Autonomies, which are analysed in Chapter 8; reference to National 
Cultural Autonomies is made in this chapter only with regard to funding.
449
 The 
interviews that provided data for this chapter were held with representatives of: 
minority NGOs (9), cultural associations (4), congresses of peoples (3), National 
Cultural Autonomies (2), human rights NGOs (7), academics (14) and public 
officials (7). 
 
7.1 The Boundaries of Public Discourse  
 
In this and the next two sections I examine the three factors listed above, inhibiting 
the potential impact of international standards on minority participation in shaping 
the nationality discourse. The first factor consists in the boundaries placed around 
this discourse by the Russian authorities. The interviews revealed a selective 
response by the authorities to issues raised by minorities, with a disinclination to 
                                                 
449
 Analysed in Section 7.3. 
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engage in ‘hard talk’450 - discussion on politically sensitive matters not fully aligned 
to the official position - or to deviate from consolidated patterns of approaching 
nationality issues. This has led to a public discourse on the cultural development of 
national minorities, rather than their rights. In a report to the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, this process has been called ‘folklorisation’ of 
minorities - a perception that minorities’ linguistic and cultural rights are 
approached as folklore.451  
In line with this approach, the Russian state typically encourages the 
celebration of diversity, yet in its archaic, frozen forms, with festivals celebrating 
national dances and customs - a form that bears little resemblance to minorities’ 
post-Soviet conditions. And, one may add, it is a form that is for the most part 
extinct, and therefore presents no threat to Russianness. Writing about Mordovia, 
Abramov traces the origins of ‘folklorisation’ to the Soviet period. In the 1960s, he 
writes, the teaching of the Mordovian languages in schools was abolished, with 
‘colossal harm’ for national culture in education, journalism and literature: 
 
[T]he national aspect, in essence, was limited only to folklore, which 
strengthened its primitive character and precluded the development into 
modern forms (2010: 121).452 
 
A respondent from Karelia, working on the promotion of the Karelian language in 
the republic, echoed this, saying that ‘language issues are mixed with folklore’ 
[1.2.2]; if the two issues were disaggregated, she suggested, it could lead to more 
nuanced (and effective) state policies on language teaching and language 
development. In one ethnic festival observed by the author,
453
 the participants 
declared their satisfaction at their freedom to express themselves through their 
                                                 
450
 The expression ‘hard talk’ is mine, and used to summarise the points made by the respondents. 
451
 PACE, Doc. 11087 (note 235). 
452
 Citation translated from the Russian by the author. 
453
 A Mordovian festival outside the Republic of Mordovia, June 2010. 
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national forms, primarily national music. The participants belonging to minorities 
celebrated their ‘wonderful neighbours’ - other nationalities with whom they had 
peacefully shared the same territory. The event was imbued with a theme 
supposedly unifying nationalities living in Russia but also with sentiments of 
‘Russian pride and patriotism’ derived from the ‘Great Patriotic War’.454 The party 
United Russia had flags scattered around the festival area.
455
  
Some respondents (civil society and academia) believed that celebration of 
minority cultures was superficial - a palliative not reaching underlying problems 
[1.2.1; 1.2.2; 1.2.9; 1.5.7; 4.14; 2.16]. Indeed, the specificities of cultural and 
linguistic rights tend to be left at the periphery of the minority rights discourse, and 
circumscribed to narratives of the coexistence of cultures and ‘tolerance’. At the 
opposite end of the spectrum is the flip-side of ‘tolerance’, ‘extremism’ (Osipov 
2010), which also enters the public discourse through official pronouncements 
featured in the media. The duality tolerance-extremism oversimplifies complexities 
relating to, for example, social integration, discrimination and stereotyping. It 
singles out a few problematic elements in society (the ‘extremists’) rather than 
highlighting patterns right across Russian society. In 2006 the Russian authorities 
reacted angrily to a report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms 
of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, that had 
found widespread discrimination against and harassment of certain, particularly 
disadvantaged, minorities - principally darker-skinned people, such as Central 
Asians, Caucasians and African immigrants.456 A representative of the Russian 
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 Several mentions of the Second World War were made at the event, as the year 2010 marked the 
65th anniversary of the Allies’ victory. 
455
 On United Russia, see Section 9.2. 
456
 See note 200. 
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authorities condemned the report and its ‘far-reaching conclusions […] based on 
unproven data and falsifications […]’.457    
This is not to say that folklore and ethnography are unimportant. On the 
contrary, their importance was stressed by some of the respondents. Karelians from 
the Republic of Karelia and from Tver noted that, after what they perceived as their 
ethnicity’s repression during the Soviet period,458 they were able to overcome 
feelings of shame about their ethnic origins, and find pride in their nationality, 
through festivals, as they enabled them to openly celebrate their cultural 
uniqueness. Tatars similarly noted the importance of celebrating traditional Tatar 
national holidays and festivals. The representative of an NGO and analyst believed 
that Russia’s support of festivals indicated the Russian government’s symbolic 
acceptance and respect for minorities [1.5.1]. Another respondent saw them as 
occasions for persons belonging to minority associations to bond and attract new 
recruits [1.2.1]. Yet the Russian authorities might be effectively instrumentalising 
these events and cultural programmes to channel nationalistic sentiments in a 
purely cultural direction. The focus on festivals can detract from opportunities to 
implement more profound, long-lasting changes - or from in-depth public 
discussions on legal reform likely to impact on minorities, such as Law 309.
459
 The 
respondents (civil society and academia) referred to other issues that do not 
commonly reach the public domain, including the low salaries of language teachers 
[1.2.2; 2.7], and the closure of ethnic schools on the grounds that they are not 
financially viable [1.2.2; 1.1.4; 2.5].
460
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 See note 201. 
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 The word ‘repression’ was used by Karelian respondents (academics) in Petrozavodsk and Tver 
[2.4; 2.5]. 
459
 See Chapter 6. 
460
 As noted (Section 6.1) this can leave students that had been studying in their national languages 
with no choice but to join schools with Russian-only education. 
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As an example, I reproduce an excerpt from an interview with a respondent 
from Karelia (a representative of a civil society organisation working on minority 
cultures), illustrating what she perceived to be the superficial approach of post-
Soviet nationalities policy:  
 
The [Karelian] Ministry on Nationality Policy
461
 doesn’t look for solutions 
to serious problems [...]. When you want to talk about things that are 
serious, they just don’t want to […]. For example, we talk about the 
publication of children’s books [in minority languages]. Already for years 
we have said that if we have a Finnish magazine for children, let’s also have 
one for Karelians and Veps, or otherwise divide the money available in 
equal parts. Nothing happened. One starts getting tired by how difficult it is. 
But the money is there for events [festivals] […] [these events] are empty of 
meaning […]. They need to go much deeper. [1.2.1] 
 
Similarly, another respondent belonging to the same category said: ‘When we want 
to discuss something serious it is avoided by the authorities’ [1.2.2]. Issues such as 
the one raised by the first respondent (minority language publications) relate to 
non-political, cultural matters, but they may be vulnerable to marginalisation if they 
do not correspond to the local authorities’ priorities and consolidated modalities of 
approaching nationality issues. A Mordovian academic and activist observed that 
the beneficial effects of festivals, noted above, could be achieved with much fewer 
events so that other activities could be more adequately funded [2.14].
462 
His 
interpretation was that the Russian authorities had made festivals the centrepiece of 
their nationality programmes as they were relatively easy to organise, allowing 
them to demonstrate a commitment to a multi-ethnic country without engaging in 
complex, wide-ranging reforms for the accommodation of minorities. This 
interpretation fits with the theory of Russia pursuing stability through an all-
encompassing Russian patriotic idea rather than the promotion of diversity - while 
                                                 
461
 The full name is Ministry of the Republic of Karelia on Issues of Nationalities Policy and 
Relations with Religious Associations. 
462
 None of the respondents from civil society had been involved in decision-making on the use of 
government funds, or participated in targeted discussions on this issue. Minority organisations may 
submit project proposals that may or may not be approved by the authorities. See Section 7.3. 
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also maintaining the (superficial) image of a multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-
faith country. Meanwhile, the tendency to folklorisation and the superficiality of the 
minority discourse was found by some respondents to hamper their activities and 
cooperation with the authorities. Restricting the scope of debate to an emolliative 
language on cultural programmes limits the options for minority needs (as rights) to 
be articulated and taken into account in policy-making. A respondent from a 
minority NGO in St Petersburg said: 
 
I must say that they [the authorities] prefer to make beautiful things. Like 
different folkloral festivals for example. Something you can show. We did 
something good [that fits into this framework]: an [itinerant] museum, 
moving from place to place, for Finno-Ugric people from the region. But I 
think the main problem for us is losing our national identity and most 
importantly losing our language. [1.2.8] 
 
 
This respondent implied that the state’s preconceptions over the formats of cultural 
programmes for national minorities forced his organisation to reformulate its 
priorities. While overall satisfied with the itinerant museum, this initiative had not 
assisted the minority NGO with what it identified as the ethnic group’s primary 
concern - that of the loss of its linguistic identity. 
 
7.2 Civil Society and the Authorities: Working Together, 
Sometimes 
 
A second hindrance to the application of international standards on minority 
participation can be found in the over-reliance on personal networks that 
characterises the cooperation between the Russian authorities and civil society. 
While these networks may benefit minorities, their regulation remains undefined, 
impeding the application of international standards - particularly the principle that 
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the needs of minorities should be taken into account prior to decision-making 
affecting them.
463
  
 Civil society and the state can be mutually reinforcing. Respondents from 
civil society saw support from and cooperation with the authorities as a 
fundamental vehicle for the success of their activities. One activist working on the 
education of children of a national minority described the importance of 
cooperation in this way: ‘there is no point in producing educational materials that 
will not be institutionalised [and therefore remain unused]’ [4.14]. In turn, the state, 
given its finite resources, can benefit from civil society. In the ethnic republics 
visited, the state had outsourced grammar books for the teaching of minority 
languages and financed Sunday schools and adult education classes on minority 
languages, as well as events such as the traditional Tatar festival Sabantui. Such 
events were all organised by minority associations. The respondents from the ‘civil 
society’ category (in Petrozavodsk, Saransk and Voronezh) noted that in some such 
cases they had forged fruitful cooperation with the authorities, primarily at the local 
level - perhaps due to the distance from the ‘core’ policies formulated in Moscow - 
allowing them to further their interests [1.1.1; 1.1.2; 1.2.6; 1.2.9; 1.3.1; 1.3.2; 
1.4.3]. Civil society’s most significant contribution is where it complements, and 
sometimes substitutes, state programmes. Among the respondents were 
representatives of organisations that: acted as focal points for other minority 
organisations and groups, facilitating joint activities; engaged in capacity-building 
of younger organisations; provided training for activists (on human rights in 
Russian and international law); trained law-enforcement officers or public officials 
on minority issues; provided legal advice and representation in court to minorities, 
particularly in discrimination cases; provided fora for discussion for representatives 
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 This is linked to effective participation. See Section 8.1 and Chapter 9. 
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of government and civil society, including minority groups, to promote dialogue 
and joint problem-solving. The respondents also cited cases in which the Russian 
authorities had solicited input from civil society specialists and academics in the 
formulation of policies. An example from Tatarstan concerned an active exchange 
in the preparation of federal educational standards for primary schools. A 
representative of the Institute of History of Tatarstan’s Academy of Sciences noted 
in an interview that the Institute had been consulted by the federal Ministry of 
Education throughout the entire process. [2.7]. In Karelia, one of the respondents, 
an academic in Petrozavodsk, was among the drafters of a nationalities policy for 
the republic [2.4].  
Analysts interviewed saw as an essential ingredient for cooperation between 
civil society and the authorities - and for furthering minority rights generally - the 
maintenance of good relations between them [1.5.1; 2.14; 2.15; 2.17; 2.19]. Indeed, 
most respondents of the ‘civil society’ category had sought cooperation rather than 
confrontation or lobbying, and had relied on personal networks. The drawback of 
such informal arrangements is that much is left to the discretion of the local 
authorities, or even individual public officials - and the commitment of local 
authorities was sometimes found to be wanting by the respondents. They cited 
varying levels of commitment and support in different cities or regions; or even at 
different times in the same region, as a supportive public official’s position could 
be left vacant, through personnel cuts or internal restructuring,464 or occupied by a 
person with different priorities. A respondent from a minority NGO in St 
Petersburg said: 
 
                                                 
464
 A respondent said that, shortly before the interview, the Ministry of Education of Karelia had lost 
a committed public official, who had been active in the area of minority education for Karelians and 
Veps [1.2.1].  
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Any level of the administration […] depends on the public officials. And 
also on their position, and whether a particular position exists. Before there 
was no department on nationality issues [in St Petersburg], then a public 
official requested it, and they created it […]. Some of the work is decorative 
but we still managed to do important things [with the new department], like 
new publications. [1.2.9] 
 
Some respondents believed that regional imperatives also influence performance. 
The director of a minority NGO in Karelia said that ‘all authorities have their own 
priorities’ [1.2.1]. She particularly saw as problematic what she believed was an 
attitude of indifference often displayed by the authorities. With regard to the 
teaching of minority language, she said:  
 
If there wasn’t a group of activists nobody would do anything. The state 
doesn’t take the initiative. [An NGO] started to prepare materials [for 
schools]. Then they distribute them. And the authorities never admitted that 
this type of materials has to be provided [by the state] by law. Instead [the 
NGO] takes the materials to schools, and, if the local authorities are not 
against, they can be used […]. The federal authorities are completely 
uninterested. [1.2.1]
465
 
 
Practical considerations also come into play: for example, cities tend to have more 
funds than rural areas. A respondent, an academic and Tatar activist from Kazan, 
summarised the situation as follows:  
 
The authorities have things that they absolutely must do, and things that 
they can do if they wish to. Nationality issues are in the second category, 
they are optional. [2.6] 
 
Similarly, another respondent, the director of an NGO working on inter-ethnic 
relations in Moscow, believed that interest in and commitment to international 
standards depended on individual public officials and institutions. Even allowing 
for exaggeration from some of the respondents, the absence of precise programmes 
                                                 
465
 The government of Karelia does provide materials for the study of minority languages free of 
charge, but these were deemed to be insufficient by the respondent. A school employee in Karelia 
noted that her school had to make do on the limited resources available [5.1]. 
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for the preservation of minority cultures point to a volatility of these initiatives. 
Meanwhile, the vertical system of appointment that has replaced elections
466
 has led 
to a situation where local authorities have a higher degree of accountability to their 
superiors than to the public. According to Russian civil society organisations that 
authored the 2006 Shadow Report to the ACFC, in the period 2004-2006 contacts 
between minority NGOs and federal ministries were only sporadic, with ‘no overall 
cooperation’.467 
While establishing optimal mechanisms for representation is certainly a 
challenge everywhere,
468
 in Russia the Soviet legacy of centralisation has led to the 
marginalisation of bottom-up initiatives. The Soviet Union hinged on hyper-
centralism - hardly a likely precursor to participatory democracy. A Tatar scholar 
interviewed in Kazan expressed the following opinion during an interview:  
 
During the Socialist period all was based on collectivisation [...]. All private 
life was controlled, people lived off what came from above […]. The first 
secretary [of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] was a Tatar, 
with the second secretary a Russian, who was there to control him. The 
centre established all. [2.6]  
 
The interviews included no questions on the Soviet period, but the respondent 
introduced the theme to emphasise the origins of centralised, top-down decision-
making, while also noting restricted regional autonomy vis-à-vis Moscow. In post-
Soviet Russia, Putin’s power vertical, by centralising decision-making and 
favouring appointments over elections, has created a system that limits entry points 
for civil society in decision-making. This was emphasised by an activist from 
Karelia, who believed that opportunities for campaigning and consultation had 
                                                 
466
 See Section 5.2. 
467
 Shadow Report ‘On the Implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities by the Russian Federation’, February 2006, § 348, and ACFC, (Second) 
Opinion on Russia (note 133), § 90. The ACFC, in the Second Opinion, added that advisory councils 
‘are expected to implement rather than contribute to the preparation of minority-relevant legislation’ 
(§ 90). 
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 See, for example, Phillips (1991). 
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decreased with the consolidation of Putin’s power [1.2.1]. Indeed, many 
achievements in the area of minority rights, such as the opening of schools in 
national languages, were secured immediately following the Soviet Union’s 
collapse. In some, more recent, cases, even concerted action, along with substantial 
numbers and the influence of lobbyists, have not borne fruit (as in the case of Law 
309
469
). With activists restricted in their scope of action, a highly centralised 
political system has discouraged grassroots initiative, leading to inertia, as 
suggested by Konuykhov: 
 
The leading role of the state shaping virtually all life aspects of ethnicities 
has, possibly, formed a paternalistic and latent model of interaction. Their 
paternalistic pattern of interaction brings inertia in the ethno-state 
development, constraints a search for new forms of interaction between 
people and authorities. Paternalism is typical for all the society in Russia 
today […] (2009: 93).470  
 
Interview data and secondary sources
471
 indicate that the marginalisation and 
limited impact of civil society in the area of minority rights does not tend to be 
linked to the direct repression of organisations, although intimidation may also play 
a role in shaping state-civil society relations.
472
 Rather, problems identified were: 
the already mentioned indifference by the authorities to minority issues in some 
instances; and approaches to nationality issues that reproduce Soviet models. In the 
latter case, cultural programmes for minorities, at both the federal and regional 
levels, continue to repeat existing blueprints. It results in the perpetuation of the 
nationality programmes in line with notions first conceptualised in the Soviet 
period, with a strong folkloristic slant. Whether new approaches are introduced 
appears to depend on individual public officials or institutions, and to be 
                                                 
469
 See Chapter 6. 
470
 This is reinforced by a centralised taxation system. See also Section 5.2. 
471
 ACFC Opinions and Shadow Report submitted to the ACFC, 2006 (note 467). 
472
 See Section 7.3. 
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circumstantial. For example, a shift was noted in St Petersburg by one of the 
respondents, from a minority NGO:  
 
Two years ago nationality issues were seen as just festivals. Now there are 
new public officials [in St Petersburg] and with them we work on a different 
level. The discussion is not only on the preservation of [minority] cultures, 
but also on ethnic identity. This is a new understanding of ‘culture’ […]. It’s 
good that these public officials came, it all depends on them [...].  Before 
national issues only meant music groups [playing traditional music], but 
now it’s also education, publications, etc. This new situation has created 
new conflicts [between the public officials with a more traditional outlook 
and civil society] […]. [The former] try to get their festivals, civil society 
wants to have conferences, education. 
 
But I am happy that things have changed. Before nationalities were like 
exotic animals in a zoo. Some public officials just say: ‘I love Veps, 
beautiful costumes, tasty pies’, and nationalities only mean this to them. 
They don’t realise that nationalities have their own unique mythology and 
much else. [1.2.9]
473 
 
 
She placed the St Petersburg House of Nationalities among the more traditional 
institutions for the promotion of nationalities programmes: 
 
The [St Petersburg] House of Nationalities is the typical Soviet institution… 
it’s Soviet in style. They mostly focus on festivals. The House wants to have 
festivals with a lot of different nationalities. Their message with these 
events is ‘Look how many nationalities we have!’ [1.2.9] 
 
Another respondent from St Petersburg, representative of a different minority 
agreed:  
 
A: The House of Nationalities tries [to be helpful] but [its approach] is 
losing touch with the times.
474
 It’s not the work, but the format of their 
work. Mostly it is the way it was in the past. There is a certain conservatism. 
Q: Is it ‘Soviet’ in style? 
A: Something like that. [1.2.11] 
 
                                                 
473
 This respondent was the only one who spoke about a new emphasis on education rather than 
folklore on the part of public officials. 
474
 The respondent used the expression ‘it is getting old’ (staraetsiya). 
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These respondents, then, complained of a trivialisation of their minority status, and 
of a simplification of the nationality discourse - with institutions such as the House 
of Nationalities unable to meet existing challenges. They saw a tendency by the 
authorities to default to pre-established modalities of interaction with civil society. 
Transcending, by modernising, these dynamics depends on public officials, as the 
state ‘nationalities policy’ consists in a general set of principles devoid of concrete 
targets.
475
 The open-endedness of nationalities policy can facilitate flexible 
arrangements, meeting the particular needs of minorities, but also exempt public 
officials from specific responsibilities. It can only result in a varied (and 
unpredictable) level of consultation. 
 
Consultation: Varied Impact 
The respondents (academics and civil society alike) referred to Law 309, amending 
the Law ‘On Education’,476 as the principal example of reform affecting the cultural 
rights of minorities that excluded minorities from consultation. Those respondents 
who said they had been excluded from public debate on legal reform encompassed 
representatives of minorities working for specialised bodies. These were: a section 
of the Ministry of Education [4.14], the Kazan’s Institute of History of the 
Academy of Science of the Republic of Tatarstan [2.7], and a Federal National 
Cultural Autonomy [1.1.6]. The adoption of Law 309 led to an extraordinary 
response, with numerous nationalities and their representative bodies protesting in 
unison. Among the most influential figures opposed to it was former Tatar 
President Mintimer Shaimiev.
477
 Yet the results were not what the campaigners had 
hoped for: 
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 As in the Concept of State Nationalities Policy of the Russian Federation (note 210). 
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 See Chapter 6. 
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 Lobjakas, A. 23-4-2009. ‘Apparently Russia Needs Just One ‘National Component’’, Radio Free 
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At first we thought that Law 309 might be repealed quickly, or at least that 
there could be amendments, but it hasn’t happened […]. All agree that the 
law is bad and there was a lot of noise, but there was no positive response 
from the authorities. [2.7]  
 
The absence of public discussions and the swiftness of the law’s adoption, noted by 
the respondents working in the area of minority education [2.7; 4.7; 4.14] generated 
widespread concern among minorities. This reaction appears disproportionate when 
compared to the actual impact of the law, whose practical application, by 2011, had 
remained marginal.478 Yet a scarcity of information fuelled suspicions and feelings 
of uncertainty among Russia’s minorities.   
Other specialists (academics and members of advisory committees on 
nationality issues) similarly noted difficulties in inputting into decision-making. It 
was only one respondent in Karelia who said that the local authorities took 
stakeholders’ (minorities’) opinions into account in decision-making - the 
representative of a quasi-state institution, the Centre of National Cultures in 
Petrozavodsk [1.3.2]. Other civil society representatives noted that the discussions 
were ‘useful’, without referring to possible impacts on decision-making [1.1.1; 
1.1.5; 1.2.5; 1.2.6; 1.2.7] - with a few exceptions noted below.  The disparity 
between respondents who felt excluded and those who felt included might be 
explained through the respondents’ differing interpretations of participation in 
decision-making and the format of stakeholders’ input. The civil society 
representatives who saw impediments to their contribution to decision-making 
referred to specific issues, such as minority education [1.2.1; 1.2.2]; those who 
found discussions satisfactory, or partially so, referred to the promotion of minority 
                                                                                                                                        
Europe/Radio Liberty. 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Apparently_Russia_Needs_Just_One_National_Component/1614655.h
tml (accessed 12-4-2011). 
478
 Mostly due to a lack of clarity as to the modalities of implementation and as to the schools’ new 
responsibilities. 
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cultures and tolerance generally. While both aims correspond to FCNM principles, 
the latter is more closely aligned with an official Russian discourse on nationality 
issues based on general notions of ‘tolerance’, rather than singling out specific 
issues - for example in the spheres of education and participation. In sum, the more 
satisfied minority representatives might be those who do not hit the invisible 
boundaries of minority activism. 
Despite this, respondents provided some examples of minorities’ 
participation in decision-making affecting them. In Karelia, respondents cited the 
opening of Karelian-language nurseries, following a petition organised by local 
civil society activists [1.3.2]. A respondent from the Centre of National Cultures in 
Petrozavodsk stated that the institution was itself opened as a result of public calls 
for it, which won the support of the government of the Republic of Karelia [1.3.1]. 
The representative of the House of Nationalities in Moscow had a similar story over 
the establishment of the institution [1.3.4]. Another example in Karelia was the 
granting of the status of ‘indigenous people’ to the Veps minority479 [1.2.1], a long 
and somewhat tortuous journey to that had lasted 20 years (1987-2007). A few 
thoughts should be added here. First, none of these claims was of a political, 
controversial nature (with the exception, perhaps, of the status of indigenous people 
for the Veps minority). Second, none of them required wide-ranging reforms, while 
there have been no cases of successful campaigns for administrative or legal 
reform.
480
 Third, results might not be long-lasting. The Karelian-language 
nurseries, referred to above, were subsequently closed.
481
 Newly-established 
institutions might also function poorly. In the case of new schools or courses 
teaching minority languages, a respondent referred to scarce resources in terms of 
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 One of the three autochthonous minorities of Karelia, together with Karelians and Finns. 
480
 As noted, protests against Law 309 did not lead to the amendment of the relevant provisions. See 
Section 6.1. 
481
 See Section 6.1. 
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materials and teachers [1.4.2]. In the case of Houses of Nationalities, respondents 
(representatives of minorities and NGOs), while valuing their existence and 
support, noted their limited impact [1.2.4; 1.2.5; 1.2.11]. In other words, such 
concessions might not lead to a net improvement in the enjoyment of minorities’ 
cultural rights.  
Opportunities for minorities to input in decision-making can be further 
reduced, in some cases, by the fragmentation of minority bodies. Two analysts in 
Moscow pointed to the fact that nationalities rarely build bridges for concerted 
action [2.17; 2.18]. At the same time, institutions representing minorities 
proliferate.482 Although some groups with common affiliations do join forces, as in 
the case of the overarching Association of Finno-Ugric Peoples, competition and 
collisions also exist. During the interviews there were innumerable references to 
these tensions: by analysts and observers; and directly by representatives of 
minority organisations, who expressed hostility towards other stakeholders 
(including persons belonging to the same minority). In some cases tensions were 
observed between organisations that cultivated good relations with the authorities 
and those that distanced themselves from the establishment and were more openly 
critical. Some respondents also saw opportunism on the part of some persons 
belonging to minorities. For example, the representative of a minority organisation 
in Moscow referred with contempt to another, larger organisation representing the 
same minority, whose head had substantial business interests. In the opinion of the 
respondent, his counterpart used the minority organisation simply as a means to 
promote himself [1.2.4].
483
 Fragmentation resulting from in-group tensions 
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 In at least one case, from Tatarstan, a splinter organisation separated from the ‘mother’ 
organisation. See also Chapter 8.3 on the fragmentation of minority institutions. 
483
 See also Section 8.2. 
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complicates any consideration of the needs of minorities by the authorities, with a 
proliferation of interlocutors. 
Some respondents mentioned written appeals to the authorities as the most 
appropriate way for civil society to put forth their claims [1.2.1; 2.6; 4.14]. The 
prime minister and president of Russia, seen as the true holders of power, are the 
primary targets. A respondent summarised the situation as such: decisions (on 
education programmes in this case) are taken by the presidential administration; 
writing to the President is, therefore, ‘the only hope that something will change’ 
[4.14]. This attitude reveals an absence of trust in consultation, or in lobbying 
institutions such as Committee of the State Duma on Nationality Affairs, as, in this 
respondent’s view, it had no influence. The highest echelons of power are seen as 
the only hope - but also a very remote hope given the respondents had received no 
replies to their appeals. The view of the president (or prime minister) as the ‘only 
hope’ mirrors a pattern already seen, for example, in the case of a conflict on the 
payment of wages in a factory in Pikalevo.
484
 It led to the workers’ representatives 
calling on Prime Minister Putin to intervene directly as only he, they believed, 
could solve the impasse. Putin was implicitly likened to the ‘good leader’ (dobryi 
tsar), intervening to restore order among recalcitrant public officials
485
 - akin to a 
benevolent tsar’s intercession. Even those who are less in awe of Putin and 
Medvedev recognise the power of the duo. Putin has reinforced the perceptions of 
‘good leader’, for example by establishing a channel of communication with 
particular members of the public during his annual (since 2000) televised question-
and-answer session. He has provided an immediate resolution of, or final say on, 
                                                 
484
 Among the many articles on this issue, see, for example, Zarakhovich, Y. 9-6-2009. ‘Putin 
Resolves Protest in Pikalevo’, Eurasia Daily Monitor. 
http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12076&Itemid=68 
(accessed 5-1-2011). 
485
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the issues raised during the programme.
486
 This is an informal practice, and a way 
of circumventing ordinary systems par excellence. It consolidates the perception 
that networks are the way forward, while systems are unreliable.  In line with this, 
the respondents saw contacts and networks as prerequisites for impact - although 
the fact that some well-connected minority activists also complained of the minimal 
impact of their activities indicates that networks are a necessary, but not a 
sufficient, condition for it. The cumulative effect of the unreliability of systems for 
cooperation, the volatility of public officials’ support, and the reliance on personal 
and local circumstances, offers barren ground for the application of international 
standards in the area of consultation.   
 
7.3 Civil Society’s Vulnerability  
 
The last section of this chapter discusses another hindrance to the application of 
international standards on participation: civil society’s vulnerability vis-à-vis the 
authorities. Two main sources of vulnerability are identified: possible direct 
interference in the right to freedom of association, and the limited availability of 
funds for civil society. The right to association, as for other principles of 
international law, can be applied selectively in Russia. This right, protected at 
Articles 7 FCNM and 11 ECHR, is itself not absolute, and can be subjected to 
restrictions. These are not detailed in Article 7 FCNM, but those limitations listed 
in Article 11(2) ECHR are applied.
487
 The resulting intersection of the ECHR and 
FCNM is justified by the FCNM’s travaux préparatoires and its Article 19488 and 
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Article 23489 - which strongly indicate that the rights protected in Article 7 FCNM 
are analogous to those protected in Article 11 ECHR. Not itself a minority rights 
instrument, the ECHR nevertheless crystallises the minimum standards of freedom 
of association, which can of course be applied to minority groups. Similarly, the 
FCNM’s restrictions cannot go beyond those of the ECHR, as detailed in ECtHR 
jurisprudence (Machnyikova 2005: 128-9; 202). Member states have a margin of 
appreciation in ECHR implementation,
490
 and a state should develop its own modus 
operandi to guarantee the right to participation. Yet, as per Article 11(2) ECHR, 
restrictions must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’, and proportional to a 
legitimate aim pursued.491 Selective implementation occurs when a state oversteps 
the boundaries of these legitimate restrictions to further limit the right. 
While in the other cases described in this thesis Russian law does not come 
into direct conflict with international standards - rather, it tends to be vague and 
declarative, and to have limited enforcement - in the case of the right of association 
such a conflict does arise. General guarantees of freedom of association can be 
found in the Russian Constitution’s Article 30, but legislation on NGOs, 
particularly following amendments in 2006,492 permits wide-ranging controls on the 
activities of civil society and their receipt of foreign funds.493 Russia’s regulations 
on registration have also been applied selectively, as in the arbitrary non-
                                                                                                                                        
The Parties undertake to respect and implement the principles enshrined in the present framework 
Convention making, where necessary, only those limitations, restrictions or derogations which are 
provided for in international legal instruments, in particular the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in so far as they are relevant to the rights and freedoms 
flowing from the said principles. 
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491
 See Manoussakis and Others v Greece, Application No. 18748/91, 26 September 1996, § 44; and 
ACFC, (Second) Opinion on Russia (note 133), § 163.  
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registration of certain groups. Relevant ECtHR case-law on Russia includes: 
Presidential Party of Mordovia v Russia;
494
 Vatan v Russia;
495
 and three cases in 
which re-registration of organisations was denied: Moscow Branch of the Salvation 
Army v Russia,496 Church of Scientology Moscow v Russia
497
 and Jehovah’s 
Witnesses of Moscow v Russia.
498
 In the last case, the ECtHR ruled that the denial 
of re-registration had ‘no legal basis’, given that the Jehova’s Witnesses institution 
in question had presented the required documents on several occasions.
499
 In 
practice, the Russian authorities have had the discretion to deny permission to 
establish certain organisations. Civil society representatives who authored the 2006 
Shadow Report to the ACFC on Russia argued that obstacles to registration arose 
when the ‘authorities [we]re not comfortable with an association’.500 On some 
occasions, registration has been denied for administrative reasons - minutiae such 
as imprecisions in ‘founding documents’ (i.e. data on founders).501 Additionally, the 
law permits the suspension of activities or closure of an NGO by court order when 
it repeatedly violates the law or its activities are ‘contrary to the charter goals’.502 In 
these cases, Russian courts assess whether an organisation’s activities fully 
correspond to what is stated in the objectives of the organisation’s own charter, 
rather than examining the potential threat to society of the organisation’s activities 
themselves, and whether banning them is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ - as 
per Article 11(2) ECHR. Meanwhile, Russian legislation includes overly-general 
provisions left open to elastic interpretation which might be used to threaten an 
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organisation.503 A respondent, a public official and Tatar activist in Kazan, 
commented on the authorities’ powers on civil society: 
 
They can always find something wrong with you [your organisation] if they 
want. It could just be something like fire regulations. In Russia you don’t 
violate the law only if you’re dead. [4.7] 
 
Overall, issues of registration, arbitrary closure and obstacles to free association 
have rarely affected minority groups,504 and a number of organisations have 
succeeded in pursuing their projects while maintaining amicable relations with the 
authorities. The low number of cases of disbandment of minority organisations 
might be linked to the fact that their activities remain in the cultural sphere, without 
raising politically controversial issues. This can indicate: an organisational choice 
and a lack of interest in becoming politically involved; the existence of a 
(government-supported) gulf between the cultural and political spheres in the 
activities of minority groups; a possible ‘chilling effect’ on minority organisations 
by the mere existence of punishing provisions; and the preference for informal 
practices in raising claims, rather than confrontation or even open and frank 
discussions. 
A respondent, the leader of a minority institution in Kazan, referred to 
another possible means to eliminate minority organisations’ political threats, 
involving informal, covert practices. He believed that Russia’s Federal Security 
Service (FSB) was ‘very active’ in scrutinising minority organisations’ operations 
[1.4.2]. Similarly, the Shadow Report to the ACFC refers to FSB’s ‘warnings’ to 
                                                 
503
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intimidate organisations, including minority groups.505 The representative of a 
minority in St Petersburg referred to a different type of surveillance:  
 
There is some freedom in working on nationality issues, but in this freedom 
one is also under control. There is a feeling that you need to regulate 
nationalities. This is why there are institutions like the Houses of 
Nationalities. If all [nationalities] worked separately it would be difficult [to 
monitor them], but if you gather them all in the same place, then all is in 
front of your eyes, all can be seen. [1.2.11]
506
 
 
To conclude, civil society’s scope of action is restricted by a need to maintain good 
relations with the authorities, and by legal uncertainty - the threat of possible abuse 
of legal and administrative provisions by the authorities. The perception is that in 
Russia ‘nobody is safe’, as one respondent was cited as saying earlier [6.3 - Chapter 
3]. Meanwhile, the last two cited respondents felt that there was a governmental 
effort to control (regulate) minority organisations, through overt or covert means. 
Institutions that should supposedly aid pluralism and participation, such as Houses 
of Nationality, might effectively end up as agents of control. A final source of 
vulnerability relates to funding. 
 
Funding Pains 
The adoption of the Law on National Cultural 
Authority raised expectations of state financial 
support [for minority organisations]. We quickly 
came to the understanding that there would be no 
such support.
507
 
 
Programmes to preserve a country’s cultural and linguistic diversity require 
investment on the part of the state. In its reports to the ACFC, Russia has 
                                                 
505
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emphasised that substantial funds have been made available for cultural 
programmes of national minorities.508 Despite this, respondents of the various ‘civil 
society’ categories reported operational difficulties linked to funding. The issues 
raised can be grouped into two main areas, relating to funds originating from the 
Russian state and non-state funds. In the case of state funds, the issues related to 
their limited availability, and to the limited autonomy in the management of funds. 
In the case of non-state funds the main issue concerned impediments to their free 
use, particularly in the case of foreign donors. The two types of funding are 
analysed below.   
With regard to state funding, the ACFC has recommended that 
representatives of national minorities participate in decision-making over the 
allocation of financial resources, including through a ‘greater portion’ of the 
available funds being ‘managed directly’ by NCAs and other associations.509 The 
issue of limited finances was raised by numerous respondents. In the case of NCAs, 
only miniscule resources are allocated to them (Osipov 2004): the bigger NCAs 
interviewed reported that they operated primarily through funds from sponsors 
rather than from the government.
510
 Other respondents reported working without 
payment for some activities [1.2.3; 1.2.4], and developing strategies to minimise 
costs. For example, a respondent described expenditure as such: the members of his 
organisation were volunteers, thereby incurring no salary costs; their expenses only 
related to venue rental at events or printing costs for publications, as a rent-free 
venue for events was normally provided by the Moscow House of Nationalities; the 
House of Nationalities further provided some financial help for events; other costs 
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were covered by the organisers’ own funds and by ad hoc sponsors. He added that 
‘the rest is taken care of by our enthusiasm’ [1.2.4]. Yet the ACFC has 
recommended not a greater amount of funds to be made available to minorities, but 
rather greater minority participation in decision-making on funding allocation, as 
well as autonomy in the management of funds.  
I subdivide the state funds into three categories. The first category includes 
funds managed by the authorities themselves, for centrally-conceived and centrally-
managed programmes. Among these are events organised by the (Federal) Ministry 
of Regional Development - for example, 65 events in 2008, including youth 
forums, festivals, youth camps, conferences - and sociological studies on inter-
ethnic relations and extremism.511 Second, funds are allocated to certain institutions 
in receipt of regular state contributions, primarily through the budgets of the 
republics.
512
 The main targets of federal funds have been cultural institutions: the 
already-cited Centres of National Cultures (i.e. in Petrozavodsk), Houses of 
Nationalities (Moscow and St Petersburg), or similar.
513
 These are effectively semi-
official institutions, affiliated to, as well as funded by, regional or local 
government. Their function is to coordinate local activities and events, and provide 
fora for discussions, as well as venues for events and activities organised by 
minority organisations.514 Other organisations in receipt of federal funds, whose 
representatives were interviewed, included the Inter-regional Social Movement of 
Mordovian (Moksha and Erzya) Peoples [1.4.3]; and regional minority media, such 
as Moksha and Erzya-language newspapers published in Saransk [3.3; 3.5]. These 
respondents reported the continued receipt of state support, even though in modest 
amounts, despite the global financial crisis from 2008 onwards.  
                                                 
511
 ACFC, (Third) Report submitted by Russia (note 132), p. 33. 
512
 Article 16, Law No. 74-FZ of 17 June 1996  ‘On National Cultural Autonomy’. See Chapter 8. 
513
 ACFC, (Second) Opinion on Russia (note 133), § 80. 
514
 According to a respondent in Moscow, the Moscow House of Nationalities provided small sums 
of money to the groups loosely affiliated with it - mostly minority NGOs or NCAs. 
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Third, alongside those institutions in receipt of regular funding are other 
organisations that apply for funding from the authorities for individual projects - at 
the local, regional or federal levels. The modalities of funding allocation vary from 
region to region in the case of local and regional, rather than federal, funds.515 The 
grantees in some cases reported continuity in the inflow of funds - with regular 
funding applications followed by regular awards [1.3.5; 1.1.2]. This suggests the 
building of a relationship of cooperation between the authorities and the grantees. It 
could simultaneously mean the marginalisation of organisations that have not 
developed the needed contacts and networks. In Tver, for example, a public official 
in the local administration stated that, on the one hand, the choice of winning 
projects was made by assessing the quality of the proposed projects, rather than the 
organisations per se; on the other, organisations registered for less than a year were 
automatically excluded from competition. This was justified by the need to 
eliminate from the selection process those organisations that exist only on paper (in 
the interview referred to as ‘dead organisations’) [4.6]. Indeed, respondents across 
different categories noted the volatility of organisations - many of which appeared 
and, shortly after, disappeared, for reasons including both external factors (paucity 
of funds and bureaucratic difficulties) and the organisations’ internal weaknesses 
(inadequate management skills and human resources). In Tver, the representative of 
an (established) organisation commented that the exclusion of young organisations 
from competition prevented them from developing [2.5]. 
Even in the case of sustained financial support, the respondents referred to 
bureaucratic hurdles that impeded the smooth unfolding of civil society 
programmes. I provide three examples to show how cases can vary: from Tver, 
Mordovia and St Petersburg. In Tver, a respondent described the local funding 
                                                 
515
 There are also discrepancies in the amount of funds for nationality programmes in different 
regions. ACFC, (Second) Opinion on Russia (note 133), § 83.  
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cycle thus: a funding application is submitted at the beginning of the year; in May-
June the applicant learns the outcome of the funding proposal; if successful, the 
funds become available no earlier than July; the grant’s financial report has to be 
prepared in December, before compiling and submitting another application early 
in the following year [2.5]. There was no option of fundraising for a multiple-phase 
project, running over a year. The respondent, who managed a newspaper in 
Karelian language, said in May 2010: 
 
We got a grant this year but we still don’t have the money. We used to get a 
salary automatically every year for the newspaper, now we have to apply 
every year for a grant. [With the old system] the newspaper used to come 
out six times a year, now only twice a year, because we have fewer funds 
and they are not regular. [This system] is fine for festivals, they can be 
organised any time [of the year]. But it’s harder for the newspaper, which 
has to come out at regular intervals […]. The money has to be spent in just a 
few months. We try to have a newspaper come out in the summer, which is 
prepared very quickly, and another around November. [2.5] 
 
A public official responsible for the management of grants in Tver explained in an 
interview that, under Russian regulations, the regional authorities, in providing 
funds, need to follow the calendar year (January to December): administrative 
procedures, as well as project implementation, have to be completed within this 
timeframe [4.6]. The regions with fewer human and administrative resources are 
then likely to be more susceptible to delays that constrain the grantees’ activities. In 
Mordovia, greater expediency was reported by a grantee, with a call for proposals 
in September, results in mid-December and the possibility of starting a project in 
January [1.3.5]. In St Petersburg, a respondent from a minority organisation noted a 
local relaxation of bureaucratic requirements which led to her organisation’s 
receipt, in early 2010, of a long-term (two years) grant. Increased flexibility, with 
the removal of the rigid one-year timeframe, she said, allowed the organisation to 
expand its activities, and publish books for dissemination among local schools - 
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which she saw as an organisational priority. However, she noted that financial 
uncertainties would re-emerge when the two years elapsed [1.2.9].  
In another case, a Karelian respondent talked about funds that were 
promised but never delivered: 
 
We worked on the preparation of a programme [...]. The [Karelian] Ministry 
agreed that a budget would be allocated to the project […] but didn’t try to 
actually get the money, because they had other priorities, for other projects 
[...]. For three years we didn’t get the three millions roubles [promised] [...]. 
We wrote many times, met many times, but never received the money. 
[1.2.1] 
 
The respondent, the director of a minority NGO in Petrozavodsk, sat on Karelian 
and Russia-wide advisory bodies for the protection of Finno-Ugric cultures, and 
participated in events organised by the local authorities; she was therefore well-
placed to cultivate good relations with the regional authorities.  
There is little available data to verify the actual delivery of promised or 
earmarked funds. The figures indicated in Russia’s reports to the ACFC appear 
substantial, but are not accompanied by a detailed breakdown. Governmental data 
are insufficient to: quantify the financial support to minority groups; analyse what 
groups are awarded grants; and what types of projects are funded. What the data, 
including reports to the ACFC, clearly indicate is a high and recurring prominence 
of cultural programmes including festivals and ‘programmes on tolerance’, 
reflecting a centrally-conceived notion of cultural programmes for nationalities. 
Hence, centralised decision-making affects: funds allocated to the authorities’ own 
projects; and the allocation of grants to minority organisations themselves, as grants 
are approved by the authorities. In the second case, a respondent from a minority 
NGO in St Petersburg believed that the awarding of grants was linked to a certain 
type of performance, rather than simply the organisations’ levels of 
professionalism: 
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There is no obligation on the authorities to finance our activities, and if we 
are good, if we are quiet, maybe they will give something, maybe. The state 
has no obligation, they decide. If we try to criticise them too much I’m not 
sure that we will get anything. [1.2.8] 
 
The respondent’s organisation, he believed, had managed to forge a good working 
relationship with the city authorities and had been awarded grants. He said that he 
was generally satisfied at the receptivity of the local authorities to their needs. He 
noted, however, that the local authorities expressed preferences as to the projects 
they wished to fund, requiring organisations to tailor their projects accordingly if 
they wished to maximise their funding chances. The authorities provided funding 
‘according to their own criteria’, he said. He was asked to elaborate:   
 
In all the projects one of the criteria was to organise training for young 
people, to involve youth. In this case sometimes they demand things that are 
very strange, that we have to involve other national communities in our 
activities. They declare ideas of tolerance, which is good in some ways but 
sometimes it’s difficult, because we want to have our own festivals […]. We 
won’t want to necessarily involve Lithuanians, or Poles. This [type of joint 
festivals] is very good but it’s something different.   
 
This statement points to a need for minority organisations to adjust their activities 
to reflect government priorities. The respondent saw the loss of its language as his 
minority’s primary concern, but the type of joint festivals encouraged by the city 
authorities pushed the organisation to prioritise different types of activity.  
An area where officialdom might control civil society’s activities is in the 
linkages between networks and funding. One example was provided by a 
representative of the (Saransk-based) Association of Finno-Ugric Peoples of Russia 
(AFUN): the nomination of the Ministry of Culture of Mordovia Petr Tultaev as 
leader of the institution in September 2009 had coincided with the start of a regular 
inflow of funds to AFUN [1.4.3]. In another case from Tver, a public official stated 
that, in the case of application for federal funding, a letter of support by the local 
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authorities was required by the federal authorities - with clear implications of 
potential vetting. Other respondents pointed to issues of favouritism in relation to 
loyal groups [1.4.2] and a lack of transparency [2.19]. As one analyst put it, with 
regard to funding ‘all is negotiable’ [2.15].  
It is due to this governmental control over funds that the ACFC 
recommended that minorities be enabled to directly manage the funds that are 
earmarked for the preservation of minority cultures and languages. The Russian 
authorities, in their Third Report to the ACFC, responded to the ACFC’s earlier 
recommendations, stating that the Russian government ‘[t]ake steps in order to 
ensure the balance between the financing provided to cultural activities and the 
needs of the national minorities concerned’, and facilitate greater participation in 
decision-making on funding allocation. The Russian government simply referred to 
the Law ‘On National Cultural Autonomy’ (NCA Law),516 whose Article 16 
concerns funding from federal, regional and local authorities.
517
 This provision has 
been added by amendments in 2009.
518
 A public official interviewed similarly 
answered a question on the limited funds for NCAs by referring to the same legal 
provisions, saying: ‘there are special amendments by which NCAs receive funding 
from the government’ [4.15]. The provisions are not, however, matched by a 
concurring obligation for the authorities to provide funding - at least not in all 
cases. A different formulation is used for three levels of authorities in Article 16: 
the federal authorities ‘can provide support’ to NCAs from the federal budget; the 
authorities of Russia’s subjects ‘provide support’ from the subjects’ budgets; and 
the organs of local self-government ‘have the right to provide support’ [italics 
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 Law No. 11-FZ of 9 February 2009 ‘On Introducing Changes to Article 16 of the Federal Law 
‘On National Cultural Autonomy’’. 
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added]. Additionally, Article 9 of the NCA Law was amended in 2004,
519
 
modifying the provision that federal and regional authorities ‘assist’ NCAs to the 
stipulation that they ‘can support’ NCAs (in their activities in the areas of education 
and the media). A respondent linked this type of provisions to the Russian joke 
reported at the beginning of the chapter. She referred to the first formulation (the 
authorities ‘can provide support’), seeing it as symptomatic of the state approach to 
nationality issues. It made existing systems simply ‘declarative’. She argued that: 
 
The authorities can do something, but they also can not do it. [Equally] 
people have a right [to receive funding] but they still cannot do anything [if 
they don’t have the funds they need]. There are no mechanisms [to exercise 
their rights] […]. [In the same way] you can request that your child receive 
an education in a [particular] language, but you can’t find a [suitable] 
school. I can do something but I also can’t. [1.2.9] 
 
The absence of specific responsibilities also means that networks and good 
relations with the authorities are not necessarily a recipe for financial security - for 
example, if the local authorities, even if sympathetic to the needs of minorities, 
have other priorities.  
An alternative source of funds is that of non-state grants, from both 
international donors and Russia-based donors. In the case of international donors, 
the respondents referred to funding from Finland and other Finno-Ugric countries 
(for Finno-Ugric nationalities), Canada and the United States. As part of the 
programme ‘Minorities in Russia’,520 the Council of Europe had also financed four 
projects in Mordovia on the preservation and development of the Mordovian 
languages. The (civil society) respondents referred to bureaucratic hurdles and 
financial disincentives over the receipt of foreign funds, particularly following the 
2006 amendments to Russian law, increasing the level of state scrutiny over the 
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 See Section 1.3. 
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inflow of foreign funds to NGOs.
521
 The first notable disincentive is the high taxes 
for their receipt, with the exceptions of foreign institutions that are on a list of 
accredited donors whose grants are not taxable. The number of donors on this list 
was reduced from 101 to 12 in June 2008.
522
 Bank checks and tax inspections can 
be carried out - normally the latter with a prior warning. Bank checks are 
undertaken directly by banks, on the basis of a financial plan submitted by the 
organisation at the beginning of the year (known as kassovaya ditsiplina); it indeed 
requires administrative discipline as funds that were initially allocated for an event, 
for example, may not be used for salaries [1.5.4]. For tax inspections, reports have 
to be submitted to the local authorities four times a year.
523
 In turn, international 
organisations have themselves been subjected to pressure, sometimes resulting in 
the closure of their offices in Russia.524  
These regulations, with the exception of the list of accredited donors, affect 
all institutions and not only NGOs. The director of a human rights NGO, however, 
linked human rights activities to enhanced control by the authorities [1.5.5]. The 
following excerpt from the interview with this respondent provides an example. 
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522
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 For example, in December 2007 the British Council was required by the Russian authorities to 
close its offices in St Petersburg and Ekaterinburg by January 2008. The request was justified on the 
grounds of alleged irregularities, including tax evasion. The allegations denied by the British 
Council. See BBC, 12-12-2007. ‘Russia to Limit British Council’. 
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Q: Why do you think that there is a requirement to produce tax reports four times a 
year?  [the question referred to reports to the tax authorities on organisations’ 
activities and sources of funding]. 
 
A: I don’t know, it’s a means of control. If you don’t produce the report it’s a legal 
reason for them to sue the NGO and withdraw the registration. The state says that 
there are many NGOs that are registered and don’t work, which is true [...]. By 
making them produce these reports the state assesses whether the organisation is 
operational […].  But we are bothered about the questions about where we got our 
funds from and [the fact that] they can get back to us to say: ‘you got all this 
foreign funding! You’re just spies’525[...]. And I’m not sure that officials that are 
involved in this [reviewing the reports] would not abuse their power with their 
reports. Once I was really angry by a press release of the press office of the judicial 
department [of the local administration] that looks at the reports. We reported to 
them, on how much money we got, from what sources of funding. They then 
published a press release on their website saying that 3 NGOs in our city are getting 
this much American money.  
 
Q: Why is that a problem? 
 
A: That shows to people who are patriotic that we are working as spies. It’s about 
reputation… it’s not the business of the state to publish information about where we 
get our funding. That’s my view. I didn’t like that at all. Then I got phone calls 
from journalists asking ‘it is true that you got that much money from America?’ [...] 
 
Q: Is it a way to discredit NGOs? 
 
A: That’s true, that’s what I think is happening […] because only human rights 
groups raise issues that are uncomfortable for the state. Instead of responding to 
these issues and say ‘yes, we violated human rights’ they [the government] would 
rather show that people who raised these issues were just spies, to discredit them, so 
that the public won’t believe us, and take seriously the accusations raised by human 
rights activists. Instead they decided to show that we are working on foreign 
money, so people won’t believe us. They are just exploiting this old concept of the 
cold war, that Americans are bad and we are good. 
 
Q: Do you think that if some organisation became too critical the government could 
abuse the law, referring to irregularities in the reports? 
 
A: I can say that’s absolutely possible.  
 
Q: Is that what happened to [organisation A]?
526
  
 
A: That was provocation, 100%. They didn’t find anything wrong in their reports, 
they just opened a criminal case against [the director and deputy director]. [The 
director] had the best reputation among NGOs and human rights activists. So to 
                                                 
525
 Foreign institutions have been linked to espionage. The British Embassy in Moscow, which has 
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discredit the whole human rights world it was enough to discredit her, in the eyes of 
the public.  
 
Q: Was it a warning to other organisations? 
 
A: Yes, it was a demonstration, like saying ‘look, we can do that, even to somebody 
who is the strongest of all of you’. 
 
Q: Are you afraid that something like that could happen to you? 
 
A: I can say that if they want to discredit us and shut us down I probably won’t be 
able to stop them. The only thing we can do is to be as clear, transparent and in line 
with the law as possible, to prevent any type of accusations against us. But if the 
state wants, they can do it, look at [the director of organisation A]. They can do it 
with her, they can do it with anybody else. 
 
Q: Can tax officials visit your office and look at your documents any time? 
 
A: It’s true. They’re supposed to give you notice beforehand but I’m not sure that 
there’s a specific time limit. They can notify you this evening that they will come 
tomorrow, but they have to give you notice […]. Normally they plan inspections, 
and they publish the list of organisations that they will inspect on their website [...]. 
But if there is a complaint against you they do it right after it. The complaint can be 
from anybody, so if they want to check you they will create a complaint. 
 
Q: What about fire inspections? 
 
A: Normally it doesn’t happen very often [...]. We’ve never had one. But I can tell 
you if they come they will find violations even in our office, because nobody really 
knows exactly what has to be done. The fire inspector will assess the situation and 
list irregularities, and what has to be done to change the situation [rectify 
irregularities]. They give you a few days or few weeks to deal with it. You do 
everything you can, but certain things are very difficult to deal with. Like last year I 
was asked by a friend to help her friend, who is the head an [NGO]. The fire 
inspection found a lot of irregularities. They [the NGO] dealt with them, but at 
some point the inspectors said that the ceiling was too low, and they had to raise it. 
How can you do that? [...] They [the authorities] shut down the organisation for a 
few weeks. Then we had to go to court. Then we somehow got around it […], but 
they might come [later] and find something else. If they are told to do so, they will 
find something wrong.  
 
This excerpt refers to techniques that could be employed to undermine civil society: 
the discrediting of NGOs, possible abuse of legislation and fabrication of 
irregularities, as well as high taxes combined with tax inspections.   
One last source of funds for minority organisations is private sponsors - 
usually wealthy businessmen belonging to national minorities. While these 
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donations provide release from the dependency on state funds and a break from the 
red tape, the boundaries of businesses and the state are often blurred - with 
businesses involved in politics and vice versa. At a minimum, businesses generally 
do not wish to antagonise politicians and civil servants - particularly where they use 
informal networks to protect their interests. Private sponsorship of minority 
activities might not necessarily signify freedom to engage in forms of activism that 
may be unpalatable to the authorities, but result, for the most part, in cultural events 
not dissimilar to those sponsored by the Russian state. Some of the respondents 
who were also leaders of minority groups were themselves businesspeople who 
used their own private funds to support minority organisations. An academic from 
Moscow suggested that these associations, when their leaders are themselves 
wealthy businesspeople, have the dual function of self-promotion and promotion of 
the minority culture [2.19]. As a means of decentralising the funding of minority 
programmes, private enterprise is only a limited advance.  
 
7.4 Conclusion: Some Cooperation, No Promises 
 
This chapter has examined the tensions existing in the relationship between civil 
society and the Russian authorities, highlighting how international standards in the 
area of minority consultation may be ignored or imperfectly adhered to. Civil 
society is confronted with many obstacles. Local authorities shy away from debate 
on minority issues that cross into the political sphere. State-sponsored minority 
programmes tend to skim the surface, dealing with symptoms rather than causes. In 
turn, civil society’s (frequent) condition of dependency on the state for funding, 
coupled with its administrative and financial vulnerability, typically makes it 
reluctant to challenge the authorities. Indeed, good relations with the authorities 
were perceived by civil society respondents as the most effective tool to advance 
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minority rights; and in some cases civil society has been able to cooperate quite 
fruitfully with the authorities, primarily at the local level. At the same time, 
cooperation is generally contingent on public officials’ discretion, while the points 
of entry into the public discourse and policy-making for minorities seem to have 
decreased with Putin’s centralising measures. Finally, the state has the power to 
intervene to undermine the activities of civil society, including through the abuse of 
the legislation and administrative procedures such as tax inspections.527  
Centralised control of funding greatly restricts opportunities for minorities 
to distance themselves, if they so wish, from Soviet-inspired approaches to 
nationality programmes. This is exacerbated by the absence of detailed programmes 
for minority rights, with precise targets, and their relatively low priority in 
contemporary Russian politics - compared, for example, to the state’s objective in 
fighting extremism and popularising a Russian patriotic discourse. Putin’s vertical, 
and minorities’ reliance on public officials’ discretion, has created a tension 
between centralism and localism: core policies (e.g. the Russian patriotic discourse) 
coexist with a form of laissez-faire, as individual public officials are exempt from 
well-defined responsibilities in the area of nationalities policy. Civil society is 
caught between these two poles: on one side, it finds inflexible, centrally-conceived 
policies; on the other, loose regulations for the upholding of minority rights, with 
public officials in a position to make arbitrary decisions. 
 Against this background there are areas in which international standards are 
effectively powerless to enhance cooperation between civil society and the 
authorities, and others in which they may carve out a small role for themselves. In 
the first case, the Russian authorities have ignored the Council of Europe’s 
recommendation to allow minority associations to manage their own financial 
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to the ECtHR (in Fedotova v Russia, note 188). 
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resources. International standards can also do little to change the traditional top-
down approach to the management of nationality issues, and the limited receptivity 
to civil society’s input. Although the Council of Europe may encourage and 
facilitate discussions between civil society and the authorities - for example through 
events linked to FCNM implementation and ECRML ratification - there are no 
guarantees that the needs of minorities, as articulated during these debates, will be 
taken into account. The tradition of informal practices, with the fortunes of 
nationality programmes contingent upon the goodwill of public officials, appears 
likely to persist - at least under the Putin-Medvedev leadership.  
International standards have a more enhanced role in upholding negative 
rights. They can ease some of the pressure on civil society, for example through 
intervention in cases of non-registration or the closure of organisations, including 
through ECtHR judgements. Although direct violations of Article 11 ECHR rarely 
affect minority organisations, the existence of the ECtHR provides potential victims 
with the option of accessing a supra-national judicial body not susceptible to 
political considerations that may exist in Russia, in the case of politicised, 
controversial cases. In turn, the ECtHR may act as a deterrent for the Russian 
government, causing it to be wary of allowing violations of the ECHR in the 
knowledge that these could result in international judgements against Russia. The 
Council of Europe further involves Russian civil society in the FCNM monitoring 
processes, through the consideration of civil society’s shadow reports, and in 
Council of Europe-sponsored events, such as those promoting the FCNM’s 
implementation and the ECRLM’s ratification. Even where these events do not lead 
to tangible results,528 they may contribute to shifting political processes to a more 
open system somewhat more amenable to dialogue - one that is subjected to 
                                                 
528
 An education expert from Moscow noted that these events were ‘just useful for the Council of 
Europe to collect information’, without making a difference to minorities [4.14].  
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international scrutiny. One expert interviewed noted that events such as those 
organised under the project ‘Minorities in Russia’ had taken place ‘only because’ of 
the Council of Europe’s ‘insistence’ upon them; before the Council of Europe’s 
intervention, he noted, ‘there were no discussions on the Charter’ [2.7].529 These 
events can contribute to concretising what tend to be seen as nebulous moral values, 
providing minorities with rights recognised by legally binding conventions.  
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 Presumably as a result of these events, respondents had generally greater familiarity with the 
ECRML than the FCNM.  
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8. NATIONAL CULTURAL AUTONOMY: REAL OR 
FICTITIOUS PARTICIPATION? 
 
Chapter 7 revealed a limited role for international standards in opening up new 
opportunities for the cooperation of national minorities with the Russian authorities. 
The chapter focused on informal means of consultation and cooperation that take 
place alongside other, official mechanisms, analysed in this and the next chapters. 
Chapters 8 and 9 introduce a second, major distinction in measures to uphold 
participatory rights: between consultative mechanisms and representation in elected 
bodies. Chapter 8 focuses on the main consultative mechanism developed by the 
Russian authorities for their national minorities - that of National Cultural 
Autonomy. Representation in elected bodies and other forms of consultative 
mechanisms are analysed in Chapter 9. 
‘National Cultural Autonomy’ (NCA) designates a concept of autonomy for 
national minorities that is based on ethnic affiliation rather than territory - 
essentially, the reverse of the notion of ethnic federalism. In Russia the notion of 
NCA has been reworked into a mechanism for minority groups to form 
associations, also called NCAs (such as Tatar or Mordovian NCAs). NCAs are 
relevant to this study not least because the Russian authorities have presented them 
as the centrepiece of FCNM implementation.530 Russia has included the operations 
of NCAs in its reports to the ACFC, and the ACFC has commented on them, 
raising concerns regarding their effectiveness.531 Indeed, in 2011, 15 years after the 
enactment of the Russian Federal Law ‘On National Cultural Autonomy’ (NCA 
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Law),532 it was apparent that the system it created offered no real ‘autonomy’ to 
minority groups despite the Russian authorities’ argument that the institution of 
NCA is based on the principles of ‘self-organization and self-government’.533 A 
considerable body of academic research has shown that the Russian NCA system is 
largely ineffective (Bowring 2005; Bowring 2007; Filippova & Filippov 2008; 
Osipov 2004; Osipov - forthcoming).534 One respondent called them a ‘palliative’ 
[1.4.2].535 In this chapter I analyse NCAs specifically from the point of view of 
participatory rights. I argue that the hindrances to effective participation come from 
two directions: from within the minority organisations themselves (bottom up), and 
in the conditions surrounding cultural ‘autonomy’ created by the Russian 
authorities (top down). In the first case, NCAs offer no guarantees that concerns of 
‘ordinary’ persons belonging to national minorities will be represented at higher 
levels by NCA leaders. From the top down, established mechanisms for 
consultation (consultative councils at various government levels) also offer few 
guarantees and opportunities for concrete impact. The NCA system, therefore, 
raises issues of internal democracy within NCAs themselves, while also revealing 
some genuine difficulties for the authorities in any efforts to concretely incorporate 
NCA input into their decision-making. The chapter concludes that the NCA system 
is not conducive to minority groups’ enjoyment of their right to participation. 
Rather, minority representatives interviewed continue to link decision-making to 
territoriality, seeing national cultural autonomies as merely leading to forms of 
participation that are little more than ‘fiction’.536 Against this background, 
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international standards have been unable to penetrate the complexities of minority 
participation in Russia. 
As will be seen below, NCAs are multi-layered bodies, that are formed at 
the local, regional and federal level. These structures increase in complexity as they 
move higher to the apex of the NCA system; and, with this, NCAs’ bureaucratic 
commitments also increase. This is the reason why, of the three case studies, only 
the Tatars had a federal NCA. Additionally, given the focus on ethnicity rather than 
territory, NCAs for a particular nationality are located outside ‘its’ ethnic republic: 
there are no Karelian NCAs in Karelia, no Mordovian NCAs in Mordovia and no 
Tatar NCAs in Tatarstan. Hence, of the three case studies, this chapter only 
includes data on Tatar NCAs (in Moscow), and on the NCA of Tver Karelians (in 
Tver). I supplemented these data with interviews with NCAs of other nationalities, 
as well as with academics and public officials, who offered insight on NCAs’ 
structures, functions and operations. The findings relating to the complexity of 
translating NCA activity into effective participation were consistent across different 
ethnic groups. The observed differences in perceptions of NCAs were by category 
of respondents (NCA, non-NCA civil society, public officials and academics), 
rather than revealing variance based on ethnicity.  
After an introduction on the meaning of effective participation, I briefly 
outline the reasons that led to the establishment of NCAs in post-Soviet Russia. I 
then examine the reasons for the limited guarantees over participation provided by 
this system: first focusing on the NCAs’ internal structure, and subsequently on the 
conditions in which NCAs operate.  
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8.1 From Territorial to Cultural Autonomy 
 
To assess levels of participation, one first has to clarify the meaning of 
‘participation’ and of its qualifier ‘effective’. The right to participation of national 
minorities is included in Article 15 FCNM, which states: 
 
The Parties shall create the conditions necessary for the effective 
participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social 
and economic life and in public affairs, in particular those affecting them. 
 
State obligations in the area of participatory rights arise from Article 27 ICCPR, in 
light of General Comment 23 of the UN Human Rights Committee, stating that the 
exercise of cultural rights ‘may require [...] measures to ensure the effective 
participation of members of minority communities in decisions which affect 
them’.537 In the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities there are four specific references to 
‘participation’, in the context of cultural, religious, social, economic and public life, 
and decision-making affecting minorities.
538
 The UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination includes provisions on 
participation in elections and public affairs (Article 5(c)), and on the right to equal 
participation in cultural activities (Article 5(e)(6)). Soft law standards on 
participation are provided by the OSCE Lund Recommendations.
539
  
The adjective ‘effective’, in relation to participation, is employed, inter alia, 
in Article 2(2) and 2(3) of the UN Declaration, with the importance of effectiveness 
further stressed in the UN Declaration’s Commentary.540 Effectiveness is linked in 
                                                 
537
 General Comment No. 23: The rights of Minorities (Art. 27): 08/04/1994, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add 5, § 7. 
538
 Articles 2(2), 4(5) and 5. 
539
 Lund Recommendations (note 131). On the Lund Recommendations and participation, see 
Drzewicki (2010). 
540
 De Varennes, ‘Commentary of the Working Group on Minorities to the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
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the Commentary to the involvement of minorities in all stages of decision-making 
affecting them - at the local, national and international levels. The expression 
‘effective participation’ is also found in the OSCE Lund Recommendations, where 
it is described as an ‘essential component of a peaceful and democratic society’ 
(Point 1.1). In its Opinions on periodic country reports by participating states, the 
ACFC has referred repeatedly to ‘effective participation’, although it has provided 
no actual definition of either ‘effectiveness’ or ‘participation’. What transpires from 
the ACFC’s Opinions is that effective participation is closely linked to the 
achievement of full and effective equality (Marko 2006: 3; Verstichel 2008: 454; 
Weller 2005: 435). The adoption of ‘special measures’ in the form of affirmative 
action may be required to achieve real equality, concretely and practically levelling 
opportunities for minorities and the majority. ‘Effectiveness’ also means that the 
voice of minorities should not only be heard but also be taken seriously (Henrard 
2005): the presence of minorities in consultative and elected bodies has to be 
matched by their actual influence on decision-making (Verstichel 2008: 452-3).541  
While minorities have a particular right to effective participation in matters that 
affect them,542 such as linguistic and education policies, it is now recognised that 
such rights should extend to other areas, such as social and economic ones.543 This 
signals that the state also ‘belongs to’ minorities, paving the way for their 
integration and, with it, for internal stability (Hofmann 2006: 6-7).  International 
standards afford states wide margins of discretion in developing participatory 
mechanisms for minorities. Minimum standards involve two forms of participation: 
                                                                                                                                        
Minorities’, 4 April 2005, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/2, § 38. 
541
 See for example ACFC, (Second) Opinion on Finland, 20 April 2006, ACFC/OP/II(2006)003, § 
156. It states that the views of minorities (the Sami Parliament in this case) should be ‘fully taken 
into account in decision-making affecting the protection of the Sami’.  
542
 Article 15 FCNM; and Lund Recommendations (note 131), Points 13, 16 and 19.   
543
 See ACFC, ‘Commentary on the Effective Participation of Persons Belonging to National 
Minorities in Cultural, Social and Economic Life and Public Affairs’, ACFC31DOC(2008)001, 5 
May 2008  (hereinafter ACFC, Commentary on Participation).  See also Palermo (2008). 
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political representation in elected bodies and consultation (through consultative 
mechanisms).544 It is not an exclusive choice between the two. Rather the two 
should act in unison and be mutually supporting (Marko 2006: 9). 
In Russia there are no ‘special measures’ to uphold minorities’ participatory 
rights such as mechanisms to guarantee their presence in elected bodies. This 
regulatory vacuum is examined in the next chapter. In the case of consultation, 
Russia has chosen to use NCAs as the principal mechanism. The model of National 
Cultural Autonomy was developed by Karl Renner in his article State and Nation 
([1899] 2005). Renner’s objective was the creation of a confederation of nations 
from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The model is based on the ‘personality 
principle’ - the idea that communities may be autonomous and sovereign within a 
multinational state, regardless of whether they have, or identify with, a particular 
territory (Renner [1899] 2005). Although this concept has not found wide support, 
there have been attempts by modern scholars to revive it (Kymlicka 2007b; Nimni 
2005; Nimni 2007). There has also been experimentation with NCA in countries 
other than Russia.545  
The appeal of NCAs in post-Soviet Russia was exactly the disassociation of 
nationality and territoriality - a rejection of the territoriality-centred Soviet 
approach to the ‘national question’. This approach had rested on the forging of a 
strong link between ethnicity and territory.
546
 Placing territoriality at the heart of 
nationality policy had led to difficulties: the system’s inability to accommodate 
non-titular nationalities, or titular nationalities residing outside ‘their’ territory;547 
and post-Soviet ethnic mobilisation, with republics claiming independence from 
                                                 
544
 See ACFC, (First) Opinion on Albania (note 418), § 72.  
545
 For example, in Hungary.  See Dobos (2007).  
546
 See Section 2.3. 
547
 See also Chapter 5. The reasons are analogous to those for homogenisation. 
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Russia en masse following the Soviet Union’s collapse.548 The intelligentsia started 
to distance themselves from the principle of territoriality, which had become 
associated with ethnic claims (Codagnone & Filippov 2000). Thus, in 1992 the 
(then) Ministry for Nationalities Valerii Tishkov first proposed introducing NCAs: 
these would not displace existing territorial autonomies but simply act as a 
complementary institution, moulding themselves around the existing system 
(Codagnone & Filippov 2000; Filippova and Filippov 2008). NCAs were defined in 
Article 1 of the 1996 NCA Law as: 
  
[A] form of national and cultural self-determination constituting a public 
association of citizens of the Russian Federation, identifying with a 
particular ethnic community, finding themselves in a situation of national 
minority in a particular territory, based on their voluntary chosen identity 
for the purpose of independently regulating the issues of their identity 
preservation and their linguistic, educational and national cultural 
development.549  
 
That NCAs would not substitute territorial autonomy was made clear by the NCA 
Law itself550 and public officials’ statements.551 A respondent, a scholar and former 
advisor to Yeltsin on nationality issues, said in an interview: 
 
I never thought that [the NCA system] was realistic. Never. When ethnic 
federalism was strong NCAs were not needed. Nowadays that the problems 
of migrants and diasporas are growing there could be some opportunities for 
NCAs, but as an addition to ethnic federalism. [2.18]  
 
Theorists accept that the concept of NCAs, although in principle transcending 
territory, can coexist with it (Nimni 2007: 356). Tishkov’s theoretical approach 
(1996) certainly seems a sensible one: while not stripping the titular nationalities of 
                                                 
548
 A phenomenon known as the ‘parade of sovereignties’. See Hale (2000). 
549
  Article 1, NCA Law. 
550
 Article 4 states: ‘The right to national cultural autonomy does not correspond to the right to 
national territorial self-determination’. 
551
 For example, by Vladimir Zorin, chair of the State Duma Nationalities Committee (1996-1999) 
and the state minister in charge of nationalities affairs (2001-2004), as cited in Osipov 
(forthcoming). 
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their acquired rights, it introduces an additional mechanism to accommodate those 
minority groups that Soviet ethnic federalism had neglected. According to Russia’s 
Third Report to the ACFC, 18 federal, 208 regional and 501 local NCAs were 
registered in Russia at the end of 2008.552 However, the specific formulae developed 
in Russia are not sufficiently wide-ranging to guarantee minorities’ right to 
participation. The remainder of the chapter illustrates this argument from two points 
of view: ‘from below’ (NCAs’ internal shortcomings); and ‘from above’ 
(conditions created by the Russian authorities). 
 
8.2 NCAs’ Internal Shortcomings: Insufficient 
Representation and Accountability  
 
NCAs’ internal shortcomings relate to the absence of guarantees of a wide 
representative base for minorities, reflecting the multiplicity of the group’s views 
and concerns. Two reasons are identified: first, an assumption of group 
homogeneity in the NCA system; and, second, a tenuous link of accountability 
between the representatives (leaders of NCAs) and the represented (‘ordinary’ 
members of the same minority).   
The NCA system, established through the 1996 NCA Law, was meant to 
create a pyramidal structure of representation, with local, regional and federal 
NCAs. The system would carry the concerns of minorities from the local sections 
up to the highest political institutions. The NCA system would act as the main form 
of exchange between the authorities and minorities, condensing the various 
messages from minority institutions into manageable ‘bites’, to which the 
government could respond. It was envisaged that each minority as a group would 
speak with one voice, reducing redundant or contradictory messages, and distilling 
                                                 
552
 ACFC, (Third) Report submitted by Russia (note 132), p. 24. 
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‘core’ messages that should lay the foundations of nationalities policy. Hence, the 
NCA system is based on the assumption of homogeneity in groups, and it 
fundamentally presupposes one local institution (one ‘autonomy’) per nationality 
per territory.553   
The assumption of homogeneity is what Phillips calls an ‘essentialist’ and 
‘reified’ understanding of culture (2007: 8-9). Other authors echo the criticism of a 
reductionist model that stresses internal homogeneity, together with a clear-cut 
separateness from other groups (Benhabib 2002: 4; Tully 1995: 10).554 Narayan 
talks about a ‘package picture of cultures’ (2000: 1084). These concepts are closely 
connected to what Brubacker calls ‘groupism’, or:   
[T]he tendency to take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally 
homogeneous and externally bounded groups as basic constituents of social 
life, chief protagonists of social conflict, and fundamental units of social 
analysis (2002). 
 
This approach ignores the nuances and the multiple facets of a group, and their 
dynamic, ever-changing character. It reflects a perception of minorities as static, 
compared with the dynamism of dominant cultures (Musschenga 1998: 206). 
Similarly, the Russian NCA system (and Russia’s overall approach to nationalities 
policy) reduces minorities to their skeletal structures and oversimplifies them. It 
mirrors the Soviet essentialist approach to ethnicity, in which ‘core’ attributes are 
assigned to each minority, so as to enable their codification and subdivision - as 
described by Tishkov (1997). Each nationality is homogenised, and effectively the 
                                                 
553
 Local NCAs can then merge to form regional autonomies, and then federal ones. Immediately 
following the adoption of the NCA Law several minority groups established multiple NCAs for the 
same nationality, in the same area. This threatened the concept of an organised, unitary system of 
representation. To halt this process, in 2004 the Russian Constitutional Court ruled that no more 
than one local or regional autonomy per minority could be established in a municipality or a region. 
RCC, Judgement of 3 March 2004, No.5 ‘On the Constitutionality of Article 5(3) of the Federal Law 
on National Cultural Autonomy with regard to the Complaint submitted by A.H.Ditsa i 
O.A.Shumacher’.  
554
 Tully criticises the notion of each culture as ‘separate, bounded and internally uniform’ (1995: 
10) .  
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perceived essence of an ethnicity tends to revolve around festivals, customs, 
traditional music and literature - overlooking other facets.  
The internal complexity of minority groups behind the homogenising façade 
is one of the reasons why the idea of a consultative system with a neat pyramidal 
structure could not be translated into reality. Some of the respondents linked this to 
rivalries between competing leaders of minority organisations. For example, a 
respondent from a cultural association said:  
 
NCAs were established because they [the authorities] wanted to have a 
system that was like a pyramid. There would be local, regional and federal 
NCAs. At the top there would be the Federal Consultative Council on 
NCAs,
555
 that would bring groups together. But not all [groups] have 
formed a federal NCA. The reason is that people have their own ambitions. 
Two people would want to be leaders of the Federal NCA, and the people 
supporting one would not support the other [the rival], so it just didn’t 
happen. The reason why there are NCAs and also public organisations 
[NGOs] is this, because of personal ambitions, and more than one person 
wants to be leader. [1.3.4] 
  
Yet this only explains a diversity of views and priorities within the leadership of 
minority groups. The problem runs much deeper. There are multiple identities and 
traits in each person belonging to a minority. In addition to being the representative 
of a minority, a person has a gender, age, profession, level of education, as well as 
variegated allegiances and affiliations. An individual’s identity is not shaped solely 
by his/her ethnic background. Given these multiple layers of identity there should, 
at least, be an attempt to engage with this diversity by widening the potential for 
participation, enabling different segments of the minority population to become 
involved. Phillips describes this position:  
 
[I]n however occasional and patchy a way, modern democracies need to 
increase and widen that participation in discussion and decision that 
stretches our sense of alternative, and requires us to confront those who are 
different from ourselves (2002: 21). 
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 See Section 8.3. 
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Similarly, Palermo argues that ‘the benchmark of the effectiveness of participation 
is its degree of pluralism’ (2008: 411). The Russian authorities’ chosen system of 
representation is antithetical to the notion of broad representation. While minorities 
should be allowed to develop a ‘group-oriented dimension’ through the right of 
association (Marko 2006: 4), a group’s internal differences should also be 
recognised, through a system of representation that allows a wider range of voices 
to receive attention during consultation. There should also be space for internal 
dissent within the collective persona created by the group (Nimni 2007: 360).556   
 
A Missing Link of Accountability  
In practice, not all people can (or wish to) be politically active, but accountable 
representatives can act as delegates for the group as a whole. Thus, the rules for the 
appointment of delegates and for their accountability have paramount importance. 
A loose system of participation, based primarily (or solely) on all-inclusive 
procedures such as open meetings, leads to what Phillips calls one of the ‘paradoxes 
of participation’: in theory all can participate, but in practice many encounter 
obstacles. Participation requires an investment in time, energy and possibly funds - 
through loss of earnings - which only some people can afford. Clearly, the 
particular societal segments that can make these ‘sacrifices’ cannot be 
representative of the group - they might, for example, have greater financial 
stability and higher levels of education than average. Ultimately only the vote 
guarantees a basic right enjoyed by all members of a group (Phillips 1991: 140-6).  
                                                 
556
 The expectation, within and outside the group, of general consent, can cause a stultified debate 
and even self-censorship. See, for example, the effects of this phenomenon on the women’s 
movement, with ‘women being pressured to pretend to agree’ (Phillips 1991: 126). The issue of 
internal dissent is addressed in the next chapter.   
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The NCAs’ hierarchical structure operates on the assumption that local 
concerns (from local NCAs) will be elevated to the federal level (through the 
various federal NCAs’ access to their special federal consultative body - the Federal 
Consultative Council). The system is not based on voting for the selection of 
delegates but effectively on self-appointment.557 In the absence of voting or other 
guarantees of broad representation, this seemingly inclusive process masks 
communication channels whose trajectory is merely from the local elite to the 
federal, via the regional, elite. This type of elite ‘representation’ can extend beyond 
NCAs, to other minority associations, when their leaders assume the function not 
only of leaders of their associations, but also of the nationality as a whole. Two of 
the respondents expressed the opinion that these leaders belong to minority groups’ 
intelligentsia. They both referred to the exclusion of ‘ordinary’ minority members, 
particularly in the case of disadvantaged minorities, such as the Roma and 
nationalities from Central Asia. In the case of Central Asian nationalities, the first 
respondent, an academic in Moscow, noted: 
 
There is a gap between the minority leaders and the rest of the group, and 
not even communication between them [...]. The leaders represent the 
intelligentsia, people who have lived in Russia for a long time, have status 
and work. [2.19]
558
 
 
The second respondent, an activist on Roma rights in St Petersburg, herself a 
Russian, said: 
 
There was a roundtable I attended, where there was a discussion on [Roma] 
settlements of the town of [X].
559
 There was a conflict between the Roma 
and the administration, on houses that were built without permission, and 
                                                 
557
 Although not the case for NCAs, there are other minority institutions in which elections take 
place, such as the Congress of Tatars, the Congress of Karelians and the Inter-regional Movement of 
Mordovian  (Moksha and Erzya) Peoples. Abramov argues that in the Mordovian case voting results 
might be controlled by the Russian authorities (2010). See Section 9.1. On Congresses of Peoples 
see also Osipov (2011). 
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 Many Central Asians, instead, are migrants living in precarious conditions. 
559
 Not specified in the interests of confidentiality. 
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some were destroyed by a decision of the court. At the roundtable there was 
nobody from the community, only a representative of the Roma Federal 
NCA, a famous singer and actor. He is the picture of Roma life that 
corresponds to the stereotype, not to reality. He didn’t defend the Roma, he 
said that the authorities were right. [1.5.8]  
 
The Russian NCA system is based on a ‘descriptive’, rather than a ‘substantial’, 
form of representation - the former assuming that belonging to a certain (ethnic) 
group will automatically guarantee the representation of the group’s interests 
(Pitkin 1967).
560
 More important than ethnic affiliation, argues Verstichel, is a 
strong ‘link of accountability’ between the representatives and the represented 
(2008: 459). This link is tenuous in Russia, in the absence of procedures to elect or 
remove representatives.  
Similarly, the motivations for establishing an NCA do not always appear 
linked to a concern for accountability and group interests in the leaders. Once the 
NCA Law was adopted, an ‘offer’ was implicitly made to nationalities to organise 
themselves into NCAs. Osipov argues that minority groups accepted the ‘offer’ for 
reasons that are not necessarily (or solely) linked to cultural preservation, but also 
to calculations over potential material benefits with expectations of government 
support, and to ingratiate themselves with the authorities by demonstrating loyalty 
(2004). On the basis of the model of one NCA per minority per territory, minority 
organisations were eager to seize the opportunity to become the NCA for their area, 
filling the niche that would otherwise be occupied by another organisation (Osipov 
2004). The NCA system was established on a first-come, first-served basis - or in a 
form of ‘survival of the fastest’.  
These motivations indicate loyalty to and preoccupation with the authorities 
rather than the group. Registering as an NCA, in particular, signals to the 
                                                 
560
 The issue of descriptive representation and the ‘link of accountability’ are further discussed in 
Chapter 9. 
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authorities that the organisation wishes to focus on culture, distancing itself from 
politics - and therefore remaining non-threatening to the status quo. Although some 
respondents indicated cases of cooperation with the local authorities, one 
respondent, an academic and analyst from Moscow, noted that cooperation came 
with a ‘contract’ of loyalty [2.21]. Daucé believes that NCAs are no more than a 
system for handpicking loyalists: in describing the Tatar associations in Moscow, 
she suggests that the NCA Law was a tool of political control over independent 
Tatar associations. NCA leaders were selected for their loyalty to the authorities, 
and are rewarded with state support while other Tatar associations are marginalised 
(Daucé 2008). 
In practice, NCAs are not necessarily given preference compared to other 
minority organisations, while financial and other government support is minimal 
(Osipov 2004). Yet NCAs continue to be established. According to a respondent, an 
academic belonging to a national minority in Moscow, leadership of an NCA is 
sometimes seen as a step towards a political career [2.20]. Another respondent, 
head of a minority institution in Kazan, expressed the opinion that the flexibility 
and non-transparency of the regulation of NCAs meant that these institutions might 
give access to opportunities to enrich oneself through illicit means [1.4.2]. Some 
noted other potential benefits of loyalty to the authorities: speaking about a NCA in 
a Petrozavodsk, the director of an NGO in the same city said: 
 
[The representatives of this NCA] are not interested in the kopeks that they 
might get from the government. They have their own festivals. What they 
need is visas and work permits for their relatives and friends [fellow 
minority members]. [1.2.1] 
 
In this case, NCAs may become an instrument to facilitate amicable relations with 
the authorities, and the resulting networks may be used to benefit certain other 
members of the same minority. In an environment where unpredictability and 
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informal practices permeate society (Ledeneva 2006a), these networks may in 
practice be necessary. The leader of the NCA in Petrozavodsk - referred to by 
respondent 1.2.1 - was asked whether members of his minority, some of whom are 
recent (post-Soviet) immigrants, experienced discrimination in Russia; he said that 
citizenship was the priority in seeing one’s rights respected [1.1.1]. If NCAs’ 
networks are indeed employed to obtain work permits and citizenship, leadership of 
an NCA might enable the resolution of some very real concerns for minorities, 
including immigrants - yet in a circuitous and opaque manner, through behind-the-
scenes negotiations and informal networks.  
Respondents of both the ‘civil society’ and ‘academia’ categories argued 
that the ethnic leaders might be driven more by self-interest than altruism. 
Approximately half of the minority leaders interviewed were wealthy businessmen: 
informal networks might help protect their businesses from the unpredictability of 
the Russian economic and legal environment, where, again, informal practices are 
ubiquitous (Ledeneva 2006a). The reality is likely to be an amalgam of motivations. 
Helping fellow minorities will reconfirm one’s position as the leader of a particular 
minority and ultimately serve his/her interests. For the cultivation of good relations 
with the authorities, membership in bodies such as Public Chambers
561
 and 
parliamentary assemblies are of further benefit to one’s status.562 This form of 
‘representation’ might in practice be beneficial to the group generally, even when it 
originates from self-interest. The leaders of minority organisations may use their 
informal networks with the local authorities to help fellow minorities - for example, 
if the latter are harassed by law-enforcement officials. One respondent, the leader of 
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 Public Chambers are another form of consultative body. See Section 9.1. 
562
 Some of the minority leaders interviewed had passes to access the federal Duma by virtue of their 
leadership roles within minority groups in their regions.  
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a minority group in a city (not in an ethnic republic), and the head of a Public 
Chamber advising the local authorities on nationality issues, said: 
 
When people [minority members] get stopped by the police they call me. 
They ask me to go and speak to the police. [1.2.6]  
 
The potential benefits of this system come with a risk of bestowing excessive 
discretionary powers on the group’s leaders. An excessive reliance on informal 
practices also means that those who do not have the necessary networks to benefit 
from them may remain without support from both the authorities and the group. As 
noted by a respondent, a Russian scholar in Moscow:  
 
For the elites [the NCA system] is an instrument of self-realisation. They 
[the leaders] do represent the interests of the group, but they have the right 
to [the control of] the point of contact between the group and the authorities. 
This unique channel is monopolised by these leaders. The majority of them 
are good, they want to help. But the system is built in a way that even good 
people become corrupted by it […]. They have to show their loyalty. [2.21] 
 
Limited accountability and uncertain responsiveness to the needs of minority 
members point to the questionable internal democracy of NCAs.
563
 Ultimately, 
NCAs’ minority leaders are complicit in perpetuating the (government’s) unwritten 
rules for the regulation of nationality issues. As Osipov puts it, it is a matter of: 
 
[…] “governmentality” (gouvernementalité) in Foucault’s terms, in the 
sense that power means general acknowledgement of certain ideas and rules 
as part of the natural and unavoidable order. Power functions as a wide 
range of control techniques embedded in society itself, and it remains 
invisible, being literally kept out of politics in the narrow sense. Thus, the 
Russian system of diversity governance looks stable and rests on a silent 
agreement between the government and the citizenry (Osipov - 
forthcoming).  
 
To conclude, in Russia there is a stultified system of representation, which fails to 
involve any but the leaders of minority institutions. The NCA system is a loose 
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arrangement for the ‘consultation’ of the few, rather than an institutionalised form 
of participation encompassing the minority group’s many diverse segments.  
 
8.3 NCAs: A Framework ‘From Above’  
 
The issues analysed thus far have been internal to NCAs. I now focus on the 
(external) conditions in which NCAs operate. It has been argued that NCAs are 
structures that originate ‘from above’, being established by law by the Russian 
government, and minorities having no  co-ownership of them (Filippova & Filippov 
2008). The Russian authorities also shape the framework in which NCAs operate, 
placing boundaries around their scope of action. In particular, inhibitors to effective 
participation are: the NCAs’ limited autonomy and opportunities for consultation; 
the unrepresentativeness of the NCA federal consultative body; the fragmentation 
of minority representative institutions; and the inadequate legal entrenchment of 
NCAs. All four obstacles to participation are addressed below.   
The first obstacle is found in the limited opportunities for autonomy and 
effective consultation offered by the NCA system. In principle NCAs could 
facilitate the realisation of minorities’ participatory rights in two ways: by granting 
genuine autonomy in decision-making on specific issues affecting minorities, or by 
guaranteeing participation in governmental decision-making through consultative 
mechanisms. The NCA Law opens up opportunities for autonomy, stipulating, at 
Article 1, that NCAs are established to ‘independently regulate the issues of their 
identity preservation’. This form of autonomy can transcend the limitations of 
federalism, which is, instead, constrained by the territoriality principle (Nimni 
2007: 355). This was noted by an analyst from Moscow, who argued in an 
interview that NCAs can benefit dispersed minorities by upholding the rights of 
minorities ‘regardless of where they are’ [2.17]. Similarly, Brubaker notes: 
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National autonomy requires not the convergence of territorial administration 
and national culture, but their independence; it requires cultural rights […] 
for members of nations wherever they live [italics added]. (Brubaker 1996: 
41) 
 
If true autonomy is reached, Nimni argues, the need for ‘special measures’ to 
accommodate minorities is eliminated, as minorities are equipped with the authority 
and resources to manage their cultural distinctiveness autonomously (2007: 360). In 
practice this is not the case in Russia: NCAs have no authority to make decisions on 
matters concerning minorities, such as the teaching of minority languages in state 
schools. On this issue, a Russian scholar in Moscow stated in an interview that, of 
the three words in the expression ‘national cultural autonomy’, the first two may be 
accurate but ‘autonomy’ is ‘unfortunate’ [2.21]. In addition to the absence of 
autonomous decision-making, the dependence upon (precarious) financial support, 
from the government or other sources, means that NCAs have no ‘autonomy’ 
(Filippova & Filippov 2008).
564
  
The NCA Law also carves out a role for NCAs as advisors of governmental 
authorities. 565 In reality, the Russian NCA system is only at the periphery of 
commonly-endorsed mechanisms for minority consultation arising from 
international standards for minority protection. These include mechanisms for co-
decision, which may be divided into ‘soft’ and ‘hard powers of co-decision’. ‘Soft 
powers of co-decision’ designate arrangements by which the views of minorities 
must be heard before decisions are taken or laws adopted on matters concerning 
them; ‘hard powers of co-decision’ are those in which minorities have the right of 
legislative initiative and veto powers in the case of legislation affecting their 
interests. Mechanisms of minority participation further encompass fully 
                                                 
564
 See 7.3 on the funding of NCAs. 
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 Article 7 envisages the creation of an advisory council on national cultural autonomy, to provide 
advice to the Russian government. The article adds that similar advisory councils ‘can be’ 
established at the regional and local levels. 
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independent decision-making in specific areas, including through forms of self-
government. In these cases the government provides a ‘general framework’ on 
nationalities policy, but decision-making in specific areas, such as minority 
education, and on the use of funds allocated to minority programmes, are left to 
minorities themselves (Weller 2008: 430-1). Set against these models, the Russian 
NCA system does not fare well. As the ACFC put it, consultative councils in Russia 
‘meet sporadically and are expected to implement rather than contribute to the 
preparation of minority-relevant legislation’.566 There is no specific obligation to 
hear minorities’ views prior to decisions or the adoption of laws affecting them: in 
2002 amendments to the NCA Law
567
 removed the obligation for the Russian 
authorities to take into account proposals from NCAs in the formulation and 
realisation of federal programmes on the development of minority cultures.
568
 A 
respondent from a minority NGO in Moscow, who had taken part in public 
discussions on minority issues, commented on their overly general nature, followed 
by ‘no outcome’ [1.2.5]. 
Despite the scarcity of opportunities for impact, the respondents noted some 
positive examples of cooperation between the authorities and the NCAs or other 
minority associations. Interviews in Tver with members of this NCA indeed pointed 
to some fruitful cooperation with the local authorities [1.1.2; 2.5]. The ACFC had 
also cited the NCA of Tver Karelians as a positive example of cooperation.569 In the 
case of the Mordovian NCA in Ul’yanovsk, Abramov writes that ‘a mutual 
understanding was established with the leadership of the Ul’yanovsk oblast, which 
                                                 
566
 ACFC, (Second) Opinion on Russia (note 133), § 90. Overall, these consultative councils have 
been viewed by the ACFC as ineffective in advising the authorities (§ 14). Concerns were echoed by 
the Committee of Ministers in Resolution CM/ResCMN(2007)7 (note 134). 
567
 Law No. 122-FZ (note 519), Article 76.  
568
 The requirement to take such proposals into account was only preserved in the case of regional 
programmes (Article 14 of the NCA Law). Even in this case, there is no obligation to implement the 
proposals after they have been heard. 
569
 ACFC, (Second) Opinion on Russia (note 133), § 89. 
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favourably related to the issues of survival and development of Mordovians’ (2010: 
173).570 Other positive examples cited were: the Mordovian NCA of Tatarstan, and 
NCAs in cities with high concentrations of Mordovians such as Penz and Samara  
(Abramov 2010: 173-5). Among the NCA activities mentioned in interviews were: 
the publication of newspapers in minority languages; the teaching of minority 
languages; the celebration of ‘days of national languages’, festivals and events on 
national cultures, concerts and cultural programmes; and the establishment and 
running of cultural centres for minorities. The NCAs’ objectives include the raising 
of national consciousness: the Tatar NCA for Moscow oblast developed 
programmes to encourage Tatars to self-identify as Tatars in the 2010 census, rather 
than as (ethnic) Russians.571  
At the same time, as seen in Chapter 7, some respondents noted a tendency 
by the authorities to restrict exchanges with civil society to a discourse confined to 
pre-existing boundaries, centring around general policies and cultural programmes, 
such as minority festivals - with a disinclination to discuss, for example, the 
intricacies of educational policies.
572
 A representative of the Jewish Federal NCA 
warned of the ‘alarming tendencies’ of placing inter-ethnic dialogue on a 
superficial level, by ‘trying to revive the hypocritical form of druzhba narodov of 
the Soviet period.’573 He would have liked, instead, for NCAs to have a more 
meaningful role, by becoming ‘partners’ to the lawmakers in formulating 
legislation.  
                                                 
570
 Author’s translation. ‘Survival’ is intended in the sense of retention of Mordovian ethnic identity, 
as opposed to assimilation with the Russian majority. 
571
 The information is from an interview with a representative of the Tatar NCA of Moscow [1.1.5]. 
The higher the number of persons declaring themselves Tatar in the census, the greater the allocation 
of federal funds for the minority. 
572
 See Section 7.1. 
573
 ‘Friendship of peoples’, a Soviet-sponsored discourse based on general notions of multi-ethnic 
tolerance. The citation is from a speech delivered at a conference on national cultural autonomies in 
Kazan, 2009 (unpublished). 
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A respondent, an academic in Moscow, believed that NCAs, having been 
prevented from acquiring a meaningful function, have tended to become inward-
looking: focusing on their own short-term projects, rather than fulfilling the 
functions listed in the NCA Law. He said:  
 
As a rule they [NCAs] don’t solve problems. They have no influence at 
higher levels. They only solve their own issues, such as getting their own 
grants. [2.20] 
 
This thesis does not wish to belittle the importance of NCAs’ activities, and the role 
that NCAs and other minority institutions play in the lives of some persons 
belonging to minorities. Many NCA members are motivated volunteers who wish 
to preserve their traditions, and assist others in the same goal, for example by 
organising - sometimes teaching themselves - language classes.
574
 Some 
respondents indicated that these activities are very much essential to the 
preservation of their cultural uniqueness and ethnic consciousness. Popov argues 
that cultural autonomies fulfil a social function, by creating an internal support 
system for minority communities - once provided by Soviet institutions - as well as, 
in the case he examines, a system of moral values (2008).575 I argue, however, that 
the NCA system is insufficient to satisfy the participatory rights of minorities in 
Russia. As Osipov contends, NCAs are entities virtually undistinguishable from 
NGOs, devoid of specific rights and guarantees (2004). For example, NCAs were 
offered no opportunity to debate the adoption of Law 309 and reform in education, 
despite their being closely connected with the teaching of minority languages, 
history and cultures.576   
 
                                                 
574
 This was the case in Tver, in the youth branch of the NCA of Tver Karelians, as reported by one 
of its members [1.1.3]. 
575
 He examines the case of Greek communities in Southern Russia. 
576
 The information was provided by a member of the FCC representing a minority, in an interview 
[1.1.6]. 
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The Federal Consultative Council: Exclusive Consultation  
The second obstacle to participation facing NCAs is the ‘exclusive consultation’ 
system found at the apex of the NCA structure: the Federal Consultative Council 
(FCC). Although in Russia there is a plethora of consultative councils - with 
multiple councils both at the local and regional levels - the FCC is the only 
consultative institution at the federal level. It consists of representatives of federal 
NCAs: these may be formed when local NCAs choose to unite to form a regional 
NCA, and regional NCAs, in turn, converge to form a federal NCA (FNCA) per 
minority. It is envisaged as a forum for discussion and consultation for 
representatives of the various minorities in Russia, yet only 18 FNCAs577 were 
registered at the end of 2008, out of the over 170 nationalities recognised Russia - a 
glaring imbalance. The FCC’s representative deficiency is primarily due to the 
bureaucratic efforts that an FNCA entails, both for its creation and maintenance 
[1.1.5; 1.1.6; 3.2].
578
  
A complicating factor in creating a wide representative base for minorities 
through NCAs is that these instruments are normally only allowed to be established 
in regions where a particular minority is not ‘titular’.579 On this basis NCAs can be 
formed only by minority groups that have no ethnic territory at all (e.g. the Roma) 
or titular groups residing outside their titular region (e.g. Tatars outside Tatarstan). 
This non-titularity requirement originates from the fact that NCAs are 
conceptualised as a mechanism for the representation of minorities in a 
disadvantaged position - and titular nationalities are regarded a dominant in the 
                                                 
577
 Of these, the Ukrainian and the Armenian Federal NCAs were closed in 2010. 
578
 The respondents who provided this information were, or had been, active in FNCAs. 
579
 Article 1 of the NCA Law states that NCAs can be formed by groups ‘finding themselves in a 
situation of national minority in a particular territory.’ This follows amendments introduced by Law 
No. 136-FZ of 10 November 2003 ‘On the Amendment of the Federal Law on National Cultural 
Autonomy. In practice there have been no official interpretations of this provision, whose 
application vary. In some cases, NCAs have been allowed to be established on behalf of titular 
groups in their regions. What is presented here is the general rule.  
 280 
ethnic republics.580 Hence, for example, there are no Mordovian NCAs in 
Mordovia. The main organisation promoting Mordovian interests is the Inter-
regional Social Movement of Mordovian (Moksha and Erzya) Peoples (Mordovian 
Movement). The Mordovian Movement’s members, however, are unable to access 
the FCC, being outside the NCA system. Meanwhile, a Mordovian FNCA had not 
been set up by 2011. The Tatar minority had a Tatar FNCA in 2011, but no regional 
or local Tatar NCAs within the Republic of Tatarstan. Consequently, alternative 
institutions have been established in the republic, primarily the World Congress of 
Tatars, with headquarters in Kazan. The FNCA brings together the Tatar NCAs 
from outside Tatarstan. Similarly, in Petrozavodsk the main institution uniting 
Karelian activists was the Congress of Karelians, with no Karelian NCA in Karelia. 
These regulations complicate the system of representation, giving it an asymmetric 
structure and fragmenting it.  
Ultimately, alternative (often informal) channels of communications 
between non-NCA structures and the authorities have been forged. For example, 
the Mordovian Movement approaches the Russian authorities to further Mordovian 
interests as this is its raison d’être.581 NCA and non-NCA structures are not 
necessarily placed antagonistically toward each other. For example, the NCA of 
Ul’yanovsk oblast was registered in 2000 following the 3rd Congress of Mordovian 
Peoples (Abramov 2010: 173). The same members can sometimes be found in 
Tatar NCAs and also in the World Congress of Tatars.582 Yet with the plurality of 
communication channels the opportunities for bilateral, informal negotiations 
multiply, with a proliferation of parallel minority institutions.  
                                                 
580
 Despite the fact that members of titular nationalities in ‘their’ republics are often numerically 
inferior to the Russian population.  
581
 Despite their titularity, Mordovians are far from ‘dominant’ within Mordovia, and the republic is 
far from being autonomous: the Republic of Mordovia is dependent on the federal centre with regard 
to, among others, standards of education and funding.  
582
 This information was provided by a respondent from the Tatar NCA for Moscow oblast [1.1.5].  
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Proliferation and Fragmentation of Minority Representative 
Institutions  
This takes us to the third obstacle to effective participation: the proliferation and 
fragmentation of minority representative institutions. In addition to the institutions 
already cited, such as the Mordovian Movement, below the FCC there is a complex 
web of consultative bodies. Pursuant to the NCA Law, these bodies are building 
blocks of the NCA structure: Article 7 stipulates that government bodies are to 
form ‘advisory councils on national-cultural autonomy’. A number of advisory 
councils have been established, although they do not represent an integral, distinct 
feature of the NCA system: in these councils no distinction is made between NCAs, 
NGOs and other ethnicity-based organisations. In reports to the ACFC, the Russian 
authorities, in listing forms of consultation present in Russia, refer not only to 
NCA-based consultative bodies but to general consultative bodies and Public 
Chambers.583 Hence, NCAs do not serve as the main channel of communication and 
cooperation between the authorities and minorities. Some incoherencies thus 
emerge: on one side, there are attempts to maintain a unified structure of 
representation - not allowing more than one NCA per region; on the other, there is a 
great deal of elasticity, in the absence of membership rules for consultative 
councils. The exclusivity rule of one NCA per minority per region is immaterial if 
an alternative (non-NCA) institution may be established for the same minority, 
whose treatment is indistinguishable from the treatment of an NCA. 
                                                 
583
 See, for example, ACFC, (Third) Report submitted by Russia (note 132). On Public Chambers, 
see Section 9.1.  
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            In principle a plurality of voices is conducive to the proper functioning of a 
democratic society.584 In line with this, ACFC recommendations focus on 
inclusiveness, urging the Russian authorities to promote ‘high levels of 
representativeness’ of NCAs, while also involving other groups in consultation 
processes alongside them - to ‘ensure pluralism among the state’s interlocutors’.585 
Certainly in addition to more formal systems of representation there is space for 
pressure groups and campaign organisations. These may operate and lobby 
alongside more formal, institutionalised structures, which enjoy specific rights and 
(preferably constitutional) guarantees. The Russian system is simultaneously 
inclusive and exclusive - in both cases remaining largely ineffective. It strips NCAs 
of their special function in the nationality discourse, by failing to institutionalise 
their role, and involves other institutions in discussions that have little practical 
impact. Rather than ensuring pluralism in decision-making, this ostensibly inclusive 
system muffles voices that are already feeble. No specific guidelines are established 
for negotiations with minority groups and for participation in decision-making, with 
nebulous provisions in the NCA Law.
586
   
            Two basic standards emerge from the ACFC’s Opinions with regard to 
consultative bodies: they ought to be ‘institutionalised’ and in ‘permanent dialogue’ 
with the authorities (Marko 2006: 7). These institutionalised consultative bodies 
                                                 
584
 See for example, Handyside v the United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, 
Application No. 5493/72, 7 December 1976, § 49. 
585
 ACFC, (Second) Opinion on Russia (note 133), § 164. 
586
 Article 7 of the NCA law, on advisory boards, states;  
The government of the Russian Federation shall determine which federal executive body will create 
an advisory board on national-cultural autonomies [...]  
An Advisory Council on national cultural autonomies: 
guarantee the coordination of activities among national cultural autonomies […]  
represent and defends, in the organs of the Russian Federation, the cultural and social 
interests of ethnic communities […] 
are involved in preparing programmes for the preservation and development of the national 
language and national culture, draft laws and regulations, as well as in the preparation of 
other decisions affecting the rights and lawful interests of Russian citizens that consider 
themselves to belong to certain ethnic communities […].  
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need to fulfil numerous functions,587 which one consultative body, on its own, is 
unlikely to encompass. For this reason, responsibilities may be distributed among 
several bodies (Weller 2008: 439). Internationally one can find consultative bodies 
with both a vertical, multi-layered structure (from local to nationwide bodies), or a 
horizontal one (specialised bodies). Specialised bodies might be thematic (e.g. 
education or cultural issues) or work with specific minorities (Weller 2008: 434-
5).
588
 What is of paramount importance is that responsibilities are spread across 
bodies that are part of the same cohesive structure. The bodies should be 
interlocking and multi-layered,
589
 rather than duplicating each other’s functions. 
The Council of Europe recommends ‘a comprehensive and integrated design of 
minority consultative structures’, with ‘[a]n overall minority consultative council 
operating at the national level, and including all minorities’. Other institutions 
should radiate from this focal point - for example, special mechanisms for 
particularly disadvantaged and marginalised minorities.
590
 Weller suggests that, 
when there is no one single institution recognised by different minorities (or by 
different groups within the same minority) as a single umbrella organisation 
representing their interests, the state might encourage minorities to reach consensus 
                                                 
In 2011 there were no guidelines or codes of practice for the practical implementation of these 
provisions. 
587
 These functions include participation in the area of minority issues, in: needs assessment, 
devising policy priorities, decision-making on funding, monitoring and evaluation of programmes, 
devising legislative and other proposals (Weller 2008: 438). See also Lund Recommendations (note 
131), Point 13.  
588
 For example, Germany has separate consultative mechanisms for three minorities: Sorbs, Frisians 
and Danes (parliament and the executive). Consultative bodies may also be mixed: on a particular 
issue affecting an individual minority (i.e. education for Roma children). See Council of Europe, 
Committee of Experts on Issues relating to the Protection of National Minorities, ‘Handbook on 
Minority Consultative Mechanisms’, 20 October 2006, DH-MIN(2006)012,  § 25. In Russia an 
Expert Group on Roma was established in August 2003 (ACFC, (Second) Report by Russia, p. 62), 
but stopped functioning in 2004 (ACFC, (Second) Opinion on Russia (note 133), § 66; 68). There 
was no mention of the Expert Group in Russia’s Third Report to the ACFC, in 2010.  
589
 For example, this is the case in Croatia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Slovak Republic, Slovenia 
and the United Kingdom.  
590
 ‘Handbook on Minority Consultative Mechanisms’ (note 588), § 33. 
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on a single representative body (2008: 443).591 In this way, institutions can 
converge into a single interlocutor, thereby simplifying negotiations. 
While this model may be an example of good practice, international 
standards of minority protection do not delineate precise guidelines, which have 
instead to be devised by individual states. To be sure, it is no easy task to strike a 
satisfactory balance between the establishment of a coherent, effective system for 
minority participation and guarantee minorities independence of action as to their 
own systems of representation. Even in the presence of adequate mechanisms, 
minorities might encounter difficulties in effectively representing their interests 
through these bodies (Marko 2006: 8; Weller 2008: 443). These complexities are 
multiplied in the case of Russia, given the extremely high number of minorities 
residing within its boundaries, and their atomisation into different structures of 
representation.  
 
Participation without Legal Guarantees 
The fourth and last obstacle to NCAs’ effective participation is the inadequate legal 
guarantees provided to them as consultative bodies. Consultative bodies should not 
be seen in a vacuum, but as part of a system providing legal guarantees and judicial 
remedies. The shedding of the requirement of territoriality that cultural autonomy 
implies should by no means create an overly flexible, amorphous system, devoid of 
strong rights and guarantees. NCA theorists argue that NCAs should be guaranteed 
exclusive decision-making in spheres of culture - in the form of constitutionally-
enshrined rights (Nimni 2007: 347). This approach is close to international 
standards relating to the participation of minorities, which call for the legal 
                                                 
591
 The state should avoid preferential treatment of an organisation over another. ACFC, (First) 
Opinion on Romania, 6 April 2001 ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)001, § 67. 
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entrenchment of mechanisms for participation.592 A corollary to this, of course, is 
that such legal provisions must be fully implemented. It means that consultation 
processes should not merely end with recommendations being submitted to the 
relevant governmental bodies: explanations ought to be provided where 
recommendations are not complied with.593  
Russian law and practice on NCAs distance themselves from these 
standards in two ways. First, mechanisms for minority participation are not 
constitutionally guaranteed: provisions are only found in the NCA Law, and there 
has been no sustained effort to implement it (Osipov - forthcoming). Second, the 
vagueness of the legislation means that the rights of NCAs tend to be ambiguous 
and open to interpretation. Respondents (civil society) referred to the fact that the 
NCA Law provides vague provisions on funding from the authorities, without an 
automatic obligation on these bodies to provide such support.
594
 The fact that the 
NCA Law lacks detailed provisions on the relations between NCAs and the 
authorities, and on financing, precludes long-term and fruitful cooperation (Osipov 
2004). The vagueness of the rights of NCAs means that it is difficult to pin down 
what the ‘violations’ are, and therefore to argue them in courts. Thus in the event 
that the authorities fail to provide funding to NCAs, there is no legal redress as the 
NCA Law’s provisions do not establish a legal obligation over financing. Similarly, 
legal vagueness exempts public structures from specific responsibilities to follow 
advice and recommendations originating from NCAs and advisory councils.  
Hence, the environment in which NCAs operate offers scarce opportunities 
for the effective participation of minorities in decision-making. This might be the 
reason why some respondents, cited below, stated what was, in their opinion, the 
                                                 
592
 The ACFC has stressed that ‘it is important to ensure that consultative bodies have a clear legal 
status’. ACFC, Commentary on Participation (note 543), § 107. 
593
 ACFC (First) Opinion on Romania (note 591) , § 66. 
594
 See Section 7.3 above. 
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importance of the nexus between nationality and territoriality. They believed that 
territoriality provided more substantial powers of decision-making and autonomy 
than NCAs. During the Soviet era territoriality advanced the rights of education, 
facilitated the establishment of cultural institutions and promoted languages (Harris 
1993). In post-Soviet Russia, ethnic Russians in the republics of Tatarstan and 
Mordovia are obliged to study titular languages. Although the respondents referred 
to instances of non-compliances with these regulations, as well as to the sometimes 
dubious quality of teaching and language-learning facilities, the regulations 
unequivocally signalled that titular languages enjoyed a special status in the ethnic 
republics.
595
 They were recognised as ‘state languages of the republics’ in the 
republics’ laws of languages.596   
Perceptions as to the importance of territory are illustrated in the following 
excerpts from interviews. The first is from an interview with a scholar from 
Moscow’s Russian Academy of Sciences: 
 
People see that with territorial autonomy much more can be achieved [than 
with NCAs]. [In an ethnic republic] you can have a national theatre, and 
regular financing. In schools there is education, students have to learn the 
[titular] language, there are textbooks, there are strong ethnological 
institutions, culture. People can see the difference, the type of guarantees 
that are there for ethnic groups. NCAs don’t give the opportunity to print 
textbooks and disseminate them - or maybe they can disseminate them but 
they can’t do anything else with them [such as ensuring that they are used in 
school]. [2.20] 
 
A minority activist employed in the Ministry of Education strongly criticised the 
NCA system, saying that cultural autonomy, without territory, is ‘fiction’ [4.14].  
She referred to the special case of Roma, a particularly disadvantaged minority: the 
cultural and educational needs of Roma, she argued, could not be met by an NCA. 
                                                 
595
 See also the RCC’s judgement on the constitutionality of the obligation to study Tatar and 
Russian ‘in equal measure’ in the Republic of Tatarstan (Section 4.2, note 264). 
596
 The only exception in Russia’s 21 ethnic republics is Karelia. 
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She believed that those nationalities benefitting from territoriality have the freedom 
and concrete opportunities to formulate and implement their own cultural and 
education projects in their own regions. She said: 
 
Other nationalities, like Tatars and Bashkirs, have their own territorial 
administrative divisions and own budgets, through which they realise their 
own cultural policies. Those [nationalities] that have no territory […] have 
no opportunity to realise their rights and develop the native culture and 
language. 
 
While territoriality is not synonymous with autonomy and financial prosperity,597 
these statements seem to indicate that there is little faith among Russian experts in 
the ability of NCAs to influence the fate of minorities through participation. Both 
respondents referred to the cultural ‘autonomy’ offered by the NCA system as mere 
‘fiction’. 
 
8.4 Conclusion: More Fiction than Reality 
 
NCAs do not satisfy the participatory rights of minorities in Russia. They offer no 
guarantees that the concerns of ‘ordinary’ persons belonging to national minorities 
will be represented at a higher level. NCAs’ leaders are unelected members of 
individual minorities’ elites. In some cases, they appear to defend their own 
interests in addition to, or rather than, the interests of their fellow minorities. A 
proliferation of consultative bodies fragments and dilutes the voices of minorities, 
defusing their messages. The system is mono-dimensional - with one 
(homogenising) NCA per minority per region - yet also coexisting with an 
(uncoordinated) proliferation of bodies. There are numerous standards on 
participatory rights arising from the ACFC’s Opinions that are not guaranteed in the 
Russian system, namely: the absence of legal entrenchment of the status, role and 
                                                 
597
 See, among others, Alexander (2002). 
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functions of the consultative bodies; the absence of systematic and effective 
exchanges on matters that affect minorities, including legislation; and the failure to 
provide explanations when minorities’ recommendations are not followed.  
Informal networks may benefit minorities in some instances. Yet the 
downside of an overreliance on informal networks is the lack of transparency and 
the absence of a ‘link of accountability’ between the leaders of minority groups and 
minority members. Without strong guarantees and a clear role for NCAs, minority 
leaders and the government alike are exempted from specific responsibilities. 
Ultimately, what happens is ad hoc: minority leaders might help their fellow 
minorities, but also they might not. Public officials might cooperate with minority 
groups, but also they might not. Rather than a pluralistic, coherent and 
institutionalised system, the Russian NCAs system encompasses various leaders at 
the apex of multiple organisations, whose activities are entangled in a web of 
informal networks.  
The recommendations by the ACFC in the area of NCAs have not resulted 
in any alteration of the NCAs structure by the Russian authorities, suggesting that 
international standards are having little or no impact in this sphere. At the end of 
the section on ‘Exclusion’ I address in greater depth the role of international 
standards in the area of participation, including with regard to the issues of internal 
democracy and ‘groupism’ raised above. Before that I complete the outline of 
participatory mechanisms for minorities by introducing the Russian approach to 
remaining vehicles for participation: representation in elected bodies and (non-
NCA) consultative bodies. 
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9. AD HOC CONSULTATION AND (A)POLITICAL 
REPRESENTATION 
 
This chapter concludes the section on ‘Exclusion’. Together with the data from the 
previous two chapters, it addresses the question as to how, if at all, international 
standards can contribute to the effective participation of minorities in decision-
making in Russia. The chapter is divided into three parts: first, I analyse (non-
NCA) consultative mechanisms, and, second, the representation of minorities in 
elected bodies. Third, I bring together the three chapters on ‘Exclusion’ to analyse 
whether international standards can facilitate the transition towards a more 
substantive form of representation for minorities in Russia. As in the case of NCAs, 
I argue that the requirements of Article 15 FCNM are not being met owing to the 
fact that the form of participation offered to minorities is devoid of guarantees that 
it will be ‘effective’. Hence, international standards on minority participation are 
unlikely to induce a substantial shift in minority policies in Russia. The reasons are 
twofold: first, the flexibility of the international standards themselves, and limits to 
their reach; and, second, the Russian mechanisms of participation themselves, some 
of which present features inimical to effective participation.   
 Obstacles to the participation of minorities in decision-making have lead to 
the formulation of minority policies that tend to be centrally-defined and top-down. 
As argued in Chapter 1, this approach has its foundations in a tradition, already 
present in the Soviet period, of managing rather than engaging diversity. In post-
Soviet Russia, although some general mechanisms for participation exist, they are 
not accompanied by guarantees that bottom-up initiatives will be effectively 
elevated to decision-making levels. As previously  noted, this is due to the 
prevalence of informal practices in Russian society (Ledeneva 2006a). This means 
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that mechanisms that ought to enable minority participation are themselves 
immersed in informal practices and as such lack institutionalisation. The ad hoc 
nature of these practices fails to guarantee the accountability of the main actors in 
majority-minority relations: public officials and institutions, and leaders of minority 
groups themselves. Unlike in the cases analysed by Ledeneva with regard to 
business practices and politics, the use of informal networks to advance minority 
interests does not tend to signify a disregard or direct violation of the law, but rather 
it is a (perhaps inevitable) response to the lack of clear, legally-entrenched 
guarantees for minority groups. The absence of guarantees for effective 
participation is shown in relation to what have been identified as the two principal 
forms of participation (Marko 2006): mechanisms for consultation and political 
representation in elected bodies.
598
  
 In addition to NCAs Russia has a plethora of consultative and coordination 
bodies. The types of bodies vary geographically as well as in their format. They can 
be nationality-specific or cover a wider range of issues, including those of 
relevance to minorities. To the first category belong advisory bodies devoted to 
nationalities in city or regional governments, such as the Consultative Council on 
Nationality Issues of Moscow oblast and the National Chamber of Voronezh oblast. 
To the second category belong the previously-mentioned Public Chambers 
(obshchestvennye palaty). These are not specialised bodies focusing on minority 
issues, but they count among their members representatives of minorities. In 
Mordovia, the republic’s Public Chamber is an instrument for minority 
participation, with de facto reserved seats for the three autochthonous nationalities 
(Mordovians - both Moksha and Erzya speakers - Russians and Tatars). Other, 
                                                 
598
 In this chapter I include considerations on elected bodies given that, when minority interests are 
represented therein, they provide a forum for the participation of minorities in all spheres of political 
and social life, including the formulation of policies and legislation on cultural rights. Consultative 
bodies are also seen in the context of participation in decision- and policy-making on cultural 
matters affecting minorities. 
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smaller advisory bodies also exist in Russia, for example at the level of city mayors.  
Discussions are further conducted in institutions such as Houses of Nationalities (in 
Moscow and St Petersburg among the regions visited), and in Congresses of 
Peoples. The latter are institutions established by minorities themselves to advance 
their interests in Russia, and used to manage internal decision-making. The 
presence of public officials at some of the meetings means that they can also 
facilitate dialogue and consultation.  
 Consultative bodies are at times confused with what Weller describes as 
‘mechanisms for coordination’.599 The latter are not mechanisms to facilitate 
consultation, but rather state bodies for the coordination of activities on minority 
issues across governmental bodies. In Russia the epicentre of this activity is in the 
Russian Ministry of Regional Development, and its Department of Inter-ethnic 
Relations. Ministries on nationality issues are also found at the level of the 
republics.
600
 There is permanent representation of the ethnic republics under the 
president - for example, the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Karelia 
under the President of the Russian Federation.
601
 Although these organs can 
facilitate the expression of regional minority interests vis-à-vis the federal 
authorities, they are part of the executive apparatus rather than consultative bodies 
stricto sensu. 
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 ‘Handbook on Minority Consultative Mechanisms’ (note 588), § 19. 
600
 Of the three focus ethnic republics, there were special ministries in Karelia and Mordovia: the 
Ministry of the Republic of Karelia on Issues of Nationalities Policy and Relations with Religious 
Associations; and the Ministry on National Policy of the Republic of Mordovia. In Tatarstan 
nationality issues are incorporated into the work of other ministries, such as the Ministry of Culture 
and the Ministry of Education and Science, and the Cabinet of Ministers itself. 
601
 Established by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 318 of 26 December 
1991 and, in the case of Karelia, by a decision of the Ministry Council of the Republic of Karelia of 
6 February 1992. See http://gov.karelia.ru/Power/Mission/index.html (accessed 1-9-2011). 
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9.1 Consultative Mechanisms: Cooperation or Infiltration? 
 
In his book Virtual Democracy Wilson describes behind-the-scenes manipulation of 
political parties, through infiltration and other illicit measures (2005). Interview 
data indicate that similar patterns might be replicated at the level of mechanisms for 
the representation of minority interests. There is a blurring of the distinction 
between minority consultative mechanisms and the executive, with the same 
persons involved in both. Among others: in 2010 the head of the Federal 
Consultative Council of NCAs was also the deputy minister in the Ministry of 
Regional Development; in 2011 the head of the National Council of Voronezh 
oblast, which advises the governor on nationalities policy, was the governor 
himself;
602
 and the speaker of the Tatar Duma in 2011 was also a member of the 
Assembly of Peoples of Tatarstan - itself a semi-official body, financially supported 
by the Republic of Tatarstan. Joint consultative bodies, formed by minority 
representatives and public officials are not per se contrary to international 
standards. In principle, this type of cooperation can further dialogue, and elevate 
the concerns of minorities to higher levels. For example, in the case of the 
Assembly of Peoples of Tatarstan, the views of minorities could be heard in the 
Tatar Duma through its speaker and member of the Assembly of Peoples. It will 
depend on the circumstances of each case as to whether these mixed consultative 
institutions function as genuine consultative bodies, or effectively just as 
‘mechanisms of coordination’. 
 The respondents referred to public officials attending meetings or being 
members of minority associations per se. For example, the Minister of Culture of 
                                                 
602
 The National Chamber in Voronezh was established by the Decree of the Governor of Voronezh 
oblast No. 300 of 7 September 2010 ‘On the Establishment of the National Chamber of the 
Governor of Voronezh oblast’. It is a permanent consultative organ whose goal is to ‘improve … the 
realisation of national policy on the territory of Voronezh oblast’ (Part 1, Point 2.1).  The decree 
states that the head of the body is the governor of Voronezh oblast (Part 2, Point 1.1). 
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Mordovia in 2011 was also the head of the Association of Finno-Ugric Peoples of 
Russia. A member of the Assembly of Peoples of Tatarstan noted that ‘several 
representatives of ministries’ attend their sessions [4.8]. A member of the Congress 
of Karelians argued that the presence of public officials at their meetings did not 
lead to servility but it meant that issues of concern could be brought directly to the 
attention of public officials; he added that he did not refrain from criticising 
decisions by public officials at these meetings [1.4.1]. At the same time, the 
presence of public officials can develop into monitoring activity. Consultative 
bodies and minority associations might be vulnerable to co-option by the 
authorities. Abramov suggests this scenario in the case of the Inter-regional Social 
Movement of Mordovian (Moksha and Erzya) Peoples Movement (the Movement). 
The Movement operates through a voting system to elect its representatives, and 
has a vertical structure (at district, regional and federal levels). Abramov argues that 
the Movement holds ‘joint meetings with the participation of the state structures of 
power [and] ministers […]’ (2010: 164). He adds that the elections to the 
Movement’s executive committee have been rigged in support of candidates loyal 
to the authorities (2010).  
A respondent, director of an NGO in Voronezh, expressed the following 
view on the National Chamber of Voronezh oblast: 
 
Our regional National Chamber was established by governmental decree. 
And the governor is the head of this body, which shows that it’s not totally 
independent and more of a way for representatives of [national] diasporas to 
be close to the authorities. They don’t raise their voices. They try to deal 
with issues using personal contacts and avoiding media coverage. That 
explains a lot. [1.5.5] 
 
One example - external to the case studies - is indicative of possible political 
manipulation of minority associations. In 2009, when a United Russia MP of the 
Republic of Buryatia became the head of the All-Buryat Association for the 
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Development of Culture, it was described by Nezavisimaya Gazeta as a case of 
‘infiltration’.603 The article argued that the MP, Vladimir Buldayev, was 
handpicked as a Putin loyalist to support the merger of Buryat regions with 
predominantly Slavic ones, which the Association had strongly opposed in 2007. 
The appointment, it was suggested, aimed at de-politicising the activity of the 
Association, transforming it into a loyal body. Interview data suggest that similar 
patterns in the activities of Public Chambers. 
 
Public Chambers: Serving the Public? 
A number of characteristics of Public Chambers
604
 are exemplified by the interview 
with a representative of the Public Chamber for her city (not in an ethnic republic), 
as well as the city Police Department’s Public Chamber. The respondent had also 
been invited to join the Public Chamber for the whole district (the regional Public 
Chamber), but had refused, as discussed below. Neither the respondent’s work nor 
the Public Chambers she had joined focused specifically on minority issues, but this 
interview was selected as an illustration of the dynamics behind Public Chambers, 
given the details provided by this respondent, and her openness in discussing 
controversial subjects.
605
 
 
  
                                                 
603
 Berezin, S. 2-6-2009. ‘Buryatskoi Intelligentsii Podobrali Partiinogo Lidera’ (‘A Party Leader 
was Chosen for the Buryat Intelligentsia’), Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 
604
 The federal Public Chamber was established by Law No. 32-FZ of  4 April 2005 ‘On the Public 
Chamber of the Russian Federation’, to facilitate state consultation with civil society. One third of 
its 126 members are appointed by presidential decree, the others by ‘public associations’. Public 
Chambers, with similar responsibilities and procedures, were also established at the regional level, 
including in the republics. 
605
 Other respondents who were asked questions on discussions in advisory bodies and Houses of 
Nationalities noted that the discussions were on ‘current issues’ affecting minorities, without 
isolating specific cases - despite requests to provide examples during interviews. The reason for this 
vagueness might be that discussions themselves were overly general, not identifying specific issues 
or corresponding solutions. It may have also been a screen protecting the respondents from scrutiny 
by a foreign researcher. 
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Q: How do you find the Public Chamber (PC)?  
 
A: It’s not very efficient in my mind. In general PCs are not really effective, 
probably because they are not formed out of active members of civil society. They 
are formed out of respected members of society, like the deans of universities, 
writers or artists, or actors.  
 
Q: How does it actually work in practice? Is there a programme for meetings? Are 
there decisions and recommendations?  
 
A: Usually there is an agenda and we all receive it by email beforehand. At the 
meeting we discuss the items on the agenda. The chairperson will give us some 
information at the beginning, then there is an open discussion, and then we decide 
what we can do to raise the issue [discussed] before the mayor’s office or before the 
city Duma, or how we could involve civil society, for example in dealing with the 
fires […].606 We involve organisations that we represent and our friends’, we use 
our networks to bring help. We also decided to send a representative of the city PC 
to each session of the city Duma […].  Still I believe this is not all what we can do 
for optimal effectiveness…  
 
Q: Have you felt any pressure in the PC?  
 
A: Well, sometimes they sort of push us to agree with certain decisions. It might 
not be that serious but still I don’t like it when it happens. Like the last time we 
voted on the ‘honoured citizens’ of our town […].  This year we all received the 
portfolios of seven people who were nominated, and basically I was told who had 
to be picked. I said: ‘what if I don’t want this particular person?’ And it was 
explained to me that the mayor and the head of the PC had already met and decided 
that those two would be preferable, so [they said] ‘we kindly ask you to vote for 
these people’. They have their own games that are not transparent and democratic. 
Maybe these two are good people - in fact I wanted to vote for one of them. But I 
don’t like it when I’m being told what to do. Or once last year […] we were invited 
to an event to plant trees in the city, initiated by the members of the PC. I went and 
I found a lot of people with signs of United Russia (UR). And I didn’t like it, I 
don’t want to be associated with UR, if it’s an event to plant trees. So they 
exploited that as well, because the head of the PC is a [public] official from UR, so 
he probably decided to combine the two things to show that he is also doing 
something for UR.  
 
Q: Do you feel that certain decisions that concern the PC are being made at the top 
(as in the ‘honoured citizens’ episode)? Are instructions handed down?  
 
A: I can’t say for sure, because those instructions would mostly be given to a 
chairperson, and then he would be promoting certain ideas, when discussing things 
with us. Then another question is whether the members of the PC themselves want 
to be independent. I feel that they are quite passive, I don’t see any active initiative, 
something substantial […] [besides the] little things that they would also do within 
their NGOs or institutes, universities, or [legal] clinics. [What they do] is so small 
                                                 
606
 Wildfires affected Russia in the summer of 2010, due to the high temperatures and drought. A 
state of emergency was declared in seven regions of Russia.  
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and irrelevant, and if they wished to do something major, I think they could, but 
they don’t raise these issues that are uncomfortable for the authorities. 
 
In a second interview the same respondent added: 
 
The PC is a small step towards more transparency. The police PC is more effective 
than the regional PC, there are more possibilities. It’s an individual thing, the head 
of the police [in our town] is quite charismatic, and the administration is more 
closed than the police. In other regions it could be the opposite, like in [Town X
607
], 
where there is a better administration. 
 
To raise an issue you don’t need to be a member of the [regional] PC. But if you are 
a member they will use you 10 times more than you benefit from them. They will 
say that a decision has been approved after discussion with the PC, and will not 
even tell you the details of the decision. Your name will be there. They will abuse 
your name, your good reputation. That’s why I did not want to get involved. At 
least in the city PC and in the police PC we have some control […]. 
 
In our society the further away you are from the authorities, the more respect you 
get from civil society. If people see you sitting with the authorities you lose your 
independence. In a PC [the authorities] can use you to cover their own stuff. If you 
are everywhere [in many different bodies] and you try to sell yourself you can get 
many advantages [...]. I have a special ID from being the member of the police PC 
but I never showed it to anybody. I could show it to people when I need to […]. 
Some of the members of the PC are there only to have this police ID and avoid 
possible conflicts - for example, if they are stopped by the police when they drive. 
Or otherwise [being on these bodies] can be useful if you have a business. 
Normally the authorities can put pressure on you through tax inspections and fire 
regulations. If you have affiliation with the authorities you don’t have these 
problems. It has nothing to do with law and democracy. The system is abused by 
both the authorities and civil society, who try to get personal gain. The PC is more a 
platform for people to raise their profile and it’s not independent. 
 
To summarise, this respondent believed that: membership in the PC can be sought 
for opportunistic reasons; the PC can be used by its members and the authorities 
alike to further their interests; where PC membership is not abused, its members 
might tend towards passivity; the benefits that the PC may provide to society are 
variable, and depend on individuals and regions. In the particular circumstances of 
her region, the respondent believed that the PC members had more freedom in the 
city and police PCs, and less so in the regional PC, headed by the governor. 
                                                 
607
 Not specified in the interests of confidentiality. 
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Another respondent, working for the Russian human rights ombudsman in 
Moscow came to similar conclusions. He believed that the function of the PC 
system, which should be that of a ‘social parliament’, was not realised in Russia. 
He identified two reasons. First, he said, some of the members of PCs were ‘not 
experts’ in human rights or social issues. Second, the members had only limited, 
and variable, influence:   
 
The PCs’ members can get the authorities’ attention [on particular issues] 
but they can’t change the system. Sometimes they can raise some issues, 
complain vigorously […]. If there is a very bad bill they might be able to 
stop it […]. When issues are raised there can be publicity, through the 
media […]. But the effectiveness of PCs depends. Mostly it only amounts to 
discussions […]. Their role is purely consultative and there is no obligation 
to follow their recommendations. It’s important to what extent the leader [of 
a PC] is authoritative. Some PCs are very servile. In some cases it’s possible 
to have some influence, in others it’s just a beautiful façade. [1.5.3] 
 
Another respondent, a member of St Petersburg’s city PC, similarly noted that ‘the 
PC can only make recommendations’. The authorities could simply respond to PC’s 
recommendations by noting that there were no funds to realise them [1.2.9].
608
 She 
had, however, observed that when funds had become available in 2010 for a two-
year project, the PC’s suggestions for a project had been accepted by the local 
authorities.   
Several points can be drawn from the interview data. First, they indicate that 
there are no measures, such as rules on conflicts of interest, to guarantee that those 
who join these bodies do not abuse their networks and influence for personal 
advantage. Second, the members tend to be ‘respected’ persons, but not necessarily 
with a specialisation in human or minority rights. Only part of the members are 
nominated or appointed by civil society, including minority groups,
609
 raising an 
                                                 
608
 She added that the PC in St Petersburg had only existed for a few months at the time of the 
interview, complicating its assessment. 
609
 In the case of PCs, two thirds of the members are appointed by ‘public associations’, the others 
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issue of representativeness; and the groups that do nominate or appoint may well be 
part of the same web of informal networks described in Chapter 8. Some exceptions 
were also noted, with reference to appointments as PCs’ members of persons 
known for their political independence [1.5.2].  
The representatives of semi-state structures on nationality issues such as 
Houses of Nationalities noted in interviews that they were open to any group that 
wished to approach them [1.3.6; 1.3.7]. The interviews with stakeholders did not 
reveal cases in which the opposite was true. At the same time, the problem rests on 
the ineffectiveness of the system of consultation. There are no specific advantages 
to its being fully inclusive, as it is ultimately ineffective. A respondent, the 
representative of a minority NGO in St Petersburg, expressed the following views 
on the meetings held in the House of Nationality in her city:  
 
A: Sometimes the discussions are important because you meet other people, 
colleagues. It’s good to know that there is a place where people can meet. 
The discussions sometimes are constructive, sometimes they haven’t been 
well prepared - they are too spontaneous.  
Q: At these meetings can you provide feedback on events [organised by the 
House], and recommendations for future events? 
A: This feedback hasn’t been requested. Usually the approach is: the event 
took place, all was good, and who was there [...]. [1.2.11]
610
 
 
After examining consultative bodies, I now turn to the second form of participation 
of national minorities: participation in the political life of the country and 
representation in elected bodies. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
by the executive (see note 604). 
610
 She further noted that most meetings were held in the afternoon, meaning that minority 
representatives in full time employment could attend only with difficulty. She had not been given 
the option of feeding into the discussion by email. 
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9.2 (A)political Participation of Minorities 
 
In Russia special measures for the presence of minorities in elected bodies do not 
exist, while legislation stipulates that political parties cannot be established on the 
basis of professional affiliation, racial, ethnic or religious identity.611 This particular 
provision was found constitutional by the RCC on the grounds that the existence of 
these parties could exacerbate existing ethnic or religious tensions.612 The ACFC 
has criticised the excessive breadth of this form of pre-emptive measure,613 and 
stated that ‘it is essential that persons belonging to national minorities have a 
possibility to pursue their legitimate interests also through political parties’.614 
Moreover, the ban is incompatible with Lund Recommendation No. 8, on the 
‘formation and activity of political parties’, stating that the principle of freedom of 
association ‘includes the freedom to establish political parties based on communal 
identities’.615 Albania, which, like Russia, has prohibited the establishment of 
political parties by minorities, lifted the ban in 2000;616 Russia has not done so.
617
 
The potential scope of the Russian provision arguably goes even further than the 
banning of ethnicity-based political parties. If broadly interpreted, it could be used 
to ban political parties simply for including in their platforms advocacy designed to 
further the interests of national minorities.618 The ban is hardly needed to exclude 
minority issues from politics: for example, in 1995, before the ban was established, 
                                                 
611
 Article 9(3) of Law No. 95-FZ of 11 July 2001 ‘On Political Parties’.  
612
 RCC, Judgement of 15 December 2004, No. 18-P, ‘Concerning the Orthodox Party of Russia’, on 
Article 9(3) of the Law No. 95-FZ of 11 July 2001 ‘On Political Parties’’.. 
613
 ACFC, (Second) Opinion on Russia (note 133), § 162.  
614
 ACFC, (First) Opinion on Russia (note 133), § 69.  
615
 Lund Recommendation (note 131).  See also PACE Recommendation 1201 (1993) ‘On an 
Additional Protocol on the Rights of National Minorities to the European Convention on Human 
Rights’, 1 February 1993. The proposed text of Article 6 states: ‘All persons belonging to a national 
minority shall have the right to set up their own organisations, including political parties.’  See also 
Weller (2005: 440). 
616
 Albania’s legal reform was welcomed by the ACFC. See ACFC, (First) Opinion on Albania (note 
418), § 42; 72. 
617
 The Tatar opposition nationalist party Ittifak remained banned in 2011. 
618
 Shadow Report submitted to the ACFC, 2006 (note 467), § 341. 
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the 5% threshold for parliamentary access was insurmountable for any single ethnic 
group. The Muslim bloc ‘Nur’ had less than 1% of votes. At the same time, the fact 
that most minorities are small and dispersed means that there is no wooing of their 
representatives by the main parties to attract ethnic votes (Moser 2000: 83). 
Electoral reform has created new challenges for smaller parties. Legal 
requirements were introduced in 2004, stipulating that political parties must have 
regional branches in at least half of Russia’s federal subjects, while a political 
party’s minimum membership requirement was raised from 10,000 to 50,000 
members. 619 The following year, a 7% threshold to access representative bodies, up 
from 5%, was introduced, along with a prohibition on the formation of electoral 
blocs.620 This has diluted the influence of the regions as political players (Hashim 
2005: 36) - and advanced centralisation policies.
621
  
 
Minorities in Parliament Representing… United Russia 
Even if minorities do not have their own political parties, their representatives can 
still reach elected bodies.
622
 Representation in elected bodies is seen as a sine qua 
non for the effective participation of minorities. As Hofmann writes:  
 
[A] seat in elected bodies is seen as a necessary requirement for effective 
political participation. In my opinion, this means that there are good 
                                                 
619
 Articles 3(2)(b)(5) of Law No. 95-FZ (note 611), following the adoption of Law 168-FZ of 20 
December 2004 ‘On the Amendment of Federal Law ‘On Political Parties’’. The requirement was 
upheld in the RCC, Judgement of 1 February 2005, No. 1-P, ‘Concerning ‘The Baltic Republican 
Party’ in the Kaliningrad region’. The ACFC noted that the requirement to have regional branches in 
at least half the subjects impairs the ability of minorities concentrated in a particular territory to form 
political parties. ACFC, (Second) Opinion on Russia (note 133), § 261. 
620
 These requirements were introduced through Law No. 93-FZ of 21 July 2005 ‘Amending the 
Laws of the Russian Federation on Elections and Referenda and other Legal Acts of the Russian 
Federation’.  Subjects of the Russian Federation, however, may set lower thresholds in their own 
Dumas. Shadow Report submitted to the ACFC, 2006 (note 467), § 342. The amendments to 
election legislation were criticized not only by the ACFC, but also by the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe. See Resolution CM/ResCMN(2007)7 (note 134), Point 1(b).   
621
 The ACFC recommended a revision of the electoral system, with a view to introducing 
modifications to enhance the effective participation of persons belonging to minorities. ACFC, 
(Second) Opinion on Russia (note 133), § 265.   
622
 On minorities and elections, see also the OSCE Warsaw Guidelines to Assist National Minority 
Participation in the Electoral Process, 2001.  
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arguments to consider the mere existence of consultative mechanisms […] 
as not sufficient for effective political participation. (Hofmann 2006: 13) 
 
As noted in the Explanatory Note to Lund Recommendation No. 7, states should 
establish electoral systems that will result in a representative government, 
particularly by facilitating adequate representation of national minorities.623 The 
ACFC has stressed the need for small, non-territorial minorities to also be 
guaranteed representation.624 Special measures for minority representation might 
involve different forms of proportional representation, the use of quotas, and the 
lowering of, or exemptions from, threshold requirements to access legislative 
bodies.625 More broadly, Article 21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights states that ‘The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of 
government.’626 The Russian Constitution offers solid foundations for this, by 
enshrining the principle that ‘[t]he bearer of sovereignty and the only source of 
power in the Russian Federation shall be its multinational people.’ (Article 3(1)) 
[italics added] 
A margin of appreciation in devising special measures for electoral 
representation is afforded to states - yet they are responsible for ensuring that 
measures are effective.627 When low levels of representation of national minorities 
have been noted in the parliaments of the member states, the ACFC has encouraged 
                                                 
623
 Explanatory Note, Lund Recommendations (note 131). 
624
 See for example the ACFC, (First) Opinion on Switzerland (note 409), § 76. 
625
 Lund Recommendations and Explanatory Note (note 131), Point 9. In particular, this will 
facilitate access to elected bodies by smaller minorities (Weller 2005: 443-4). 
626
 Provisions of this kind are also found in the ICCPR (Article 25) and the ECHR (Article 3, 
Protocol 1). See also the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human 
Dimension of the CSCE, 1990, § 6.  
627
 For example, ACFC, (First) Opinion on Hungary, 22 September 2000, 
ACFC/INF/OP/I(2001)004, § 49.  
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the adoption of measures to rectify this.628 An inclusive decision-making process is 
particularly important in decisions that are likely to affect minorities directly.629 
Special measures for minority representation are not employed in Russia.630 
It is a decisive rupture with the Soviet system, with its highly-regulated model for 
minority representation based on korenizatsiya.631 The absence of special measures 
affects primarily smaller, non-titular minorities, particularly the dispersed, non-
territorial ones, such as the Roma. This deficiency is captured in the statement of a 
Roma activist interviewed in Moscow, who stated: 
 
The Roma [in Russia] are nationalities without status […]. The situation of 
Tatars, for example, is very different. Tatars are represented in Ministries. 
They have their own Ministry of Education in Tatarstan [4.14]. 
 
This is borne out by the comments of a Tatar activist and a member of a Tatar 
National Cultural Autonomy: 
 
The head of the federal Tatar National Cultural Autonomy is also an MP. I 
can call him any time. I can also go to the Duma any time [1.1.5]. 
 
A substantive minority like the Tatars can benefit from both territoriality and 
contacts. Similarly, despite the exclusion of smaller groups, in practice there have 
been, overall, high levels of representation of minorities in both federal and 
regional representative bodies.632 But what type of representation is it? Pitkin 
differentiates between two types: descriptive and substantial. As already noted, 
descriptive representation means that representatives resemble, or are even a 
                                                 
628
 For example, ACFC, (First) Opinion on the United Kingdom, 20 November 2001, 
ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)006, § 126.   
629
 For example, ACFC, (First) Opinion on the Czech Republic, 6 April 2001, 
ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)002, § 70. 
630
 The ACFC criticised the removal, in 2004,  of quotas for indigenous people in the Dumas of 
Russia’s federal subjects - a move defined as a ‘step backwards’ in the implementation of the 
FCNM’s Article 15. ACFC, (Second) Opinion on Russia (note 133), § 260. The provision in 
question (Article 13 of the 1999 Law No. 82-FZ, ‘On the Guarantees of the Rights of Small-in-
Number Indigenous Peoples’) was repealed by the 2004 Law No. 122-FZ (note 519). 
631
 See Section 2.3. 
632
 This has been welcomed by the ACFC. ACFC, (Second) Opinion on Russia (note 133), §  258. 
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replica, of the represented (Pitkin 1967). One example would be a minority group 
represented by persons belonging to the same minority, hinging on the assumption 
that the representatives and represented strive towards the same goals. Substantive 
representation is not based on this assumption, and instead requires that 
representatives ‘be responsive to the people’ they represent [italics added] (Pitkin 
1967: 232). Through analysis of the legislation adopted by the Duma,633 Chaisty 
shows that in the second (1996-1999) and third (2000-2003) Dumas there was a 
degree of substantive representation of minority interests, but that this was much 
reduced by the United Russia party predominance in the fourth Duma (2004-2007); 
at this stage numerous minority leaders joined its ranks (Chaisty - forthcoming). 
What happened between the third and fourth Duma? 
 
United Russia, the ‘Power Vertical’ and the Duma: Political 
Homogeneity 
Among the most wide-ranging repercussions of Putin’s centralised power structure 
has been the creation of a solid parliamentary majority since 2003 under United 
Russia, a party strongly associated with Putin himself as its leader.634  As a 
consequence the Duma has effectively been incorporated into the ‘vertical of 
power’, shaping its performance to accommodate the demands of the executive 
(Chaisty 2006). For national minorities United Russia’s predominance in 
Parliament has consolidated the predominantly descriptive nature of minority 
representation.  
                                                 
633
 In the Soviet period there were also high levels of minority representation in Parliament, which in 
practice was ‘negatively correlated with power and influence’ (Chaisty - forthcoming). 
634
 Putin officially became the leader of United Russia in 2008. Even prior to 2008 the party was 
widely regarded as reflecting Putin’s interests. The parliamentary elections of 4 December 2011 saw 
a reduction of the seats for United Russia from 70% of seats (2007 elections) to 53%. Although the 
decrease is substantial, United Russia continued to count on an absolute majority. 
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Moser shows that while representatives of geographically concentrated 
minorities in Russia tend to be elected by their co-ethnics, this is not the case for 
those minorities that are more dispersed: these minorities enter Parliament through 
‘support from the Russian majority’ and through ‘assimilation’ (2008). In ethnic 
regions local minorities receive more votes, but local politics is dominated by the 
party apparatus: in turn, non-Russian elites seek integration into power politics 
(Moser 2000: 89). Moser also shows a shift from the 1990s, when ethnic federalism 
tended to further minority representation, to Putin’s centralisation policies in the 
2000s, and the resulting marked increase in clientelism and voting manipulation. 
Vote rigging has become more common in the ethnic regions than in the Russian 
ones (Moser - forthcoming). Meanwhile, an overwhelming majority of MPs 
belonging to ethnic minorities have joined United Russia in the fourth Duma. The 
2006 Shadow Report on Russia to the ACFC argues that ‘[e]thnic activists wishing 
to stand in elections become totally dependent on federal political parties.’635 The 
leaders of minority organisations636 interviewed tended to be affiliated to or actual 
members of United Russia. This assimilation is not in any ethnic sense, but a 
political one: assimilation to United Russia.  
While formally encompassing a multitude of ideologies and positions, in 
fact United Russia truly accommodates none. A respondent, the director of a human 
rights NGO in Russia, called United Russia a ‘party of bureaucrats’, in which the 
interests of national minorities, ethnicity, even forms of Russian nationalism, are 
unimportant. What matters are the particularistic interests of those in power, closely 
associated with the Putin-Medvedev duo. She put it this way: 
 
                                                 
635
 Shadow Report submitted to the ACFC, 2006 (note 467), § 342. 
636
 More frequently National Cultural Autonomies rather than NGOs. See Chapter 8 on National 
Cultural Autonomies.  
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In Chechnya for instance there are no ethnic Russians among the 
authorities
637
 but they are all members of United Russia and when 
Chechnya organises elections the entire population votes for United Russia 
[...].638 Bureaucracy is all that people care about, and if you are a member of 
United Russia you can become a public official, a functionary, [and then] 
you have privileges, you have good cars, you have businesses, nobody will 
touch you. People who are in power are all members of United Russia… I 
feel they just created this kingdom of United Russia, pro-Putin bureaucrats 
[...]. In all regions the governor is also the head of United Russia… 
Regional leaders are not fighting for their right to be independent, they want 
to be ‘the same’, part of the network and matrix of power […]. [1.5.5] 
 
This form of personalised politics is a breeding ground for informal practices. On 
the basis of such practices, the many minority leaders who have joined United 
Russia might further the interests of their fellow minorities - but equally they might 
not. They are in parliament not by virtue of their own minority status, providing 
substantive representation on the basis of a political platform incorporating 
minority interests, but as members of United Russia. Persons belonging to 
minorities as ‘minority representatives’ can only sit in consultative bodies.  
Additionally, it needs to be pointed out that the Duma is in itself a weak 
institution, and legislative decisions take place primarily outside it: 
 
The legislative work of the Parliament and the government became much 
more closely integrated [under Putin] than had been the case in the previous 
Dumas: conflicts on legislation were effectively reconciled before bills 
received their official ‘readings’ in the assembly. These informal 
arrangements for resolving disputes before legislation was introduced […] 
means that the lobbying opportunities for distributive amendments afforded 
by the previous regime were restricted (Chaisty 2006: 195). 
 
A respondent, a public official and representative of a minority, reported an 
analogous interpretation of the adoption of Law 309. She said that, as an employee 
of the Ministry of Education, she had been invited to submit recommendation to 
                                                 
637
 According to the 2002 census, ethnic Russians in Chechnya only amounted to 3.7% of the 
population (against 93.5% Chechens). 
638
  In the 2007 Duma elections United Russia had over 99% of the vote in Chechnya. See RIA 
Novosti. 3-12-2007. ‘United Russia Wins Over 99% of the Vote in Chechnya’.  
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20071203/90609389.html (accessed 30-6-2011). 
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draft Law 309, but she believed this to be an empty exercise as the Duma already 
‘had a plan’ to adopt the law without changes [4.14].  
The Duma does not serve as an effective counterbalance to the executive, 
including in the areas of federalism and nationalities policy. United Russia has 
created a web of connections whose common feature is loyalty to the centre. Rather 
than representing the interests of citizens of and the regions, United Russia is a 
mechanism for the management of the loyalties of ‘bureaucrats’ at various levels of 
the executive (Goode 2010: 242). Minorities in the Duma are primarily 
representatives of United Russia rather than representatives of minority interests 
(Chaisty - forthcoming). 
 
9.3 International Standards: Towards Substantive 
Representation? 
 
Can international standards assist in the introduction of a more substantive form of 
representation in Russia? I focus on two issues raised in the chapters on 
participation: the representation of minority interests in elected bodies, and the 
(moral) responsibility of minority leaders towards those they represent. In the 
second case, I address international standards particularly with regard to the issue 
of ‘groupism’ raised in Chapter 8. 
As noted above, the mere presence of minorities in elected and consultative 
bodies is not sufficient to meet the criteria of ‘effective participation’. The ACFC 
has also noted the importance of influence.639 For example, it commented on 
administrative reform proposed in 2004 in Denmark, by which the German 
minority in Denmark would have seats in municipal councils but without voting 
                                                 
639
 For example, it criticised the limited impact of Romania’s Council of National Minorities. 
ACFC, (Second) Opinion on Romania, 23 February 2006, ACFC/OP/II(2005)007, § 188.  
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rights. The ACFC noted that the absence of voting rights would much weaken ‘the 
room for political manoeuvre’.640 The ACFC has also brought the state parties’ 
attention to the fact that minorities in parliament can be outvoted, stripping them of 
opportunities to genuinely impact on decision- and law-making on matters that 
affect them. Despite this, Verstichel argues that the Council of Europe’s ACFC, 
along with the UN and OSCE, traditionally have primarily focused on the 
‘presence’ of minorities in elected bodies (2010: 87), thereby mostly attaching 
importance to descriptive forms of representation. With regard to Russia, the ACFC 
was broadly positive about the descriptive representation in the Duma, with 
approximately 30 national minorities represented.
641
 Persons belonging to 
minorities can vote in Parliament, being themselves MPs - so they ostensibly have 
the wherewithal to exercise influence on law-making. The issue of possible 
outvoting, and the resulting disempowerment of minority groups, has not been 
raised by the ACFC in the case of Russia - presumably owing to the fact that there 
appear to be no instances of minorities being outvoted when pursuing legal 
initiatives aiming at accommodating minority interests. This is primarily because of 
the very few laws on minority issues adopted in the period covered by the thesis 
(Chaisty - forthcoming). Two considerations are of relevance. First, the fact that 
persons belonging to minorities vote in Parliament does not automatically result in 
representation of minority interests, if we, as Verstichel does, differentiate between 
‘participation’ and ‘representation’. Participation involves (usually temporary) 
affirmative action to ensure the presence of minorities in elected bodies - for 
example to rectify present or past patterns of discrimination. Representation refers 
to the promotion of minority interests. The fact that the Russian Duma has no 
                                                 
640
 ACFC, (Second) Opinion on Denmark, 11 May 2005, ACFC/INF/OP/II(2004)005, § 167. See 
also Marko (2006). 
641
 ACFC, (Second) Opinion on Russia (note 133), § 258. 
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parties or individuals MPs devoted to minority interests lessens the chances of such 
interests being represented. MPs belonging to national minorities provide only 
descriptive representation, and may or may not advance the interests of their fellow 
minorities. Second, as already noted, the Duma is an ineffective body where 
dominant political forces prevail. Hence, descriptive representation in the Russian 
Duma means very little indeed. 
Another complexity is the issue of internal democracy of minority groups. The 
state needs to ensure the effective participation of minorities in decision-making. At 
the same time, the state is under an obligation not to interfere with the work of 
minority groups, so as to respect their right to free association.
642
 In this context, how 
can issues around group inclusiveness be addressed? Should the state intervene to 
guarantee that a ‘link of accountability’ between representatives and represented is 
indeed forged? To answer this question, a distinction has to be made between the 
electoral systems established by the state and the internal regulation of minority 
organisations. In the first case, the state has an obligation to intervene to guarantee 
the effectiveness of the systems it has established. For instance, the ACFC called 
upon Hungary to intervene directly to guarantee the ‘credibility of the system’ of 
minority representation in Hungary’s mechanisms for elections to local self-
government.643 The creation of local minority councils had led to the ‘cuckoo 
phenomenon’, or the running for elections to these councils of persons not 
belonging to the relevant minority, occupying seats reserved for minorities. These 
candidates engaged in ‘ethnobusiness’ - an expression designating the abuse of 
                                                 
642
 Article 11 ECHR and Article 22 ICCPR.  
643
 ACFC, (First) Opinion on Hungary (note 627), § 52. It was established by the 1990 Hungarian 
Act 64 ‘On the Election of Mayors and Local Council Representatives’. 
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opportunities for minority representation to pursue personal political or economic 
ambitions (Carstocea 2011).644  
The state is responsible for striking a balance between under-regulation and 
over-regulation, by establishing effective participatory systems without infringing 
the rights of minorities. In the ACFC’s Second Opinion, Russia was criticised for 
(regional) legislation of the Republic of Dagestan, regulating minority presence in 
local councils and the republic’s Duma. The legislation allocated districts to the 
republic’s main ethnic groups, mandating that only representatives of those groups 
could run for elections in the relevant districts. Despite guaranteeing (descriptive) 
representation, it impinged on the freedoms of minority representatives, by forcing 
them to identify with their ethnic background, while self-identification with a 
national minority should be exclusively by individual choice.645 The ACFC later 
welcomed the provision’s amendment,646 and the introduction of two distinct lists of 
candidates - one for persons who identified with national minorities and one for 
those who did not.  
In the Hungarian and Russian cases the ACFC recommended, respectively, 
increased and decreased regulation. The overarching principle in the two cases 
consists in the state responsibility to guarantee the effectiveness and credibility of 
systems of representation, while protecting the freedoms of minorities. Protsyk 
                                                 
644
 This form of ‘ethnobusiness’ was made possible in Hungary by the 1993 Hungarian Act 57.The 
Act established the right to choose one’s identity, meaning that anybody could declare his/her 
identification with a national minority. The Hungarian majority could then cast votes and be elected 
for seats meant to be for minorities. See Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 1999. ‘Report on the 
Situation of Minorities in Hungary’. http://www.minelres.lv/reports/hungary/hungary_NGO.htm 
(accessed 3-6-2011).  
645
 See Article 3(1) FCNM: 
Every person belonging to a national minority shall have the right freely to choose to be treated or not 
to be treated as such and no disadvantage shall result from this choice or from the exercise of the 
rights which are connected to that choice [italics added]. 
Forcing members of national minorities into ethnic categories regardless of their wishes has been 
considered by the ACFC as impinging on the rights of minorities on the basis of Article 15 taken in 
conjunction with Article 3 FCNM. ACFC, (First) Opinion on Russia (note 133), § 104. It has been 
suggested that in some extreme cases even rigid measures involving ethnic categorisation might be 
indispensable as the only avenue to further minority rights - not renouncing, however, to a degree of 
flexibility through periodic reviews (Hofmann 2006: 14). 
646
 ACFC, (Second) Opinion on Russia (note 133), § 259.  
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argues for the employment of additional measures, grounded on transparency, to 
enhance the accountability of elected representatives (2008). States, he believes, 
should make public roll-call data (the records of legislators’ votes) and speeches at 
parliamentary sessions (2008: 470-1).647 These data reveal individual legislators’ 
behaviour, enabling stakeholders to make informed electoral choices. 
The situation with regard to the internal management of minority 
organisations is significantly different. Literature on international standards on 
minority protection has devoted little attention to the principle of internal 
democracy. Certainly it is an issue: the freedom of minorities to self-organise risks 
the monopolisation of resources by ethnic entrepreneurs, when ‘leaders’ choose to 
prioritise their own interests over the group’s. And, as has been shown in this 
chapter, descriptive representation is not sufficient for effective participation - 
especially when based on essentialist and reductionist attitudes to the group. In all 
countries, minority groups’ commitment to social inclusion reflect the degree of 
responsiveness to the concerns of group members (Protsyk 2008: 472-3). These 
vary. 
Weller argues that minority organisations themselves have obligations of 
accountability and transparency (2008: 431) - yet this can only be construed as a 
moral responsibility towards the members of the group, rather than a legal 
responsibility. What about a possible state responsibility? The issue of group 
dissenters in the context of representation has been considered by the ECtHR with 
regard to religious minorities.
648
 The ECtHR has upheld the importance of 
pluralism and tolerance. In Serif v Greece it ruled:
 
 
 
                                                 
647
 These data could also be made available for MPs who are not minority representatives, as they 
reveal the (majority) legislators’ attitudes to matters that impact upon minority concerns. 
648
 See also Pentassuglia on the issue of group dissenters in international law (2009). 
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Although the Court recognises that it is possible that tension is created in 
situations where a religious or any other community becomes divided, it 
considers that this is one of the unavoidable consequences of pluralism. The 
role of the authorities in such circumstances is not to remove the cause of 
tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups 
tolerate each other.
 649
 
  
The scope of pluralism, as interpreted by the ECtHR, was tested in the case 
Cha’are Shalom ve Tsedek v France.650 The case related to two groups within the 
Jewish community in France, with differing practices on the ritual slaughter of 
animals as per the Jewish religious prescriptions. Access to slaughterhouses was 
granted to the Jewish Consistorial Association of Paris (ACIP), to which most Jews 
in France belong, but not to the splinter religious association Cha’are Shalom ve 
Tsedek, which intended to adhere to the strictest orthodox rules through more 
rigorous checks on slaughtered animals. The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR ruled 
that there had been no interference by France with the right to freedom of religion 
(Article 9) taken in conjunction with the right to freedom of discrimination (Article 
14). The decision rested on the close similarity of ritual practices of the two groups 
- which meant that the principle of pluralism was not held to have been undermined 
by the French state. However, a significant number of judges dissented (seven out 
of 17 judges of the Grand Chamber) indicating an absence of clear consensus on 
this issue.  
 The seven dissenting judges considered ‘inappropriate’ the Grand 
Chamber’s statement that the applicant association could have reached an 
agreement with the ACIP.
 651
 This was not, however, linked to a requirement of 
inclusiveness in public or religious life, but rather to the issue of discrimination, 
given that only one of the two associations was granted the requested access to 
                                                 
649
 Serif v Greece, Application No. 38178/97, 14 December 1999, § 53. The importance of religious 
pluralism was also stressed in Manoussakis and Others v Greece (note 491), § 44; and Kokkinakis v 
Greece, Application No. 14307/88, 25 May 1993, § 31. 
650
 Application No. 27417/95, 27 June 2000. 
651
 Joint dissenting opinion of judge Nicolas Bratza and others, Point 2. 
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slaughter houses. It was ruled, instead, that a state can legitimately interact with 
preferred interlocutors rather than with a plurality of groups, for logistical reasons:  
 
We certainly do not disregard the interest the authorities may have in 
dealing with the most representative organisations of a specific community. 
The fact that the State wishes to avoid dealing with an excessive number of 
negotiating partners so as not to dissipate its efforts and in order to reach 
concrete results more easily, whether in its relations with trade unions, 
political parties or religious denominations, is not illegitimate in itself, or 
disproportionate.
652
 
 
It was the granting to only one religious institution of ‘the exclusive right’ to 
authorise ritual slaughterers that failed the test of religious pluralism.
653
 The 
applicant implicitly agreed: the institution had not specifically referred to an issue 
of representativeness of the Jewish community, but simply sought to obtain 
permission to practice rituals according to its own convictions.  
There are, then, limitations to the principle of pluralism as upheld by the 
ECtHR. The ACFC has much more clearly spelled out the need to involve different 
groups in negotiations - particularly in decision-making on issues affecting 
minorities - indicating international law’s trajectory towards a greater appreciation 
of diversity within the same minority. Yet, even in this case, the approach to 
pluralism is that of pluralism between groups - equality being understood as 
equality between groups. In reality there are three layers of diversity: different 
national minorities (e.g. Tatars and Mordovians in the case of Russia); different 
groups within the same minority (e.g. Tatar NCAs and Tatar NGOs); and in-group 
diversity (e.g. individual Tatars): of these, the ACFC concerns itself only with the 
first two. The ACFC approaches pluralism as a state responsibility to involve all 
groups in negotiations, without favouring one group, or one organisation 
                                                 
652
 The dissenting judges referred to The Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v. Sweden, Application No. 
5614/72, 6 February 1976, § 46. 
653
 Joint dissenting opinion (note 651) Point 2. 
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representing a group, over another. Under international law, complexities in 
internal (in-group) democracy may effectively only be resolved through the 
formation of splinter groups, themselves formed through the exercise of their right 
to association, and themselves having access to debates on matters than concern 
them through the principle of pluralism (of groups).  
International law does not venture so far as to regulate relations between the 
members of a group and their leaders. In the case of advisory councils, the state 
must guarantee permanent and constructive exchanges.654 Minorities, however, 
organise their own leadership. In practice, the representativeness of groups depends 
on both the authorities (state actors) and the minority organisations (non-state 
actors). Weller believes that the two share an ‘equal burden of responsibility’.655 
Despite this, the imposition of legal requirements on minority organisations would 
unequivocally amount to interference in their internal operations. Thus, 
international law cannot reach deep down to the complexities posited by the 
relationships between leaders and ordinary members of minority groups, and 
eradicate hindrances to wide and accountable representation. In this case, 
shortcomings in the representation of minority interests are not due to a possible 
recalcitrance by Russia to apply international standards, but to the fact that 
standards in this area simply do not exist. 
  
 
 
                                                 
654
 Some of the advisory councils may be hybrid institutions - counting among their members both 
minority representatives and public officials. Weller argues that if the government retains influence 
on consultative councils (‘a practice not to be encouraged’), the government is responsible for their 
effective functioning (2005: 450). He refers to the ACFC, (First) Opinion on Croatia, where the 
Croatian government was urged to review the ‘appointment procedures, structures and working 
methods’ of bodies working on minority issues. 6 April 2001, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)003, § 63.  
655‘Handbook on Minority Consultative Mechanisms’ (note 588), § 63. 
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9.4 Conclusion: No Impact? 
 
This chapter has revealed numerous challenges to the implementation of 
international standards in the area of minority participation in Russia. Political 
parties cannot be formed by minorities, while there is no substantive minority 
representation in the Duma. In the absence of guarantees for the representation of 
minority interests in elected bodies, consultative mechanisms automatically acquire 
an even greater significance - having to compensate for the absence of the other 
building block to participation. The participatory rights of minorities are to be 
exclusively channelled through the one remaining outlet. At the same time, 
consultation mechanisms are fragile, devoid of effective legal guarantees which 
would enable minorities to have impact upon decision-making in matters that 
directly concern them. 
 Minorities are not utterly excluded from decision-making in Russia, but 
inclusion depends on circumstances rather than on formal systems guaranteeing 
representation and participation. Meanwhile, the political centralism established by 
the ‘power vertical’, with its non-democratic appointment processes, reinforces 
those arrangements, already present during the Soviet period, that see many leaders 
of minority groups directing their allegiance to the federal authorities rather than 
the ethnic groups they supposedly represent.  
The situation is complex. At the federal level, a system of co-decision or 
veto powers would likely be untenable due to the extremely high number of 
minorities in Russia, a situation which could easily paralyse the legislative bodies. 
Meanwhile, if specialised political parties were established by minorities, in 
practice the conditions of minorities might not ultimately see concrete improvement 
because of electoral manipulation and the Duma’s own ineffectiveness. At the same 
time, the presence of these parties, or the freedom to establish them, may carry 
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symbolic weight, as it would introduce formal processes for minorities’ entry into 
politics. In 2011 there was no political party platform incorporating the protection 
of the rights of minorities in parliament. 
 Most of the principles originating from the ACFC in the area of 
participation are not met, while, in turn, ACFC Opinions - the main source of (soft) 
law for participation, given the miniscule international jurisprudence - do not 
provide sufficient incentives or guidance to induce or facilitate compliance in 
Russia. The Russian authorities have ignored the fact that ethnicity-based political 
parties should be permitted to exist. Exchanges for consultation are sporadic, lack 
institutionalisation and are mostly inconclusive. Recommendations that may arise 
from consultative bodies tend not to produce state responses, in the absence of 
requirements to follow such recommendations, or to provide justifications for not 
complying with them. It results in an only apparent compliance with international 
standards - with descriptive representation in the Duma and the existence of 
consultative bodies, but not in actual representation of minority concerns. 
Ultimately, there is no marked distinction between the general cooperation of civil 
society and the authorities described in Chapter 7, and ‘official’ mechanisms for 
consultation. They replicate the same patterns, with an analogous precariousness 
resulting from dependence on circumstances and individuals.  
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      CONCLUSION 
 
Russia is, as it has always been, a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic country. There are 
schools teaching a myriad of minority languages, in many cases teaching through 
the medium of these languages. There are governmental institutions, both at the 
federal and regional levels, working to promote minority cultures and languages. 
These efforts are the continuation of a long tradition of attention to diversity - made 
imperative by the coexistence of a plurality of ethnicities in Russia. And, 
admittedly, minority issues are extremely complex. The state must create a form of 
integration that stops short of assimilation; provide the opportunity to preserve 
minority cultures and languages - if minorities so wish - that does not lead to 
segregation; and balance out the right to equality with special measures for 
minorities, including affirmative action.   
The thesis illustrated the dynamics in the application of international 
standards on minority rights in Russia, revealing how these practices often contrast 
with formal standards – both international and sometimes domestic. It delineated 
the conditions that contribute to, or frustrate, these standards.  It has argued that the 
implementation of international standards is affected by current political, as well as 
socio-economic, processes as well as specific legacies and practices from Russia’s 
(particularly Soviet) past. 
Despite the differences between the three case studies in terms of size and 
resources, the issues that affected them tended to be similar. The main recorded 
difference between the three ethnic groups was the higher consciousness of national 
identity of the respondents in Tatarstan, which at times resulted in more 
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pronounced activism and greater awareness of nationality issues. Even this had 
limited practical impact, as the levels of ethnic and political mobilisation, after an 
upsurge in the 1990s, decreased again in the 2000s (Gorenburg 2003: Giuliano 
2011). Then, diverging opinions and interpretations between respondents were 
linked to their profession and type of relations with the establishment, rather than 
ethnic affiliation. This can be explained by the fact that the size and resources of 
ethnic groups or ethnic republics did not provide guarantees, in all cases, of 
autonomous, or effective participation in, decision-making in relation to cultural 
matters. Given the centralised tendencies of the Russian state, all national 
minorities are at risk of being affected by the homogenising impulses of the state, 
and receive limited protection in preserving their cultural distinctiveness given the 
laissez-faire attitudes of the Russian government. I therefore do not differentiate 
between nationalities in the conclusions, but present overarching themes.  
The findings support Keck and Sikkink’s theory on ‘transnational advocacy 
networks’, regarding the existence of networks transcending physical borders. 
Russia should not be seen as a unitary, essentially homogeneous, polity, in relation 
to values, or legal culture. Some of the respondents in the thesis seemed to fully 
share the values underlying international standards on minority rights - although the 
essentialist, folkloristic approach to minorities tended to prevail. Diverging 
approaches to legality and international standards were present not only among 
different groups of respondents but also within the same group, for example among 
judges. The fact that some judges more enthusiastically than others applied 
international standards indicates that transnational networks have reached some 
parts of the judiciary. 
It can be speculated that attitudes to international law were primarily shaped 
by the practices of the environment within which individual respondents operated, 
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instead of, or jointly with, personal choice. Thus, public officials and civil society 
representatives closer to the establishment tended to espouse traditional views of 
minority cultures (with minority issues being perceived as related to ‘culture’ rather 
than ‘rights’). The judges’ environment can be characterised by instances of 
political pressure (including what Popova calls ‘strategic pressure’ - 2012),656 in 
addition to structural difficulties such as precarious financial conditions which, in 
turn, affect the application of international standards.  
Meanwhile, Russian legal history is littered with legal borrowings from 
Western Europe, revealing legal and cultural traditions that have not proceeded on 
two parallel, and completely separate trajectories. The framing of Russia as 
‘different’ by some respondents might be linked more to a perception of difference 
rather to real difference, or as a means for the Russian authorities to justify a refusal 
to undergo unwanted change. 
 The remaining conclusions are divided into the following areas: Russia’s 
selective implementation of international standards; tensions between localism and 
centralism; homogenisation; and participatory rights. I conclude by reflecting on 
what would need to change in Russia for a more comprehensive implementation of 
international standards in the area of minority rights. 
 
International Law and Minorities: Selective Implementation 
The phenomenon of legal transplantation, or the incorporation of external norms 
into the domestic sphere, is complex. The type of legal transfer analysed in this 
thesis involves a set of international legal commitments, voluntarily entered into, 
that are incorporated into domestic law, in an attempt to render the two 
interlocking, and as part of one functioning mechanism. The scholarship on 
                                                 
656
 See Section 4.1. 
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Europeanisation and EU conditionality shows that processes of domestic 
transformation through international norms is not always predictable, and 
adaptational pressure not always effective.
657
 To this has to be added the issue of 
causality – by which the causal relation between international pressure and 
domestic change may well remain tenuous. If this is so with regard to the coercive 
capacity of EU conditionality, it is more so in the case of the Council of Europe, 
which only has at its disposal only the ‘mobilisation of shame’ when a country 
refuses to comply with its obligations (Keck & Sikkink 1999: 97). Despite this, 
legal reform has been undertaken by Russia after joining the Council of Europe in 
1996 and after becoming a state party to the FCNM and the ECHR two years later. 
While difficulties remain, the increasing application of the ECHR in Russian 
courts, demonstrated by Russian and international authors, as well as interviews for 
this study, reveal incremental steps towards the implementation of the standards 
contained in these instruments. Hence, the reason for the success of some forms of 
legal transplants cannot be found solely in external influence imposed on a vaguely 
compliant but reluctant state. Primary and secondary data indicate that Russia may 
perceive benefits in being a member of the international community, including for 
pragmatic and utilitarian reasons. Thus, the ECHR and its case law are increasingly 
referred to in Russian courts. In legal proceedings, the Council of Europe has 
introduced a third layer above the Russian authorities and civil society - that of a 
supranational body, with the opportunity for everyone in Russia to submit cases to 
the ECtHR. This is a relatively new form of empowerment which can lead to highly 
significant legal precedents.
658
 Similarly, the Council of Europe’s ACFC Opinions 
and Committee of Ministers recommendations provide an alternative interpretation 
                                                 
657
 See Chapter 2, with reference to Hughes et al (2004), as well as others. 
658
 For instance, as described in Section 4.2, a parent submitted a case to Strasbourg over her 
daughter’s inability to take her final exam in the Tatar language. 
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of the Russian government’s nationality discourse, counteracting the over-
simplification of the nationality question as filtered through a narrative of 
‘tolerance’ and ‘extremism’. The ACFC focuses on minority rights - rather than 
generally on the preservation of national cultures and languages.  
At the same time, the fluidity and flexibility of international minority rights 
law has helped to produce Russian legislation and practice that are, themselves, 
flexible. This phenomenon is similar to that of EU conditionality, which has been 
judged to be fluid and imprecise in some areas - such as regional policy (Hughes et 
al 2004) - and devoid of specific benchmarks to measure compliance (Grabbe 
2001). Similarly, the flexible nature of international standards on minority rights, 
together with official Russian attitudes and practices, has generally prevented these 
rights from being translated into precise domestic legal obligations. The flexible 
nature of international minority rights law means that it is unable to reach down to 
solve the complexities posited by informal practices and centralised decision-
making combined with laissez faire. The absence of legal entrenchment of 
mechanisms for the realisation of minority rights in Russia has resulted in 
difficulties in pinning down what constitutes a ‘violation’. There are no clear 
obligations on Russian public officials, nor have precise targets been set. The 
Russian jurisprudence in this area is minimal. While the ECHR has entered Russian 
legal practice through the ECtHR’s and Russia’s own jurisprudence, the judges 
interviewed had very little experience of the application of international standards 
in the area of minority rights. Few ECHR judgements on issues relating to minority 
rights mean that, until more pre-packaged legal principles emerge from the ECtHR, 
the onus remains on Russia to solidify its flexible application of international 
standards in this area.  
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International standards may provide an alternative view to that which 
equates a diverse society with a potential threat - all too often ‘resolved’ by keeping 
minorities trapped within a controlled essentialist (and folkloristic) approach. This 
alternative discourse may coexist with and potentially ultimately penetrate, and 
revitalise, the current minority discourse. For example, the FCMN Opinions have 
introduced what in Russia is a novel way of approaching consultation: the fact that 
minority groups possess not only a right to participate in discussions and 
parliamentary debates, but also to influence policy-making. The role of 
international law might be to shake the Russian authorities out of their complacent 
attitude towards minorities - an attitude exemplified by the Russian government’s 
insistence that it fully complies with the FCNM. 
It has been argued in this thesis that Russia is resisting international pressure 
and selective aspects of its international obligations in order to preserve its own 
(Russian) way of approaching the nationality discourse. One example is its delay in 
the ratification of the ECRML, thereby postponing indefinitely the selection of real 
and specific commitments on the active promotion of minority languages. 
International standards are not designed, in the interests of state sovereignty, to 
reach deep enough to reverse these patterns. The potential impact of international 
standards is further reduced by their being dichotomised into two extremes: the 
focus on victims in specific cases for the ECHR, and on flexible and general 
arrangements for the FCNM.
659
 The state parties to the two conventions can 
harmonise and integrate these two processes, but they can also operate at the 
margins of both.  
 
                                                 
659
 Moreover, the FCNM, but not the ECHR, involves a collective dimension in the enjoyment of 
particular rights. Article 3(2) FCNM states that ‘persons belonging to minorities may exercise the 
[FCNM] rights [...] individually as well as in community with others.’ 
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Localism versus Centralism 
I have argued that the absence of precise, comprehensive legal frameworks for the 
promotion of the cultural rights of minorities has compounded a shift towards 
cultural homogenisation in Russian society. I have referred to ‘localism’ as 
encompassing the phenomenon by which nationalities policy becomes fragmented 
and lacks coherence. While localism provides the flexibility to develop mini-
policies at the local level, much is left to the goodwill of individual actors. This is 
when informal practices and networks come into play: as they are highly dependent 
on individual public officials and minority leaders, and their own particularistic 
needs and wishes, special measures become further atomised.  
Localism has alternated with forms of centralism, by which the centre has adopted 
policies or legislation that have an impact on minorities without their consultation 
or involvement. Although some respondents provided examples of consultation, 
such as in compiling some of the federal educational standards, other policies 
examined in the thesis were centrally-conceived. These included policies on: 
minority education (marginalising minority languages and cultures); de-
federalisation (merging Slavic with ethnic regions); and de-ethnification (favouring 
a Russian patriotic rather than a genuinely multicultural discourse). More widely, 
centralising measures have involved a widening democratic deficit through the 
replacement of elections to key positions with appointments. This has 
simultaneously downgraded ethnicity, resulting in the Russian authorities 
effectively retreating from international standards for the protection of minorities 
and their cultural distinctiveness. The dilution of diversity is not the only collateral 
damage of centralisation: it can also contribute to tensions. Several authors have 
warned about the potential risk of tensions in centralising policies (Artobolevskii et 
al. 2010; Bowring 2010a; Cashaback 2003; Goode 2010; Melvin 2007). 
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Russii-centred Homogenisation  
The Russian Federation has inherited both ethnic pluralism and Soviet methods to 
regulate it, particularly its ethnic federalism. Former President Putin’s leadership 
saw a departure from earlier nationalities policies towards new forms of 
homogenisation which command greater uniformity and a strong emphasis on a 
Russian identity - policies that have continued under the Putin-Medvedev ‘tandem’. 
Putinite homogenising policies have promoted the development of a common 
loyalty, a joint identity unifying the country’s nationalities, which acts to 
simultaneously downgrade (non-Russian) ethnicity and reassert Russianness. 
Although presented as a form of civic, rather than ethnic, nationalism, the general 
Russian (rossiiskii) patriotic discourse borrows from Russian (russkii) cultural 
themes. The homogenising measures are not necessarily born of a quasi-
imperialistic desire to Russianise national minorities, but may simply derive from a 
drive to strengthen and mainstream the state. Thus, the relationship of the Putin-
Medvedev leadership to ethnicity is complex: the party representing the leadership, 
United Russia, is devoid of a discernible ethnic dimension and is rather seen as a 
‘party of bureaucrats’; at the same time, the leadership makes use of Russian 
patriotic messages to convey the image of a strong Russia. The activism of persons 
belonging to minorities, as minorities, is confined to the cultural sphere; but these 
same persons are not discouraged from entering politics as United Russia 
representatives - essentially, if they are politically streamlined. Weller’s argument 
on minorities’ integration is also relevant:  
 
[M]embers of minorities could not participate in governance and in the 
economic and social life of the state as members of their respective 
minorities in the absence of a flourishing minority cultural environment 
[italics added] (2005: 431).  
 
 324 
The absence of such an environment would cause persons belonging to minorities 
to simply assimilate with the majority - politically as well as culturally. 
 In the area of education, one of the problems plaguing the system is the 
systemic lack of funding. To adverse socio-economic circumstances one has to add 
new developments in the sphere of language such as the introduction of Russian-
only exams and Law 309. These have effectively elevated the Russian language and 
culture to a condition sine qua non for (economic, social and political) success, 
giving the Russian language a veneer of superiority. With the exception of 
committed activists, interviews revealed a perceived need for an either-or choice by 
minority members, within which full integration into the Russian culture was 
equated with economic and social welfare, while a decision to maintain one’s 
original identity implied a possible sacrifice in status. Some persons belonging to 
minorities have thus chosen assimilation with the Russian culture, or selected 
aspects of it, as dictated by practical considerations - for example by sending their 
children to Russian-language schools to maximise their job prospects.  
The predominance of the Russian language and culture is also favoured in 
the media. While official pronouncements by the country’s leaders featuring in the 
media refer to a multi-national and multi-religious Russia, in practice the media 
does not reflect Russia’s cultural pluralism. Ongoing efforts to preserve minority 
cultures take place primarily within small oases for minorities.  
Similiarly, the notion of overarching civic Russianness, which I have called 
the ‘new Russian citizen’, has not being conceptualised through an all-inclusive 
process. It does not amount to a fusion of (majority and minority) cultures, or to the 
selection of common elements from a plurality of cultures which are all afforded 
equal respect. Rather, upgrading quintessentially Russian symbolism, while 
simultaneously downgrading non-Russian ethnicity, signals that the Russian culture 
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is ‘dominant’. Thus, minority cultures are ‘tolerated, in Žižek’s interpretation of the 
word (2011: 46), rather than placing an emphasis on their understanding 
appreciation and respect of minority cultures - rather than their ‘tolerance’, in 
Žižek’s interpretation of the word (2011: 46).660 As the national media is the only 
source of information that reaches the entire population of Russia, Russian 
patriotism is being produced and disseminated for mass consumption. As the 
number of minority schools decreases, and many parents opt to send their children 
to Russian schools, the media acquires an increasingly dominant role as the new 
‘teacher’, shaping social attitudes to diversity. This scenario is one in which 
minority cultures are seen as the concern of minorities only, rather than their being 
conceived as enriching, and being intertwined with, society as a whole.  
The Russian leadership’s objective seems to be that of maintaining the 
status quo through a ‘managed’ marginalisation of minority cultures. Some 
respondents discerned a pattern by which the authorities, while to some extent 
accommodating minorities, and certainly not openly repressing them, prevented 
alternative ethnic identities from flourishing - thus confining them to marginal roles 
in Russian society. Whether blaming homogenising tendencies on specific 
governmental efforts or socio-economic conditions, some respondents belonging to 
minorities held the view that advancing Russianisation, or even globalisation, could 
no longer be stopped.  
 
Fictitious Participation 
I analysed two different forms of participation: consultative mechanisms and 
political representation. In Russia there are no guarantees that the concerns of 
minorities will be represented in elected bodies, as no special measures to this 
                                                 
660
 See Section 2.2. 
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effect exist. Meanwhile, consultative mechanisms are afflicted by the absence of 
guarantees of effective participation. Several underlying causes were identified: 
among them, the fact that the environment in which civil society operates is fraught 
with complexity, including burdensome bureaucratic requirements and at times 
official harassment over technicalities; and the fact that consultative bodies (for 
minorities and civil society generally) may only issue loose recommendations to 
law- and policy-makers, to which the authorities have no obligation to respond. The 
main instruments of consultation, National Cultural Autonomies (NCAs), are in 
themselves an inadequate response to the requirements of Article 15 FCNM. ACFC 
Opinions recommend that consultative bodies be ‘institutionalised’,661 and that the 
state ‘fully support and consult’ minority councils and ‘establish constructive 
cooperation’.662 The flexibility of international standards means that in practice the 
Russian government can establish a façade of consultation. A tendency to 
ineffective consultation might be a historical legacy of managing, rather than 
engaging, diversity. International standards on minorities’ participatory rights are 
unable to break through barriers excluding minorities and civil society generally 
from mainstream politics and policy-making; consequently minority concerns do 
not reach the public discourse - with the exception of a generalised, simplified 
discourse of ‘tolerance’ or ‘extremism’, which does not reflect the depth and 
multiple layers of minorities’ variegated opinions and concerns. Additional issues 
that emerged from the interviews include: the restriction of the scope for 
consultation and lobbying which are the result of Putin’s undemocratic reforms and 
the ‘power vertical’; and the authorities’ disinclination to engage in a discourse of 
minorities’ linguistic and cultural rights as opposed to cultural programmes. 
                                                 
661The ACFC does not define the exact meaning of ‘institutionalisation’, although it is linked to 
regular and systematic consultation. ACFC (Second) Opinion on Switzerland, 2 September 2008, 
ACFC/OP/II(2008)002, § 22.  
662
 ACFC (Second) Opinion on Croatia, 13 April 2005, ACFC/INF/OP/II(2004)002 § 167. 
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Attempts to disassociate ethnicity and territory with the formation of NCAs 
have not yielded positive results. NCAs, which should uphold the participatory 
rights of minorities, are afflicted by the same malaise as numerous other institutions 
in Russia: a clan mentality and a loyalty to the centres of power. While ‘special 
relationships’ are forged between some NCA leaders and the authorities, other 
persons belonging to minorities are marginalised and voiceless, with no access to 
true political representation. International standards are unable to reach to the root 
causes of ineffective consultation: the exclusion of ethnicity-based political parties 
from the political sphere and the missing ‘link of accountability’ between 
representatives and represented in non-elected bodies. This last issue is one of the 
main inhibitors to effective participation - and no provisions in international law 
exist to address it, with the exception of some (still) embryonic jurisprudence.  
If we accept Verstichel’s view that IGOs have primarily focused on the 
presence of minority representatives in elected bodies rather than the representation 
of their interests (2010: 87), we conclude that groupism, or the inability to unpack 
the multi-layered complexity of minority groups, is not seen as a problem under 
international law. There ought to be not only an appreciation of differentiated 
citizenship as a way to establish group representation (Young 1989; 1990), but also 
an acceptance of the multidimensionality within a group. The shortcomings of 
groupism highlighted in Chapter 8, based on Brubaker’s arguments, are combined 
in Russia with the prevalence of informal practices in minority-majority relations. It 
can be argued that, with regard to groupism, the Russian government is not only 
refraining from interfering with internal decision-making of minority groups, but 
rather facilitating a system that favours negotiations with particular individuals, at 
different levels - by not institutionalising the relationship between the state and the 
minority organisations, and not realising possible recommendations from minority-
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based advisory councils. The prevalence of ‘negotiations’ is the consequence of a 
reliance on informal networks, and of a system with a tradition of handpicking 
loyalists. At the same time, among minority leaders there are of course varying 
degrees of professionalism, commitment, and differing priorities. The way in which 
minority leaders choose to use their networks is circumstantial. For some minority 
leaders the main drive is the genuine representation of the group’s interests; others 
(more or less evenly) juggle private interests with those of the groups; for a third 
category of minority leaders private interests prevail over group interests. The 
reliance on informal practices and networks reduce the independence and 
assertiveness of civil society vis-à-vis the organs of power, with ethnicity-based 
organisations shaping their programmes around government priorities, so as to 
access funding and other opportunities.  
 
What Next? 
In this thesis I have described a situation in which international standards have 
exerted little influence over the advancement of minority rights in Russia. 
International law is neither supreme nor acting in full harmony with domestic law. 
Russia maintains a balance between sufficient engangement to reap some benefits 
(trade-related or other) from adherence to international systems, without fully 
immersing itself in them. This is the situation when a country, for example, adopts 
legislation upholding the rights of minorities, but de facto abuses this same 
legislation, and refuses to bend to the pressure of international bodies in selected 
cases. I suggest that additional factors are required for a more comprehensive 
implementation of international law in the area of minority rights: its bona fide 
application, the respect and appreciation of civil society, and the respect and 
appreciation of diversity.  
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 The application of international law in good faith is one where there is a 
political will to implementation, rather than a selected effort primarily aiming at 
creating a façade of minority rights protection. A respondent cynically argued that 
‘Russia is very good at writing reports’ [2.12]663 to international bodies - implying a 
craft in projecting a positive international image without substantially engaging 
with its legal obligations. While it has been argued that the legal entrenchment of 
minority rights, and the crystallisation of state responsibilities, would facilitate the 
upholding of minority rights, legal provisions are a necessary but insufficient 
condition for minority rights. There has to be a further effort that may not be 
amenable to legal codification. Marko argues: 
 
[T]he best legal instruments for “effective participation” cannot “ensure” 
this goal if there is not a political climate and willingness of inter-ethnic 
dialogue and co-operation to give the members of national minorities a 
voice which is also “taken seriously.” Hence, in the end, not more or other 
legal instruments are necessary, but the full implementation of the 
instruments in place linked with much more effort to provide for the goals 
foreseen in Article 6 of the Framework Convention, namely to create “a 
spirit of tolerance and intercultural dialogue and take effective measures to 
promote mutual respect and understanding and co-operation.” Hence, the 
“effectiveness” of Article 15 of the Framework Convention has to be seen in 
the entire context of the Framework Convention, since the creation of 
tolerance and intercultural dialogue is a task to be achieved through the 
education system, the media and civil society empowerment […] (2006: 9).  
 
Marko traces a continuum between the upholding of minority rights through 
participation and a favourable political climate, and commitment to inter-cultural 
dialogue - to be realised within the spheres of education, media and civil society. 
The centralising tendencies of the Russian regime do not provide a ‘favourable 
political climate’, while, as we have seen, media and education are not, or are only 
partially, employed to advance inter-cultural dialogue. Similarly, a respondent, a 
representative of a minority organisation, said:  
                                                 
663
 Already cited in Section 3.4. 
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Many things have to be changed before the voices of minorities will be 
needed. They might be heard now but they are not needed [1.2.5]. 
 
Minorities’ opinions might be voiced during discussions, but their input is not used 
(‘needed’) to formulate policies. This approach closely resembles Žižek’s 
‘tolerance’ (2011: 46): these voices are tolerated, opinions allowed to be 
articulated, but the Russian authorities do not need them. They are a superfluous 
addition to policy-making. This approach is expressed in the management of 
diversity rather than engagement with it, and tends to lead to ghettoisation rather 
than integration.  
Another respondent argued for the need for societal change as the condition 
for the full effect of international standards to be felt. The respondent was a lawyer 
who had worked on cases related to freedom of expression and was referring to 
international human rights standards generally, rather that minority rights law per 
se. The cases on which she had worked had resulted in adjudications in favour of 
freedom of expression. She was asked whether these judicial decisions may 
advance a climate for greater respect of human rights:  
 
These decisions change the legal practice and court practice. To change the 
journalists’ practice is [different]. It’s editorial policy, it’s independence 
from the founders, from businesses, from authorities. It’s changing of the 
whole media business. Until [the media situation] changes, [media outlets] 
won’t be able to survive independently from financial resources given to 
them for being loyal, either from businesses, or from authorities, or from 
United Russia. 
 
We are going back, then, to informal practices. These practices hold captive large 
areas of Russian society, such as civil society and the media, which are themselves 
essential to the construction of a spirit of tolerance and inter-cultural dialogue, as 
well as for the upholding of human rights. True respect for other nations and 
cultures is bound up with democratic development (Pain 2005: 366), which is 
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contingent upon the emancipation of institutions (civil society, education and 
media) from their dependency on the centre, and from policies based on cultural 
programmes rather than cultural rights.   
The current complexities are not about an intrinsic incompatibility of 
international law and the Russian culture and society, but about aspects of the 
Putin-Medvedev leadership, and a series of legacies from the Soviet period, that are 
inimical to international standards’ application in the area of minority rights - the 
same factors that are responsible for a growing democratic deficit. Yet, although 
Putin’s popularity was high early in 2011,664 one should not assume a perpetual 
‘power vertical’. It would not be the first case of Russia taking a sharp turn that 
alters its destiny. 
 
 
                                                 
664
 Although a decline in Putin’s approval ratings were registered by polls by the Levada Center 
(from 78%  in 2010, to 72% in January 2011, to 66% in October 2011), they remained high. Data 
reported in Kulikov, A. 28-1-2011. ‘Medvedev and Putin’s Popularity Declining?’, Pravda.ru. 
http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/28-01-2011/116698-medvedev_putin-0/ (accessed 1-3-2011); 
and Tabakov, I. 9-11-2011. ‘Poll Shows Drop for Putin Party’, The Moscow Times. 
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
SUMMARY OF RESPONDENTS 
 
 1.1  civil society - (National Cultural Autonomy) (6 respondents) 
 1.2  civil society - minority NGO (11) 
 1.3  civil society - cultural association (7) 
 1.4  civil society - congress of peoples (3) 
 1.5  civil society - human rights NGO (11) 
 2  academia (23)  
 3  media (11) 
 4  public official (18)  
 5  school employee (2)  
 6  judiciary (3) 
7  Council of Europe (5) 
  
 
Cities where the interviews took place: 
Petrozavodsk  
Moscow (3 visits) 
Tver 
Kazan 
Saransk (2 visits) 
Voronezh 
St Petersburg 
Strasbourg 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Ethnic Group: 
KAR      Karelian 
MOR        Mordovian 
RUS       Russian 
TAT       Tatar 
TKAR     Tver Karelian 
MIN        Minority (other than the three case studies) 
 
Cities: 
KAZ  Kazan 
MOS  Moscow  
PETR  Petrozavodsk 
SAR  Saransk 
STPB   St Petersburg 
VOR  Voronezh 
STR  Strasbourg 
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1.1 MINORITY ASSOCIATION 
 
Code  Respondent City M/F  Ethnic 
group 
Interview 
date 
 
1.1.1 Leader of the NCA of a minority in Petrozavodsk  PETR M 
 
MIN (a) 21/05/10 
1.1.2 Leader of the NCA of Tver Karelians 
 
TVER F TKAR 03/06/10 
1.1.3 Representative of the youth branch of the NCA of 
Tver Karelians  
TVER M TKAR 04/06/10 
1.1.4 Representative of the youth branch of the NCA of 
Tver Karelians 
TVER M TKAR 04/06/10 
1.1.5 Representative of the Tatar NCA for the Moscow 
oblast  
MOS M TAT 01/06/10 
1.1.6 Leader of a Federal NCA  
 
MOS M MIN (b) 18/10/10 
 
 
1.2 MINORITY NGO 
 
Code  Respondent City M/F Ethnic 
group  
Interview 
date 
 
1.2.1 Director of a minority NGO, activist for a Finno-
Ugric minority (NGO #1) 
PETR F MIN (c) 21/05/10 
1.2.2 Activist in an NGO promoting Karelian language 
through projects in the area of education (NGO #2) 
PETR F KAR 24/05/10 
1.2.3 Director of an NGO promoting inter-ethnic 
tolerance (NGO #3) 
MOS M MIN (a) 25/05/10 
1.2.4 Representative of an NGO promoting a minority 
culture (NGO #4) 
MOS M MIN (a) 13/10/10 
1.2.5 Representative of an NGO promoting inter-ethnic 
tolerance (NGO #5) 
MOS M MIN (b) 21/02/11 
1.2.6 Leader of a minority association (NGO #6)  VOR M MIN (d) 14/10/10 
 
1.2.7 Leader of a minority association (NGO #7) 
 
VOR M MIN (a) 14/10/10 
1.2.8 Representative of an NGO promoting a minority 
culture (NGO #8) 
STPB F MIN (e) 22/10/10 
1.2.9 Representative of an NGO promoting a minority 
culture (NGO #8)  
STPB M MIN (e) 23/10/10 
1.2.10 Representative of an NGO promoting a minority 
culture (NGO #9) 
STPB F MIN (f) 24/10/10 
1.2.11 Representative of an NGO promoting a minority 
culture (NGO #10) 
STPB F MIN (g) 25/10/10 
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1.3 CULTURAL ASSOCIATION 
 
Code  Respondent City M/F Ethnic 
group 
 
Interview 
date 
1.3.1 Director of a Centre of National Cultures, 
Petrozavodsk 
PETR F MIN (c) 19/05/10 
1.3.2 Deputy Director of a Centre of National Cultures, 
Petrozavodsk 
PETR F KAR 19/05/10 
1.3.3 Project Manager of a Centre of National Cultures, 
Petrozavodsk 
PETR F KAR 20/05/10 
1.3.4 Representative of the House of Nationalities in 
Moscow  
MOS M MIN 11/10/10 
1.3.5 Representative of a Centre of Cultures of Finno-
Ugric Peoples, Saransk 
SAR M MOR 21/06/10 
1.3.6 Representative of the House of Nationalities, St 
Petersburg 
STPB M TAT 22/10/10 
1.3.7 Representative of the House of Nationalities, St 
Petersburg 
STPB F RUS 22/10/10 
 
 
1.4 CONGRESS OF PEOPLE 
 
Code  Respondent City M/F Ethnic 
group 
Interview 
date 
 
1.4.1 Representative of the Congress of Karelians  
 
PETR M KAR 20/05/10 
1.4.2 Representative of the World Congress of Tatars  
 
KAZ M TAT 11/06/10 
1.4.3 Leader of the Inter-regional Social Movement of 
Mordovian (Moksha and Erzya) Peoples; academic 
SAR M MOR 17/06/10 
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1.5 HUMAN RIGHTS NGO 
 
Code  Respondent City M/F Ethnic 
group 
Interview 
date 
 
1.5.1 Lawyer for a human rights NGO (NGO #11); 
academic specialising in minority issues 
MOS M RUS 25/05/10 
1.5.2 Director of a human rights NGO (NGO #12); 
academic  
MOS F RUS 11/10/10 
1.5.3 Representative of a human rights NGO (NGO #13), 
also working for Russia’s human rights ombudsman 
MOS M RUS 20/10/10 
1.5.4 Representative of an human rights NGO, working 
on financial and fiscal matters (NGO #14) 
VOR F RUS 13/10/10 
1.5.5 Director of a human rights NGO (NGO #14) 
 
VOR F RUS 16/10/10 
1.5.6 Representative of a minority; cooperating with a 
human rights NGO (NGO #15) 
STPB F MIN (h) 25/10/10 
1.5.7 Representative of a human rights NGO, working on 
minority issues, with a focus on Roma (NGO #15) 
STPB F RUS 25/10/10 
1.5.8 Representative of a human rights NGO, working on 
minority issues, with a focus on Roma (NGO #15) 
STPB F RUS 25/10/10 
1.5.9 Specialist on inter-ethnic tolerance in schools; 
cooperating with a human rights NGO (NGO #15) 
STPB M RUS 25/10/10 
1.5.10 Representative of a human rights NGO (NGO #16) 
 
STPB  F RUS 25/10/10 
1.5.11 Director of a human rights NGO (NGO #17) STPB  
 
M RUS 26/10/10 
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2. ACADEMIA 
 
Code  Respondent City M/F Ethnic 
group 
Interview 
date 
 
2.1 Representative of the Pedagogical Academy, Petr; 
representative of the Congress of Karelians 
PETR F KAR 19/05/10 
2.2 Karelian language expert; member of Orthographic 
Commission for the Karelian language 
PETR F KAR 19/05/10 
2.3 Professor of Karelian and Veps languages, Faculty 
of Philology, Petrozavodsk State University 
PETR M KAR 20/05/10 
2.4 Sociologist at the Karelian Research Centre, 
Russian Academy of Sciences 
PETR M TKAR 20/05/10 
2.5 Professor, Department of Russian, Tver State 
University; member of the NCA of Tver Karelians 
TVER F TKAR 04/06/10 
2.6 Researcher, Institute of History of the Academy of 
Sciences of Tatarstan (ASRT); Tatar activist  
KAZ M TAT 09/06/10 
2.7 Researcher, Institute of History, ASRT, Department 
of Tatar Education 
KAZ M TAT 09/06/10 
2.8 Sociologist, Institute of History, ASRT, Department 
of Ethnology  
KAZ 
 
F TAT 09/06/10 
2.9 Sociologist, Institute of History, ASRT, Department 
of Ethnology  
KAZ 
 
F TAT 09/06/10 
2.10 Representative of the Russian Islamic University of 
Kazan  
KAZ M TAT 10/06/10 
2.11 Language teacher, Kazan State University; working 
on methodologies to teach minority languages 
KAZ F RUS 14/06/10 
2.12 Institute for the Development of Education of 
Tatarstan; former Minister of Education, Tatarstan 
KAZ M TAT 14/06/10 
2.13 Academic, Kazan State University; Tatar activist 
 
KAZ M TAT 15/06/10 
2.14 Academic, Dept of History of Peoples of Russia, 
Mordovian State University; Mordovian activist 
SAR M MOR 20/06/10 
2.15 Academic, Institute Ethnology and Anthropology, 
Russian Academy of Sciences (IEA - RAS)  
MOS M RUS 26/05/10 
2.16 Academic, IEA - RAS  
 
MOS F RUS 26/05/10 
2.17 Analyst, Canergie Moscow Center  
 
MOS M RUS 28/05/10 
2.18 Scholar; former presidential advisor (under Yeltsin) 
on nationality issues 
MOS M MIN (b)  21/09/10 
2.19 Researcher, IEA - RAS  MOS 
 
F RUS 12/10/10 
2.20 Researcher, IEA - RAS; specialist on the North 
Caucasus  
MOS M MIN (i) 12/10/10 
2.21 Researcher, Institute of Geography, RAS  MOS 
 
F RUS 21/02/11 
2.22 Researcher, IEA - RAS; specialist on minority 
education  
MOS M RUS 22/02/11 
2.23 Researcher, IEA - RAS; specialist on minority 
education 
MOS M RUS 24/02/11 
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3. MEDIA 
 
Code  Respondent City M/F Ethnic 
group 
Interview 
date 
 
3.1 Journalist covering minority issues for the media in 
Karelia 
PETR 
 
F RUS 20/05/10 
3.2 Journalist at Radio Free Europe; professor of 
journalism; former representative of the Federal 
Tatar NCA 
KAZ M TAT 10/06/10 
3.3 Editor of the (Moksha-language) newspaper 
Moksha Pravda 
SAR M MOR 18/06/10 
3.4 Editor of the (Erzya-language) newspaper Erzya 
Pravda 
SAR M MOR 18/06/10 
3.5 Editor of the (Moksha-language) magazine Moskha  
 
SAR M MOR 18/06/10 
3.6 Editor of a Tatar-language newspaper in Saransk 
 
SAR F TAT 18/06/10 
3.7 Journalist for the journal Finno-Ugorskii Mir 
 
SAR M MIN (j) 18/06/10 
3.8 Broadcaster for a programme in Mordovian 
languages, 10
th
 channel  
SAR F MOR 21/06/10 
3.9 Journalist; director of a media freedom organisation 
  
MOS M RUS 21/02/11 
3.10 Journalist; representative of a media freedom NGO; 
member of the Russian Union of Journalists  
MOS F RUS 24/02/11 
3.11 Journalist, specialising in media ethics and diversity  STPB  F RUS 24/10/10 
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4. PUBLIC OFFICIAL 
 
Code  Respondent City M/F Ethnic 
group 
Interview 
date 
 
4.1 Responsible for programmes on Finno-Ugric 
peoples, Ministry on Nationality Policy, Karelia 
PETR F KAR 18/05/10 
4.2 Responsible for programme on indigenous peoples 
of Karelia, Ministry on Nationality Policy, Karelia  
PETR F MIN (c) 18/05/10 
4.3 Responsible for external relations (including 
minority issues), Office of Petrozavodsk Mayor  
PETR F TAT 18/05/10 
4.4 Main specialist on education, Ministry of 
Education, Karelia 
PETR F KAR 19/05/10 
4.5 Local MP, Lorskii Rayon, Murmansk  PETR 
 
F MIN (k) 20/05/10 
4.6 Public official at of the Tver administration TVER 
 
M TKAR 04/06/10 
4.7 Public official, city department on national (Tatar) 
education  
KAZ M TAT 09/06/10 
4.8 Representative of the Assembly of Peoples of 
Tatarstan  
KAZ M MIN (l) 10/06/10 
4.9 Advisor, Ministry of Culture; part-time journalist 
 
KAZ F TAT 12/06/10 
4.10 Representative of the Cabinet of Ministers, working 
on nationality issues  
KAZ M TAT 14/06/10 
4.11 Representative of the Committee on National 
Policy, government of the Republic of Mordovia  
SAR M MOR 17/06/10 
4.12 Representative of the Research Institute of 
Humanitarian Sciences, government of Mordovia  
SAR M MOR 21/06/10 
4.13 Manager of IEA - RAS, former high-ranking public 
official in the area of nationalities  
MOS M RUS 02/06/10 
4.14 Specialist on minority education (specialising in 
Roma), Russian Ministry of Education  
MOS F MIN 
(m) 
31/05/10 
4.15 Representative of the State Committee on 
Nationality Affairs, State Duma 
MOS M MOR 01/06/10 
4.16 Representative of the Russian Ministry of Regional 
Development  
MOS M RUS 23/06/10 
4.17 Representative of the Voronezh police department  
 
VOR F RUS 15/10/10 
4.18 MP, St Petersburg Legislative Assembly; working 
on relations with religious confessions  
STPB M RUS 25/10/10 
 
 
5. SCHOOL EMPLOYEE 
 
Code  Respondent City M/F Ethnic 
group 
Interview 
date 
 
5.1 Teacher, Finno-Ugric school PETR F KAR 19/05/10 
5.2 Director, Tatar Gymnasium  KAZ F TAT 15/06/10 
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6. JUDICIARY 
 
Code  Respondent City M/F Ethnic 
group 
Interview 
date 
 
6.1 Judge  
 
VOR F RUS 15/10/10 
6.2 Procurator STPB  
 
F RUS 26/10/10 
6.3 Judge STPB  
 
F RUS 26/10/10 
 
7. COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
 
Code  Respondent City M/F Ethnic 
group 
Interview 
date 
 
7.1 Council of Europe employee STR 
 
M N/A 09/04/10 
7.2 Council of Europe employee STR 
 
M N/A 13/04/10 
7.3 Council of Europe employee STR 
 
M N/A 14/04/10 
7.4 Council of Europe, external expert Other  
 
F N/A 20/09/10 
7.5 Council of Europe, external expert Other  
 
M N/A 21/09/10 
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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
 
Different questions were put to different respondents, depending on their 
professional specialisation. Numerous follow-up questions were also asked, 
which cannot all be reproduced here. 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
 
1. Are you familiar with international standards/mechanisms for minority 
protection?  
2. To what extent have you used/come across international mechanisms in 
your work? 
3. What impact have they had, if any? Give examples. 
4. If they have not been used, why? 
5. Has international involvement (Council of Europe/UN/OSCE) in minority 
rights issues in Russia led to any consequences (whether positive or 
negative)?  
6. What kind of support is needed from international organisations, if at all, for 
the promotion of the cultural rights of minorities in Russia? Why? 
7. To what extent are efforts made to ensure that federal and regional laws 
incorporate international standards? Are there plans of legal reform for 
greater compliance with international standards? 
8. How do the regional authorities use international standards, if at all, in their 
relations with the centre? 
9. How is the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities (FCNM) coordinated between the federal centre and 
the regions? 
10.  How do commitments made by the central authorities trickle down to the 
regions? 
11. How is information collected from the regions and incorporated into reports 
to Advisory Committee of the FCNM? 
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12. Is FCNM implementation evaluated? If yes, how? 
13. What efforts have been made towards ratification of the European Charter 
for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML)? Have these efforts 
facilitated ratification? Why? 
 
GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMES 
 
1. What projects have the authorities implemented to promote minorities’ 
cultural rights in your region? 
2. How effective are state policies (federal, regional and local) in promoting 
minorities’ cultural rights? Give examples. 
3. Has the impact of these programmes been assessed? If yes, how? 
4. What are the means used to incorporate cultural rights in the relevant 
government policies? What is your assessment of their effectiveness? 
5. How do public officials assess the needs of minorities in the cultural sphere? 
 
LANGUAGE 
 
1. How do you judge the teaching of, or through the medium of, 
[Karelian/Mordovian/Tatar] in your region? 
2. How were the current teaching programmes developed? (e.g. were they 
initiatiated  by the local/regional authorities, or minority groups?)  
3. Do parents tend to value bilingualism in their children? Have there been 
requests to increase/decrease the teaching of minority languages in your 
region? 
4. Has Law 309 modified teaching in your region? What future consequences, 
if any, do you expect? 
5. What have been the consequences of the introduction of Russian-only state 
examinations? 
6. To what extend is [Karelian/Mordovian/Tatar] used in the public sphere - in 
the administration and judiciary? 
7. What are the main hindrances to fluency in [Karelian/Mordovian/Tatar] in 
your region? 
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CULTURE 
 
1. What are the main difficulties affecting [minorities/your minority] in Russia 
in the preservation of [their/its] culture and language? 
2. Why do these difficulties exist? 
3. Do you think that cultural rights are important? What about [other] 
members of minority groups? Why? 
4. Have there been court cases in your region concerning cultural rights?  
5. What programmes exist, if any, to ensure cultural sensitivity among civil 
servants/law-enforcement officials? 
6. Do centralisation policies have an impact on cultures and diversity? If yes, 
in what way? Give examples. 
 
MEDIA 
 
1. How many media outlets operate in minority languages in your region? 
What is your opinion on their outputs? 
2. What is the role of minority media [in your region/in Russia]? 
3. What are the main problems affecting minority media [in your region/in 
Russia] (if any)?  
4. How are minorities portrayed in the mainstream media?  
5. What kind of programmes exist on minorities issues in the mainstream 
media? 
6. How are decisions made on programming for the state federal media? Are 
minority groups involved in decision-making? 
7. Do you believe that there are any nationalistic messages in the media 
(Russian or for other nationalities)? 
 
PARTICIPATION 
 
1. What measures exist at the local level [in yout region] for co-decision and 
participation?  
2. Have [you/minority groups] participated in devising [federal/local] policies 
for the promotion of minorities’ cultural rights?  
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3. What consultative bodies exist? How do they work? How effective are 
they? Why? 
4. What is the role of Public Chambers? Are they effective? 
5. What is your opinion on the mechanisms of election and representation 
employed in the Congresses of Peoples? 
6. Are NCAs effective and successful in representing minorities? Why?   
7. How are leaders of NCAs/minority associations appointed/nominated? Why 
was this particular system chosen? 
8. Why do NCAs register as NCAs rather than NGOs? (and vice versa) 
9. Do you think that additional mechanisms for participation are needed at all? 
If yes, which ones? 
10. Can you give concrete examples of minorities either having an impact of 
decision-making, or being excluded from it? 
11. Do the authorities involve minorities/NGOs in processes towards the 
implementation of international standards? (e.g. preparation of the reports to 
the FCNM). How effective is this type of participation? 
12. How do leaders of minority groups communicate with their fellow minority 
members to ensure that they effectively represent them and their interests?  
13. In your opinion, is there favouritism by the authorities of certain 
organisations over others?  Do you have examples? 
14. [For NGOs/NCAs] Have you had problems registering, or do you know of 
organisations that have had such problems? 
 
JUDICIARY 
 
1. What are possible difficulties for judges in applying international law in 
Russian courts? Why? 
2. What do judges do in case of conflict between Russian law and 
international law? Why? 
3. Are you aware of minority issues and cultural rights being raised in court? 
4. What role can courts have in advancing human and minority rights? 
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FUNDING 
 
1. How are state funds allocated to minority organisations for programmes 
promoting minority cultures and languages?  
2. How is federal funding allocated to the regions for programmes promoting 
minority cultures and languages? 
3. Do you believe that the funds earmarked for minority programmes are 
used effectively? 
4. Do minority associations have sufficient funds, and can they decide how to 
spend them?  
5. Are there any restrictions on funding from foreign funding bodies? If yes, 
how does it affect minority organisations? 
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